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District Court granted final approval of a $5.7 million class action overdraft fee settlement
On April 22, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York granted final approval of a $5.7 million class action settlement resolving allegations related to overdraft fees applied to certain bank account transactions. According to plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for preliminary approval, the bank was sued in 2020 for allegedly unfairly assessing and collecting overdraft fees on “Authorize Positive, Purportedly Settle Negative Transactions” (APPSN fees) as well as NSF fees. The bank denied the allegations and moved to dismiss, contending that the relevant account agreements are unambiguous, and that even if there were, “extrinsic evidence resolves the ambiguity in its favor on the whether the fees at issue are permitted.” In August 2021, the parties notified the court that they had reached an agreement. Under the terms of the preliminarily approved settlement, the bank will make a $4.25 million cash payment and will “forgive, waive, and agree not to collect an additional” $1.5 million in uncollected overdraft fees. Class members, defined as all current and former bank customers with consumer checking accounts who were charged a relevant fee between December 4, 2013, and November 30, 2021, will automatically receive their pro rata share of the settlement fund without having to prove they were harmed from the bank’s practices. There are no claim forms, and class members will be determined through the bank’s checking account data. A formula will be used to calculate each class member’s distribution. Under the terms of the settlement approximately $2.9 million will go towards customers who were charged APPSN fees, while roughly $1.3 million will be allocated for customers who were charged retry NSF fees.
9th Circuit affirms district court’s ruling in TCPA case
On April 5, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision denying a defendants’ motion to compel arbitration in a putative class action under the TCPA. The defendants were a digital marketing company and a debt-relief service company. According to the opinion, the plaintiffs visited the defendants’ websites, but allegedly did not see a notice in fine print stating, “I understand and agree to the Terms & Conditions which includes mandatory arbitration.” The underlined phrases “Terms & Conditions” and “Privacy Policy” were hyperlinks, but they appeared in the same gray font as the rest of the sentence. The marketing company and one of the defendants allegedly used the consumer’s contact information to conduct a telemarketing campaign on behalf of the debt relief companies by allegedly placing unsolicited telephone calls and text messaging consumers. The plaintiffs filed a putative class action, alleging that the calls and text messages were made without their consent, and therefore violated the TCPA. The defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that, by clicking on the “continue” buttons, the plaintiffs had agreed to the mandatory arbitration provision hyperlinked in the terms and conditions. The district court denied the defendants’ motion, concluding “that the content and design of the webpages did not conspicuously indicate to users that, by clicking on the ‘continue’ button, they were agreeing to [the service company’s] terms and conditions.”
On appeal, the 9th Circuit agreed with the district court, finding that the digital marketing company’s website did not contain a reasonably conspicuous notice of its terms and conditions. The 9th Circuit ruled that such notice must be expressly displayed in a font size and format where it can be deemed that a reasonable Internet visitor saw it and was aware of it. The appellate court noted that, on the websites at issue, “[t]he text disclosing the existence of the terms and conditions … is the antithesis of conspicuous,” and that “is printed in a tiny gray font considerably smaller than the font used in the surrounding website elements, and indeed in a font so small that it is barely legible to the naked eye. The comparatively larger font used in all of the surrounding text naturally directs the user's attention everywhere else.” The 9th Circuit also held that, “while it is permissible to disclose terms and conditions through a hyperlink, the fact that a hyperlink is present must be readily apparent. …[T]he design of the hyperlinks must put such a user on notice of their existence.”
