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Court holds SEC has not proven pre-ICO cryptocurrency is a “security”
On November 27, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California denied the SEC’s motion for a preliminary injunction against a cryptocurrency company, concluding the agency failed show the currency tokens were “securities” as defined under federal securities laws. According to the order, the SEC filed a complaint against the company in October alleging it falsely claimed its initial coin offering (ICO) was registered and approved by the SEC and other regulators, including using the agency’s seal in marketing materials. At the time of the filing, the SEC claimed the company had already raised more than $2.5 million in pre-ICO sales. The SEC moved for a preliminary injunction to freeze the company’s assets and prevent the company’s owner from buying or selling securities and other digital currency during the pendency of the case. Upon review, the court noted the SEC must establish the company previously violated federal securities laws and there is a reasonable likelihood that it will happen again. The SEC argued the allegedly fraudulent marketing materials used to raise money from 32 “test investors” violated federal securities laws, while the company argued the investors did not have an expectation to receive profits as they were working with the company on the exchange’s functionality and therefore, the currency tokens were not “securities.” The court denied the SEC’s motion, concluding that it could not determine whether the tokens were “securities” under federal law without full discovery as there were disputed issues of material facts, including what the test investors relied on in terms of marketing materials before they purchased the cryptocurrency tokens.
Court grants summary judgment in favor of bank in TCPA action
On November 13, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota held that a bank’s predictive dialing systems do not violate the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), granting summary judgment for the bank. According to the opinion, a customer of a national bank changed his phone number and his previous number was reassigned to the plaintiff in the case. The customer did not inform the bank he had changed his phone number, and between September 2015 and December 2015, the bank called the plaintiff’s cell phone 140 times. The plaintiff subsequently informed the bank he was not a customer and the bank ceased calling the cell phone number. In January 2016, the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging the company violated the TCPA by placing auto-dialed calls to his cell phone. The court stayed the action pending the result of the D.C. Circuit case ACA International v. FCC (covered by a Buckley Sandler Special Alert), which narrowed the FCC’s 2015 interpretation of “autodialer” under the TCPA.
In reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, the court disagreed with the plaintiff that the company’s predictive dialing systems qualified as an autodailer under the TCPA. Citing to ACA International, the court noted that predictive dialers are not always autodialers under the Act, the equipment must have the capacity to randomly or sequentially generate numbers to dial, and the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove the systems has this capability. Moreover, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that it should follow the 9th Circuit, which recently broadened the definition of autodialer under the TCPA (covered by InfoBytes here), concluding that other courts’ narrow interpretations were more persuasive (InfoBytes coverage available here).
5th Circuit denies attorney’s fees in successful FDCPA action based on “outrageous facts”
On November 16, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit affirmed a Texas district court’s denial of attorney’s fees in an FDCPA action, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the fees based on the “outrageous facts” in the case. The decision results from a lawsuit filed by a consumer against a debt collector, alleging the company violated the FDCPA and the Texas Debt Collection Act (TDCA) by using the words “credit bureau” in its name despite having ceased to function as a consumer reporting agency, and therefore misrepresented itself as a credit bureau in an attempt to collect a debt. The district court adopted a magistrate judge’s recommendation and found the company violated the FDCPA, granted summary judgment in part for the plaintiff (while denying the TDCA claims), and awarded her statutory damages of $1,000. The plaintiff then filed a motion for $130,410 in attorney’ fees, based on her attorney’s hourly rate of $450. The magistrate judge denied the attorney’s fees, noting that although violation of the FDCPA ordinarily justifies awards of attorneys’ fees, the amount claimed was “excessive by orders of magnitude,” and the lawsuit appeared to have been “created by counsel for the purpose of generating, in counsel’s own words, an ‘incredibly high fee request.’” The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s order.
On appeal, the 5th Circuit noted that other circuits have held there can be narrow exceptions to the FDCPA’s attorneys’ fees mandate, including the presence of bad faith conduct on the part of the plaintiff. In determining the “extreme facts” of the case justify the district court’s denial of attorney’s fees, the appeals court noted the almost 290 hours claimed to be worked by the attorneys are not reflected in the pleadings filed, which were “replete with grammatical errors, formatting issues, and improper citations.” The poor craftsmanship of the filings, the court noted, did not justify the $450 hourly rate charged.
