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  • FinCEN Deputy Director: Industry Collaboration Key to Finalizing Customer Due Diligence Rule

    Consumer Finance

    On May 16, FinCEN Deputy Director Jamal El-Hindi delivered remarks at the Institute of International Bankers (IIB) Annual Anti-Money Laundering Seminar in New York. The focal point of El-Hindi’s remarks were recent Treasury initiatives, including, (i) the final Customer Due Diligence (CDD) rule; (ii) draft beneficial ownership legislation; and (iii) FinCEN’s use of Geographical Targeting Orders, as addressed in the beneficial ownership draft legislation. The remarks provide an overarching summary of Treasury’s recent regulatory efforts and address the process by which Treasury developed the final CDD rule and the draft beneficial ownership legislation, specifically commenting on and emphasizing FinCEN’s collaborative rulemaking efforts with industry: “I encourage you to keep our conversation going—particularly with respect to support for the beneficial ownership legislation. . . .Please know that FinCEN depends on you, the institutions you represent, and the key feedback and financial intelligence they provide.”

    FinCEN Agency Rule-Making & Guidance Customer Due Diligence CDD Rule

  • CSBS and Multi-State Mortgage Committee Report on 2015 Supervisory Efforts

    Lending

    The Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) and the Multi-State Mortgage Committee (MMC) issued a report to state regulators regarding its 2015 review of the supervisory structure around examination and risk assessment of non-bank mortgage loan servicers. Notable servicing examination findings outlined in the report include: (i) violations and deficiencies related to loan transfer activity, noting that a “significant portion of servicing examination findings are tied to the mortgage servicing requirements implemented into the [RESPA] and [TILA] in January of 2014”; (ii) ineffective oversight of sub-servicer activity and insufficient third party vendor management; and (iii) ineffective examination management procedures on the part of mortgage servicers, leading to delayed examination processes, as well as impeded regulatory oversight. The report further outlines origination examination findings, emphasizing RESPA violations related to Mortgage Servicing Agreements (MSAs) which typically include payments for promotional advertising services performed on behalf of the mortgage company. According to the MMC, MSA-related violations carry high risk. Additional MMC 2015 observations outlined in the report include, but are not limited to, the following: (i) state license engagement of third party providers overseen by federal regulators resulted in an increase of state/federal communications and information sharing, fostering a stronger regulatory framework; (ii) lapses in loan originator education may lead to significant deficiencies at the company level; (iii) whistleblower information provided to the MMC in 2015 played a large role in uncovering prohibited activity; and (iv) technological systems with incorrect programming continue to cause lenders to charge borrowers statutorily prohibited fees. Finally, the report briefly touches on the CSBS’ and the NMLS’s Mortgage Call Report Analytics Tool – designed to provide detailed information about the loan portfolio and financial condition of a company – and the State Coordinating Committee’s coordinated efforts with the CFPB to include the development of the Coordinated Examination Guidance tool, which is intended to provide “suggested best practices for coordinated examinations and a step-by-step listing of action items to be completed during a coordinated examination.”

    Examination TILA Mortgage Servicing RESPA CSBS Vendor Management

  • CSBS Publishes Annual Report

    Privacy, Cyber Risk & Data Security

    Recently, the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) published its 2015 Annual Report to provide an overview of its activities and initiatives in 2015. The report highlights that, throughout 2015, state regulators (i) increased coordination and collaboration between state regulators and other stakeholders, including federal regulators and Congress; (ii) developed research and analytical tools, such as risk profiling tools to assist with the examination selection process, as well as tools to address emerging non-depository regulatory issues; (iii) developed “right-sized” policy solutions for an ever-changing financial services industry, acknowledging that “community banks play a vital and necessary role in [the] diverse financial services ecosystem”; and (iv) provided education and training for examiners and supervisors, noting that “more than 1,000 examiners from 43 agencies representing 41 states had been certified through the CSBS Certification Program.” Importantly, the report notes that cybersecurity remains a “major issue facing the financial services industry.” In an effort to encourage executive leadership and raise awareness, CSBS launched the Executive Leadership of Cybersecurity (ELOC) initiative, which emphasizes that cybersecurity is “more than a ‘back office’ issue, but an executive issue that requires CEO and Board level attention.”