District Court compels college operator to testify in CFPB CID challenge
On April 20, a magistrate judge for the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah issued a report and recommendation in a CFPB action seeking to compel testimony from a private, non-profit operator of several colleges as part of its petition to enforce a 2019 civil investigative demand (CID). The CID seeks information about (i) the operator’s private student loan program to determine whether its private financing program violated federal consumer financial laws; and (ii) litigation involving the operator’s student loan program in which it has been a party in since 2012. The CID also sought testimony for what it said was an investigation into whether the operator had misled student borrowers about the offered loans or signed them up for loans without their knowledge or consent—a potential UDAAP violation. Former Bureau Director Kathleen Kraninger previously denied a petition to set aside the CID (and ultimately ratified its enforcement), but offered to narrow the CID’s scope to only require testimony regarding the first of these topics on the condition that the operator would testify as scheduled. The Bureau filed a petition to enforce the CID after the operator failed to comply. The operator challenged the Bureau’s single-director structure (which was addressed in rulings issued by the U.S. Supreme Court in Seila Law v. CFPB and Collins v. Yellen, covered by a Buckley Special Alert here and InfoBytes here), and argued, among other things, that the CID was “overly broad” and “burdensome.”
The magistrate judge rejected the majority of the operator’s arguments, which included constitutional arguments, lack of relevance, abuse of process, and that the demand is too indefinite, overly broad and burdensome. The magistrate judge concluded that enforcing the compromise offered by the Bureau back in 2019 would be an equitable solution and give the agency the necessary information without imposing undue burden, explaining that the defendant “has now had multiple years to prepare witnesses for deposition and should not be unduly burdened to answer questions regarding its own private-student-loan program.”
District Court grants final approval to class action data breach settlement against national convenience store chain
On April 20, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted final approval to a settlement in a class action against a national convenience store chain (defendant) for a 2019 data security incident that allegedly compromised consumers’ credit and debit card information. As previously covered by InfoBytes, class members claimed that “despite the foreseeability of a data breach” the defendant, among other things, “failed to implement adequate measures to protect the sensitive, non-public payment card information entrusted to it by its customers.” In May 2021, the court ruled that the defendant must face certain claims filed by a group of financial institutions (covered by InfoBytes here). In August, the court granted preliminary approval of the settlement, which required the defendant to provide monetary relief to class members totaling approximately $9 million, plus $3.2 million for attorneys’ fees and expenses and class representative service awards, in addition to requiring the defendant to take additional measures for a period of two years to prevent future unauthorized intrusions. The settlement includes three tiers of customers, who will receive gift cards for either $5 or $15, or $500 in cash, depending on the level of their injury caused by the data breach.
District Court lowers punitive damages award in FCRA dispute
On April 8, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied in part and granted in part a defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and alternative motion for a new trial, after concluding that the debt collector violated the FCRA by incorrectly reporting medical debts on the plaintiff’s credit reports despite allegedly receiving 31 separate disputes challenging the validity of the debt. The plaintiff contended that the medical debts in question belonged to his father, and that due to the inaccurate reporting, he was denied credit by two lenders. At trial, after finding that the defendant failed to conduct a reasonable investigation into the plaintiff’s FCRA disputes as required by the statute, a jury awarded the plaintiff $80,000 in actual damages and $700,000 in punitive damages for willful violations. The defendant challenged the award and requested a new trial, arguing that the court improperly admitted hearsay testimony, that the plaintiff failed to prove he suffered emotional damage, and that the jury’s punitive damages award was too high.
The court denied defendant’s request for a new trial, finding that the plaintiff suffered emotional damages and that the “verdict could be supported ‘without considering the challenged testimony.’” With respect to the amount of punitive damages awarded, the court concluded that the defendant’s actions were “highly reprehensible” and “callous” in the way it processed consumers’ disputes. However, in comparing the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages in other cases, the court determined that $700,000 was too high based on the actual damages award and lowered the punitive damages to $475,000 to be consistent with Eleventh Circuit law. The court concluded, “to be sure, the high punitive damages award likely reflects the jury’s assessment of Defendant’s callous behavior throughout the eighteen months of processing Plaintiff’s approximately thirty disputes, and Defendant’s employees’ testimony which confirmed that such treatment would likely repeatedly occur with countless other consumers,” adding that “given the size of [the defendant], and the number of disputes handled annually, it is not surprising that the jury deemed a high punitive damages award necessary to send the Defendant a deterrence message.”