Supreme Court will not hear 9th Circuit interest on escrow preemption decision
On November 19, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit’s March decision, which held that a California law requiring banks to pay interest on mortgage escrow funds is not preempted by federal law. As previously covered by InfoBytes, a national bank petitioned for writ of certiorari in August, arguing the 9th Circuit’s decision—holding that the Dodd-Frank Act of 2011 codified the existing National Bank Act preemption standard from the 1996 Supreme Court decision in Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson—warranted further review “because it creates significant uncertainty about whether national banks must comply with similar laws in other states” and whether other state banking laws also apply to national banks. Additionally, the petition argued the uncertainty is exacerbated by the fact that the appellate court “disregarded and refused to enforce longstanding OCC regulations” and that the court interpreted the Barnett decision incorrectly.
7th Circuit holds homeowner failed to show harm from servicer’s QWR failing
On November 7, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of a mortgage servicer. The court, noting the District Court had concluded there was insufficient evidence to support a claim the servicer had violated RESPA, affirmed the lower court decision that even if such a violation had occurred, the homeowner plaintiff failed to demonstrate any actual harm from the servicer’s alleged failure to fully respond to his qualified written request (QWR). According to the opinion, in November 2012, a state court entered a judgment of foreclosure against a homeowner who struggled to make payments on his mortgage loan; and after numerous reschedulings due to bankruptcy filings, a sheriff sale was set to be conducted in October 2016. In August 2016, the homeowner sent a letter to his mortgage servicer with “twenty-two wide-ranging questions about his account.” The mortgage servicer treated the letter as a QWR under RESPA, acknowledged receipt of the letter and stated it would provide a substantive response by September 30, the deadline under the statute. Two days prior to the statutory deadline, the homeowner and his wife filed a lawsuit against the mortgage servicer, alleging violations of RESPA and Wisconsin law for failing to respond to the QWR, which they argued, would have provided information to assist in their fight against forthcoming sheriff’s sale. The mortgage servicer mailed a response on September 30, consisting of a three-page letter and 58 pages of attachments, which addressed “most of [the homeowner]’s questions to some degree, but not all of them,” and also invited further information from the homeowner to consider further responses. The district court granted the mortgage servicer’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the homeowner failed to provide evidence the mortgage servicer violated RESPA or state law and failed to show how any alleged failure, even had it occurred, caused harm.
On appeal, the 7th Circuit determined the homeowner had standing to sue the mortgage servicer but his wife did not, as she had no legal interest in the property. As for the alleged RESPA violation, assuming such a violation occurred, the court concluded that the homeowner failed to establish an actual harm that resulted from the mortgage servicer’s alleged violation. Specifically, the appeals court disagreed with the homeowner that the fees paid to an attorney to review the mortgage servicer’s response “could be a cost incurred as a result of an alleged violation” of RESPA. The appeals court also rejected claims of damages for physical and emotional distress because the homeowner’s “stress had essentially nothing to do with any arguable RESPA violations.”
Court holds credit union must face breach of contract claims over overdraft practices
On November 8, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted in part and denied in part a credit union’s motion to dismiss a putative class action challenging the institution’s overdraft practices. As summarized in the order, the plaintiff alleged the credit union improperly charged overdraft fees when the “available balance” of her account, which was calculated by deducting pending debits and deposit holds, was insufficient to cover a transaction, even though the “actual” or ledger balance would have covered the transaction. The plaintiff brought multiple claims against the credit union, including breach of contract and Electronic Funds Transfers Act (EFTA) claims.
The credit union moved to dismiss arguing, in part, that the relevant account agreements referenced the “available balance” method for overdraft purposes and that the term is a “well-known bank term that has long been understood to mean the money in an account minus holds placed on funds to account for uncollected deposits and for pending debit transaction.”
The court disagreed, concluding that “available balance” is not a defined term, is ambiguous, and therefore its meaning presents a factual dispute that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss. The court allowed, however, the EFTA claim to proceed only for violations that occurred within one year of the complaint filing.
