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House subcommittee holds hearing on stablecoin regulation
The House Financial Services Subcommittee on Digital Assets, Financial Technology and Inclusion recently held a hearing to examine stablecoins’ role in the payment system and to discuss proposed legislation for creating a federal framework for issuing stablecoins. A subcommittee memorandum identified different types of stablecoins (the most popular being pegged to the U.S. dollar to diminish volatility) and presented an overview of the market, which currently consists of more than 200 different types of stablecoins, collectively worth more than $132 billion. The subcommittee referred to a 2021 report issued by the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, along with the FDIC and OCC (covered by InfoBytes here), in which it was recommended that Congress pass legislation requiring stablecoins to be issued only by insured depository institutions to ensure that payment stablecoins are subject to a federal prudential regulatory framework. The subcommittee discussed draft legislation that would define a payment stablecoin issuer and establish a regulatory framework for payment stablecoin issuers, including enforcement requirements and interoperability standards.
Subcommittee Chairman, French Hill (R-AR), delivered opening remarks, in which he commented that the proposed legislation would require stablecoin issuers to comply with redemption requirements, monthly attestation and disclosures, and risk management standards. Recognizing the significant amount of work yet to be done in this space, Hill said he believes that “innovation is fostered through choice and competition,” and that “one way to do that is through multiple pathways to become a stablecoin issuer, though with appropriate protections [to] prevent regulatory arbitrage and a race to the bottom.” He cited reports that digital asset developers are leaving the U.S. for countries that currently provide a more established regulatory framework for digital assets, and warned that this will stymie innovation, jobs, and consumer/investor protection. He also criticized ”the ongoing turf war between the SEC and CFTC” with respect to digital assets, and warned that “[w]hen you have two agencies contradicting each other in court about whether one of the most utilized stablecoins in the market is a security or a commodity, what you end up with is uncertainty.”
Witness NYDFS Superintendent Adrienne A. Harris discussed the framework that is currently in place in New York and highlighted requirements for payment stablecoin issuers operating in the state. In a prepared statement, Harris said many domestic and foreign regulators call the Department’s regulatory and supervisory oversight of virtual currency the “gold standard,” in which virtual currency entities are “subject to custody and capital requirements designed to industry-specific risks necessary for sound, prudential regulation.” Harris explained that NYDFS established “additional regulations, guidance, and company-specific supervisory agreements to tailor [its] oversight” over financial products, including stablecoins, and said the Department is the first agency to provide regulatory clarity for these types of products. She highlighted guidance released last June, which established criteria for regulated entities seeking to issue USD-backed stablecoins in the state (covered by InfoBytes here), and encouraged a collaborative framework that mirrors the regulatory system for more traditional financial institutions and takes advantage of the comparative strengths offered by federal and state regulators. Federal regulators will be able to comprehensively address “macroprudential considerations” and implement foundational consumer and market protections, while states can “leverage their more immediate understanding of consumer needs” and more quickly modernize regulations in response to industry developments and innovation, Harris said.
Credit reporter must face FCRA suit on hard-inquiry reinvestigation
On April 10, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied a credit reporting agency’s (CRA) motion for summary judgment in a certified class action suit accusing the CRA of willfully violating the reinvestigation provision in the FCRA. Plaintiff claimed that he disputed an alleged inaccurate hard inquiry on his credit report, and argued that not only did the CRA fail to remove the hard inquiry from his credit file, he was given a sales pitch for an identity theft product. The CRA conceded that it did not reinvestigate the dispute and argued, among other things, “that hard inquiries do not necessarily decrease a consumer’s credit score and, even if they did, such diminutions do not necessarily result in the denial of credit.” Experts for both parties debated the extent to which a hard inquiry affects a consumer’s credit score.