    Examination Privacy/Cyber Risk & Data Security

  • Nebraska AG Peterson and Department of Banking Announce Settlement with Loan Companies for Alleged Deceptive Practices

    Consumer Finance

    Recently, Nebraska AG Doug Peterson, in conjunction with the Director of the Department of Banking and Finance, Mark Quandahl, announced a settlement with four loan companies and their owners for alleged violations of three state laws, the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices (UDTPA), and the Nebraska Installment Loan Act (NILA). According to AG Peterson, three of the companies “managed and facilitated almost every aspect” of the fourth company’s business. The complaint alleged that the fourth company acted as an unlicensed lender to originate usury-based internet loans to Nebraska consumers by way of electronic transfer. In violation of the CPA and the UDTPA, AG Peterson alleged that the fourth company’s loan agreements deceptively stated that it was a “tribal entity subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, Cheyenne River Indian Reservation” when it was not; rather, according to the complaint, it is a limited liability company whose profits were distributed directly to its owner. Pursuant to the Department of Banking and Finance’s authority to enforce the NILA, Director Quandahl alleged that the defendants “charged loan origination fees in excess of the state’s maximum origination fee permitted for installment loan licensees and non-licensed lenders.” Under the terms of the settlement, the companies and their owners will pay $150,000 to the state and establish a restitution fund of $950,000 to repay, pro rata, excess interest and fees paid by Nebraska consumers. In addition, more than $557,000 in loans taken out by Nebraska consumers and held by one of the four companies will be forgiven, and credit reporting agencies will be notified to remove the history of the loans. The companies and their owners are prohibited from originating loans in Nebraska until they comply with state law.

    State Attorney General Online Lending Usury

  • Supreme Court: Special Counsel Using State AG Letterhead Not in Violation of FDCPA

    Consumer Finance

    On May 16, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit’s ruling that special counsel using Ohio AG letterhead to collect debts owed to the state is false or misleading in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §1692. Sheriff v. Gillie, No. 15-338 (U.S. May 16, 2016). In a unanimous 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, the Court opined that its “conclusion is bolstered by the character of the relationship between special counsel and the [AG].” Specifically, the Court determined that, because special counsel acts on behalf of the AG to provide legal services to state clients, a “debtor’s impression that a letter from special counsel is a letter from the [AG’s] Office is scarcely inaccurate.” The Court further opined that, being required by the AG’s office to send debt collection communications, special counsel “create no false impression in doing just what they have been instructed to do.” The Court rejects the Sixth Circuit’s argument that consumers may have concern regarding the letters’ authenticity: "[t]o the extent that consumers may be concerned that the letters are a ‘scam,’ the solution is for special counsel to say more, not less, about their role as agents of the [AG]. Special counsel’s use of the [AG’s] letterhead, furthermore, encourages consumers to use official channels to ensure the legitimacy of the letters, assuaging the very concern the Sixth Circuit identified.” The Court concludes by emphasizing the AG’s authority, as the top law enforcement official, to take punitive action against consumers who owe debts, commenting that §1692e of the FDCPA prohibits collectors from deceiving or misleading consumers, but “it does not protect consumers from fearing the actual consequences of their debts.”

    The Court’s opinion does not address the question of whether or not special counsel rank as “state officers” within the meaning of the FDCPA, noting that even if it were to assume as much, arguendo, special counsel’s use of AG letterhead does not offend § 1692e. The Supreme Court remanded the issues surrounding §1692e back to the Sixth Circuit for further consideration.

