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  • FinCEN Issues Five Rulings On Application Of BSA Regulations To Certain Activities

    Fintech

    On April 29, FinCEN issued five rulings in response to companies who sought clarification regarding whether their company is a money service business under the BSA. In FIN-2014-R006, FinCEN determined that a company that operates an online real-time deposit, settlement, and payment services platform for banks, businesses, and consumers is considered a money transmitter, not a provider of prepaid access, and should be registered as a money services business under BSA regulations. In two other rulings—FIN-2014-R004 and FIN-2014-R005— FinCEN clarified the exemption from the money transmitter definition for persons that accept and transmit funds “only integral to the sale of goods or the provision of services, other than money transmission services.” FinCEN determined that the escrow services at issue in FIN-2014-R004 and the transaction management services at issue in FIN-2014-R005 fit within that exemption because the acceptance and transmission of funds in these cases is not a separate and discrete service in addition to the underlying service, but instead is a necessary and integral part of the service itself. Therefore, these companies are not considered to be money transmitters subject to registration. FinCEN determined in FIN-2014-R007 that a company that rents computer systems used to mine virtual currencies is not a money transmitter. Finally, in FIN-2014-R008, FinCEN determined that although the company, which uses armored cars to facilitate the exchange of coins and cash, does not qualify for the “armored car” exemption in the money transmitter definition, it is still not considered a money transmitter. FinCEN stated that the transportation of currency and/or coin of certain denominations from the company’s vault to the customer’s location and the return transportation of currency and/or coin in the exact amount of the change provided to the company’s own vault does not constitute the acceptance of value from one person and the transportation of such value to another person or location.

    FinCEN Bank Secrecy Act Money Service / Money Transmitters Escrow Virtual Currency

  • New York Targets Online Lenders Through Debit Card Networks

    Fintech

    On April 30, the New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS) again expanded the scope of its activities targeting online payday lenders by announcing that two major debit card network operators agreed to halt the processing of payday loan deductions from bank accounts owned by New York consumers who allegedly obtained illegal online payday loans. The DFS asserts that in response to increased regulatory pressure on online lenders’ use of the ACH network—known as Operation Choke Point—those lenders are using debit card transactions to collect on payday loans originated online to New York residents. The DFS believes such loans violate the state’s usury laws. The DFS also sent cease-and-desist letters to 20 companies it believes are “illegally promoting, making, or collecting on payday loans to New York consumers.” The DFS’s assault on online lenders publicly began in February 2013 when it warned third-party debt collectors about collecting on allegedly illegal payday loans, and was first expanded in August 2013 when the DFS sent letters to 35 online lenders, including lenders affiliated with Native American Tribes, demanding that they cease and desist offering allegedly illegal payday loans to New York borrowers. At the same time, the DFS asked banks and NACHA to limit such lenders’ access to the payment system. DFS subsequently expanded its effort in December 2013 when it began targeting payday loan lead generation companies.

    Payday Lending Debt Collection Debit Cards Online Lending NYDFS

  • New York Court System Proposes Consumer Debt Collection Reforms

    Consumer Finance

    On April 30, the New York Unified Court System proposed new rules for consumer credit collection cases. If adopted, the rules would (i) require creditors to submit affidavits based on personal knowledge that meet the substantive and evidentiary standards for entry of default judgments under state law; (ii) expand to all state courts an existing requirement applicable to cases in New York City courts that an additional notice of a consumer credit action be mailed to debtors; and (iii) provide unrepresented debtors with additional resources and assistance. The proposal attaches copies of the potential affidavits, which the court system states are necessary to address so-called “robosigning.” Last October, New York State Department of Financial Services Superintendent Benjamin Lawsky urged these and other changes as part of the court’s initial public comment period. Comments on the proposal are due May 30, 2014.

