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CFPB urges court for final judgment in order to appeal constitutionality determination
On August 10, the CFPB submitted a request to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for a pre-motion conference to discuss approval to file a motion requesting entry of final judgment with respect to the court’s June decision, which would allow the Bureau to appeal that decision. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the court had terminated the CFPB as a party to an action with the New York Attorney General’s office (NYAG) against a New Jersey-based finance company and its affiliates (defendants), concluding that the CFPB’s organizational structure is unconstitutional and therefore, the agency lacks authority to bring claims under the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA). The court determined that the NYAG, however, had plausibly alleged claims under the CFPA and New York law and had the independent authority to pursue those claims.
In its letter, the CFPB argues that the conditions of Rule 54(b) are met because (i) there are multiple parties still involved in the litigation; (ii) the court’s decision as to the Bureau’s claims is final; and (iii) there is no just reason for delay. Moreover, the CFPB argues that allowing the NYAG to proceed with claims under the CFPA without the Bureau’s “statutorily-assigned right to participate in CFPA claims brought by state regulators” would result in hardship or injustice that could be alleviated by an immediate appeal. Additionally, the CFPB asserts that the issues to be appealed—the constitutionality of the Bureau’s structure and whether the for-cause removal provision is severable from the rest of the CFPA—are separable from the issues that remain to be decided between the NYAG and the defendants.
In response to the Bureau’s letter, the NYAG argued that, regardless of the court’s decision under Rule 54(b), the court should not stay the case and should resolve all of its claims. The defendants responded that they do not oppose the Bureau’s Rule 54(b) request but believe NYAG’s claims should be stayed during the pendency of the Bureau’s appeal, arguing that the Bureau implied this in their request. The Bureau subsequently denied any implication that the NYAG’s claims should be stayed.
National bank petitions for cert in 9th Circuit preemption decision
On August 14, a national bank filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court requesting review of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit’s March decision, which held that a California law that requires the bank to pay interest on mortgage escrow funds is not preempted by federal law. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the 9th Circuit held that the Dodd-Frank Act of 2011 essentially codified the existing National Bank Act preemption standard from the 1996 Supreme Court decision in Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson. In May, a panel of three judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit denied the petition for an en banc rehearing. In its petition, the bank argues that the appeals court decision warrants further review “because it creates significant uncertainty about whether national banks must comply with similar laws in other states” and whether other state banking laws also apply to national banks. The petition argues the uncertainty is exacerbated by the fact that the appellate court “disregarded and refused to enforce longstanding OCC regulations.” The bank contends that the 9th circuit interpreted the decision in Barnett incorrectly, and when a state law limits “a national bank’s federal authority to set the terms for their products and services, it is preempted by the National Bank Act.”
Court holds RESPA loss mitigation claim is ripe prior to a foreclosure sale
On August 14, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that RESPA (and its implementing Regulation X) does not require a plaintiff to wait until a property is foreclosed upon to bring an action for a violation of Regulation X’s loss mitigation requirements. The plaintiff filed a complaint against her mortgage servicer for (among other claims) allegedly violating RESPA when the company initiated a foreclosure action while she had a pending loss mitigation application, even though the company did not ultimately foreclose on the property. The company moved to dismiss the RESPA claim as unripe and the court disagreed, finding there is no language in the statute or implementing regulation that states a plaintiff must wait. Conversely, the implementing regulation “expressly states that the prohibited action is a servicer making ‘the first notice or filing required by applicable law…’” and, therefore, the plaintiff’s claim did not fail for lack of ripeness. The court ultimately dismissed the plaintiff’s action against the company, however, finding the plaintiff did not adequately plead actual damages, and granted the plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint.
3rd Circuit rules student loan servicer must comply with CID
On August 13, in a divided opinion that is not precedential, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit affirmed a lower court’s decision to grant a petition filed by the CFPB to enforce a civil investigative demand (CID) issued to a student loan servicer, rejecting arguments that the scope of the Bureau’s investigation was too broadly defined. The Notification of Purpose in the CID at issue named the entirety of the servicer’s business operations, without identifying any specific conduct, when the CFPB sought records to determine whether the servicer’s practices violated federal consumer financial laws. The servicer objected to the Notification of Purpose and petitioned the Bureau to set aside or modify the CID because it did not adequately “state the nature of the conduct constituting the alleged violation which is under investigation and the provision of law applicable to such violation.” The appellate court held that the servicer’s “contention rests on the flawed assumption that the CFPB could not investigate all of [the servicer’s] conduct,” and that, moreover, “[n]othing prohibits the CFPB from investigating the totality of [the servicer’s] business activities, and courts have previously enforced administrative subpoenas regarding conduct that is coextensive with the recipient’s business activity.”
7th Circuit reverses district court, holds settlement with debt collector moots claims against law firm
On August 13, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit vacated a district court’s decision, holding that a consumer who settled with a debt collector is not entitled to pursue Fair Debt Collection Practices Act statutory damages claims against the debt collector’s law firm. Under the single recovery for a single injury principle, a consumer can only obtain one recovery for a single injury “regardless of how many defendants could be liable for that single injury, or how many different theories of recovery could apply to that single injury.” In this instance, the consumer settled the claim with the debt collector for $5,000 plus release of the consumer’s original debt. The consumer later sued the debt collector’s law firm, spending over $69,000 on attorneys’ fees to argue that the law firm filed suit to collect the debt in the wrong court. While the district court ordered the law firm to pay the attorneys’ fees to the consumer, the 7th Circuit reversed, holding that the settlement with the creditor rendered the consumer’s claim against the law firm moot and thus the consumer could not recover attorneys’ fees or costs.
