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District Court: Using department store name as creditor is not prohibited under the FDCPA
On March 21, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted a debt collector’s motion for summary judgment in an action alleging that the debt collector violated the FDCPA by failing to name the creditor to whom the debt was owed. According to the opinion, the debt collector sent a consumer an initial demand letter stating it was attempting to collect a debt and named the department store associated with the credit card as the current and original creditor. The consumer initiated an action against the debt collector alleging violations of the FDCPA for failing to specifically name the creditor associated with the department store credit card. Both parties moved for summary judgment. Because the department store’s name was on the credit card, the application, and the billing statements, and consumers are directed to make payments to the department store by mail or online, the court determined that using the creditor’s name “could very well cause confusion and influence a consumer’s decision to pay or challenge the debt.” Using the department store’s name, while potentially a technical misrepresentation, is not a material misrepresentation under the FDCPA because it “would not mislead the least sophisticated consumer or influence a decision about whether to pay or challenge the debt,” as it named the entity the consumer had conducted business with in connection with the debt.
District Court: “Ringless” voicemail is a “call” under the TCPA
On March 25, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted in part and denied in a part a motion to dismiss a putative class action alleging that an auto dealer violated the TCPA by using a “ringless” voicemail platform to leave pre-recorded telemarketing voicemails on consumers’ cell phones without obtaining prior express consent. The defendant moved to dismiss the putative class claims arguing that (i) the plaintiff lacked standing and failed to state a claim because he did not receive a “call” within the meaning of the TCPA; (ii) the plaintiff lacked standing to seek declaratory or injunctive relief; (iii) the TCPA was unconstitutional; and (iv) the complaint failed to adequately allege that the defendant “willfully or knowingly violated the TCPA.”
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff did not receive a “call” as defined by the TCPA, concluding that a ringless voicemail is a call subject to the TCPA restrictions. The court found that the plaintiff had Article III standing because he sufficiently alleged an injury-in-fact and actual harm, including, among other things, invasion of privacy, aggravation, annoyance, and intrusion. The court further found that the plaintiff’s complaint alleged sufficient facts to support the TCPA claim and the allegation that defendant acted willfully or knowingly. The court also rejected defendant’s challenge to the TCPA’s constitutionality. However, the court found the plaintiff could not seek declaratory or injunctive relief because the plaintiff failed to show real and immediate threat of future harm or proffer a basis that would allow the court to infer that the defendant would ever send ringless voicemails again.
CFPB settles with online lead aggregator for $4 million
On March 28, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California entered a stipulated final judgment and order resolving the CFPB’s allegations against a California-based company for allegedly buying and selling personal information from payday and installment loan applications without properly vetting buyers and sellers. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the CFPB’s December 2015 complaint alleged that, among other things, the company (i) knew or should have known that the lead generators in its network used false or misleading statements to obtain consumer information; and (ii) connected consumers with lenders that offered less favorable loan terms than were otherwise available, did not comply with state usury limits, or claimed they were exempt from state regulation and jurisdiction. The stipulated order requires the company to pay $1 million for consumer redress and $3 million in civil money penalties. Additionally, the company is banned from acting as a lead generator, lead aggregator, or data broker in connection with the offering of certain loans. The company neither admitted nor denied the allegations.
11th Circuit: SOL begins on date of mortgage loan acceleration
On March 11, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed a lower court’s dismissal of a consumer’s FDCPA action. The consumer alleged that his mortgage servicer violated the FDCPA by attempting to collect overdue payments beyond Florida’s five-year statute of limitations for foreclosure actions. According to the opinion, the consumer “stopped paying his mortgage in 2008 and has not made payments since then.” In 2009, the servicer invoked an acceleration clause and attempted to foreclose on the property, but the foreclosure action was dismissed in 2011. In 2015, the servicer sent another notice of default, accelerated the debt once again, and filed a second foreclosure action seeking the entire debt, including all delinquent payments since 2008. The consumer filed suit, arguing that the servicer, by seeking pre-2010 debt in 2015, violated the FDCPA’s prohibition on the collection of time-barred debts. The lower court dismissed the action.
