InfoBytes Blog
Filter
Subscribe to our InfoBytes Blog weekly newsletter and other publications for news affecting the financial services industry.
2nd Circuit: Failure to clarify static balance of debt is not an FDCPA violation
On November 4, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision that a debt collector does not violate the FDCPA by sending notices to consumers that do not clarify that a debt is static. The plaintiff in that case alleged that the defendant violated the FDCPA’s prohibition on false, deceptive, or misleading representations in connection with the collection of a debt when it sent her a letter that contained a breakdown of interest and charges or fees accrued on the balance as separate line items, even though the amounts accrued explicitly reflect $0, along with the phrase “[a]s of the date of this letter, you owe $ [amount].” By implying that the amount owed might increase, the plaintiff argued that the least sophisticated consumer may erroneously think the debt is dynamic. The district court disagreed and granted the defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.
In affirming this decision on appeal, the 2nd Circuit cited its own holding in Taylor v. Financial Recovery Services, Inc., in which it previously determined “that ‘a collection notice that fails to disclose that interest and fees are not currently accruing on a debt is not misleading within the meaning of [the FDCPA].” The appellate court was not persuaded by the plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish her case from Taylor, finding that the language in the plaintiff’s letter is “stock language. . .present in a number of collection notices, including those considered not misleading in Taylor.” The 2nd Circuit further noted that “requiring debt collectors to draw attention to the static nature of a debt could incentivize collectors to make debts dynamic instead of static.”
District Court certifies payday lending class action
On October 31, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey certified two classes of consumers alleging a payday lender and its subsidiaries charged usurious, triple-digit interest rates on short-term loans originated by a nonparty entity run by a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe. The lawsuit—which alleges, among other things, usury and consumer fraud in violation of New Jersey law, common law restitution and unjust enrichment, and violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act—was filed in 2016 with the defendants arguing that the claims were subject to an arbitration provision accompanying the loan agreement. However, as previously covered by InfoBytes, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the district court’s decision that the tribal arbitration forum referenced in the loan agreement does not actually exist and, “because the loan agreement’s forum selection clause is an integral, non-severable part of the arbitration agreement,” the entire arbitration agreement is unenforceable.
According to the plaintiffs, the defendants evaded state law usury limits by attempting to use the sovereignty of an Indian tribe, with most loans carrying an annual percentage interest rate of 139 percent. While the defendants challenged the notion that common questions about the loan agreements predominated over the individual concerns of each class member, the court determined that the loan agreements at issue have an identical structure of interest amortized over a fixed payment schedule. “Plaintiffs have therefore shown that they can use common evidence to prove their [Consumer Fraud Act] claims, and that common questions predominate,” the court stated. “Namely the nearly identical, allegedly usurious loan agreements, which caused an out of pocket loss in the form of usurious interest.” The court also dismissed the defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs’ suit was inferior to a 2018 CFPB action, which resulted in a $10.3 million civil money penalty but no restitution (previous InfoBytes coverage here), stating that “[i]ncredibly, [d]efendants argue that this CFPB action, which denied any recovery to the putative class members here, is a superior means for them to obtain relief.”
District Court certifies class suing Department of Education over borrower defense claims
On October 30, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California certified a class of borrowers who allegedly applied for student loan relief based on their higher education institution’s misconduct but have yet to receive a decision from the Department of Education. The borrowers allege that the Department has arbitrarily and capriciously stonewalled its own process for adjudicating the borrowers’ defense claims under the Higher Education Act, which “allows the Department to cancel a student federal loan repayment based on a school’s misconduct.” The borrowers claim the Department has failed to decide a borrower defense claim since June 2018. According to the borrowers—former students of for-profit schools with claims dating back to 2015—“the Department’s inaction continues to cause putative class members ongoing harm.” The Department argued, however, that the class should not be certified because the borrowers’ claims rely too much on individual circumstances and fail to prove a “systemic policy of inaction[.]” The court disagreed and certified the class, stating that the borrowers “have identified a single uniform policy—namely, the Department’s alleged ‘blanket refusal’ to adjudicate borrower defenses—which ‘bridges all their claims.’” Moreover, the court noted that “this alleged uniform policy is supported by the undisputed fact that the Department has failed to adjudicate a single borrower defense claim in over a year.” The class does not include borrowers who are part of a separate action filed against the Department (covered by InfoBytes here).