The court disagreed with the CRA’s position concerning the impact of hard inquiries on consumers’ credit scores, noting the conflict with federal regulators’ cautionary advice that “[t]hese inquiries will impact your credit score because most scoring models look at how recently and how frequently you apply for credit.” Moreover, the CRA’s own expert opined that hard inquiries usually do have a “minor impact” on consumers’ credit scores. Additionally, the court rejected the CRA’s argument that it did not willfully violate the FCRA because its process for handing hard-inquiry disputes was in line with industry-wide practices. The court cited Third Circuit precedent requiring CRAs to reinvestigate any information a consumer claims is inaccurate if the CRA does not deem the information frivolous or chooses not to delete it from the customer’s file. “When industry practices are contradicted by clear statutory language and case law giving force to that language, common practice does not save a defendant from a finding of willfulness,” the court wrote. With respect to the decertification request, the court said class members established that the time and resources spent trying to resolve disputes over inaccurate hard inquiries, and their lowered credit scores, amounted to concrete injury that can be fairly traceable to the CRA’s statutory violation.
The court denied summary judgment for two reasons. First, the court did not find that the CRA’s actions were “objectively reasonable” based on the CRA’s reliance on a “contorted and inconsistent” reading of the FCRA and its interpretation of § 1681i (which “requires a reasonable reinvestigation when consumers raise a dispute of inaccuracy”). The court also denied summary judgment “[b]ecause a jury could find that [the CRA’s] blanket policy of refusing to reinvestigate disputes of hard inquiries is not reasonable under the law.”
District Court upholds arbitration in website terms of use
On March 28, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina ruled that class members must arbitrate their claims against an online lending marketplace relating to a 2022 data breach that affected current, former, and prospective customers. The court found that a mandatory arbitration clause contained in the defendant’s terms of use agreement “is broad enough to encompass the claims” brought by class members, and adopted recommendations made by a magistrate judge in February, who found that the agreement not only requires users to agree to be bound by its terms of use when they make their accounts, but also requires that users consent, acknowledge, and agree to its terms of use any time they submit consumer loan searches on the website. The plaintiff argued that there was not a binding contract between the parties because he did not “fully and clearly” understand that he had agreed to arbitrate disputes with the defendant. He further attested that because he never saw the terms of use, he “lacked actual or inquiry notice.” In particular, the plaintiff complained about the placement and font size of the notice, which he claimed no reasonable consumer would have seen “as there is no reason to scroll down the page after seeing the ‘Create Account’ tab.” The magistrate judge disagreed, stating that the “[p]laintiff had multiple opportunities to read and decline the terms if he chose,” and that “[t]his is not the needle in a haystack search that [p]laintiff depicts.” In agreeing with the recommendations, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed to show that the magistrate judge’s determination “was clearly erroneous or contrary to law” and said the plaintiff is bound by the arbitration clause.
District Court: Collection can resume after debt is verified
On March 24, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment in an action concerning whether the defendants failed to adequately validate plaintiff’s debt. Plaintiff incurred a debt that was charged off and sold to one of the defendants for collection. The defendant creditor used the second defendant to manage collection of the account. An independent third party hired by the defendant creditor to collect on the debt sent an email containing a FDCPA-required validation notice to the plaintiff, who responded by sending a written validation request to the third party. In response, the second defendant sent two letters to the plaintiff, validating the debt and including the name of the original creditor, the current creditor, the last four digits of the account number, and the amount owed. The plaintiff submitted additional validation requests to the second defendant. The account was eventually placed with a different third-party collection agency, which sent a verification letter containing the same information to the plaintiff. The plaintiff sent a validation request to the new collection agency, as well as an additional request to the second defendant, and received responses to these validation requests as well.
The plaintiff sued, premising her FDCPA claims on the argument that the defendants acted deceptively when they attempted to collect on a debt by placing the account with the second collection agency while the debt was being actively disputed. The court disagreed, stating that after the defendants “provided verification of the debt, they were free to resume collection efforts.” The court explained that the plaintiff “cannot forestall collection efforts by disputing the debt into perpetuity,” and added that nothing in the FDCPA prevents the use of more than one collection agency to collect on a debt. The court also said the fact that the initial validation response was sent after the 30-day statutory validation period expired and contained a second validation notice, did not adversely impact the plaintiff nor “create actionable confusion,” particularly because “the second validation notice was sent after Plaintiff exercised her statutory right to dispute the debt.”