On appeal, the 11th Circuit held that the pre-2010 debt sought in the 2015 foreclosure action “was not time-barred as a matter of law” and therefore did not violate the FDCPA. The 11th Circuit found that Florida’s five-year statute of limitations does not necessarily bar the recovery of payments that were originally due more than five years prior to the filing of the foreclosure action. Instead, any time a consumer defaults and the servicer invokes an acceleration clause, the entire debt “comes due” and the five-year clock starts to run.
9th Circuit: Administrator vicariously liable for debt collectors’ alleged TCPA violations
On March 22, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit reversed a lower court’s decision to dismiss TCPA claims against a student loan administrator (defendant), finding that the administrator could be held vicariously liable for a contractor’s alleged debt collection attempts. The plaintiff claimed in her suit that the companies hired by the contracted student loan servicer violated the TCPA by using an autodialer when attempting to contact borrowers to collect payment. The plaintiff argued that the defendant was “vicariously liable” for the alleged TCPA violations of the companies that were hired to collect the plaintiff’s debts, and that the defendant was “similarly liable under the federal common law agency principles of ratification and implied actual authority.” The claims against the collectors and the servicer were dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the lower court ruled on summary judgment that a jury could not hold the defendant responsible for the actions of the servicer.
On appeal, the split three-judge panel held that a reasonable jury could find that the defendant knew of the alleged TCPA violations, and that because the defendant “ratified the debt collectors’ calling practices by remaining silent,” or alternatively, willfully ignored potential violations through its collections arrangement with the servicer, a jury could find a “principal-agent” relationship—even if one did not exist in the contract—and the court should hold it liable for the collectors’ TCPA violations. According to the panel, there was evidence in the record that the defendant “had actual knowledge” of the alleged violations through audit reports provided by the servicer and “did nothing” to ensure that the debt collectors complied with the law. However, the entire panel agreed that the defendant was not per se vicariously liable for the debt collectors’ alleged TCPA violations.
In dissent, Judge Bybee agreed with the panel that the defendant is not per se vicariously liable for the debt collectors’ practices, and noted in addition that there is not enough evidence to show that the defendant consented to practices that violate the TCPA or that it granted the debt collectors authority to violate the law. He wrote, “there is no evidence whatsoever that [the defendant] approved of such practices. In fact, the only evidence in the record is to the contrary: when [the defendant] learned of wrongful practices, it reported them to [the servicer] and asked [the servicer] to correct the problem.”
Law firms settle with CFPB over debt relief fee allegations
On March 27, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California entered a consent judgment ending a CFPB lawsuit against a group of affiliated law firms and their managing attorneys. As previously covered by InfoBytes in 2017, the Bureau’s enforcement action alleged that the defendants violated the Telemarketing Sales Rule by, among other things, (i) collecting improper fees in advance of providing debt relief services; (ii) misrepresenting that advance fees would not be charged; and (iii) providing substantial assistance to another company it knew or should have known was engaged in acts or practices that violated the rule. Under the terms of the consent judgment, the defendants—who have neither admitted nor denied the Bureau’s allegations or the factual findings outlined in the judgment—agreed to pay approximately $35.3 million in redress to affected consumers and a $40 million civil money penalty. However, based on the defendants’ inability to pay this amount, full payment is suspended subject to the defendants paying $50,000 to affected consumers and $1.00 toward the CMP.
1st Circuit: “Sustained Overdraft Fees” are not interest under the National Bank Act
On March 26, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision to dismiss putative class action allegations that a bank charged usurious interest rates on its overdraft products, finding that the bank’s “Sustained Overdraft Fees” are not interest under the National Bank Act (NBA). The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the bank in 2017, alleging that sustained overdraft fees should be considered interest charges subject to Rhode Island’s interest rate cap of 21 percent, and that because the alleged annual interest rates exceeded the cap, the fees violated the NBA. The district court, however, dismissed the case, ruling that the sustained overdraft fees were service charges, not interest charges.
