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7th Circuit: Collector did not violate FCRA by obtaining a “propensity-to-pay score”
On December 22, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of a defendant debt collector in an FCRA action alleging a plaintiff’s credit information was acquired without a permissible purpose. The plaintiff and her husband jointly filed for bankruptcy protection. The bankruptcy court ordered a discharge of their debts, which included a debt incurred by the plaintiff’s husband that was being serviced by the defendant. The defendant was notified of the discharge (which included each of the four former last names used by the plaintiff) and scanned its system for affected accounts; however, by the time it received notice of the bankruptcy, it had already closed the account it had been servicing. Later, another account bearing one of the plaintiff’s former names was placed with the defendant. The defendant sent the account to a third-party vendor to see if the individual had filed for bankruptcy protection and did not received any bankruptcy results. It then ordered a “propensity-to-pay-score” from a credit reporting agency. The plaintiff’s records were eventually updated by the third-party vendor with information about the bankruptcy, and the defendant closed the account. However, the plaintiff noted the soft inquiry on her credit report and sued, alleging the defendant did not have a permissible purpose to make such an inquiry. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant.
On appeal, the 7th Circuit determined that the plaintiff had suffered a concrete injury, concluding that an “unauthorized inquiry into a consumer’s propensity‐to‐pay score is analogous to the unlawful inspection of one’s mail, wallet, or bank account.” However, after reviewing the merits of the case, the appellate court held that an alleged invasion of privacy was not enough for it to overturn the district court’s ruling. There was no negligent violation of the FCRA “because no reasonable juror could conclude that the inquiry into [the plaintiff’s] propensity‐to‐pay score resulted in actual damages,” the appellate court wrote. Additionally, while the 7th Circuit acknowledged that the plaintiff’s debt was discharged by the time the defendant obtained her propensity-to-pay score, there was no willful violation of the FCRA because the defendant “lacked actual knowledge of the bankruptcy” and “did not recklessly disregard the possibility that debt had been discharged.” The appellate court added that the evidence showed that the defendant “had a reasonable basis for relying on its procedures.”
Agencies file amicus brief on use of term “applicant” in ECOA
On December 16, the CFPB filed a joint amicus brief with the DOJ, Federal Reserve Board, and the FTC arguing that the term “applicant” as used in ECOA and its implementing rule, Regulation B, includes both those seeking credit as well as persons who have sought and have received credit (i.e., current borrowers). (See also a Bureau blog post discussing the brief.) The amicus brief is in support of a plaintiff in an action where the plaintiff consumer sued a national bank for closing his credit card account without providing an explanation for the adverse action as required by ECOA. The case is currently on appeal before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit after a district court determined that ECOA protections only apply “during the process of requesting credit and do not protect those with existing credit accounts.”
The central issue identified in the brief revolves around whether ECOA applies beyond persons seeking credit to persons who have already received credit. The brief focused on this issue by analyzing (i) ECOA’s text, history and purpose; (ii) the application of Regulation B; and (iii) alleged incorrect interpretations in the underlying defendant’s arguments. In looking at the text of ECOA, the brief asserted that ECOA applies to “applicants” without regard to how their credit is resolved because ECOA defines “applicant” as “any person who applies to a creditor directly for an extension, renewal, or continuation of credit, or applies to a creditor indirectly by use of an existing credit plan for an amount exceeding a previously established credit limit.” In further analyzing the statutory text, the brief further explained that ECOA also gives consumers the right to adverse action notices, which include the “revocation of credit” as well as a “change in the terms of an existing credit arrangement”—actions, the brief stated, “that can be taken only with respect to persons who have already received credit.” The brief also stated that legislative history shows it was Congress’s intent to reach discrimination “in any aspect of a credit transaction.”
In looking at the context of Regulation B, the brief asserted, among other things, that ECOA’s protections continue to apply after an applicant receives credit, explaining that Regulation B “did so by defining ‘applicant’ to include, ‘[w]ith respect to any creditor[,] … any person to whom credit is or has been extended by that creditor.’” Moreover, the brief asserted, ECOA provides a private right of action, which allows aggrieved applicants to file suits for alleged ECOA/Regulation B violations. In this instance, the term “applicant” cannot be meant to refer only to consumers with pending credit applications because otherwise a consumer whose application was denied on a prohibited basis would have no private right of action recourse. These references, the brief emphasized, “further confirm that the term “applicant” is not limited to those currently applying for credit.”
