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CFPB Finalizes "Larger Participant" Rule For Student Loan Servicing, Updates Exam Procedures
On December 3, the CFPB issued a final rule that will allow the Bureau to supervise certain nonbank student loan servicers for the first time. The CFPB already oversees student loan servicing at the largest banks. The new rule will allow the Bureau to also oversee “larger participants” in federal and private loan servicing, defined as any nonbank student loan servicer that handles more than one million borrower accounts. The Bureau estimates that its final rule will allow supervision of the seven largest student loan servicers, responsible for servicing the loans of more than 49 million borrower accounts. The final rule takes effect on March 1, 2014.
Several commenters to the Bureau’s initial proposal requested further clarification of what constitutes an “account.” The final rule, like the proposed rule issued on March 28, 2013, considers each separate stream of fees to which a servicer is entitled for servicing post-secondary education loans with respect to a given student or prior student to be an account. Commenters also requested further clarification of the inclusions and exclusions implicit in this definition. The Bureau declined to make any substantive changes and instead adopted its proposed definitions with only technical changes.
The final rule does adopt several adjustments to the proposed definition of “student loan servicing.” The Bureau changed the proposed definition to address comments related to the use of a lockbox and similar services, agreeing that the function of merely receiving and remitting payments without handling borrowers’ accounts should not itself be considered “student loan servicing” for purposes of the final rule. The final rule also further clarifies that the purpose of an interaction with a borrower is important for determining whether it is “student loan servicing” and that activities to prevent default arising from post-secondary education loans are only included if conducted to facilitate the core servicing activities identified in the definition of “student loan servicing.” In addition, the Bureau adjusted the clause of the definition that addresses periods when payments are not required on the loan to make clear that it intends the clause to apply during all periods when no payment is required on a loan, including, for example, periods of forbearance.
The Bureau did not receive any objections to the proposed method of aggregating accounts of affiliated companies for the purpose of calculating volume and therefore adopts the aggregation method as proposed. The final rule also adopts the proposed threshold of one million accounts for the student loan servicing market, despite numerous comments requesting an alternate threshold for qualifying entities as “larger participants.”
On the same date, the CFPB released updated student loan examination procedures, which the Bureau revised to account for examination of nonbank servicers under the larger participant rule. In addition, the revised procedures prepare examiners to identify potential violations outside of consumer financial service laws applicable to servicers and administered by the CFPB, including potential violations of certain Servicemember Civil Relief Act (SCRA) requirements. The procedures also were revised to emphasize student loan servicing transfer and repayment issues, two issues the CFPB has highlighted as areas of concern over the past year.
ACLU Seeks FHFA Documents On Eminent Domain Analysis
On December 5, ACLU-affiliated entities and borrower advocacy groups filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of California seeking to compel FHFA to produce “all [FHFA] records pertaining to the use of eminent domain to purchase mortgages.” Alliance of Californians for Community Empowerment v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, No. 13-5618 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2013). Specifically, the plaintiffs seek to compel FHFA to respond to a FOIA request that demanded, among other things, (i) all communications and records of meetings between FHFA leadership and financial services industry trade associations and individual companies; (ii) all FHFA records regarding the City of Richmond’s proposal to seize certain mortgages; and (iii) all studies and analyses of the impact of eminent domain or principal reduction proposals relied upon by FHFA in support of materials it released in August 2013 outlining potential actions the agency could take in response to local efforts to employ eminent domain to seize mortgages. The complaint details the organizations’ position on eminent domain as a tool to implement principal reduction, which the organizations complain FHFA has improperly failed to pursue on its own. The request and complaint suggest that FHFA’s eminent domain position was unduly influenced by the financial services industry and “is advancing the interests of Wall Street firms at the expense of the nation’s homeowners.” This latest challenge of FHFA’s positions on eminent domain and principle reduction precede, potentially by days, an anticipated vote to confirm Representative Mel Watt (D-NC) to serve as FHFA Director.
