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8th Circuit holds employee failed to plead injuries in FCRA suit against employer, law firm, and credit reporting agency
On September 6, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit held that an employee lacked standing to bring claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) because she failed to sufficiently plead she suffered injuries. An employee brought a lawsuit against her former employer, a law firm, and a credit reporting agency (defendants) alleging various violations of the FCRA after the employee’s credit report that was obtained as part of the hiring process background check was provided to the employee in response to her records request in a wrongful termination lawsuit she had filed. The district court dismissed the claims against the employer and the law firm and granted judgment on the pleadings for the credit reporting agency. Upon appeal, the 8th Circuit, citing the Supreme Court’s 2016 ruling in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (covered by a Buckley Sandler Special Alert), concluded the former employee lacked Article III standing to bring the claims. The court found that the former employee authorized her employer to obtain the credit report and failed to allege the report was used for unauthorized purposes, therefore there was no intangible injury to her privacy. Additionally, the court determined that the injuries to her “reputational harm, compromised security, and lost time” were “‘naked assertion[s]’ of reputational harm, ‘devoid of further factual enhancement.’” As for claims against the law firm and credit reporting agency, the court found that the injury was too speculative as to the alleged failures to take reasonable measures to dispose of her information. Further, whether the credit reporting agency met all of its statutory obligations to ensure the report was for a permissible purpose was irrelevant, as she suffered no injury because she provided the employer with consent to obtain her credit report.
Texas bank petitions Supreme Court over CFPB constitutionality
On September 6, a Texas bank and two associations (petitioners) filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the CFPB’s structure. Specifically, the petition asks the Court (i) whether the CFPB as an independent agency headed by a single director that can only be removed from office for cause violates the Constitution’s separation of powers; (ii) whether a 1935 Supreme Court case upholding removal restrictions on members of the FTC should be overturned; and (iii) weather the CFPB’s “perpetual, on-demand funding streams” are permitted under the Appropriations Clause. The petition results from a 2012 lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of several provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, which resulted in the June decision by the D.C. Circuit to uphold summary judgment against the petitioners. That decision was based on the January 2018 D.C. Circuit en banc decision concluding the CFPB’s single-director structure is constitutional (covered by a Buckley Sandler Special Alert.
District court denies bank’s motion to dismiss; rules homeowner’s claims under California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices can proceed
On September 5, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California denied a national bank’s motion to dismiss certain alleged violations of both the California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Rosenthal Act) and the state’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) as cited in the homeowner’s first amended complaint. According to the order, the plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the bank engaged in debt collection activities that went “beyond the scope of an ordinary foreclosure process” under the Rosenthal Act “when it attempted to collect on the original amount due under the promissory note rather than the [loan modification] agreement.” The bank countered and argued that when it acted as the mortgage loan servicer for the homeowner in the context of foreclosure proceedings it was not subject to liability under the Rosenthal Act because “courts have held ‘that the Rosenthal Act [is] not applicable to residential mortgage loans.” However, the court rejected the bank’s argument and found, among other things, that (i) the homeowner adequately pleaded the bank engaged in debt collection activities; (ii) as determined by the 9th Circuit, “mortgage servicers may be subject to the Rosenthal Act for collection activities surrounding a loan modification agreement”; and (iii) the plaintiff’s allegations concerning the bank’s debt collection practices may be subject to the Rosenthal Act and are sufficient to withstand the bank’s motion to dismiss. Concerning the alleged UCL violation, the court determined that the plaintiff’s factual allegations supported her claims.
5th Circuit rejects enforcement of CFPB CID for failing to allege a violation
On September 6, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit declined to enforce a Civil Investigative Demand (CID) issued by the CFPB against a Texas public records company, after holding the Bureau did not comply with Dodd-Frank when it issued the CID. After initially receiving the CID, the Texas company objected to its Notification of Purpose as inadequate, as it read, “whether consumer reporting agencies, persons using consumer reports, or other persons have engaged or are engaging in unlawful acts and practices in connection with the provision or use of public records information in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act . . . or any other federal consumer law.” In response, the Bureau filed a petition in federal court seeking to enforce the CID and the lower court granted the petition, holding that the Notification of Purpose provided fair notice of the violations under investigation as required by the Dodd-Frank Act. The 5th Circuit disagreed, however, finding that the CID did not identify an alleged violation. The court noted that the CID only made references to the FCRA, a “broad provision of law that the CFPB has authority to enforce,” and “any other federal consumer financial law,” which subsequently “defeats any specificity provided by the reference to the FCRA.” The court emphasized that it could not review the CID under the “reasonable relevance” standard, because the CID failed to identify the conduct under investigation and concluded that the Bureau does not have “unfettered authority to cast about for potential wrongdoing.”
