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District Court vacates DOE order on student loan servicer’s $22 million repayment
On December 16, the U.S. District Court for Eastern District of Virginia vacated and remanded the Department of Education’s (DOE) decision that a student loan servicer (plaintiff) had improperly collected $22 million in student loan-related subsidies from 2002 to 2005. According to the opinion, the plaintiff alleged that the DOE acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act when it determined that the plaintiff erroneously claimed over $22 million in student loan-related subsidies. The plaintiff contended that in claiming those subsidies, it reasonably relied on two 1993 “Dear Colleague Letters” (DCL) from the DOE authorizing it to collect subsidies for student loans funded in whole or in part by tax-exempt obligations. According to the plaintiff, the DOE issued a new DCL in 2007 which disavowed the guidance in the DOE’s two 1993 DCLs, but nonetheless stated that the DOE would not collect past erroneous subsidies if the plaintiff prospectively followed the DOE’s revised interpretation set forth in the 2007 DCL. Nevertheless, the DOE initiated administrative proceedings seeking over $22 million in past subsidies collected by the plaintiff pursuant to the 1993 DCLs. The DOE’s acting secretary ruled in January 2021 that the plaintiff erred when it claimed those subsidies and must pay it back.
The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the DOE’s decision in 2021 failed to consider its reliance on the previous policy statements in the 1993 and 2007 letters. However, the DOE argued it was “unreasonable” for the plaintiff to rely on the DCLs, saying that the loan company should have known that the 1993 letters contradicted the Higher Education Act. Siding with the plaintiff, the court relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California, which found that when an agency alters existing policy, it must assess “whether there were reliance interests, determine whether they were significant, and weigh any such interests against competing policy concerns.” The court further held that it is DOE's job to “weigh the strength of those reliance interests,” and it failed to do so.
District Court says debtor bears the burden of asserting a garnishment exemption
On December 15, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted a defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in a debt collection garnishment suit. One of the plaintiffs was referred to collections after he defaulted on his credit card debt, and a judgment was entered against him by the original creditor. The defendant filed for a writ of execution, seeking to garnish funds that were in a joint bank account maintained by both plaintiffs. The writ outlined major exemptions under Pennsylvania and federal law, noting that the plaintiff may also be able to rely on other exemptions, and instructed him to complete a claim for exemption. Plaintiffs sued for violations of the FDCPA, claiming, among other things, that the defendant should have known that the account was a joint account, and therefore exempt, before seeking the writ of execution. According to the plaintiffs, the defendant should have known or reasonably known “that the funds in the joint account were immune from execution because it ‘performed its own private asset search to discover’ the account.” The court disagreed, holding, that under Pennsylvania’s garnishment procedures, the debtor bears the burden of asserting an exemption. This assertion, the court said, must be more than a “self-serving statement that an exemption applies.”
The court cited a ruling issued by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, in which the court determined that “[t]he bottom line here is that, right or wrong, a judgment creditor has no duty under either California or federal law to investigate, much less confirm, that a judgment debtor’s bank accounts contain only non-exempt funds prior to authorizing a levy on those accounts. It is unreasonable to conclude that a judgment creditor’s failure to conduct a pre-levy debtor’s exam, when there is no legal obligation or requirement to do so, constitutes unfair or unconscionable action.”
CFPB issues HMDA technical amendment
On December 12, the CFPB issued a technical amendment to the HMDA Rule to reflect the closed-end mortgage loan reporting threshold of 25 mortgage loans in each of the two preceding calendar years. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in September, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted partial summary judgment to a group of consumer fair housing associations (collectively, “plaintiffs”) that challenged changes made in 2020 that permanently raised coverage thresholds for collecting and reporting data about closed-end mortgage loans and open-end lines of credit under HMDA. The 2020 Rule, which amended Regulation C, permanently increased the reporting threshold from the origination of at least 25 closed-end mortgage loans in each of the two preceding calendar years to 100, and permanently increased the threshold for collecting and reporting data about open-end lines of credit from the origination of 100 lines of credit in each of the two preceding calendar years to 200 (covered by InfoBytes here). The plaintiffs sued the CFPB in 2020, arguing, among other things, that the final rule “exempts about 40 percent of depository institutions that were previously required to report” and undermines HMDA’s purpose by allowing potential violations of fair lending laws to go undetected. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) As a result of the September 23 order, the threshold for reporting data about closed-end mortgage loans is 25, the threshold established by the 2015 HMDA Rule.