    Debt Collection

  • C.D. Cal. Limits Scope Of RESPA Kickback Safe Harbor For "Services Actually Performed"

    Lending

    On April 29, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California held that RESPA’s preclusion of liability for otherwise illegal kickbacks based on “services actually performed” relates only to “settlement services” as defined in RESPA, and not to some broader set of services. Henson v. Fidelity Nat’l Fin. Inc., No. 14-cv-01240, 2014 WL 1682005 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2014). Last month in the same case, the court held that the overnight delivery services provided by certain delivery companies to a parent company of various escrow companies were “settlement services” under RESPA and concluded that the borrowers had pleaded facts sufficient to establish that the defendant parent company may have violated RESPA by accepting marketing fees from certain delivery companies in exchange for “referring”—via its escrow subsidiaries—overnight delivery business to those delivery companies. The defendant then moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that its subsidiary performed actual services in exchange for the marketing fees it received from the delivery companies, and therefore was not liable under RESPA. The court held that although the relevant RESPA section uses only the general term “services” and not the specific phrase “settlement services” used elsewhere in the statue, “Congress would have vitiated RESPA’s purposes by permitting kickbacks as long as the recipient performed any service—even if the service bore no relationship to a real-estate settlement.” The court held that Congress clearly intended to provide a safe harbor only with regard to “settlement services.” In this case, the court held that issues of fact persist as to whether the services performed were settlement services and denied the motion for judgment on the pleadings.

    Mortgage Origination RESPA Escrow

  • Treasury Implements Additional Russia Sanctions

    Consumer Finance

    On April 28, the Treasury Department announced additional sanctions in response to developments in Ukraine by designating seven Russian government officials and 17 entities, including numerous financial institutions, pursuant to Executive Order 13661. That order authorizes sanctions on, among others, officials of the Russian Government and any individual or entity that is owned or controlled by, that has acted for or on behalf of, or that has provided material or other support to, a senior Russian government official. The designated individuals will be subject to an asset freeze and a U.S. visa ban, and the companies will be subject to an asset freeze. In addition, the Department of Commerce imposed additional restrictions on 13 of the companies by imposing a license requirement with a presumption of denial for the export, re-export or other foreign transfer of U.S.-origin items to the companies. Further, the Departments of Commerce and State tightened review of export license applications for any high-technology items that could contribute to Russia’s military capabilities, and plan to revoke any existing export licenses that meet the tightened conditions.

    Department of Treasury Sanctions OFAC Russia Ukraine

  • Georgia Carves Overdraft, Other Fees Out Of Usury Limit Applicable To State Banks

    State Issues

    On April 15, Georgia Governor Nathan Deal signed HB 824, which amends state law to clarify that certain banking fees are not “interest” subject to the state’s usury cap applicable to state-chartered institutions. Specifically, the bill carves out from the definition of “interest” the following: overdraft and nonsufficient funds, delinquency or default charges, returned payment charges, stop payment charges, or automated teller machine charges, and any other charge agreed upon in a written agreement governing a deposit, share, or other account. The legislation was crafted to codify and expand a declaratory order issued by the state banking commissioner following a March 2013 Georgia Court of Appeals holding that Georgia law in some situations could allow overdraft fees to be considered interest. Plaintiffs in the case had sued a state bank claiming that its overdraft fees amounted to an interest rate that far exceeded the state’s usury cap. The changes made by HB 824 took effect immediately.

    Overdraft Usury

  • California Appeals Court Holds Judgment Creditor's Forbearance Fees Not Subject To State Usury Law

    Consumer Finance

    On April 25, the California Court of Appeal, First District, held that California’s usury law does not prohibit a judgment creditor from accepting a forbearance fee to delay collecting on a judgment. Bisno v. Kahn, No. A133537, 2014 WL 1647660 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2014). In consolidated cases, the judgment creditors agreed to delay executing on their judgments in exchange for the payment of forbearance fees in addition to statutory post-judgment interest on the unpaid balance of the judgments. The judgment debtors subsequently claimed the forbearance fees are usurious and sought treble damages against the creditors. The court held that because the state’s usury law does not expressly prohibit a party from entering into an agreement to forbear collecting on a judgment, usury liability does not extend to judgment creditors who receive remuneration beyond the statutory interest rate in exchange for a delay in enforcing a judgment. The court added that a forbearance agreement is a contract between the judgment creditor and the judgment debtor that is separate from the judgment to which it applies, and therefore must be enforced in a separate contract action and is subject to standard contractual defenses such as duress and unconscionability.