Court approves final class action settlement; previously ruled that extended overdrawn balance charge fees are “interest” under National Bank Act
On August 31, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California granted final approval to a class action settlement, resolving a suit alleging that a national bank’s overdraft fees exceeded the maximum interest rate permitted by the National Bank Act (NBA). According to the order, the settlement ends a putative class action concerning the bank’s practice of charging a $35 “extended overdrawn balance charge” fee (EOBCs) on deposit accounts that remained overdrawn for more than five days when funds were advanced to honor an overdrawn check. Class members argued that the fee amounted to interest and—when taken into account as a percentage of an account holder’s negative balance—exceeded the NBA’s allowable interest rate. The bank countered, stating that “EOBCs were not ‘interest’ and therefore cannot trigger the NBA.” A 2016 order denying the bank’s motion to dismiss, which departed from several other district courts on this issue, found that “covering an overdraft check is an ‘extension of credit’” and therefore overdraft fees can be considered interest under the NBA. The bank appealed the decision to the 9th Circuit in April 2017, but reached a settlement last October with class members.
Under the terms of the approved settlement, the bank will refrain from charging extended overdraft fees for five years—retroactive to December 31, 2017—unless the U.S. Supreme Court “expressly holds that EOBCs or their equivalent do not constitute interest under the NBA.” The bank also will provide $37.5 million in relief to certain class members who paid at least one EOBC and were not provided a refund or a charge-off, and will provide at least $29.1 million in debt reduction for class members whose overdrawn accounts were closed by the bank while they still had an outstanding balance as a result of one or more EOBCs applied during the class period. The bank also will pay attorneys’ fees.
Court approves $17 million class action settlement with mortgage company and real estate service companies for alleged RESPA violations
On August 27, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California approved a class action settlement agreement resolving allegations against a national mortgage company and a real estate services family of companies (defendants) for allegedly arranging kickbacks for unlawful referrals of title services in violation of RESPA. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the 2015 complaint accused the defendants of violating RESPA by allegedly facilitating the exchange of unlawful referral fees and kickbacks through an affiliated business arrangement, while also directing various banks to refer title insurance and other settlement services to a subsidiary in the family of real estate services companies without informing customers of the relationship between the entities. In a stipulation of settlement filed in 2017 alongside a motion for preliminary approval, defendants indicated that they continued “to deny each and all of the claims and contentions alleged in the [a]ction . . . [but] have concluded that the further conduct of the [a]ction against them would be protracted and expensive.” The stipulation further noted that “substantial amounts of time, energy and resources have been and, unless this [s]ettlement is made, will continue to be devoted to the defense of the claims asserted in the [a]ction.”
The approved settlement class encompasses more than 32,000 transactions related to borrowers who closed on mortgage loans originated by the mortgage company between approximately November 2014 through November 2015, and who paid any title, escrow or closing related charges to the real estate services companies. The defendants will pay $17 million into a settlement fund, which covers payment to class members as well as attorney’s fees and costs.
Court approves $8.5 million class action settlement with global money service for alleged TCPA violations
On August 31, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois approved an $8.5 million class action settlement resolving allegations that a global money service violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by sending unsolicited text messages to class members. While the court approved the full settlement amount, it only awarded 5 percent of the fund to the class counsel, as opposed to the 35 percent requested, noting counsel’s “disquieting conduct” related to a class objector and lack of billing records supporting the “substantial work” counsel claimed to have performed on the case (reportedly more than 2.5 times the hours spent by defense counsel). Of the $8.5 million required to be paid by the company, the court modified the agreement to provide class member claims over $7.5 million. The court determined that the settlement “provides fair actual cash value to the class,” as the company had potential defenses to the pending litigation; there was legal uncertainty as to whether the telecommunications equipment used by the company was actually an “automatic telephone dialing system” under the TCPA; and the inherent expense in litigation and proceeding to trial for the class.
