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District court dismisses class claims regarding out-of-network ATM fees
On March 4, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California issued an order granting five separate motions for dismissal filed by a national bank and several independent ATM operators (defendants) regarding allegations that the defendants (i) charged unwarranted fees for using out-of-network (OON) ATMs for balance inquiries; (ii) made deceptive and misleading representations on screens and on signs regarding those fees; and (iii) assessed fees in violation of governing account documents. The plaintiffs’ putative class action alleged 13 claims against the defendants for violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law (CUCL), California’s False Advertising Law (FAL), and the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), as well as for conversion, negligence, and breach of contract. The defendants premised their motions to dismiss on several bases, including a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, and the plaintiffs’ failure to plead the necessary elements of the claims.
The court generally agreed with the arguments made by the defendants as to the court’s lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction. In particular, the court held that the common law claims brought on behalf of the nationwide class should be dismissed for lack of Article III standing because the named plaintiffs failed to allege they were charged the relevant balance inquiry fees in states outside of California. In addition, the court agreed with an argument raised by one defendant that the plaintiffs lacked standing to file claims for injunctive relief for violations of the CUCL, FAL, and CLRA because they failed to allege a likelihood of actual or imminent future harm; specifically, they failed to allege they intended to use the ATMs in the future to make balance inquiries. The court thereafter assessed the plaintiffs’ remaining common law and statutory claims, and in each case, granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the claims for various failures to establish the necessary elements of each of the alleged claims. Of the 13 dismissed claims, the court permitted plaintiffs leave to amend 10 of them. The court required any amended complaint address the standing issues related to claims brought on behalf of the California and nationwide classes.
5th Circuit: Non-party plaintiff cannot bring action to enforce violation of CFPB consent order
On March 4, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of a debt collector (defendant) accused of violating the FDCPA and the terms of a CFPB consent order. According to the opinion, the defendant attempted to collect a credit card debt from the plaintiff that the plaintiff did not recognize. In December 2014, the defendant filed suit to collect the past due debt. In the meantime, the CFPB issued a consent order against the defendant for violations of the FDCPA (covered by InfoBytes here) while the parties awaited trial. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the CFPB regarding the validity of the debt, but the Bureau closed that complaint after verifying the defendant’s ownership of the plaintiff’s debt. The plaintiff responded by filing his own lawsuit in March 2017, claiming the defendant violated the FDCPA by (i) “lacking validation of his debt prior to his January 2016 trial”; (ii) failing to timely validate his debt in violation of provisions of its consent order with the CFPB; and (iii) “misrepresenting that it intended to prove ownership of his debt if contested.” The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant based on the plaintiff’s failure to prove actual damages.
On appeal, the appellate court determined that the district court erred in ruling that the plaintiff failed to plead actual damages, finding that “the FDCPA does not require proof of actual damages to ground statutory damages.” However, the appellate court did not reverse the district court’s decision. Instead, the appellate court affirmed, holding that the plaintiff’s debt validation claims were time-barred because he did not file suit within the FDCPA’s one-year statute of limitations. Regarding the other two claims, the appellate court stated that while the claims were not time-barred, the plaintiff lacked standing because “private persons may not bring actions to enforce violations of consent decrees to which they are not a party.” The CFPB’s consent order with the defendant specified that the CFPB was the enforcer of the order, and its text could not be read to invoke a private right of action permitting the plaintiff’s suit. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed summary judgment against the plaintiff on these remaining two claims.
SEC’s disgorgement authority examined during Supreme Court oral arguments
On March 3, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Liu v. SEC. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the principal question at issue in this case is whether the SEC’s authority to seek “equitable relief” permits it to seek and obtain disgorgement orders in federal court. Petitioners—a couple found to have defrauded investors and ordered to disgorge $26.7 million by a California federal court—argued that disgorgement is not a form of “equitable relief” available to the SEC. Respondent SEC contended that Congress enacted several statutes that anticipated the SEC’s use of disgorgement, including the Securities Exchange Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and that historically, disgorgement has been used as an equitable remedy to deny wrongdoers of their ill-gotten gains.
