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D.C. enacts law extending obligations for debt collection, credit reporting, mortgage servicing, and evictions during the Covid-19 pandemic
On August 19, the mayor of D.C. signed the Coronavirus Support Second Congressional Review Emergency Act of 2020. The act extends the provisions of D.C.’s prior Covid-19 relief act (previously covered here), which was set to expire after 90 days, until November 16. Among other things, the act includes consumer protection provisions, including provisions regarding debt collection and credit reporting. It also provides housing and tenant protections, including in the areas of mortgage relief, restrictions on evictions, and foreclosures.
Senators question FHFA on adverse market refinance fee
On August 19, a group of Democratic Senators wrote to FHFA Director Mark Calabria expressing concern over the newly announced adverse market refinance fee of 50 basis points, or 0.5 percent, on certain refinance mortgages (covered by InfoBytes here). The letter acknowledges that throughout the Covid-19 pandemic, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (GSEs) “have adopted policies to ease purchase and most refinance transactions,” to assist homeowners. However, the new refinance fee “that will be implemented just three weeks after it was announced” was a “surprise to see,” according to the letter. The senators stress that the new fee “will shift more of a financial burden to consumers,” which would contradict the GSEs’ purpose of providing stability in the secondary mortgage market.
The letter follows an August 14 letter from the Chair of the Senate Banking Committee, Mike Crapo (R-ID), which expresses similar concern for consumers but also notes that the short window before the effective date can complicate the refinance process for current buyers and negatively impact community lenders who already have closed loans that cannot be delivered before September 1.
Both letters request Calabria provide more information on the policy change, including details regarding the market conditions that would be addressed by the fee and how the fee amount was determined.
No enforcement action against investment advisor in first FCPA advisory opinion in six years
On August 14, the DOJ issued an FCPA Opinion Procedure Release concluding that a U.S. financial institution’s proposed payment to a foreign government-linked investment bank would not result in an enforcement action. This is the first FCPA advisory opinion issued since 2014. According to the opinion, a U.S.-based multinational financial institution (Requestor) asked the DOJ for guidance on whether its planned conduct would conform with the DOJ’s enforcement policy regarding the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions. The Requestor explained that it intended to pay a $237,500 fee to a foreign subsidiary of a foreign investment bank that was majority owned by a foreign government, as “compensation for services the [foreign subsidiary] provided during a two-year period in which Requestor sought to and ultimately did acquire a portfolio of assets” from a different foreign subsidiary of the same investment bank. The fee represented 0.5 percent of the face value of the assets, and was intended to compensate the foreign subsidiary for “certain enumerated analytical and advisory tasks it had performed on Requestor’s behalf.”
In response to the request, the DOJ stated that it did not presently intend to take any enforcement action if the fee payment was made, noting that there is “no information evincing a corrupt intent to offer, promise, or pay anything of value to a ‘foreign official.’” For the purposes of review, the DOJ assumed that the foreign subsidiary receiving payment is “an instrumentality of a foreign government” and its employees are considered “foreign officials” as defined by the FCPA. With those assumptions, the DOJ concluded that the facts “do not reflect a corrupt intent to influence a foreign official,” because (i) the payment would be to an office, not an individual; (ii) there was no indication the payment would be diverted to an individual and there were no representations of “corrupt offers, promises, or payments of anything of value”; and (iii) the fee was commercially reasonable in response to “specific, legitimate services.”
Texas State Securities Board halts cryptocurrency debit card investment scheme
On August 14, the Texas State Securities Board issued a cease and desist order against three South African companies and an officer of the companies (collectively, “defendants”) accused of violating the state’s securities act by engaging in an international cryptocurrency debit card scheme. The defendants allegedly solicited Texas residents to make investments that promised guaranteed gains based on the number of cardholders that eventually signed up for the cryptocurrency debit card. The cryptocurrency debit card was promoted as a prepaid Mastercard that would allow cardholders to use various types of stablecoins to avoid certain taxable events. However, the defendants allegedly intentionally failed to disclose the risks associated with the use of stablecoins (e.g. stablecoin transactions are not reversible and “a party sending stablecoins to an address accepts the risk that the party may lose access to, or any claim on, the stablecoins”), nor did they disclose that legislation and regulations may negatively impact the taxation of cryptocurrencies. Additionally, the order states that the defendants concealed business information about their relationships, contracts, compensation, and the use of the funds, and that because they are not registered as dealers or agents with the Texas State Securities Board, they cannot sell their investment products in Texas.
9th Circuit: No bona fide error defense when relying on creditor to provide information
On August 17, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a summary judgment ruling in favor of a debt collector (defendant) accused of violating the FDCPA, determining the district court erred in concluding that the defendant qualified for the bona fide error defense. According to the opinion, the plaintiff incurred a debt to a medical provider (creditor), who eventually placed the debt with the defendant for collection. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated the FDCPA when it miscalculated the interest on the unpaid debt. While the parties did not dispute the issue of whether the defendant unintentionally violated the FDCPA when it miscalculated interest on the debt, the issue remained as to whether the defendant had reasonable procedures in place to qualify for the bona fide error defense. The defendant argued that it has reasonable procedures in place because its agreement with the creditor contained a requirement that the creditor supply it with accurate information for collection. The defendant argued “that this procedure was reasonably adapted to avoid violations of the FDCPA,” and that it should be entitled to the bona fide error defense. The district court agreed with the defendant and granted its request for summary judgment.
On appeal, the 9th Circuit determined that relying on creditor-clients to provide accurate information is insufficient to establish a bona fide error defense. Moreover, a “boilerplate agreement” between the creditor and the defendant “effectively outsourced the defendant’s statutory duty under the FDCPA,” the appellate court held, noting that defendants are not allowed to simply rely on the information they are being provided.