District Court grants final approval in usury class action settlement
On August 16, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted final approval of a class action settlement resolving a purported scheme to unlawfully use tribe-owned firms to make online short-term loans and charge triple-digit interest rates. According to the memorandum of law in support of plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement and the stipulation and agreement of settlement, the district court previously approved two class settlements related to the lending enterprise. The first resulted in the purported lender and others: (i) repaying over $53 million dollars in cash; and (ii) forgiving over $380 million dollars of debt owed by consumers who took out loans with three lending companies. However, these settlements did not resolve every claim surrounding the purported scheme, and did not resolve claims with the settling defendant. The plaintiffs claimed that the settling defendant assisted the purported lender’s operations despite a corporate spinoff in May 2014, alleging that “[b]ecause many [of the purported lender’s] employees with institutional knowledge of and involvement in the company’s rent-a-tribe lending business were quickly transferred to [the settling defendant], [the purported lender] required and depended on continued involvement by [the settling defendant] and its employees in operating its rent-a-tribe lending business, which involvement was freely and often provided.” Under the terms of the preliminarily approved settlement, the settling defendant must provide monetary relief to class members totaling approximately $45 million.
District Court grants final approval of $10 million class action settlement
On April 11, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted final approval to a $10 million class action settlement resolving allegations that a defendant bank breached its payment card processing servicing contracts with merchants by imposing excessive fees without contractually required notice. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant was “unjustly enriched by imposing early termination fees that constituted unlawful penalties.” The settlement class includes over 200,000 merchants that entered into a payment card processing servicing contract with the defendant and who paid at least one of the fees underlying the litigation from October 2011 to the settlement date. Those fees include annual fees, early termination fees, and paper statement fees. According to the memorandum in support of the unopposed motion for preliminary approval of class settlement, the deal would provide $10 million in cash to the settlement class, and attorneys representing the class can seek up to one-third of that fund in attorneys’ fees. In addition, each of the three class representatives will be granted $10,000 service awards, per the motion.
District Court rules “informational harm” does not create standing in FDCPA case
On April 6, the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut granted a defendant law firm’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in a putative class action, ruling the plaintiff lacked standing to bring a claim for abusive debt collection under the FDCPA. The plaintiff incurred a debt that was placed with a collection agency. The collection agency sent the plaintiff a letter, to which the plaintiff sent three letters disputing the debt and requesting validation of the debt as well as the agency’s authority to collect on the debt. According to the plaintiff, she never received the requested verification. The original creditor eventually hired the defendant to collect the debt. The defendant sent its own letter enclosing verification of the debt. The plaintiff sued alleging the defendant’s letter violated Section 1692g(b) of the FDCPA, which requires debt collection efforts to cease after timely dispute of a debt until the debt collector provides verification of the debt to the debtor. According to the plaintiff, her previous requests for validation triggered obligations under Section 1692g(b) with respect to the defendant, thus obligating the defendant to cease collection efforts until the validation information was provided to the plaintiff. She also asserted violations of Section 1692(e) on the grounds that an attorney did not meaningfully review her file before the defendant’s letter was sent. The defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings on two grounds: lack of standing and failure to state a claim that defendant violated the FDCPA.
The court agreed with the defendant that the plaintiff failed to show an injury-in-fact, as required for Article IIII standing, and instead only alleged informational harm including confusion caused by the defendant’s letter. The court held that confusion is not a legally cognizable injury and found that the plaintiff lacked standing because she did not suffer a cognizable injury.