9th Circuit: Law firm did not violate FCRA by accessing credit report
On March 17, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a defendant law firm that allegedly accessed a plaintiff’s credit report to obtain her current address after it was hired to collect unpaid homeowner association (HOA) assessments. The plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit claiming, among other things, that the defendant violated the FCRA by accessing her credit report without her consent and that neither the HOA nor the defendant are creditors within the meaning of the FCRA. The district court disagreed, concluding that the HOA was in fact a creditor for purposes of the FCRA. “Under the [a]greement, the HOA determines the assessment amount for a full year and then makes it payable in installments over the course of the year. Thus, it regularly extends credit,” the district court wrote, explaining that because the HOA is a creditor, its attorneys, in collecting on the account, have the right to review a consumer’s credit report without consent. Moreover, the district court determined that the defendant had established the requisite “direct link” between the credit transaction and its request for the plaintiff’s credit report.
The 9th Circuit concluded that the “[d]efendant’s reading of the statute was not objectively unreasonable” because the plaintiff “had a grace period during which she could receive half a month’s services that she had not yet paid for,” which “could be considered an extension of credit.” While concurring with the panel, one of the judges commented, however, that “[i]t is hard to imagine that Congress intended FCRA, a statute that protects consumer privacy, to empower HOAs composed of neighboring homeowners to run their neighbors’ credit reports if homeowners fall two weeks behind in their payments.” The judge recommended that the appellate court “revisit the issue,” noting that it is unclear under current case law whether an HOA assessment qualifies as a “credit transaction” under the FCRA.
CFPB and NLRB to share info on employer-driven debt practices and illegal surveillance
On March 7, the CFPB and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) entered into an information sharing agreement to create a formal partnership for addressing unlawful practices involving employer surveillance and employer driven debt. The agencies stressed in the joint announcement that their Memorandum of Understanding will help identify and end employer practices that cause workers to incur debt by forcing them to pay for employer-mandated training or equipment that they might not need, or that surveil workers and sell their personal data to financial institutions, insurers, and other employers. These actions, the agencies said, may violate the FCRA and other consumer financial protection laws. As previously covered by InfoBytes, last June the Bureau launched an inquiry into employer-driven debt practices. The request for information focused on debt obligations incurred by consumers in the context of an employment or independent contractor arrangement, and sought information on “prevalence, pricing and other terms of the obligations, disclosures, dispute resolution, and the servicing and collection of these debts.”
“Many workers discover that getting a job can mean piling up debt instead of making a living,” CFPB Director Rohit Chopra said in the announcement. “Information sharing with the [NLRB] will support our efforts to end debt traps that stop workers from leaving one job for another.” NLRB General Counsel Jennifer Abruzzo agreed, adding that as the “economy, industries and workplaces continue to change, we are excited to work with CFPB to strengthen our whole-of-government approach and ensure that employers obey the law and workers are able to fully and freely exercise their rights without interference or adverse consequences.”
2nd Circuit says collection letter sent on law firm letterhead did not violate FDCPA
On February 13, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of a defendant law firm accused of violating the FDCPA when it sent the plaintiff a collection letter on law firm letterhead. The plaintiff claimed both that the letter overshadowed her validation notice by failing to advise her that her validation rights were not overridden because her account had been placed with a law firm and that the letter falsely implied it was a communication from an attorney even though no attorney was meaningfully involved in collecting the debt, which courts have found is prohibited under the FDCPA. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant on both grounds. The district court held that “because there was meaningful attorney involvement in the collection of plaintiff’s debt,” the letter was not required to include a disclaimer regarding the lack of attorney involvement in the debt collection effort. Additionally, the district court held that because the letter did not refer to any consequences should the plaintiff fail to repay the outstanding debt, “the mere fact that [the] Collection Letter is printed on law firm letterhead does not, by itself, imply an immediate threat of legal action overshadowing a validation notice in violation of the FDCPA.” The plaintiff appealed.
In affirming the grant of summary judgment, the appellate court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that, because several of the steps the attorney supposedly followed were “performed by non-attorneys,” were “automated,” or could have been completed in a minimal amount of time, there was not meaningful attorney involvement. According to the 2nd Circuit, even if these facts were true, they did not refute the attorney’s “statement that he conducted a meaningful legal analysis of [plaintiff’s] account and ‘formed an opinion about how to manage [the] case.’” “We have never established a specific minimum period of review time to qualify as meaningful attorney involvement, and the only function that [plaintiff] has identified that [defendant] did not perform before approving the letter was establishing a specific plan to sue in the event of non-payment.” Consequently, the appellate court concluded that the FDCPA did not require the defendant to provide a disclaimer in its initial collection letter to the plaintiff.
