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3rd Circuit: Commercial purpose does not make unsolicited fax an advertisement under TCPA
On May 28, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit, in a consolidated action, affirmed summary judgment that a health care provider database company’s (defendant) unsolicited fax did not violate the TCPA. According to the opinion, the defendant updated its database by sending unsolicited faxes to healthcare providers, requesting that they voluntarily update their contact information, if necessary. The fax included disclaimers that there was no cost to the recipient for participating in the database maintenance initiative and that it was not an attempt to sell a product. The plaintiff sued the defendant alleging a state law claim and that the fax violated the TCPA’s prohibition on sending unsolicited advertisements by fax. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claim.
On appeal, the 3rd Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, rejecting the plaintiff’s third-party liability argument that the fax should be regarded as an advertisement, even though he was not a purchaser of the company’s services. The 3rd Circuit held that to establish third-party based liability under TCPA, the “plaintiff must show that the fax: (1) sought to promote or enhance the quality or quantity of a product or services being sold commercially; (2) was reasonably calculated to increase the profits of the sender; and (3) directly or indirectly encouraged the recipient to influence the purchasing decisions of a third party.” The appellate court found that, even though the defendant had a “profit motive” in sending the fax because it wanted to improve the quality of its product by making its database more accurate, “the faxes did not attempt to influence the purchasing decisions of any potential buyer,” nor did the fax encourage the recipient to influence the purchasing decisions of a third party.
District court approves final settlement resolving breach of contract and conversion claims related to debit card overdraft fees
On May 28, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California granted final approval to a roughly $24.5 million settlement resolving class action allegations that a credit union unfairly charged optional overdraft protection fees on certain debit card transactions. In 2017, the plaintiffs challenged the credit union’s practices, alleging breaches of contract, covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and conversion. Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged whether the language in the accountholder agreements prohibited the credit union from assessing and collecting optional overdraft protection fees on certain debit card transactions that were authorized against positive available account balances. In 2018, the court granted in part and denied in part the credit union’s motion to dismiss, allowing the plaintiffs’ breach of contract and conversion claims to proceed. The parties entered into settlement discussions, and reached an agreement. Under the terms of the settlement, the credit union will provide $24.5 million in relief to class members, along with approximately $6.1 million in attorneys’ fees. However, the court denied a request to reimburse plaintiffs’ expert witness for work completed after the settlement agreement was preliminary approved last year, stating “as a matter of awarding funds from the [s]ettlement [f]und, the [c]ourt cannot find reasonable the $109,100.00 price tag for an exercise that appears to post-date the preliminary approval order and which merely confirmed what the parties already understood to be the class’s potential recovery.”
3rd Circuit holds trustee not liable for RMBS losses
On May 21, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of an investor action against Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) trustees, concluding the investors failed to show that the trustees breached any duties owed under the governing documents. According to the opinion, investors filed suit against the owner trustee for fifteen RMBS trusts, which became “worthless in the wake of widespread loan defaults,” claiming breach of contract and the implied covenant of good faith. The investors argued the trustee (i) abdicated its responsibilities relating to the loan files; (ii) failed to provide written notice of default; and (iii) failed to intervene when other parties exercised their duties carelessly. The trial court dismissed all claims against the trustee.
On appeal, the appellate court concluded the trial court correctly dismissed the claims. Specifically, the appellate court noted that under the trusts’ governing documents, the trustee was acting as an “owner trustee,” which was “primarily ministerial, involving limited duties such as executing documents on behalf of the trusts and accepting service of legal process.” The trustee did not have an overarching duty to protect the trusts, as it agreed “to perform only the modest functions” under the governing agreements and therefore, was shielded from that general liability. The appellate court concluded that the investors failed to show the trustee breached any actual duties owed under the governing agreements, rejecting the investors’ three specific claims for breach of contract. Moreover, the court emphasized that the governing agreement “forecloses the implied duty [the investors] propose,” noting that the trustee negotiated for limited liability and received a fee in exchange for modest functions, making it “difficult to imagine” the trustee would willingly agree to “sweeping supervisory responsibility.”
West Virginia high court: Insufficient facts to determine whether arbitration is enforceable
On May 17, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals vacated a state circuit court’s ruling to deny a motion to compel arbitration in a case related to bounced convenience checks drawn on a consumer’s credit card account, finding that the circuit court’s order failed to contain sufficient findings of fact or conclusions of law to allow the Supreme Court of Appeals to conduct a proper review. According to the opinion, the plaintiff-respondent sued the debt collector defendants for invasion of privacy and violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act after the defendants attempted to collect debt arising from two convenience check transactions that were allegedly returned as unpaid. The defendants moved to compel arbitration and presented enrollment forms that contained arbitration clauses purportedly signed by the plaintiff-respondent. However, the plaintiff-respondent claimed the enrollment forms were never presented to her, that her signature was applied to the forms electronically after she used a card reader terminal to electronically cash her checks, and that the “signing process was ‘rushed’ and unfair.” Following a brief hearing on the motion to compel arbitration, the circuit court entered an order denying the motion to compel arbitration.