Sixth Circuit Rejects HUD Test For RESPA Affiliated Business Safe Harbor
On November 27, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that HUD’s supplemental ten factor test for determining whether RESPA’s affiliated business arrangements safe harbor applies is not entitled to deference or persuasive weight, and determined that a real estate agency and its affiliated title servicers companies satisfied RESPA’s statutory affiliated business arrangements safe harbor provision. Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., No. 10-3922, 2013 WL 6183851 (6th Cir. Nov. 27, 2013). On behalf of a putative class, a group of homebuyers who used a real estate agency’s settlement services claimed that the agency and two title services companies violated RESPA’s referral fee prohibition. The agency and title companies asserted that they satisfied RESPA’s affiliated business arrangements safe harbor provision because (i) they disclosed the arrangement to the homebuyers, (ii) the homebuyers were free to reject the referral, and (iii) the companies only received a return from the referral through their ownership interest. The homebuyers countered that the companies must also demonstrate that they were bona fide providers of settlement services under HUD’s ten factor test for distinguishing sham business arrangements, which HUD established in a 1996 policy statement. A district court granted summary judgment in favor of the companies, finding that HUD’s ten factor test was void for unconstitutional vagueness. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed but on different grounds. The Sixth Circuit held that HUD’s policy statement is not entitled to Chevron or Skidmore deference because the statement provides only ambiguous guidelines HUD intends to consider rather than HUD’s interpretation of the statute. As a result, the companies’ compliance with the three conditions set out in the statute sufficed to obtain the exemption under the affiliated business safe harbor provision. The Sixth Circuit noted that “a statutory safe harbor is not very safe if a federal agency may add a new requirement to it through a policy statement.”
Fifth Circuit Holds State AG Credit Card Add-On Suit Not Subject To Federal Jurisdiction
On December 2, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a set of parens patriae suits filed by the Mississippi Attorney General (AG) against credit card issuers is not subject to federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) or National Bank Act (NBA) preemption. Hood v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., No. 13-60686, 2013 WL 6230960 (5th Cir. Dec. 2, 2013). The consolidated appeal involves cases originally filed by the AG in state court against six credit card issuers for allegedly violating the Mississippi Consumer Protection Act in connection with the marketing, sale, and administering of certain ancillary products, including payment protection plans. After the card issuers removed the cases, a federal district court denied the state’s motion to remand, holding that it had subject matter jurisdiction because: (i) the cases were CAFA mass actions; (ii) the NBA (and the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act for one state-chartered bank defendant) preempted some of the state law claims; and (iii) it had supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. The Sixth Circuit disagreed and held that the card issuers failed to prove that any card holder met CAFA’s individual amount in controversy requirement, rejecting the issuers’ argument that the state is the real party in interest and its claims for restitution and civil penalties exceed the threshold. The court also rejected the issuers’ argument—and the district court’s holding—that the payment protection plans were part of the loan agreement and the fees associated with the plans constitute “interest,” such that the state’s challenge to the plans was an implicit usury claim preempted by the NBA. Instead, the court held that while the plans could conceivably fit within the definition of “interest,” there is no clear rule on this subject that demands removal. Moreover, the court held that even if the payment protection plan fees are “interest,” the claims still would not be preempted because the state does not allege that the issuers charged too much interest, but rather challenges the alleged practice of improperly enrolling customers in the plans. The court reversed the district court and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Sixth Circuit Holds Servicers Exempt from TILA Liability
On November 26, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that mortgage servicers are exempted from TILA liability, despite recent amendments to the statute. Marais v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, No. 12-4248, 2013 WL 6170977 (6th Cir. Nov. 26, 2013). A borrower had alleged that her servicer violated TILA by failing to properly respond to her written request for information regarding her loan. The Sixth Circuit rejected the borrower’s argument that amendments to TILA as part of the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 created a cause of action against mere servicers, and held that servicers who are not creditors or creditor assignees are expressly exempt from TILA liability. The court, however, held that the servicer could be liable under RESPA for damages caused by its purported deficient response to the borrower’s request for information.
Seventh Circuit Holds TCPA Does Not Preempt State Law Banning Robocalls
On November 21, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) does not preempt an Indiana statute that bans most robocalls without exempting calls that are not made for a commercial purpose. Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. State of Indiana, No. 11-3265, 2013 WL 6114836 (7th Cir. Nov. 21, 2013). A not-for-profit Illinois corporation seeking to use automatically dialed interstate phone calls to deliver political messages to Indiana residents sought a declaration that the Indiana Automated Dialing Machine Statute (IADMS) violates the First Amendment, at least as it applies to political messages, and also is preempted by the TCPA, which expressly exempts non-commercial calls such as political calls from the TCPA’s regulation of autodialers. Overturning the district court’s decision, the Seventh Circuit found that the Indiana statute is not expressly preempted by the TCPA because the plain language of the TCPA’s savings clause states that the federal law does not preempt any state law that prohibits the use of automatic telephone dialing systems and, even if the IADMS is considered a regulation of, rather than a prohibition on, the use of autodialers, the savings clause does not at all address state laws that impose interstate regulations on their use. The court further found that the IADMS is not impliedly preempted by the TCPA because it is possible to comply with the state statute without violating the TCPA, the state statute furthers the TCPA’s purpose of protecting the privacy interests of residential telephone subscribers, and Congress did not intend to create field preemption when it enacted the TCPA. The court, however, remanded the case to the district court to consider whether the statute violates the First Amendment.
