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Minnesota clarifies definition of “sales finance company” for licensing purposes
On April 5, the Minnesota Department of Commerce (Department) issued guidance clarifying the types of entities meeting the definition of “sales finance company” under Minnesota law for purposes of whether a license is needed to conduct business. The guidance requires “any company who purchases motor vehicle retail installment contracts from retail sellers located in Minnesota, and applies a finance charge,” to obtain a motor vehicle sales finance company license. Any company engaged in the business of a “sales finance company” is required to apply for and maintain a license under Minnesota law, regardless of whether the company has a physical presence in Minnesota or whether an in-state retail seller chooses to hold and collect retail installment contracts out-of-state.
Completed applications by companies that purchase motor vehicle retail installment contracts are due to the Department by July 1. The license application requirement will only apply to those contracts entered into on or after July 1. Non-depository financial institution applicants must apply through the Nationwide Multistate Licensing System (NMLS).
11th Circuit: Consumer’s repayment agreement not an escrow account
On April 9, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit held that a consumer’s insurance repayment plan on her reverse mortgage did not qualify as an escrow account under RESPA’s Regulation X. According to the opinion, a consumer’s reverse mortgage required her to maintain hazard insurance on her property, which she elected to pay herself, and did not establish an escrow account with the mortgage servicer to pay her insurance and property taxes. After her insurance lapsed, the mortgage servicer advanced her over $5,000 in funds paid directly to her insurance carrier to ensure the property was covered, subject to a repayment agreement. After the consumer failed to make any payments under the agreement, the servicer initiated a foreclosure action against the consumer and obtained a forced-placed insurance policy when the insurance lapsed for a second time. Ultimately, a state-run forgivable loan program brought the consumer’s past due balance current and excess funds were placed in a trust to cover future insurance payments on the property. The consumer filed an action against the mortgage servicer alleging the servicer violated RESPA’s implementing Regulation X when it initiated forced-placed insurance, because the repayment agreement purportedly established an escrow account, which required the servicer to advance the funds for insurance. The district court entered judgment in favor of the servicer.
On appeal, the 11th Circuit agreed with the district court, concluding that no escrow account existed between the consumer and the servicer, emphasizing that nothing in the repayment agreement set aside funds for the servicer to pay insurance or taxes on the property in the future. The 11th Circuit rejected the consumer’s characterization of the repayment agreement as an arrangement under Regulation X “where the servicer adds a portion of the borrower’s payment to principal and subsequently deducts from principal the disbursements for escrow account items.” The 11th Circuit reasoned that not only did the consumer never make a principal payment to the servicer, the consumer’s characterization is “entirely inconsistent” with the reverse mortgage security instrument. Because the servicer never deducted anything from the principal when it disbursed funds to pay the insurance, the repayment agreement did not qualify as an escrow agreement under Regulation X.
Ninth Circuit denies rehearing in Wadler FCPA whistleblower retaliation case
On April 8, the Ninth Circuit denied a petition to rehear its February order affirming most of the jury’s award – $8 million of the original $11 million – in a landmark FCPA whistleblower-retaliation case. The court denied the life sciences manufacturing company’s petition without explanation.
For prior coverage of the matter, including an analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s February opinion, please see here, here, here, and here.
Micronesian official pleads guilty to corruption-related money laundering conspiracy
On April 3, the DOJ announced that a Micronesian government official pleaded guilty in the District of Hawaii to a money laundering conspiracy “involving bribes made to corruptly secure engineering and project management contracts from the government of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), in violation of the” FCPA. The official was arrested in February after a Hawaiian executive pleaded guilty to a related FCPA conspiracy charge the prior month (see previous FCPA Scorecard coverage here).
According to the DOJ, the official "was a government official in the FSM Department of Transportation, Communications and Infrastructure who administered FSM’s aviation programs, including the management of its airports.” The official admitted that, between 2006 and 2016, a Hawaii-based engineering and consulting company “paid bribes to FSM officials, including [the official], to obtain and retain contracts with the FSM government valued at nearly $8 million.” The official’s sentencing is scheduled for July 29.