On appeal, the state’s highest court vacated the circuit court’s order, which it found to be “unclear and contradictory in its rulings,” in that the lower court appeared to determine that the plaintiff-respondent had not agreed to the terms of the arbitration agreement, but also appeared to determine that the contract was unconscionable and could not be enforced. The high court remanded the case for further proceedings, including determining whether an arbitration agreement existed, and if it did, whether the agreement was unconscionable.
10th Circuit: Compliance employees must show they went beyond established protocols to obtain FCA whistleblower retaliation protection
On April 30, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a former employee’s False Claims Act (FCA) whistleblower retaliation claims, holding that employees with compliance responsibilities bear the burden of showing that their alleged protected activities are not simply part of their job responsibilities. The case concerned a qui tam relator who alleged her former employer systemically violated the FCA when it knowingly and fraudulently billed the government for inadequately or improperly completed work, and then fired her in retaliation for trying to end the alleged fraud. According to the plaintiff—who was previously employed as a senior quality control analyst responsible for reviewing investigators’ work and documenting incomplete investigations—the company violated the FCA by: (i) “falsely certifying that it performed complete and accurate investigations”; (ii) “falsely certifying that it did proper case reviews and quality-control checks”; and (iii) “falsifying corrective action reports.” The district court, however, entered summary judgment for the company on all counts, determining that the plaintiff’s qui tam claims were “‘substantially the same’ as those that had been publically [sic] disclosed” in previous investigations and news reports, and dismissing her claims under the public disclosure bar. Her retaliation claim was dismissed after the district court determined that she had failed to properly plead that the company was on notice that she was engaging in protected activity.
On appeal, the 10th Circuit concluded that the district court erred in its legal determinations on the qui tam claims, vacated the order for summary judgment, and remanded those claims for further proceedings. However, the 10th Circuit agreed with the district court’s decision to dismiss the plaintiff’s whistleblower retaliation claim, stating that in order to establish FCA whistleblower liability, an employer must know that the employee’s actions were connected to a claimed FCA violation, and an employee “must overcome the presumption that her internal reports of fraud were part of her job.” The appellate court held that because the plaintiff’s allegations did not show that she went outside of established protocols or broke her chain of command, she failed to allege adequately that the company was on notice of her claimed FCA-protected activity.
9th Circuit revives FCRA suit against credit reporting agency
On May 17, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit revived a putative class action lawsuit against a national credit reporting agency for allegedly failing to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy in the plaintiffs’ credit reports, in violation of the FCRA. According to the opinion, the credit reporting agency failed to delete all the accounts associated with a defunct loan servicer, despite statements claiming to have done so in January 2015. As of October 2015, 125,000 accounts from the defunct loan servicer were still being reported, and the accounts were not deleted until April 2016. A consumer filed the putative class action alleging the credit reporting agency violated the FCRA by continuing to report her past-due account, even after deleting portions of the positive payment history on the account. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the credit reporting agency on the consumer’s claim that the credit reporting agency failed to “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy” in her credit report.
On appeal, the court determined that a “reasonable jury could conclude that [the credit reporting agency]’s continued reporting of [the account], either on its own, or coupled with the deletion of portions of [the consumer’s] positive payment history on the same loan, was materially misleading.” Moreover, the appellate court noted that a jury could conclude that the credit reporting agency’s reading of the FCRA “runs a risk of error substantially greater than the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless,” and that the length of delay in implementing the decision to delete the defunct loan servicers accounts “entail[ed] ‘an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.’”
7th Circuit agrees with reduction of attorney’s fees in FDCPA action
On May 15, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit held a prevailing consumer’s request for $187,410 in attorney’s fees was unreasonable in a FDCPA action. In 2014, the consumer and a debt collector settled the consumer’s FDCPA related claims for $1,001 plus attorney’s fees of $4,500. Despite the settlement agreement, the debt collector continued to attempt to collect the debt, and the consumer sued a second time alleging violations of the FDCPA and FCRA. The consumer did not respond to multiple settlement offers from the debt collector, including one in March 2015 for $3,051, proceeding to trial on the FDCPA claim, and subsequently rejected a settlement offer from the debt collector of $25,000 and reasonable attorney’s fees. At trial, the jury only awarded the consumer the $1,000 in FDCPA statutory damages, after which he sought to recover $187,410 in attorney’s fees. The district court reduced his request to $10,875, concluding that the consumer’s rejection of “meaningful settlement offers precluded a fee award in such disproportion to his trial recovery.”