    Foreclosure Debt Collection

  • New York AG Action Targets Out-Of-State Retail Installment Obligation Finance Companies

    Consumer Finance

    On April 30, New York Attorney General (AG) Eric Schneiderman announced that four out-of-state companies alleged to have financed retail installment obligations (RIOs) at rates in excess of the state’s usury cap agreed to recast the RIOs at a rate of not more than 16% and provide repayment or credits to impacted New York consumers. The settlements are the latest in a series of actions in New York targeting out-of-state or online lenders and finance companies that make loans in New York without obtaining a license to operate in that state.

    The companies financed elective medical and surgical procedures through RIOs offered by medical providers to patients, an activity the AG believes required the companies to obtain a state license to operate as sales finance companies or lenders. The AG’s Health Care Bureau initiated the investigation after it received complaints about an online lead generation site. As described in the AG’s release, that lead generator requested information regarding a consumer’s employment and credit history, automatically set the APR and RIO repayment terms, and submitted the completed application to sales finance companies. The AG explains that once a finance company agreed to purchase the RIO, the medical provider and the patient both signed a financing agreement that the medical provider immediately assigned to the finance company. The finance company then transferred the funds to the medical provider who agreed to accept less than their usual and customary fees in exchange for upfront payments from the finance company. The patient, however, would be required to repay to the financier full fees plus interest, which in this case allegedly exceeded the statutory usury cap, up to 55% in some instances. State law restricts unlicensed lenders to charging an APR of up to 16%, and establishes criminal penalties for unlicensed lenders that charge interest at a rate exceeding 25% APR.

    In addition to revising existing loans and providing approximately $230,000 in remediation to 317 consumers, the agreements require the companies to (i) collectively pay $35,000 in penalties; (ii) cease all conduct as unlicensed sales finance companies in New York; and (iii) notify any consumer reporting agencies to which they gave consumer information to delete all references to the transactions from customers’ credit records. The agreements do not include any criminal penalties.

    In addition to extending the state’s licensing enforcement focus, this is at least the second financial services case initiated in recent months by the AG’s Health Care Bureau. In June 2013, the AG announced a settlement with a credit card issuer related to alleged illegal deferred interest products offered through medical provider offices.

    State Attorney General Enforcement Installment Loans Licensing

  • Special Alert: CFPB Proposes Amendments To Mortgage Rules

    Lending

    On April 30, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB or Bureau) proposed targeted amendments to the Dodd-Frank Act mortgage rules that took effect in January 2014. Comments are due 30 days after publication of the proposal in the Federal Register.

    Ability-to-Repay/Qualified Mortgage

    • Points and fees cure. The CFPB proposed a post-consummation cure mechanism for loans that are originated with the good faith expectation of qualified mortgage (QM) status but exceed the points and fees limit for QMs. Specifically, the Bureau’s proposal would allow the loan to retain QM status if the excess points and fees are refunded to the borrower within 120 days after consummation by the creditor or assignee.

      In proposing this amendment, the Bureau acknowledged that “[t]he calculation of points and fees is complex and can involve the exercise of judgment that may lead to inadvertent errors.” The Bureau further acknowledged that “some creditors may not originate, and some secondary market participants may not purchase, mortgage loans that are near the [QM] limits on points and fees because of concern that the limits may be inadvertently exceeded at the time of consummation.” As a result, creditors seeking to originate QMs may establish buffers to avoid exceeding the points and fees limit and “refuse to extend mortgage credit to consumers whose loans would exceed the buffer threshold, either due to the creditors’ concerns about the potential liability attending loans originated under the general ability-to-repay standard or the risk of repurchase demands from the secondary market if the qualified mortgage points and fees limit is later found to have been exceeded.” The Bureau expressed concern that such buffers would negatively affect the cost and availability of credit.

    • Debt-to-income cure. The Bureau did not propose a cure for loans that inadvertently exceed the 43% debt-to-income ratio (DTI) requirement for QMs made under Appendix Q. The Bureau did, however, request comment on the question, noting concerns that creditors may establish DTI buffers that would affect access to credit. For a DTI cure provision to be considered, the Bureau stated that “creditors would need to maintain and follow policies and procedures of post-consummation review of loans to restructure them and refund amounts as necessary to bring the debt-to-income ratio within the 43-percent limit.” However, the Bureau expressed skepticism that creditors could realistically meet such a requirement.