Counsel for the petitioners made three primary arguments before the Court: (i) the SEC is only authorized to use the powers conferred upon it by Congress and disgorgement is not one of them; (ii) though the statute allows the SEC to seek equitable relief, disgorgement as the SEC has used it is akin to a penalty and “penalties are not equitable relief.”; and (iii) “Congressional silence…does not give an agency any authority to act, much less the authority to punish” in a manner that exceeds its existing statutory authority
Petitioners’ counsel fielded questions from Justices Ginsburg, Alito, and others that probed the limits of the petitioners’ position. The justices asked, among other things, whether disgorgement could ever be ordered by the SEC; whether it could be ordered if the profits are paid out to injured parties; and whether the Court’s holding in Kokesh v SEC, that disgorgement as a penalty should be controlling only when determining the applicable statute of limitations, which was the issue presented in that case. Petitioner’s counsel stated that “the rule should be, if you’re giving the money back to the investors, then [the SEC] can take it and not otherwise, because…then it’s just a punishment.”
Respondent’s counsel argued that the Court’s ruling in Kokesh was limited to determining the applicability of the statute of limitations. He also urged that “courts should continue to order disgorgement but compute it in accordance with traditional general equitable rules, not in accordance with any SEC-specific formula.” In response to a question from Justice Sotomayor regarding the proper recipient of disgorged funds, respondent’s counsel said that if the defrauded investors can be located, the SEC’s practice it to return disgorgement amounts to them. However, he noted that sometimes, such as in FCPA actions, there are no obvious victims to whom the money could be returned. Justice Kavanaugh asked if it would be proper for the Court to insist that the amounts received from a disgorgement order be returned to defrauded investors if at all possible. Respondent’s counsel conceded this would be within the Court’s authority, but added that the “core purposes of disgorgement are to prevent the wrongdoer from profiting from its own wrong and to deter future violations, and disgorgement can serve those traditional purposes, regardless of where the money ends up.”
On rebuttal, petitioner’s counsel asserted that “the scope of disgorgement has grown over time in part because it is not grounded in statutory text.” He contended that “there is no precedent for using an accounting to compel funds to be paid to the Treasury.” Justice Ginsburg pressed petitioner’s counsel regarding statutes that appear to be predicated on disgorgement being available. Petitioner’s counsel suggested those statutes might show that Congress was aware that courts were ordering disgorgement, but that was “not an authorization, and authorization is what’s needed…to inflict a penalty.” He closed by asking the Court to reverse the case, saying that the petitioners were already responsible to pay their entire gains from the fraud, and “anything more would go beyond the equitable principle that no individual should be permitted to profit from his or her own wrong.”
5th Circuit: CFPB structure is constitutional
On March 3, the same day the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB (covered by InfoBytes here), a divided U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the CFPB’s single-director structure is constitutional, finding no constitutional defect with allowing the director of the Bureau to only be fired for cause. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the CFPB filed a complaint against two Mississippi-based payday loan and check cashing companies for allegedly violating the Consumer Financial Protection Act’s prohibition on unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices. In March 2018, a district court denied the payday lenders’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, rejecting the argument that the structure of the CFPB is unconstitutional and that the CFPB’s claims violate due process. The 5th Circuit agreed to hear an interlocutory appeal on the constitutionality question, and subsequently, the payday lenders filed an unchallenged petition requesting an initial hearing en banc. (Covered by InfoBytes here.)
On appeal, the majority upheld the district court’s decision that the Bureau is not unconstitutional based on its single-director structure. “The payday lenders argue that the structure of the CFPB denies the Executive Branch its due because the Bureau is led by a single director removable by the President only for cause,” the majority wrote. “We find no support for this argument in constitutional text or in Supreme Court decisions and uphold the constitutionality of the CFPB’s structure, as did the D.C. and Ninth [C]ircuits.” The majority compared the case to the D.C. Circuit’s en banc decision in PHH v. CFPB (covered by a Buckley Special Alert) and the 9th Circuit’s decision in CFPB v. Seila Law LLC (covered by InfoBytes here), both of which upheld the Bureau’s structure. The majority also distinguished a 2018 ruling from the 5th Circuit sitting en banc, which held the FHFA’s single-director structure unconstitutional (covered by InfoBytes here). This provoked a strong dissent charging that the majority had “suddenly discover[ed] that stare decisis is for suckers.”