District Court approves $12.5 million settlement in TCPA class action
On October 28, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted final approval of a $12.5 million TCPA class action settlement between a group of consumers and three cruise lines and their marketing group (collectively, “defendants”). According to the opinion, a consumer filed the action against the defendants alleging they violated the TCPA’s prohibition of the use of an autodialer without prior consent. While the motion for class certification was pending, the parties reached an agreement-in-principle for a class-wide settlement. The settlement requires the defendants to, among other things, set up a common fund of $12.5 million to permit each claimant to “recover for up to three calls per telephone number, with a maximum value for each call set at $300.” The court noted that after deducting attorneys’ fees, other costs, and an incentive award for the principal plaintiff, the nearly 275,000 class members will be eligible to receive an average of about $22 per claim. The court noted that while $22 is “significantly below the $500 recovery available under the statute for each call… a settlement does not need to provide the class with the maximum possible damages in order to be reasonable.” The court went on to state that the settlement “still serves the purpose of punishing [the cruise lines] for their role in the controversy,” and the total settlement fund is a “deterrent to potential future defendants who might think twice about violating the TCPA in an effort to boost business.”
11th Circuit: District Court erred in denying class certification over bankruptcy preemption defense
On October 29, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated a district court decision denying class certification, concluding the court erred in its determination that each FDCPA and Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA) claim’s individualized inquiries predominated over issues common to the proposed class. According to the opinion, two plaintiffs filed a class action against their mortgage servicer alleging the servicer violated the FDCPA and the FCCPA by sending monthly mortgage statements after the debt was discharged in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy and they moved out of the home. The servicer objected to class certification that included both consumers who vacated their homes and those who remained in their homes because the Bankruptcy Code treats the two groups differently, thus requiring an individualized review to decide how the rules would be applied. Additionally, the servicer argued that the court would be required to decide whether the Bankruptcy Code precluded or preempted the claims for only class members who chose to remain in their homes. The district court denied class certification, concluding that individualized claims predominated over common issues, because “the question of ‘whether the Bankruptcy Code precluded and/or preempted the FDCPA and FCCPA’ presented an individualized rather than a common issue.”
On appeal, the 11th Circuit disagreed. The appellate court noted that the district court erred when it concluded that the question of whether the Bankruptcy Code precluded or preempted the FDCPA only applied to those consumers who chose to remain in their homes, because the preemption defense “potentially barred every class member’s FDCPA claim,” thus requiring the court to treat it as a common issue. The appellate court made a similar determination for the FCCPA claims. The appellate court cautioned that its conclusion was not an opinion about whether the servicer’s “defense is meritorious,” but was “limited to the conclusion that [the] defense raises questions common to all class members.” The appellate court, therefore, vacated and remanded the case back to district court.
Department of Education held in contempt for continuing to collect certain student loans
On October 24, a magistrate judge for the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California held the Department of Education and Secretary Betsy DeVos in civil contempt and ordered them to pay $100,000 in sanctions for violating a May 2018 preliminary injunction that prohibited them from collecting on student loans used for programs at a now defunct for-profit college (previously covered by InfoBytes here). According to the October 24 order, the defendants allegedly showed “only minimal efforts to comply with the preliminary injunction.” Moreover, a compliance report filed in September was “silent as to the normal actions one would expect from an entity facing a binding court order: multiple in-person meetings or telephone calls to explain the preliminary injunction and to confirm that the contractors were complying with the preliminary injunction.” The court further stated that the defendants acknowledged in their compliance report, among other things, that (i) more than 16,000 former student were told they had payments due on their student loans after the court-ordered prohibition went into effect in May 2018; (ii) nearly 3,300 of the borrowers made one or more payments; and (iii) more than 1,800 other borrowers had wages or tax returns garnished to collect on unpaid student loans. In addition to the finding of contempt and the monetary penalty, the defendants are required to file monthly status reports on their compliance with the injunction and “submit a revised notice to be sent to the entire potential class regarding [d]efendants’ noncompliance with the preliminary injunction and their forthcoming efforts to fully comply.”