CFPB will not initiate HMDA enforcement actions for certain reporting failures
On December 6, the CFPB issued a blog post emphasizing that financial institutions may need time to implement or adjust policies, procedures, systems and operations to come into compliance with the new HMDA volume reporting threshold and that the agency does not view action regarding institutions’ HMDA data as a current priority. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in September, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted partial summary judgment to a group of consumer fair housing associations that challenged changes made in 2020 that permanently raised coverage thresholds for collecting and reporting data about closed-end mortgage loans and open-end lines of credit under HMDA. The 2020 Rule, which amended Regulation C, permanently increased the reporting threshold from the origination of at least 25 closed-end mortgage loans in each of the two preceding calendar years to 100, and permanently increased the threshold for collecting and reporting data about open-end lines of credit from the origination of 100 lines of credit in each of the two preceding calendar years to 200 (covered by InfoBytes here). The plaintiffs sued the CFPB in 2020, arguing, among other things, that the final rule “exempts about 40 percent of depository institutions that were previously required to report” and undermines HMDA’s purpose by allowing potential violations of fair lending laws to go undetected. (Covered by InfoBytes here.)
According to the blog post, the Bureau “does not intend to initiate enforcement actions or cite HMDA violations for failures to report closed-end mortgage loan data collected in 2022, 2021 or 2020 for institutions subject to the CFPB’s enforcement or supervisory jurisdiction that meet Regulation C’s other coverage requirements and originated at least 25 closed-end mortgage loans in each of the two preceding calendar years but fewer than 100 closed-end mortgage loans in either or both of the two preceding calendar years.”
District Court: Defendants cannot use CFPB funding argument to dismiss deceptive marketing lawsuit
On November 18, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled that the CFPB can proceed in its lawsuit against a credit reporting agency, two of its subsidiaries (collectively, “corporate defendants”), and a former senior executive accused of allegedly violating a 2017 enforcement order in connection with alleged deceptive practices related to their marketing and sale of credit scores, credit reports, and credit-monitoring products to consumers. According to the court, a recent decision issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which found that the Bureau’s funding structure violates the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution (covered by a Buckley Special Alert), is a persuasive basis to have the lawsuit dismissed.
As previously covered by InfoBytes, the Bureau sued the defendants in April claiming the corporate defendants, under the individual defendant’s direction, allegedly violated the 2017 consent order from the day it went into effect instead of implementing agreed-upon policy changes intended to stop consumers from unknowingly signing up for credit monitoring services that charge monthly payments. The Bureau further claimed that the corporate defendants’ practices continued even after examiners raised concerns several times, and that the individual defendant had both the “authority and obligation” to ensure compliance with the 2017 consent order but did not do so.
The defendants sought to have the lawsuit dismissed for several reasons, including on constitutional grounds. The court disagreed with defendants’ constitutional argument, stating that, other than the 5th Circuit, courts around the country have “uniformly” found that Congress’ choice to provide independent funding for the Bureau conformed with the Constitution. “Courts are ill-equipped to second guess exactly how Congress chooses to structure the funding of financial regulators like the Bureau, so long as the funding remains tethered to a law passed by Congress,” the court wrote. The court also overruled defendants’ other objections to the lawsuit. “[T]his case is only at the pleading stage, and all the Bureau must do is plausibly allege that [the individual defendant] was recklessly indifferent to the wrongfulness of [the corporate defendants’] actions over which he had authority,” the court said, adding that the Bureau “has done so because it alleges that because of financial implications, [the individual defendant] actively ‘created a plan to delay or avoid’ implementing the consent order.”
The Bureau is currently seeking Supreme Court review of the 5th Circuit’s decision during its current term. (Covered by InfoBytes here.)
District Court sends overdraft fee suit to arbitration
On November 16, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted a defendant’s motion to compel arbitration regarding claims that consumers are charged significant overdraft or non-sufficient funds fees on bank accounts linked to discount cards issued by the gas-discount company. According to the plaintiff’s putative class action suit, the defendant advertises fuel discounts through a mobile app and payment card system while claiming that its service acts “like a debit card” by “‘effortlessly deduct[ing]’ funds from linked checking accounts at the time of purchase[.].” While these payments and discounts are represented as being “automatically applied,” the plaintiff alleged that paying with the discount card results in significant processing delays. These delays, the plaintiff contended, cause users to run the risk of having insufficient fees in their checking accounts before the payment is processed, thus resulting in overdraft fees. Additionally, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant does not verify whether a consumer has sufficient funds in the checking account before payments are withdrawn. The defendant moved to compel arbitration, or in the alternative, moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming that during the sign-up process, the plaintiff was presented with terms and conditions that explicitly require users to arbitrate any disputes, claims, or controversies. Moreover, the defendant argued that users cannot sign up for the program unless they first check a button that says “I agree” with the terms of use. While the parties agreed that the plaintiff was presented at a minimum a hyperlink to the terms and conditions, they disputed whether the sign-up process required the plaintiff to affirmatively assent to them. According to the plaintiff, there was no such checkbox button when he signed up for the program.