Court enters summary judgment in favor of bank in wrongful foreclosure action
On August 3, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts entered summary judgment in favor of a national bank regarding a mortgage borrower’s allegations that the bank engaged in, among other things, predatory lending, wrongful foreclosure, and violations of Massachusetts’ unfair or deceptive practices (UDAP) law. As to the wrongful foreclosure claim, the borrower alleged that the bank lacked the legal authority to foreclose on his property because the chain of title was compromised and the mortgage transfers were invalid prior to the bank becoming the holder of the mortgage through assignments. The court rejected the borrower’s arguments because Massachusetts law allows for “splitting the note” as long as the mortgage documents are unified at the time of foreclosure, and there was no reason to question the validity of the prior assignments. The court rejected the borrower’s predatory lending claim because the bank was not the original lender of the mortgage note and had no duty to negotiate a modification because the borrower was already in default when the bank became the holder of the mortgage. The court also dismissed the UDAP claim on procedural grounds.
7th Circuit says inspection company that left door hangers is not a debt collector
On August 10, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit affirmed a lower court’s ruling that a company (defendant) that performed inspections for a mortgage servicer is not a “debt collector” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and was not liable for claims brought by a putative class of homeowners. According to the opinion, the defendant entered into a contract with the mortgage servicer to perform inspections to determine whether properties were still occupied for homes with defaulted mortgage payments of 45 days or more if the servicer was unable to contact the homeowner directly. When performing the inspections, the defendants left door hangers on the plaintiffs’ properties containing instructions to contact the mortgage servicer, which the plaintiffs claimed violated the FDCPA's disclosure requirements, including the requirement to disclose the creditor’s name, the amount owed, and that the debtor can dispute the debt. However, the lower court ruled—and the appellate court affirmed—that the defendant was not a “debt collector” for purposes of the FDCPA. The court found that the activities did not constitute direct debt collection because the door hangers did not demand payment and did not reference the underlying debt. The court also held that the defendant was not engaged in “indirect” debt collection, agreeing with the characterization of the lower court that the activities were more akin to those of a “messenger” than those of an “indirect” debt collector.
District Court rules student loan servicer must turn over Department of Education borrower records to Bureau
On August 10, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania ordered a loan servicer hired by the Department of Education (Department) to service loans it owns to turn over certain Department-owned student loan borrower documents to the CFPB, which relate to the servicer’s collection and management of its federal student loan borrowers’ payments. During the course of the ongoing litigation (see previous InfoBytes coverage here), the servicer withheld the documents in discovery on the grounds that they belonged to the Department and were therefore protected from disclosure by the Privacy Act. Moreover, the servicer asserted that the dispute was really between the Bureau and the Department because, in order to turn over the documents, the servicer would first have to obtain permission from the Department.
However, according to the opinion issued by the court, turning over the documents would not violate the defendants’ agreement with the Department or violate federal privacy law. Specifically, the court stated that “there is no dispute that the borrower documents at issue are in the possession of [d]efendants, even if, as [d]efendants assert, they are owned by the Department,” and as such, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “requests can be made for production of documents, electronically stored information, and things in ‘the responding party’s possession, custody or control.’” Furthermore, the court stated that “the Privacy Act’s general prohibition on disclosure of records . . . does not create a qualified discovery privilege” and cannot be used as a means to “block the normal course of court proceedings, including court-ordered discovery.”
District Court dismisses ADA claim against credit union on standing grounds
On August 7, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed claims that a credit union’s website violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), holding that the plaintiff lacked standing because he was not (and was ineligible to be) a member of the credit union. According to the opinion, the plaintiff is permanently blind and alleged that the credit union’s website did not comply with ADA requirements that are applicable to online website accessibility. The district court granted the credit union’s motion to dismiss on standing grounds, finding the plaintiff had no plausible reason to use the credit union’s website because the website was directed at members of the credit union, and the plaintiff was not (and was ineligible to be) a member.
Maryland Court of Appeals holds foreign securitization trusts do not need to be licensed in the state as collection agencies
On August 2, the Maryland Court of Appeals, in a consolidated appeal of four circuit cases, held that foreign statutory trusts are not required to obtain a debt collection agency license under the Maryland Collection Agency Licensing Act (MCALA) before filing foreclosure actions in state circuit courts. The decision results from two cases consolidated before the Court of Special Appeals and two actions appealed directly from circuit court proceedings, in which substitute trustees acting on behalf of two Delaware statutory trusts initiated foreclosure proceedings on homeowners who had defaulted on their mortgage payments. The homeowners challenged the foreclosure actions, arguing that the Delaware statutory trusts acted as collection agencies under MCALA by “obtain[ing] mortgage loans and then collet[ing] mortgage payments through communication and foreclosure actions” without being licensed. The lower courts dismissed all four foreclosure actions, finding the Delaware statutory trusts did not fall under the trust exemption to MCALA and were in the business of collecting consumer debts and therefore, subject to the MCALA licenses requirements, which both trusts had not obtained.
The overarching issue presented in the consolidated appeal was whether the Maryland General Assembly intended a foreign statutory trust, as owner of a delinquent mortgage loan, to obtain a license as a collection agency before directing trustees to initiate foreclosure proceedings. The court concluded that the plain language of MCALA was ambiguous as to the question and therefore, analyzed the legislative history and other similar statutes in order to determine the intent of the 1977 version of the law, as well as the reason the Department of Labor Licensing and Regulation revised the law in 2007 by departmental bill. Ultimately, the appeals court found the lower courts erred in dismissing the foreclosure actions against the homeowners, holding the General Assembly did not intend for MCALA to apply to foreclosure proceedings generally and therefore, foreign statutory trusts are not required to obtain a license under MCALA to initiate foreclosure proceedings.