District Court holds debt collection letter properly named creditor
On October 21, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted judgment for a debt collection law firm, concluding the law firm properly identified the current owner of the consumer’s debt in its collection letter. According to the opinion, the law firm sent a letter in March 2018 seeking to collect a debt from the consumer. The letter acknowledges the law firm is a debt collector and provides the balance due, a reference number, the last four digits of the associated bank account, and in two places, states “Re: [bank name].” The consumer filed the action against the law firm, alleging it violated the FDCPA because the least sophisticated consumer would be confused as to whether the bank or the law firm is “the creditor to whom the alleged debt is now purportedly owed.” Both parties moved for judgment and the court agreed with the law firm. Specifically, the court noted that the letter refers to the original creditor twice by stating, “Re: [bank name],” and also the subject line of the letter “identifies both the creditor, [the bank], and plaintiff’s account number with that institution,” which “strongly suggests” that the listed bank is the current creditor. Moreover, the court rejected the consumer’s argument that the least sophisticated consumer would understand the bank is the “source” of the debt but would not understand the bank is the “owner” of the debt, concluding that the least sophisticated consumer would “not likely make such a leap” to assume the debt may have been subsequently sold to another party not mentioned in the letter.
3rd Circuit affirms summary judgment in bankruptcy, FDCPA action
On October 23, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for a debt collection law firm and attorney (collectively, “defendants”) in an action alleging the defendants violated the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA. According to the opinion, the plaintiffs had to make monthly payments to their condominium association as part of a special assessment to pay for an improvement project. The plaintiffs made payments until filing for bankruptcy in 2014. After the bankruptcy closed, the plaintiffs did not resume payments to the association for the improvement project. The balance continued to accrue and a lien was filed for the outstanding balance of $10,137.38. The association also created a “Certificate of Amount of Unpaid Assessments” that referenced the outstanding balance and explained over $8,000 of the total balance had been discharged in the 2014 bankruptcy. The plaintiffs sued the defendants, asserting that the bankruptcy discharged all the debt owed, including the post-discharge payments, and that the defendants’ collection efforts “were coercive and misleading.” The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
On appeal, the 3rd Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the payment owed to the condominium association was a “fee or assessment” under the Bankruptcy Code that was not discharged here because the plaintiffs retained ownership interest in the property and the assessment payment became due after the bankruptcy. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ FDCPA claims against the defendants. The court explained that the defendants were not responsible for the amount listed in the condominium association’s certificate and, in any event, the amount the defendants’ attempted to collect did not include the discharged amount. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence that would create an issue of material fact on the FDCPA claim and affirmed the district court’s summary judgment ruling.
District Court denies request to enforce modified CID, says CFPB can issue third-party CID
On October 18, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia denied defendants’ request to enforce a modified Civil Investigative Demand (CID) and prevent the CFPB from obtaining personal information about the defendants’ clients via CIDs to third parties. In August 2017, the CFPB issued a CID to the defendants requesting various documents and information. The defendants challenged the scope of the original CID and, following mediation, the parties stipulated to a modified CID that no longer sought personal information of the defendants’ clients who obtained products or services related to immigration bonds. The CFPB subsequently issued third party CIDs and requested the personal information of the defendants’ clients from certain other parties. In March 2019, the defendants moved to enforce the modified CID, claiming that the CFPB “reneged on its stipulation and [acted] in bad faith” by seeking this personal information from third parties. The court, however, denied the defendants’ request to enforce the modified CID, ruling that “the modified CID makes no mention of CIDs issued to other parties,” and that the parties’ stipulation did not “preclude the CFPB from acquiring any type of information from third parties.” The court also explained that it was unclear whether the defendants had standing to contest the CFPB’s CID to a third party, noting that the defendants failed to state how they would suffer an injury if the pertinent information was disclosed by a third party.
Massachusetts AG sues Department of Education for failure to discharge loans
On October 22, the Massachusetts attorney general filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts challenging the U.S. Department of Education’s (DOE) continued collection of federal student loan debt incurred by over 7,000 individuals to attend a now closed for-profit college. The complaint alleges that, in 2015, the attorney general submitted an application to the DOE on behalf of the individuals who attended the for-profit school to have their federal loans forgiven due to the institution’s allegedly fraudulent conduct. The attorney general asserts that its application for loan discharge was supported by evidence of the institution’s various wrongful conduct towards Massachusetts students, and its submission established a defense to the enforceability of the underlying federal student loan debt. However, the complaint asserts that the DOE did not grant the requested loan relief and instead has continued collection efforts on debts subject to discharge under the attorney general’s application. The attorney general is seeking an order to set aside the DOE’s decision to continue collection efforts as “arbitrary and capricious” in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act and to declare that Massachusetts borrowers have established a defense to repayment of their federal student loans.