The court disagreed, ruling that the plaintiff had notice of and agreed to terms and conditions that included an arbitration clause and class action waiver. According to the court, the defendant adequately showed that the checkbox button was part of the process when the plaintiff signed up and that the defendant obtained his affirmative asset to the agreement. Further, the plaintiff failed to support his claim with any specific evidence that the checkbox button may not have been there during the sign-up process, the court maintained.
District Court says university is a financial institution exempt from state privacy law
On November 4, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted a defendant university’s motion to dismiss Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act claims (BIPA), ruling that because the defendant participates in the Department of Education’s Federal Student Aid Program, it is a “financial institution” subject to Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) and therefore exempt from BIPA. Plaintiff sued the defendant claiming the university used technology to collect biometric identifiers to surveil students taking online exams. According to the plaintiff, the defendant’s use of this technology violated students’ biometric privacy rights because the defendant did not obtain students’ written consent to collect and use that data, failed to disclose what happens with the data after collection, and failed to adhere to BIPA’s retention and destruction requirements.
The court disagreed and dismissed the putative class action. The court explained that the defendant’s direct student lending and participation in the Federal Student Aid Program allows it to qualify as a “financial institution,” defined by the GLBA as “any institution the business of which is engaging in financial activities.” As such, it is expressly exempt from BIPA. The court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the defendant did not fit within this definition because it is in the business of higher education rather than financial activities because at least five other courts that have also concluded that “institutions of higher education that are significantly engaged in financial activities such as making or administering student loans” qualify for exemption. The court also referred to a 2000 FTC rule issued when the Commission had both enforcement and rulemaking authority under the GLBA. The rule considered colleges and universities to be financial institutions if they “appear to be significantly engaged in lending funds to consumers,” which the court found to be “particularly persuasive because it evidences longstanding, consistent, and well-reasoned interpretation of the statute that it had been tasked to administer.”
District Court says blockchain network’s token is a security
On November 7, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire ruled that digital tokens sold by a blockchain network qualify as securities under the Securities Act of 1933. The SEC sued the company in 2021, claiming that by issuing the tokens, the company conducted an unregistered offering of securities. The company countered that its tokens are not securities because they are not being offered as an investment opportunity on its platform, but rather are designed to be used by content creators and users. The company also argued that the tokens are not securities because they function as “an essential component” of the company’s blockchain and that investors acquired them for use on the company’s network, rather than with the intention of holding them as an investment. Further, the company claimed that it did not receive fair notice that its token offerings are subject to securities laws.
In determining whether the tokens are securities, the court relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s definition of an investment contract in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., focusing on the issue of “whether the economic realities surrounding [the company’s] offerings of [the tokens] led investors to have a ‘reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.’” According to the court, multiple statements made by the company led potential investors to reasonably expect the tokens to grow in value as the company continued to oversee the development of its network. “[P]otential investors would understand that [the company] was pitching a speculative value proposition for its digital token,” the court said, rejecting the company’s argument that it had informed some potential investors that the company was not offering its token as an investment. “[A] disclaimer cannot undo the objective economic realities of a transaction,” the court stated, adding that “[n]othing in the case law suggests that a token with both consumptive and speculative uses cannot be sold as an investment contract.” Additionally, the court explained that, while this may be the first instance where securities laws are being “used against an issuer of digital tokens that did not conduct an ICO, [the company] is in no position to claim that it did not receive fair notice that its conduct was unlawful.”
Mortgage servicer must pay $4.5 million in payment service fee suit
On November 7, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia granted final approval of a class action settlement, resolving allegations that a defendant mortgage servicer charged improper fees for optional payment services in connection with mortgage payments made online or over the telephone. The plaintiffs' memorandum of law in support of its motion for final approval of the settlement alleges the defendant engaged in violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit Protection Act, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment with respect to the fees. According to the memorandum, before deduction of attorneys’ fees and expenses, administrative costs, and any service award, the $4.5 million settlement fund represents approximately $216 per fee paid to the defendant by the putative class members. The court also approved $1.5 million in attorney’s fees, plus $4,519.20 in expenses, along with a $15,000 service award for the settlement class representative.
District Court approves $14 million wireless rates settlement
On November 8, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted final approval to a $14 million settlement resolving allegations that a telecommunications company made misleading claims regarding its administrative fees. According to the plaintiffs’ memorandum of points and authorities in support of motion for preliminary approval of class settlement, current and former wireless-service customers of the defendant (plaintiffs) with post-paid wireless service plans were charged an improper administrative fee. The plaintiffs alleged, generally, that the defendant’s representations and advertisements regarding the monthly price of its post-paid wireless service plans were misleading because the prices did not include the administrative fee, and that the defendant implemented and charged the administrative fee in a deceptive and unfair manner. According to the terms of the $14 million settlement agreement, $3.5 million of the award will cover attorney fees and costs, with additional funds allocated to cover litigation expenses.