District Court finds auto dealerships did not violate UTPA or financial elder abuse law
On March 30, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon granted a group of car dealerships’ (defendants) summary judgment motion in a putative class action involving claims that the dealership violated Oregon’s Unlawful Trade Practices Act (UTPA) as well as the state’s financial elder-abuse law. The plaintiffs, who all purchased vehicles along with other goods or services from one or more of the defendants, asserted that the defendants allegedly failed to “appropriately disclose [their] specific fees associated with arrangement of financing or the profit margins related to the sale of third-party products and services.” By failing to comply with these disclosure requirements, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants “wrongfully appropriated money from elderly persons.” Concerning the alleged violations of UTPA, the defendants argued that its section titled “Undisclosed Fee Payments” only applies to referral fees greater than $100 paid to non-employee third-parties and not to other payments made by a dealership to a third party. The court agreed and stated that the defendants’ position was further supported by the state’s official commentary. With regard to the plaintiffs’ other claim concerning deficiencies in the disclosures, the court concluded that “strict recitation of the statute is not required to meet the clear and conspicuous standard,” and that the disclosures in question were clearly visible and easy to understand. Finally, the court granted summary dismissal on the plaintiffs’ claim of elder abuse because the claim was premised on the alleged violations of UTPA, which were dismissed.
California Court of Appeal upholds return of $331 million to NMS Deposit Fund despite legislative efforts
On April 2, the California Third District Court of Appeal upheld its July 2018 ruling that the state is required to return $331 million to the National Mortgage Settlement Deposit Fund (NMS Deposit Fund), reaching the same conclusion as it did previously notwithstanding newly enacted legislation. As previously covered by InfoBytes, three groups filed a lawsuit in 2014 against California Governor Jerry Brown and the state’s director of finance and controller alleging they unlawfully diverted money from the NMS Deposit Fund to make bond payments and offset general fund expenditures. The groups sought a writ of mandate compelling the state government to pay back approximately $350 million in diverted funds. After the Superior Court denied the writ, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the money still belongs in the NMS Deposit Fund, and not in the state’s General Fund. The state petitioned to the State Supreme Court for review and while the petition was pending, the governor signed SB 861, which states, “It is the intent of the Legislature…to confirm that allocations and uses of funds made by the director of finance from the National Mortgage Special Deposit Fund pursuant to [section 12531] in the 2011-12, 2012-13, and 2013-14 fiscal years were consistent with legislative direction and intent and to abrogate the holding of the Court of Appeal in [this case]. The Legislature further declares that the allocations made by the director of finance pursuant to [section 12531] were made for purposes consistent with the National Mortgage Settlement.” The Supreme Court directed the Court of Appeal to vacate the July 2018 opinion and reconsider in light of SB 861.
The Court of Appeal, having considered the views of the legislature in SB 861, confirmed its original conclusion from July 2018. Specifically, the court stated that the defendants’ reading of SB 861, “would effectively defeat the purpose of creating a special deposit fund to house the money” and would disregard the former Attorney General’s instructions for use of the settlement money, which was part of the National Mortgage Settlement. The Court of Appeal noted that in SB 861, the legislature declared that “the allocations…were made consistent with the National Mortgage Settlement,” but emphasized that “such a ‘belief is not binding on a court. . . .’” and the interpretation is “an exercise of the judicial power the Constitution assigns to the courts.” Therefore, upon second review, the Court of Appeal again held that the trial court erred when it did not issue a writ of mandate ordering the diverted funds to be returned to the NMS Deposit Fund.
Federal Reserve seeks comments on capital framework for U.S. subsidiaries of foreign banks
On April 8, the Federal Reserve Board announced a notice of proposed rulemaking and request for comment (NPRM) seeking to modify its regulation of the regulatory capital requirements for U.S. subsidiaries of foreign banking organizations. Chairman Jerome Powell referred to a proposal issued last fall for refining regulations for domestic banking firms based on risk profiles (previously covered by InfoBytes here), and noted that “because the U.S. operations of most foreign banks tend to have a larger cross-border profile, greater capital markets activities, and higher levels of short-term funding, they often present greater risk than a simpler, more traditional domestic bank.”
The NPRM builds upon the Federal Reserve’s framework for U.S. firms announced last fall, and states that foreign banking organizations with $100 billion or more in U.S. assets would be assigned to one of three categories based on the size of their U.S. operations as well as the following risk-based indicators: “cross-jurisdictional activity, nonbank assets, off-balance sheet exposure, and weighted short-term wholesale funding.” Under the proposal, foreign banking organizations would be classified into the following three categories: (i) Category II: foreign banking organizations with U.S. assets exceeding $700 billion or $75 billion in cross-border activity; (ii) Category III: foreign banking organizations with more than $250 billion in U.S. assets that also exceed certain risk thresholds; and (iii) Category IV: foreign banking organizations with U.S. assets between $100 billion and $250 billion and minimal risk factors. Category I would be reserved for U.S.-based global systemically important banks.
A second proposal issued the same day by the Federal Reserve Board, the FDIC, and the OCC (collectively, the “Agencies”) requests comment on, among other things, whether the Agencies should extend standardized liquidity requirements to foreign banking organizations’ U.S.-based branches and agency networks as well as approaches for doing so.