      The Bureau stated that it would also consider allowing creditors or assignees to correct DTI overages that result solely from errors in documentation of debt or income. However, the Bureau expressed concern that such a process might lead to post-consummation underwriting and requested comment on “whether or how a debt-to-income cure or correction provision might be exploited by unscrupulous creditors to undermine consumer protections and undercut incentives for strict compliance efforts by creditors or assignees.”

    • Non-profit small creditor exemption. The CFPB proposed to amend the exemption for non-profit lenders that make 200 or fewer dwelling-secured loans in a year to exclude from that limit certain interest-free, contingent subordinate liens commonly offered by affordable homeownership programs.
    • Other small creditor exemptions. The Bureau requested feedback and data from smaller creditors regarding the 500 loan limit on first lien mortgages for “small creditor” status, the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act mortgage rules by small creditors, and how small creditors’ origination activities have changed in light of the new rules.

    Mortgage Servicing

    • Non-profit small servicer exemption. The CFPB proposed to provide an alternative definition of “small servicer,” that would apply to certain non-profit entities that service for a fee loans on behalf of other non-profit chapters of the same organization that do not fall within the Bank Holding Company Act definition of “affiliate.” Adoption of the proposal would exempt these entities would be exempt from the Regulation Z periodic statement requirements as well as certain provisions in Regulation X regarding force-placed insurance, servicing policies and procedures, and loss mitigation.

    Additional Amendments

    The CFPB also stated that it expects to issue additional proposals to address other topics relating to the Dodd-Frank Act mortgage rules, including the definition of “rural and underserved” for purposes of certain mortgage provisions affecting small creditors.

     

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    Questions regarding the matters discussed in the Alert may be directed to any of our lawyers listed below, or to any other BuckleySandler attorney with whom you have consulted in the past.

     

    CFPB Mortgage Origination Mortgage Servicing Qualified Mortgage Ability To Repay Loss Mitigation

  • Special Alert: Supreme Court To Hear TILA Rescission Case

    Lending

    On April 28, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 13-684, an appeal of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s September 2013 holding that a borrower seeking to rescind a loan transaction under TILA must file suit within three years of consummating the loan, and that written notice within the three-year rescission period is insufficient to preserve a borrower’s right of rescission.

    TILA Section 1635 grants borrowers the right to rescind a transaction “by notifying the creditor” and provides that a borrower’s “right of rescission shall expire three years after the date of consummation of the transaction" even if the "disclosures required . . . have not been delivered.” In Jesinoski, the Eighth Circuit cited its July 2013 holding in Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. Jul. 12, 2013), in which the court reasoned that the text of the statute, as explicated by the Supreme Court in Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank, 523 U.S. 410 (1998), established a strict limit on the time for filing suits for rescission. The Eighth Circuit expressly rejected an argument presented in an amicus brief filed by the CFPB that the lender, rather than the obligor, should be required to file suit to prevent rescission. To adopt the CFPB’s position, the court explained, “would create a situation wherein rescission is complete, in effect, simply upon notice from the borrower, whether or not the borrower had a valid basis for such a remedy. Under this scenario, the bank’s security interest would be unilaterally impaired, casting a cloud on the property’s title, an approach envisioned and rejected by Beach.”

    In holding in favor of the lender, the Eighth Circuit joined the majority of the circuit courts that have addressed the issue—the First, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits all previously have held that a borrower must file suit within the three-year rescission period, while the Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that written notice is sufficient to preserve a borrower’s statutory right of rescission. BuckleySandler filed an amicus brief in Keiran on behalf of a group of industry trade groups, as it has done in three other circuit court cases on this issue.

    The Supreme Court now may resolve this circuit split. Like the prior circuit court cases, the Supreme Court’s review of the issue likely will draw attention and briefs from lenders, the CFPB, and consumer groups.

    CFPB TILA U.S. Supreme Court

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