District court: $925 million statutory damages award not constitutionally excessive
On August 14, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon refused to reduce a $925 million statutory damages award against a company found to have violated the TCPA by sending almost two million unsolicited robocalls to consumers. The company argued that the statutory damages award violates due process because “it is so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportionate to the offense and obviously unreasonable.” The court rejected the company’s argument that the penalty was unconstitutionally excessive, noting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has not yet answered the question as to “whether due process limits the aggregate statutory damages that can be awarded in a class action lawsuit under the TCPA.” Instead, the district court concluded that the allowance for at least $500 per violation under the TCPA is constitutionally valid and that the penalty’s “large aggregate number comes from simple arithmetic.” Referencing an opinion issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the court reasoned that “[s]omeone whose maximum penalty reaches the mesosphere only because the number of violations reaches the stratosphere can’t complain about the consequences of its own extensive misconduct.” Thus, the court rejected the company’s argument that the aggregate damages award should be reduced, finding that due process does not require the reduction of the aggregate statutory award where the company violated the TCPA nearly two million times.
Arkansas Securities Department extends work-from-home guidance
On August 18, the Arkansas Securities Department further extended interim regulatory guidance previously issued to licensed mortgage companies, mortgage loan officers, and branch managers. The original interim regulatory guidance, previously covered here, and extended in May, permits mortgage loan officers to conduct activities requiring a license from home, provided certain data security provisions are met. This guidance is extended through the duration of the emergency declared by the governor of Arkansas.
FHA releases electronic appraisal technology for single family submissions
On August 18, HUD announced the availability of a new electronic appraisal delivery module on the FHA Catalyst platform. According to the announcement, the “FHA Catalyst: Electronic Appraisal Delivery” module can be used by lenders to electronically submit, track, and manage single family appraisal reports and updates for FHA Single Family Title II forward mortgages. Assistant Secretary for Housing and Federal Housing Commissioner Dana Wade noted that the new electronic appraisal module is “one more way FHA is supporting the housing market with innovative technology during the COVID-19 economic recovery.” Among other details, Mortgagee Letter 2020-26 states that lenders may begin using the new module on or after September 1.
OCC defends fintech charter authority in NYDFS challenge
On August 13, the OCC filed its reply brief in its appeal of a district court’s 2019 final judgment, which set aside the OCC’s regulation that would allow non-depository fintech companies to apply for Special Purpose National Bank charters (SPNB charter). As previously covered by InfoBytes, last October, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York entered final judgment in favor of NYDFS, ruling that the SPNB regulation should be “set aside with respect to all fintech applicants seeking a national bank charter that do not accept deposits,” rather than only those that have a nexus to New York State.
As discussed in its opening brief filed in April appealing the final judgment (covered by InfoBytes here), the OCC reiterated that the case is not justiciable until it actually grants a fintech charter, that it is entitled to deference for its interpretation of the term “business of banking,” and that the court should set aside the regulation only with respect to non-depository fintech applicants with a nexus to New York. Following NYDFS’s opening brief filed last month (covered by InfoBytes here), the OCC argued, among other things, that the case is not ripe and NYDFS lacks standing because its alleged injuries are speculative and “rely on a series of events that have not occurred: OCC receiving and approving an SPNB charter application from a non-depository fintech that intends to conduct business in New York, and then does so in a manner that causes the harms [NYDFS] identifies.”
The OCC further argued that NYDFS “cannot show the statutory term ‘business of banking’ is unambiguous, or that it requires a bank to accept deposits to receive an OCC charter.” Highlighting the evolution of the “business of banking” over the last 160 years, the OCC contended that the National Bank Act does not contain a requirement “that an applicant for a national bank charter accept deposits if it can present the OCC with a viable business model that does not require it,” and that its regulation interpreting the ambiguous phrase “business of banking” is reasonable as it is consistent with U.S. Supreme Court case law. Lastly, the OCC argued that NYDFS’s claim that it is entitled to nationwide relief afforded under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is inconsistent with another 2nd Circuit decision, “as well as principles of equity and the APA’s text and history.” The OCC stated that even if the appellate court were to conclude that NYDFS’s claims are justiciable, the regulations should be set aside only with respect to non-depository fintech applicants with a nexus to New York.
District Court dismisses usury claim against New York lender
On August 12, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York dismissed usury claims against a lender, concluding that lenders licensed in New York can charge interest rates up to 25 percent on loans under $25,000. According to the opinion, a consumer received a check in the mail in the amount of $2,539 from a licensed lender under Article IX of New York Banking Law, with terms requiring repayment at an annual interest rate of 24.99 percent, if the consumer cashed the check. The consumer cashed the check, agreeing to the loan terms. After failing to repay the debt in full, the consumer filed a complaint against the lender asserting various claims, including that the interest rate is unenforceable under New York General Obligations Law (GOL) § 5-511 because it exceeds 16 percent. The lender moved to dismiss the action.
The court agreed with the lender on the usurious claim, concluding that as a licensed lender in New York, the lender is “authorized to extend loans of $25,000 or less with interest rates up to 25[percent]” which is “the limit set by New York’s criminal usury statute, New York Penal Law § 190.40.” The court cited to NYDFS interpretations, stating that unlicensed nonbank lenders may not charge more than a 16 percent annual interest rate, but lenders that “obtain an Article IX license [] may charge interest up to 25[percent] per annum on the small loans.” Because the lender was licensed under Article IX in the state of New York, the lender “was permitted to loan $2,539.00 to [the consumer] at an agreed-upon annual interest rate of 24.99[percent] without violating GOL § 5-511.”