Comments on both proposals are due June 21.
11th Circuit: An implicit threat of litigation is enough to assert a FDCPA claim
On April 5, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part a district court’s order dismissing a plaintiff’s action alleging a debt collector violated the FDCPA when attempting to collect on a time-barred debt. According to the opinion, the plaintiff brought a lawsuit asserting a debt collector (i) violated the FDCPA’s prohibition on “false, deceptive or misleading” practices under section 1692e; (ii) violated the FDCPA’s prohibition on “unfair or unconscionable” practices under section 1692f by attempting to collect on a time-barred debt; and (iii) violated Florida state collection laws. The district court dismissed the FDCPA claims, concluding that the law allows for collectors to seek “voluntary repayment of…time-barred debt so long as the debt collector does not initiate or threaten legal action,” and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims once it dismissed the FDCPA claims.
On appeal, the 11th Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the section 1692f claim, rejecting the argument that attempts to collect on time-barred debt are generally unconscionable or unfair under the law. As for the claim under section 1692e, the 11th Circuit concluded the collection letter could plausibly be misleading or deceptive to the “least sophisticated consumer.” Specifically, the 11th Circuit noted that, “as a general matter, a creditor can seek voluntary payment of a time-barred debt,” but the “right to seek repayment does not confer a right to mislead” and one must only “reasonably infer an implicit threat” of litigation to state a claim under section 1692e. The 11th Circuit concluded that the letter’s offer to “resolve” the debt at a discount—“combined with a deadline” to accept the offer—is a “warning” that the offer may not be renewed, and that a lack of disclosure that the debt is time barred could “plausibly deceive or mislead an unsophisticated consumer as to the legal status of the debt, even in the absence of an express threat of litigation.” In reversing the dismissal of the claim under section 1692e, the appellate court also reinstated the state law claim and remanded the case back to district court.
Senate Democrats question the CFPB on PSLF oversight
On April 3, six Democratic Senators wrote to the CFPB seeking additional information on the Bureau’s oversight of student loan companies and servicers involved in the administration of the federal Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program (PSLF). In the letter, the Senators expressed concern that the Bureau’s leadership “has abandoned its supervision and enforcement activities related to federal student loan servicers.” The Senators noted that consumers owe more than $1.5 trillion in student loan debt in the U.S. and that loan servicing companies under contract with the U.S. Department of Education (the “Department”) are “covered persons” under Title X of the Dodd Frank Act, which allows the Bureau “broad oversight authority over their actions.” The Senators cited to a number of lawsuits brought by private citizens and state authorities challenging student loan servicing companies’ actions with regard to PSLF, and requested the Bureau respond to a series of questions regarding its activities overseeing student loan servicers’ handling of PSLF since December 2017. Among other things, the Senators requested information regarding (i) the Bureau’s examinations of student loan servicers’ PSLF administration; (ii) the effect of the Department’s December 2017 guidance to loan servicing contractors not to produce documents directly to other government agencies; (iii) the status of the CFPB’s alleged investigation into a specific student loan servicer’s actions; and (iv) the status of information sharing with the Department since August 2017.
Colorado Court of Appeals reverses law firm penalty for affiliated vendor relationships
On April 4, the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling assessing civil penalties against a foreclosure law firm for allegedly failing to disclose that its principals had an ownership interest in one of its vendors. The appeals court found that the civil penalty was not warranted because the failure to disclose “did not significantly impact members of the public as actual or potential consumers.” According to the opinion, the State of Colorado brought an enforcement action against a foreclosure law firm and its affiliated vendors, alleging, among other things, that the law firm and its vendors violated the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (the Consumer Act) by making “false or misleading statements of fact concerning the price” of their foreclosure services. The State argued that the relationship between the law firm and its vendors allowed the vendors to charge for services in excess of the market rate, pass on those costs to the law firm’s customers, and share a portion of the inflated costs with the law firm. While the trial court rejected two of the State’s claims against the defendants, it concluded that the law firm committed a deceptive practice under the Consumer Act that, “significantly impact[ed] the public as actual or potential consumers,” by failing to disclose its affiliated relationship with one of the vendors.
On appeal, the appellate court rejected the trial court’s conclusion that the alleged deception significantly impacted the public, noting that the deception was confined to two clients, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, in the context of their private agreements with the firm. Because the misrepresentation was in the context of a private relationship, and the tax-paying public were not “consumers of the law firm’s services for purposes of the Consumer Act,” the appellate court found the trial court erred when awarding the civil penalties under the Act. Moreover, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s rejection of the State’s other claims against the law firm.