DOJ sues international bank for RMBS fraud
On November 8, the DOJ announced it filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against an international bank and several of its U.S. affiliates for allegedly defrauding investors in connection with the sale of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) from 2006 through 2007. Specifically, the DOJ alleges the bank violated the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) based on mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, and other misconduct by “knowingly and repeatedly” making false and fraudulent representations to investors about the quality of the loans backing 40 RMBS deals. The DOJ is seeking an unspecified amount of civil money penalties under five FIRREA claims.
In response to the filing, the international bank issued a statement indicating that it intends to “contest the complaint vigorously,” arguing, among other things, that the risks of RMBS investments were clearly disclosed to investors and that the bank suffered its own losses from investing in the RMBS referred to in the DOJ complaint.
Jury awards mortgage company successor $27.8 million in indemnity RMBS case
On November 8, a federal jury for the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota awarded the ResCap Liquidating Trust, the post-bankruptcy successor-in-interest to Residential Funding Company, LLC (RFC), a $27.8 million verdict in an indemnity case against a correspondent lender. Shortly after RFC’s bankruptcy plan was confirmed in 2013, the ResCap Liquidating Trust filed indemnity and breach of contract lawsuits against more than 80 correspondent lenders, alleging that the loans RFC purchased from the lenders did not comply with applicable representations and warranties, thereby causing RFC to incur liabilities in the form of bankruptcy-allowed claims.
Before trial, the court excluded certain of the lender’s expert witnesses and concluded that under the relevant contracts, the ResCap Liquidating Trust had sole discretion to determine whether a loan was in breach. Thus, the issues for the jury largely were limited to determining the applicability of certain contracts to the loans and assessing damages for the alleged breaches.
Court orders judgement in favor of defendants in FCRA action based on limitations of Wisconsin “alternative-to-bankruptcy” statute
On October 26, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin denied a plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and instead entered judgement in favor of two creditors and two consumer reporting agencies (collectively, “defendants”), holding that the debtor failed to show a factual inaccuracy in the credit reporting of a debt. According to the opinion, the debtor successfully completed an amortization plan under Section 128.21 of the Wisconsin Statues, an “alternative to bankruptcy” law that allows debtors to file an action that establishes “a personal receivership wherein, much like in a federal Chapter 13 ‘wage earners’ bankruptcy, a person may amortize problem debts through a deliberate and scheduled repayment plan.” Subsequently, the debtor submitted disputes to two consumer reporting agencies that still showed balances due on the credit lines for both creditors. In response, the creditors argued that the debtor understated the balances owed to them during the Section 128.21 proceeding and as a result, a balance still existed. The debtor filed suit against the defendants alleging multiple violations of the FCRA. In response, the defendants argued that the state court order dismissing the debtor’s Section 128.21 action only covers the amount of the debt submitted by the debtor in the Section 128.21 proceeding and does not cover the interest and late charges the debtor failed to include in the claim. The district court agreed and dismissed the action, determining that the Wisconsin statute applies only to claims included in the plan and does not dismiss debts in their entirety. The court concluded, “as a result, unless and until a proper tribunal concludes the [Section 128.21] proceeding eliminated the debts in their entirety or that the plan precludes the accrual of post-filing interest and other penalties, [debtor] cannot establish the reported information is factually inaccurate,” and therefore, the debtor’s FCRA claims failed as a matter of law.
Court grants request to stay CFPB payday rule compliance date
On November 6, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas granted two payday loan trade groups’ request to reconsider the court’s June decision to deny a stay of the compliance date (August 19, 2019) of the Bureau’s final rule on payday loans, vehicle title loans, and certain other installment loans (Rule). The court styed the compliance date until further order of the court. The court previously (twice) denied requests to stay the compliance date (covered by InfoBytes here and here). However, the court reconsidered its decision after an October 26 status update, in which the Bureau informed the court of its intention to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking in January 2019 to reconsider parts of the Rule and the compliance date (covered by InfoBytes here).
As previously covered by InfoBytes, the payday loan trade groups filed a lawsuit against the Bureau in April asking the court to set aside the Rule on the grounds that, among other reasons, the Bureau is unconstitutional and the rulemaking failed to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act.