    FDCPA U.S. Supreme Court State Attorney General Debt Collection

  • New York Court of Appeals Rules on Lien Priority in Consolidated Mortgages Case

    Lending

    On May 10, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision that consolidated mortgages qualify as the first mortgage of record under Real Property Law article 9-B (the Condominium Act) when the mortgages were consolidated years prior to unpaid common charges (or charges lien) being filed. Plotch v. Citibank, N.A., No. 57, slip op. at 3 (N.Y. May 10, 2016). In this case, the plaintiff purchased a condominium unit subject to “‘[t]he first Mortgage of record against the premises’” in a foreclosure action in 2010. Prior to the plaintiff’s purchase, the defendant had entered into a consolidation agreement with the unit’s previous owner, whereby the former owner’s two separate mortgages of $54,000 and $38,000 “were consolidated ‘into a single mortgage lien’ for $92,000, which the owner and [defendant] intended to be treated as a single mortgage.” Citing Societe General v. Charles & Co. Acquisition (157 Misc 2d 643 [Sup. Ct., NY County 1993]), the plaintiff contended that the initial mortgage of $54,000 is, pursuant to Real Property Law § 339-z, the first mortgage of record and, therefore, the defendant’s common charges lien against the unit for unpaid charges are unlawful. Specifically, the plaintiff declared that “the second mortgage for $38,000 held by [the defendant] was subordinate to the subsequently recorded common charges lien under Real Property Law § 339-z and was therefore extinguished by the condominium board’s successful foreclosure action.” The defendant, however, cited various cases since Societe General in which lower courts have held that a consolidation agreement recorded prior to common charges lien being filed qualify as the first mortgage under Real Property Law § 339-z. The court held for the defendant bank because (i) there was no intervening lien at the time of consolidation; and (ii) the charges lien were filed years after the defendant filed common charges lien.

    Foreclosure

  • Supreme Court Holds "Arising Under" Standard Satisfies Jurisdictional Questions

    Consumer Finance

    In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Kagan on May 16, the Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit’s ruling that the “jurisdictional test established by §27 [of the Exchange Act] is the same as [28 U.S.C.] §1331’s test for deciding if a case ‘arises under’ a federal law.” Merrill Lynch v. Manning, No. 14-1132 (U.S. May 16, 2016). In this case, the defendant, an investment bank, removed plaintiff’s case against the bank for its short sale practices to Federal District Court. The bank asserted that plaintiff’s claims, which referred explicitly to the SEC’s Regulation SHO in “describing the purposes of that rule and cataloguing past accusations against [the bank] for flouting its requirements,” were within federal jurisdiction on the following two grounds: (i) 28 U.S.C. §1331 grants district courts jurisdiction of “all civil actions arising under federal law”; and (ii) §27 of the Exchange Act “grants federal courts exclusive jurisdiction of ‘all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce liability or duty created by [the Exchange Act] or the rules or regulations thereunder.’” The plaintiff, in seeking remand of the case back to state court, argued that neither 28 U.S.C. §1331 nor §27 of the Exchange Act granted federal court the authority to adjudicate his claims which were brought under state law – specifically, the New Jersey Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), New Jersey Criminal Code, and New Jersey Uniform Securities Law, as well as New Jersey common law of negligence, unjust enrichment, and interference with contractual relations. The Supreme Court’s opinion relies heavily on the natural reading of §27: “Like the Third Circuit, we read §27 as conferring exclusive federal jurisdiction of the same suits as ‘aris[e] under’ the Exchange Act pursuant to the general federal question statute.” The Court concluded that because the plaintiff’s claims were brought under state law and merely referenced Regulation SHO, the Federal District Court did not have jurisdiction and the case was remanded to state court.

    U.S. Supreme Court Short Sale

  • Monaco-Based Company Alleges Extortion Following Media Reports of Mass Bribery

    Federal Issues

    On May 16, a Monaco-based industrial solutions company released a statement denying claims made in a media report that linked the company to allegations of bribing foreign government officials to secure contracts within the oil and gas industry. The company stated it has “been the victim of a four-month extortion attempt by criminals,” and that it is currently engaged with UK authorities.

    Separately, an Amsterdam-based oil services company disclosed in a May 11 S-3 filing that it has been subject of DOJ questioning in relation to the investigation of the Monaco-based industrial solutions company. The company stated that it is cooperating with the DOJ’s inquiries. The Amsterdam-based company is the third company to disclose DOJ inquires as a result of the investigation surrounding the Monaco-based company and the companies that used its services. For additional coverage on the investigations, visit BuckleySandler’s FCPA Scorecard website.