7th Circuit rejects request to void $17.5 million TCPA settlement
On February 25, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied a request to overturn a $17.5 million settlement agreement arising out of a national bank’s alleged violations of the TCPA. Six different class actions had been filed against the bank in different federal courts, all alleging that the bank had violated the TCPA by making robocalls and autodialed calls and sending text messages to the class members even though they were not customers of the bank. The settlement resolved all six cases, involving roughly 440,000 total class members. An individual claiming to be a class member sought to object to the settlement, but the district court found that he lacked standing to object because he could not show that he had received a call or text, and the bank’s records indicated that he had not, and therefore he was not a member of the class.
Upon appeal, the 7th Circuit affirmed the lower court’s determination that the objector was not a class member in a brief, unsigned order. The panel corrected the objector’s misrepresentation of the lower court’s ruling that the objector’s own testimony could not prove that he was a class member, stating that “[t]he problem here is that [the objector’s] account was so vague—no dates, no subject matter, and not even whether the calls were ‘artificial or pre-recorded’”—that the court reasonably discounted it in comparison to the evidence from [the bank] that [the objector] never received one of the disputed types of calls.”
Supreme Court vacates as moot 11th Circuit’s FHA decision
On March 2, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated as moot a 2019 judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which had held that the City of Miami plausibly alleged that two national banks’ lending practices violated the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and led to defaults, foreclosures, and vacancies, eventually reducing property values and corresponding property tax revenues. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) This follows the City’s voluntarily dismissal in January of fair housing lawsuits brought against four national banks (covered by InfoBytes here).
The Supreme Court first addressed the underlying case in 2017, holding that municipal plaintiffs may be “aggrieved persons” authorized to bring suit under the FHA against lenders for injuries allegedly flowing from discriminatory lending practices. (Covered by a Buckley Special Alert.) However, the Court held that such injuries must be proximately caused by, rather than simply the foreseeable result of, the alleged misconduct. On remand, the 11th Circuit found “a logical and direct bond between discriminatory lending as a pattern and practice applied to neighborhoods throughout the City and the reduction in property values,” but also noted that the City’s allegations fell short of establishing a direct relationship between the alleged misconduct and the City’s purported increase in its municipal services expenditures. The banks subsequently filed petitions (see here and here) last November, asking the Supreme Court to review “[w]hether proximate cause in private litigation about the [FHA] requires more than a ‘logical bond’ between the alleged statutory violation and the plaintiff’s injury.”
Supreme Court hears arguments on CFPB’s structure
On March 3, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB to consider whether the Constitution prohibits an agency being led by a single director who cannot be removed at will by the President. In addition, the arguments addressed the question of the appropriate remedy if the Court determines that the limitation on the President’s ability to remove the director is unconstitutional.
The case arises out of a Civil Investigative Demand (CID) issued by the CFPB to the petitioner Seila Law, a law firm providing debt relief services to consumers. Seila Law refused to respond to the CID, arguing that it is invalid because the CFPB’s structure is unconstitutional. The CFPB and the DOJ agreed with the contention that the statute is unconstitutional. However, the parties differed on the question of remedy. The government argued that the removal restriction should simply be severed from the statute, leaving the remainder of the Consumer Financial Protection Act in place. But Seila Law argued that to do so would amount to a judicial “rewrite” of the statute, and the Court should instead simply hold that the CID is unenforceable and leave to Congress the task of revising the statute to comply with the Constitution.
Because the government was not defending the constitutionality of the statute, the court appointed a former Solicitor General to act as an amicus to defend the constitutionality of the statute. In addition, the House of Representatives, which had filed an amicus brief on behalf of that legislative body, also defended the constitutionality of the statute at the oral arguments.
Find continuing InfoBytes coverage of Seila Law here.
9th Circuit reduces punitive damages in FCRA class action
On February 27, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reduced punitive damages in a class action against a credit reporting agency (CRA) for allegedly violating the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by erroneously linking class members to criminals and terrorists with similar names in a database maintained by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). At trial, the jury found that the CRA violated the FCRA by willfully failing to (i) “follow reasonable procedures to assure accuracy of the terrorist alerts”; (ii) “disclose to the class members their entire credit reports by excluding the alerts from the reports”; and (iii) “provide a summary of rights” to class members with each disclosure. Subsequently, the jury awarded $8 million in statutory damages and $52 million in punitive damages to the class.