On appeal, the split three-judge panel held that, because the sustained overdraft fees did not constitute interest payments under the NBA and the OCC’s regulations interpreting the NBA, the class challenges cannot move forward. The panel stated that the agency’s interpretation in its 2007 Interpretive Letter is due “a measure of deference.” The panel found the agency’s interpretation persuasive because “[f]lat excess overdraft fees (1) arise from the terms of a bank’s deposit account agreement with its customers, (2) are connected to deposit account services, (3) lack the hallmarks of an extension of credit, and (4) do not operate like conventional interest charges.”
In dissent, Judge Lipez noted that, while the OCC interpretive letter laid out a clear case for overdraft fees as service, not interest charges, it was silent on the question of “Sustained Overdraft Fees.” He wrote that “[s]ilence, however, is not guidance, and we would thus need to infer a ruling on a debated issue from between the lines of the Letter.” Furthermore, he could “not see how we can defer to an interpretation that the OCC never clearly made on an issue that it previously described as complex and fact-specific.”
District Court: Debt collector did not buy right to arbitrate with credit card account
On March 22, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled that a debt collector (defendant) who purchased a consumer’s credit card account failed to establish that the sale of the account included the sale of the right to arbitrate disputes relating to the account. According to the ruling, a bank sold a consumer’s credit card account to the defendant after the plaintiff defaulted on his payments. The agreement between the consumer and the bank included a mandatory arbitration clause, as well as a class action waiver. When the defendant sent a collection letter to the plaintiff, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging the letter violated the FDCPA because, among other things, it included ambiguous language regarding discount payment options. The defendant moved to compel arbitration. The court denied the defendant’s motion, stating that the sale of the accounts does not axiomatically include the right to arbitrate disputes relating to them, and that the defendant had not provided adequate documentation to support the conclusion that it did in this case. The court found that “subject to further argument and possible evidence clarifying possible ambiguity in the use of the term ‘account’ in the assignment,” the court would not presume that the sale of the accounts included the bank’s rights to compel arbitration.
District Court partially grants summary judgment in favor of CFPB in debt collection action
On March 21, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia partially granted the CFPB’s motion for summary judgment against a New York-based company and three individuals for allegedly violating the CFPA and the FDCPA in a debt collection operation, but denied the motion for the remaining defendants—a Georgia-based company and one individual—determining there was a genuine issue of material fact. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in March 2015, the CFPB filed a lawsuit against participants in the debt collection operation, alleging that the participants attempted to collect debt that consumers did not owe or that they were not authorized to collect. Further, the CFPB alleged that the participants used harassing and deceptive techniques, including placing robocalls through a telephone broadcast service provider to millions of consumers, stating that the consumers had engaged in check fraud and threatening them with legal action if they did not provide payment information. As a result, according to the CFPB’s allegations, the participants received millions of dollars in profits from the targeted consumers. The CFPB moved for summary judgment on all claims.
The court granted the motion on all claims against the New York-based company and three individuals, concluding that they committed multiple violations of the CFPA and the FDCPA through, among other things, the robocalls, false legal threats, and the processing of consumer payments. With respect to the CFPA claims against certain individuals, the court found that they provided “substantial assistance” to the other participants in the operation as they committed actions in violation of the CFPA, and therefore were liable themselves. With respect to the Georgia-based company and one individual, the court concluded that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether either qualified as a “debt collector” under the FDCPA and, therefore denied the CFPB’s motion as to those claims. Because there are remaining issues as to some of the participants’ liability, the court concluded that a ruling on damages would be premature.
District Court approves relief order in Spokeo
On March 11, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California approved a stipulation for prospective relief, settling a consumer FCRA action against a purported credit reporting agency (defendant) for alleged procedural violations. In 2016, the case went to the U.S. Supreme Court (covered by a Buckley Special Alert), which remanded the case so the 9th Circuit could fully consider whether the plaintiff had standing under Article III of the Constitution. The approved stipulation lasts three years and, among other things, requires the defendant to (i) post a “clear and appropriately-titled” link to its opt-out privacy form; (ii) create a step requiring that its customers affirmatively agree not to use its information to determine eligibility for a FCRA-related purpose; and (iii) state on all of its webpages that it is not a consumer reporting agency. The order also prohibits the defendant from publishing “any numerical estimates or predictions of consumer credit scores” unless its terms and conditions specify that the information may not be used for FCRA purposes.