    DOJ

  • Swiss Extradite Final FIFA Official Arrested in May 2015 Sweep

    Federal Issues

    On May 18, former President of the Nicaraguan Football Federal Julio Rocha was extradited from Switzerland to the United States. He was the final FIFA official to be extradited following the arrests made in Zurich in May 2015, according to the Swiss Federal Office of Justice, which has handled the extradition proceedings over the past year. Mr. Rocha was indicted by the DOJ in May 2015 along with 13 other FIFA officials.

    DOJ

  • Special Alert: SCOTUS Vacates Ninth Circuit Decision in Case Alleging Procedural FCRA Violations

    Consumer Finance

    On May 16, the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion vacating the Ninth Circuit’s 2014 ruling that a plaintiff had standing under Article III of the Constitution to sue an alleged consumer reporting agency as defined by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), for alleged procedural violations of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C § 1681 et seq. Spokeo v. Robins, No. 13-1339 (U.S. May 16, 2016). According to plaintiff Thomas Robins, the reporting agency violated his individualized (rather than collective) statutory rights by reporting inaccurate credit information regarding Robins’s wealth, job status, graduate degree, and marital status in willful noncompliance with certain FCRA requirements. In a 6-2 opinion delivered by Justice Alito, the Court ruled that Robins could not establish standing by alleging a bare procedural violation because Article III requires a concrete injury even in the context of statutory violation. Here, the Ninth Circuit erred in failing to consider separately both the “concrete and particularized” aspects of the injury-in-fact component of standing. The Court opined that the Ninth Circuit’s analysis was incomplete:

     

    [T]he injury-in-fact requirement requires a plaintiff to allege an injury that is both “concrete and particularized.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-181 (2000) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit’s analysis focused on the second characteristic (particularity), but it overlooked the first (concreteness). We therefore…remand for the Ninth Circuit to consider both aspects of the injury-in-fact requirement.

     

    Relying on case law, the Court emphasized that the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of Article III’s standing to sue relies on the plaintiff demonstrating (i) an injury-in-fact; (ii) that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant; and (iii) that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S., 560-561 (U.S. June 12, 1992); Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S., at 180-181. Spokeo primarily revolves around the first element, establishing an injury-in-fact. Again relying on Lujan, the Court reasoned that to establish injury-in-fact, the plaintiff must “show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Lujan, at 560. According to the Court, the Ninth Circuit’s discussion of Robins’s standing to sue, and in particular its discussion of whether Robins had articulated an individualized statutory right rather than a collective right, concerned only the particularization element of establishing an injury-in-fact. The Court stated that the Ninth Circuit’s standing analysis was incomplete because it had failed to consider whether the “concreteness” requirement for an injury-in-fact—whether Robins had a “real” and “not abstract” injury—also had been satisfied. While the Court did make clear that a concrete injury could be intangible and that Congress may identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article III requirements, it noted that “Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible harms does not mean that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.”

    The Court noted that because the Ninth Circuit had not fully distinguished concreteness from particularization, it had failed to consider whether the reporting agency’s procedural violations of the FCRA constituted a sufficient degree of risk to Robins to meet the concreteness standard. The Court observed that while a procedural violation of the FCRA may, in some cases, be sufficient to establish a concrete injury-in-fact, not all inaccuracies in consumer information, i.e. an incorrect zip code, cause harm or a material risk of harm. Further, because “Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation” the Court explained that “Robins cannot satisfy the demands of Article III by alleging a bare procedural violation.”

    The Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s judgment, and remanded the case for the Ninth Circuit to consider both aspects of the injury-in-fact requirement.

     

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    Questions regarding the matters discussed in this Alert may be directed to any of our lawyers listed below, or to any other BuckleySandler attorney with whom you have consulted in the past.

     

     

    FCRA U.S. Supreme Court Spokeo Appellate Ninth Circuit

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