8th Circuit: Bank that discharged employees as a “business necessity” did not violate Section 19 of the FDI Act
On August 29, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit affirmed a lower court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of a national bank, holding that the bank did not violate the Federal Deposit Insurance Act’s Section 19 employment ban when it discharged African-American and Latino employees who previously had been convicted of crimes involving dishonesty. Under Section 19, individuals who have been convicted of a crime “involving dishonesty or a breach of trust” cannot be employed by a financial institution covered by federal deposit insurance. A bank that violates the ban is subject to criminal penalties, although an individual may request a waiver from the FDIC. According to the order, the bank screened all home mortgage division employees in 2012 and discharged anyone who was found to have a conviction without providing the option to apply for a waiver. The class members—who brought discrimination claims based on a disparate impact theory—complained that the bank’s automatic discharge of all affected employees impacted African Americans and Latinos at a higher rate than white employees, and contended that the bank could have prevented this result with an alternative such as giving employees “advance notice of the need for a Section 19 discharge, granting leave time to seek a waiver, and/or sponsoring a waiver.” The appellate court relied on data showing that approximately half of waiver applications are approved by the FDIC, and class members presented no data to show that sponsored waivers would ameliorate any racial disparity. In addition, the appellate court held that the bank’s decision to comply with the statute was a business necessity in light of the possibility of a $1 million-per-day fine “even if [the bank’s] policy of summarily terminating or not hiring any Section 19 disqualified individual creates a disparate impact.” Moreover, the appellate court stated that the class members “failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact,” and did not present a less discriminatory alternative that would serve the bank’s interests in compliance with the statute.
Court finds no ECOA violation with credit union’s dispute-free credit report requirement
On August 28, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin dismissed an action against a credit union, holding that the credit union’s decision to consider only dispute-free credit reports of all applicants does not amount to a “prohibited basis” under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). According to the opinion, the credit union required the consumer to remove his disputed debts from his credit report in order for his application for a home equity loan to move forward. After the disputes were removed, the consumer’s credit score dropped below the minimum required by the credit union, and his application was denied. In December 2017, the consumer brought an action against the credit union, alleging that he was discriminated against in violation of ECOA for exercising his dispute rights under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The court rejected the consumer’s arguments, concluding that the FDCPA and the FCRA do not give a consumer a right to dispute debts, but rather a right to ensure that disputed debts are accurately reported as such. The court also rejected the consumer’s theory of recovery under ECOA, finding that his arguments were inconsistent with ECOA’s implementing regulation, Regulation B. The court determined that Regulation B allows a creditor to restrict the types of credit history that it will consider if the restrictions are applied to all applicants without regard to a prohibited basis. Because the dispute-free restriction was applied to all applicants of the credit union equally, the consumer’s claim failed.
8th Circuit holds a garnishment notice sent after receiving a “cease” letter does not violate the FDCPA
On August 27, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit affirmed summary judgment for a law firm, holding that a garnishment notice sent after a consumer requested the company cease communication did not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The court held that sending a notice of garnishment was permissible because a “creditor may communicate with a debtor after receiving a cease letter to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor may invoke specified remedies which are ordinarily invoked by such debt collector or creditor.” The court further held that the notice’s inclusion of a contact phone number did not “transform” the notice into a communication regarding the debt because, while the notice was a “communication regarding the debt in a general sense . . . it still fits within the remedy exception” and it would have been “odd” for the notice not to provide contact information. The court also rejected the claim that the law firm violated the FDCPA by discussing possible resolution of the debt in a subsequent phone call initiated by the consumer, noting that the consumer had asked about the debt, and agreeing with the district court that the phone call was “an unsubtle and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to provoke [the law firm] into committing an FDCPA violation.” The court added that prohibiting debt collectors from responding to a consumer’s inquiries after a cease letter would often force debt collectors to file suit in order to resolve debts, which is “clearly at odds with the language and purpose of the FDCPA.”
Finally, the court rejected the argument that the garnishment notice deceived consumers into contacting the law firm to discuss the legal aspects of the garnishment process, when in fact they would be subjected to debt collection efforts. Applying the unsophisticated consumer standard, the court held that the garnishment notice was not deceptive because it did not state that phone calls would be answered by attorneys prepared to answer questions solely about garnishment, and the consumer’s belief to the contrary was “the exact sort of peculiar interpretation against which debt collectors are protected by the objective element of the unsophisticated consumer standard.”