9th Circuit: Defendant is liable for third-party calls
Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part a district court’s ruling that a defendant knew its third-party contractor was making pre-recorded calls to prospective consumers without consumers’ consent in violation of the TCPA. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in December 2017, consumers filed a consolidated class action against a cruise line, alleging violations of, among other things, the TCPA for marketing calls made to class members’ cell phones using an automatic telephone dialing system between November 2016 and December 2017. The suit alleged that the defendant hired a company to generate leads and initiate telephone calls to prospective consumers for cruise packages. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California denied dismissal of the TCPA action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the Court’s decision in Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants Inc., did not invalidate the TCPA in its entirety from 2015 until July 2020. In Barr the U.S. Supreme Court held that the TCPA’s government-debt exception is an unconstitutional content-based speech restriction and severed the provision from the remainder of the statute. (Covered previously by InfoBytes here.)
On the appeal, the issue was whether the defendant is liable under the TCPA for prerecorded voice calls made by the third-party contractor to the plaintiffs, who had not given prior express consent to be called. The 9th Circuit agreed with the district court’s decision in granting summary judgment for the defendant where the TCPA did not require the defendant to ensure that the third-party contractor had prior express consent for each call that it made to the defendant’s customers, nor did the defendant have actual authority over the third-party contractor. However, the 9th Circuit concluded that the defendant may be vicariously liable for the third-party contractor’s calls because it might have ratified them. The appellate court noted that the defendant knew that it received 2.1 million warm-transferred calls from the company between January 2017 and June 2018, but only 80,081 of those transfers were from individuals who had allegedly consented to receiving the calls. The defendant also had knowledge that there was a slew of mismatched caller data, and that the third-party contractor placed calls using prerecorded voices. The appellate court wrote that, “[t]hese facts, in combination with the evidence of widespread TCPA violations in the cruise industry, would support a finding that [the defendant] knew facts that should have led it to investigate [the company’s] work for TCPA violations.”
10th Circuit: Extended overdraft fees do not qualify as interest under the NBA
On April 8, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concluded that extended overdraft fees do not legally qualify as interest under the National Bank Act (NBA). According to the opinion, after the plaintiff overdrew funds from his checking account, the bank covered the cost of the item and charged an initial overdraft fee. The bank later began imposing an extended overdraft fee each business day following the initial overdraft, ultimately assessing 36 separate overdraft fees. The plaintiff filed a putative class action, contending that the bank’s extended overdraft fees qualify as interest under the NBA, and that the amount charged (which he claimed translated to an effective annualized interest rate between 501 and 2,462 percent) violated the NBA’s anti-usury provisions because it exceeded Oklahoma’s maximum annualized interest rate of 6 percent. While the plaintiff recognized that the initial overdraft fee qualifies as a “deposit account service,” he argued that the extended overdraft fee “‘is an interest charge levied by [the bank] for the continued extension of credit made in covering a customer’s overdraft’ and therefore cannot be considered connected to the same banking services that [the bank] provides to its depositors.” The district court disagreed and dismissed the action for failure to state a claim after determining that the bank’s extended overdraft fees were fees for “deposit account services” and were not “interest” under the NBA.
In affirming the district court’s dismissal, the appellate majority (an issue of first impression in the 10th Circuit) agreed that the fees qualify as non-interest account fees rather than interest charges under the NBA. The majority deferred to the OCC’s 2007 Interpretive Letter, which addressed the legality of a similar overdraft program fee structure. The letter “represents OCC’s reasonable interpretation of genuinely ambiguous regulations, and OCC’s determination that fees like [the bank’s] extended overdraft fees are ‘non-interest charges’ is neither plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulations it interprets,” the majority wrote. “As ‘non-interest charges’ under § 7.4002, [the bank’s] extended overdraft fees are not subject to the NBA’s usury limits, and [plaintiff] fails to state a claim,” the majority added.
The dissenting judge countered that extended overdraft fees are interest, and that the OCC’s interpretation did not deserve deference because these fees “unambiguously” meet the definition of interest under 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001(a). According to the dissenting judge, this regulation provides that “‘interest’ ... includes any payment compensating a creditor ... for an extension of credit,” and that as such, the “definition maps onto extended overdraft fees like [the bank’s]” and thus the plaintiff had stated a claim.