Upon appeal, the 9th Circuit affirmed the lower court’s determinations that all class members—not just the class representative—must have “standing at the final stage of a money damages suit when class members are to be awarded individual monetary damages.” But the appellate court found that all class members did have standing due to, among other things, the CRA’s “reckless handling of information from OFAC,” which subjected class members to “a real risk of harm,” and because “the violation of a statutory right constituted a concrete injury.” In addition, the appellate court rejected the CRA’s request for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial on the basis that the class had failed to provide sufficient evidence of injuries or to support the damages award. Moreover, the appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the class representative’s claims were typical of the class’s claims, nor in certifying the class or denying the CRA’s motion to decertify the class. The appellate court also agreed with the lower court on statutory damages, but it held that the $52 million punitive damages award was “unconstitutionally excessive.” The appellate court explained that although the CRA’s “conduct was reprehensible, it was not so egregious as to justify a punitive award of more than six times an already substantial compensatory award.” Accordingly, the appellate court vacated the jury’s award of punitive damages and remanded, directing that the punitive damages be reduced to four times the statutory damages award.
District court says unlicensed debt collection agency violated FDCPA
On February 24, the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah issued an order granting in part and denying in part a Wisconsin debt collection agency’s (defendant) motion for judgment on the pleadings in a suit concerning alleged FDCPA and state law violations. In 2019, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the defendant—who had purchased the plaintiffs’ debts from various lending agencies—for attempting to garnish their wages to satisfy default judgments. The plaintiffs contended that the defendant violated Section 1692e(5) of the FDCPA and the Utah Consumer Sales Practice Act (UCSPA) because it operated as a collection agency in the state without being registered according to the Utah Collection Agency Act (UCAA). The defendant argued, however, that “failing to comply with the UCAA’s registration provision would not make it illegal for it to file debt collection actions in Utah,” and that “even if it is illegal to file suit while unregistered, courts cannot transform a UCAA violation into a private right of action under the FDCPA.”
The court determined that the plaintiffs adequately pleaded an FDCPA claim against the defendant for false, deceptive, or misleading representations, stating that it is illegal for a collection agency to file a debt collection action in Utah if it is not registered with the state according to UCAA provisions. According to the court, violating the UCAA’s registration provision “may provide a basis for finding an FDCPA violation when accompanied by the filing of a lawsuit to collect debt.” However, the court ruled that the plaintiffs failed to show that the defendant engaged in “deceptive and unconscionable sales practices” under the UCSPA. According to the court, the plaintiffs were “improperly attempting to transform a violation of the UCAA into a private right of action under the UCSPA” since they failed to plead sufficient facts to show that the defendant “knowingly made misleading statements or intended to deceive [the plaintiffs] regarding its registration or bond status.”
District court: Maryland’s interest on escrow law not preempted by National Bank Act
On February 24, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland denied a national bank’s motion to dismiss a putative class action alleging the bank violated Maryland law by not paying interest on escrow sums for residential mortgages. After the bank allegedly failed to pay the mortgage escrow interest, the consumer filed a lawsuit asserting various claims including for violation of Section 12-109 of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), which “requires lenders to pay interest on funds maintained in escrow on behalf of borrowers.” In response, the bank filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that the state law is preempted by the National Bank Act (NBA) and by 2004 OCC preemption regulations.
The court disagreed, determining that under the Dodd-Frank Act, national banks are required to pay interest on escrow accounts when mandated by applicable state or federal law. Citing previous decisions in similar escrow interest cases brought against the same bank in other states (covered by InfoBytes here and here), the court stated that Section 12-109 “does not prevent or significantly interfere with [the bank’s] exercise of its federal banking authority, because [Section] 12-109’s ‘interference’ is minimal, when compared with statutes that the Supreme Court has previously found were preempted.” The court noted that state law—which “still allows [the bank] to require escrow accounts for its borrowers”—provides that the bank must pay a small amount of interest to borrowers if it chooses to maintain escrow accounts. Moreover, the court concluded that the bank’s “suggestions about interference are belied by the fact that its direct competitors dutifully comply with [Section] 12-109.” As for the OCC’s 2004 preemption regulation, Section 34.4, the court determined that the regulation is entitled to minimal deference, and noted that it is not clear that the OCC, in promulgating the regulations, “ever considered whether the NBA preempts state laws that mandate payment of interest for escrow accounts.” According to the court, the regulations do not mention state escrow interest laws at all. As such, the court stated that it “will not defer to the OCC’s regulation, or to the agency’s current position that [Section] 12-109 is preempted.”