New York Appeals Court Shields Banks From Suits Over Frozen Customer Accounts
Recently, the New York Court of Appeals, in answering questions , held that no private right of action exists for judgment debtors to seek money damages and injunctive relief against banks that allegedly violate New Yorks Exempt Income Protection Act (EIPA) procedural requirements. In this case, two groups of judgment debtor plaintiffs alleged that their banks failed to provide them and other members of putative classes with exemption notices and claim forms as required by the EIPA, and asserted that the banks unlawfully froze their accounts and charged them various fees in violation of the statute. The federal district courts held that the EIPA, which provides a special exemption from satisfaction of money judgments for certain amounts and types of a debtors income, permits judgment debtors and creditors to bring claims against each other but provides no private right of action against the banks. On a consolidated appeal, the Second Circuit asked New Yorks highest court to address the issue, given (i) there was no controlling precedent in New York that governs the cases and (ii) the questions presented involve important issues of New York state law and policy that are likely to recur. The New York Court of Appeals agreed with the federal district courts that a private right of action cannot be implied from the EIPA. As to whether judgment debtors can seek money damages and injunctive relief against banks that violate EIPA in special proceedings and, if so, whether those special proceedings are the exclusive mechanism for such relief or whether judgment debtors may also seek relief in a plenary action, the New York Court of Appeals held that the banks had no obligation under the common law to provide the notices and form, and therefore any right debtors have to enforce that obligation arises from the statute.
Federal District Court Holds Evidence Of Online Notice Regarding Arbitration Policy Change Alone Insufficient To Support Arbitration Demand
On December 2, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California denied a bank’s motion to compel arbitration, in part because the bank failed to provide evidence that its customer received an online notice of a contract change that added the arbitration clause. Martin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 12-6030, slip op. (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2013). In this case, a bank customer filed suit alleging the bank violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and the state’s Unfair Competition Law. The bank moved to compel arbitration, claiming that it properly amended the controlling customer agreement to include the arbitration clause at issue by providing written notice in a billing insert, and by providing the same notice online to customers who logged into their account. The court held that the bank failed to demonstrate the customer logged on to her online account and received the notice at issue. Similarly, the court explained that the bank’s supporting declaration only stated that the customer’s account was “targeted to receive” the written notice, but the bank did not state the customer actually was provided with the notice. The court also questioned whether the amendment adding the arbitration clause was fair, explaining that the original customer agreement allowed the bank to amend “charges, fees, or other information contained in the disclosure” and suggested that the original agreement’s terms did not indicate the addition of an arbitration agreement was an anticipated modification.
New York Targets Lead Generators In Expanded Online Payday Lending Investigation
On December 3, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo announced that the state Department of Financial Services (DFS) sent subpoenas to 16 online “lead generation” companies as part of its expanding investigation into online payday lending. The DFS alleges the target companies are engaged in deceptive or misleading marketing of illegal, online payday loans in New York, and claims lead generation companies offer access to quick cash to encourage consumers to provide sensitive personal information and then sell that information to, among others, payday lenders operating unlawfully in New York. The DFS publicly kicked off an investigation of online payday lending earlier this year when it sent letters to 35 online lenders, including lenders affiliated with Native American Tribes, demanding that they cease and desist offering allegedly illegal payday loans to New York borrowers. Under New York law, it is civil usury for a company to make a loan or forbearance under $250,000 with an interest rate exceeding 16% per year, and a criminal violation to make a loan with an interest rate exceeding 25% per year. The DFS cites as part of the basis for its expanded investigation consumer complaints about false and misleading advertising (including celebrity endorsements), harassing phone calls, suspicious solicitations, privacy breaches, and other issues.
Pennsylvania Updates Auto Finance Statutes
On November 27, Pennsylvania enacted HB 1128, which updates and consolidates the state’s Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act (MVSFA) and Goods and Services Installment Sales Act (GSISA), and includes numerous changes relevant to auto finance companies. Among other things, the bill amends the MVSFA with regard to installment sales contracts, to, among other things: (i) require installment sale contracts to include a statement informing the buyer of possible additional rights under the state Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law; (ii) add triggers allowing for an acceleration clause; (iii) require a holder to notify a buyer upon payment in full by specifying the obligation has been paid in full on the instruments which are to be returned to that buyer with delivery in 10 days of the tender date; and (iv) prohibit a buyer from waiving any provisions in the chapter, including any purported waiver affected by a contractual choice of the law of another jurisdiction contained in an installment sale contract. Other MVSFA amendments provide that only costs disclosed at the time of the installment sale can be included in the contract and specifically prohibit costs for repairs that arise after contract execution from being added to the original contract. The bill amends the GSISA to, among other things: (i) add new requirements related to repossession; (ii) specify new standards for closed-end and open-end credit agreements; and (iii) increase certain maximum allowable fees and finance charges. The changes take effect November 27, 2014.