District Court gives preliminary approval to $11.5 million FCRA settlement
On January 6, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted preliminary approval of a $11.5 million settlement in a class action FCRA suit, resolving allegations that a credit reporting agency (CRA) reported inaccurate or incomplete criminal and civil records. According to the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval of the proposed settlement and memorandum in support, the defendant violated the FCRA by attributing criminal records to consumers that did not belong to them. The plaintiffs further alleged that “misattribution resulted from [the defendant’s] unreasonable procedures related to its using or failure to use certain identifying information in its matching algorithm.” In addition, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant failed to report favorable dispositions in landlord-tenant records. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendant “did not obtain complete and up-to-date public records from the source, instead relying on old or incomplete data obtained from its vendor(s) or retrieved through automated processes.” If final approval of the settlement is granted, attorney fees will account for about a third of the $11.5 million settlement amount. The estimated number of people who could benefit from the settlement is approximately 90,000, with awards for this group ranging from $40 to $800. The defendant will also be obliged under the settlement to provide data needed to identify members of the class. Further, class members whose names were misreported as tied to felonies or sex offenses, or who disputed their criminal records, will be paid higher payments than those linked to misdemeanors, lower-level offenses, or eviction records.
District Court approves $11 million data breach settlement
On January 4, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas granted final approval of an $11 million class action settlement resolving allegations related to a February 2021 data breach that compromised more than 4.3 million customers’ personally identifiable information, including names, Social Security numbers, driver’s license numbers, dates of birth, and username/password information. According to plaintiffs’ amended complaint, the defendant insurance software providers failed to notify affected individuals about the data breach until on or after May 10, 2021, despite commencing an investigation in March. Plaintiffs maintained that the defendants’ alleged failure to comply with FTC cybersecurity guidelines and industry data protection standards put at risk their financial and personal records, and said they now face years of constant surveillance to prevent potential identity theft and fraud. Under the terms of the settlement (see also plaintiffs’ memorandum of law in support of the motion for final approval), class members will each receive up to $5,000 for out-of-pocket expenses, including up to eight hours of lost time at $25/hour, as well as 12 months of financial fraud protection. Members of a California subclass will receive additional benefits of between $100 and $300 each. The defendants are also responsible for paying each named plaintiff a $2,000 service award and must pay over $3 million in attorney fees, costs, and expenses.
District Court grants summary judgment to bank in discriminatory lending suit
On December 19, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of a national bank with respect to discriminatory lending allegations brought by the County of Cook in Illinois (County). As previously covered by InfoBytes, the County alleged that the bank’s lending practices were discriminatory and led to an increase in foreclosures among Black and Latino borrowers, causing the County to incur financial injury, including foreclosure-related and judicial proceeding costs and municipal expenses due to an increase in vacant properties. In 2021, the court denied the bank’s motion to dismiss the alleged Fair Housing Act violations after determining that all the County had to do was show a reasonable argument that the bank’s lending practices resulted in foreclosures, and that the bank failed to dispute that the County properly alleged a financial injury sufficient to support standing.
The court explained in its December 19 order, however, that two of the County’s expert witnesses did not make valid comparisons when measuring the denial rate for minority borrowers compared to white borrowers. According to the court, the expert witnesses failed to properly account for the financial conditions of the borrowers seeking mortgage modifications, leaving the County with “no other evidentiary basis to establish that [the bank] engaged in intentionally discriminatory servicing practices that caused minority borrowers to disproportionately suffer default and foreclosure.” The court found that, accordingly, the County cannot demonstrate “intentional discrimination against minority borrowers that proximately caused the County’s injuries, and its disparate treatment claim accordingly cannot survive summary judgment.” Additionally, the court found that the County failed to cite authority for its arguments that the bank can be liable for loans it purchased “and for which it did not commit any discriminatory acts in servicing” or for loans it originated but sold and never serviced.