On appeal, the appellate court agreed with the district court that the March 2015 settlement offer of $3,051 was reasonable, rejecting the consumer’s argument that the settlement “was not substantial and therefore should have been disregarded by the district court in determining the fee award.” The appellate court also rejected the consumer’s argument that because the settlement offer disclaimed liability for the debt collector, his results at the jury trial were much better than the settlement as it yielded judgment on the merits. The appellate court noted that settlement offers regularly disclaim liability, and by operation, judgment against the debt collector would still have been entered under Rule 68. Therefore, the appellate court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion when reducing the attorney’s fees to $10,875 based on 29 hours’ worth of work at an hourly rate of $375 prior to the March 2015 settlement offer.
CFPB files suit against New York-based debt-collection law firm
On May 17, the CFPB announced it filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against a New York debt-collection law firm. According to the Bureau’s complaint, between 2014 and 2016 the law firm allegedly initiated more than 99,000 collection lawsuits in an attempt to collect debts through reliance on “non-attorney support staff, automation, and both a cursory and deficient review of account files,” in violation of both the FDCPA and the Consumer Financial Protection Act. The Bureau alleges the lawsuits contained names and signatures of attorneys despite those attorneys “not being meaningfully involved in reviewing the merits of the lawsuits,” including not reviewing pertinent documentation related to the debts, such as account applications, billing statements, payment histories, and the terms and conditions governing an account. The law firm allegedly did not perform reviews of the contracts related to debt sales, despite filing lawsuits on behalf of debt buyers that have been accused of unlawful debt collection practices. The Bureau is seeking an injunction, damages, redress to consumers, and the imposition of a civil money penalty.
California Reinvestment Coalition sues CFPB alleging data collection failures
On May 14, the California Reinvestment Coalition (CRC) announced it filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against the CFPB for allegedly failing to implement Section 1071 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which requires the Bureau to collect and disclose data on lending to small, women, and minority-owned businesses. In the complaint, the CRC argues that the failure to implement Section 1071 violates two provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act. Specifically, the CRC alleges the that Bureau has “unlawfully withheld and unreasonably delayed” the implementation of Section 1071 since Dodd Frank’s passage in 2011, and also, that the Bureau has acted “arbitrarily and capriciously” by informing financial institutions to “not to make [the] inquiries, nor compile, maintain, and submit [the loan application] data” required by Section 1071. The CRC claims that the failure to collect and publish the data has harmed its ability to advocate for access to credit, advise organizations working with women and minority-owned small businesses, and work with lenders to arrange investment in low-income and communities of color. The CRC is seeking the court to invalidate the Bureau’s countermanding of Section 1071’s requirements on financial institutions and an order or writ compelling the Bureau to issue a final rule implementing Section 1071.
Supreme Court holds FCA relators have 10 years to bring nonintervened suit
On May 13, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that a relator has up to 10 years to bring a qui tam suit under the False Claims Act (FCA) whether or not the government intervenes in the suit. According to the opinion, in November 2013, a relator brought a suit against two defense contractors alleging they defrauded the U.S. Government by submitting false payment claims for security services in Iraq through early 2007. The relator claimed he told federal officials about the allegedly fraudulent conduct in November 2010, but the Government declined to intervene. The defendants moved to dismiss the action as barred by the six year statute of limitations under 31 U. S. C. §3730(b)(1), while the relator claimed the action was timely under §3730(b)(2)— which states that a FCA civil action may not be brought “more than 3 years after the date when facts material to the right of action are known or reasonably should have been known by the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances, but in no event more than 10 years after the date on which the violation is committed.” The district court dismissed the action, while the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit reversed the decision, concluding that §3730(b)(2) applies in “nonintervened actions, and the limitations period begins when the Government official responsible for acting knew or should have known the relevant facts.”
Upon review, the Supreme Court rejected the defendants’ argument that the six year statute of limitations in §3731(b)(1) applies to all relator-initiated actions (whether the Government intervenes or not), while § 3731(b)(2) applies only to qui tam actions when the Government intervenes, arguing the interpretation is “at odds with fundamental rules of statutory interpretation.” Moreover, the Court concluded that the relator in a nonintervened suit is not “the official of the United States” whose knowledge triggers §3731(b)(2)’s three-year limitations period, as it was not what Congress intended, and a private relator is neither “appointed as an officer of the United States nor employed by the United States.”