5th Circuit says bank and mortgage servicer did not engage in “dual tracking”
On December 15, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendants in a mortgage foreclosure action. According to the opinion, after the plaintiff fell behind on his mortgage payments, the defendant bank’s mortgage servicer approved him for a trial loan modification plan that required timely reduced payments for a period of three months. The plaintiff stated that he complied with the trial plan but that the defendant bank nevertheless foreclosed on his property and sold the property to a third defendant. The plaintiff further claimed that he did not learn about the sale of his property until two months after it happened when the third defendant sought to evict him. The plaintiff sued the bank and mortgage servicer for violating RESPA and the Texas Debt Collection Act (TDCA), and sued the purchaser of the property “asserting claims to quiet title and for trespass to try title.” All defendants moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted based on evidence that refuted each allegation. The plaintiff appealed.
On appeal, the 5th Circuit first reviewed, among other claims, the plaintiff’s RESPA claim, which alleged the bank and mortgage servicer engaged in “dual tracking” by initiating foreclosure proceedings while the plaintiff’s trial modification plan was purportedly still active. According to the court, dual tracking occurs when “the lender actively pursues foreclosure while simultaneously considering the borrower for loss mitigation options.” The appellate court agreed with the district court’s conclusion that summary judgment was appropriate because the plaintiff did not submit his first payment by the deadline established under the trial modification plan, and thus “did not timely accept the Trial Modification Plan.” As such, the bank and mortgage servicer did not engage in “dual tracking” because there was no obligation to notify the plaintiff of any denial of a permanent loan modification or to provide an opportunity to appeal, and accordingly was not considering the plaintiff for loss mitigation options. The court also found deficiencies in the plaintiff’s Texas law and TDCA claims.
6th Circuit: OSHA required testing is allowed
On December 17, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit lifted the stay on the federal government’s rule requiring employers with 100 or more employees to ensure their employees are vaccinated against Covid-19 or be subjected to weekly Covid-19 testing. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the U.S. Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) published a rule in the Federal Register requiring employers to develop, implement, and enforce a mandatory Covid-19 vaccination policy, unless they adopt a policy requiring employees to choose between vaccination or regular testing for Covid-19 and wearing a face covering at work. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued a nationwide stay on the emergency temporary standard (ETS), which mandates that all employers with 100 or more employees require employees to be fully vaccinated or be subject to a weekly Covid-19 test (covered by InfoBytes here). The 5th Circuit stay, which was in response to a legal challenge filed by several states along with private entities and individuals, affirmed the court’s initial stay. The 5th Circuit said OSHA’s enforcement of the ETS is illegitimate and called it “unlawful” and “likely unconstitutional.” Furthermore, the 5th Circuit ordered OSHA to “take no steps to implement or enforce the Mandate until further court order.”
On the appeal, the 6th Circuit lifted the stay in a 2-1 ruling, stating that “[b]ased on [OSHA’s] language, structure and Congressional approval, OSHA has long asserted its authority to protect workers against infectious diseases." The appellate court also noted that “OSHA relied on public health data to support its observations that workplaces have a heightened risk of exposure to the dangers of COVID-19 transmission.” However, one judge dissented, writing that “[v]accines are freely available, and unvaccinated people may choose to protect themselves at anytime. And because the [Secretary of Labor] likely lacks congressional authority to force them to protect themselves, the remaining stay factors cannot tip the balance.”
9th Circuit partially reverses unauthorized EFTs action
On December 20, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part a district court’s dismissal of an action under the EFTA against a national bank related to alleged unauthorized electronic fund transfers. The plaintiff, a foreign national who resided primarily outside the U.S., held several accounts with the defendant, including the checking account at issue. According to the plaintiff, “through unknown means, unidentified individuals gained access to her [] checking account in October 2017 and began making unauthorized withdrawals without her knowledge.” A separate bank flagged a large transfer from the plaintiff’s account and reached out to the defendant’s fraud department. That bank ultimately refunded the plaintiff’s money; however, according to the opinion, the defendant allegedly did not change the plaintiff’s account number and password, freeze her account, or inform her of the unauthorized transfer. From November 2017 through March 2019, more than 100 additional unauthorized withdrawals were made. The plaintiff acknowledged that she did not report any of these unauthorized transactions until March 2019, claiming she had been overseas with “‘very limited or no’ internet access to check her bank statements.” While some of the unauthorized withdrawals were reimbursed through the defendant’s internal dispute-resolution process, the defendant allegedly “refused to reimburse her for $300,000 of the losses she suffered, citing her failure to report the initial unauthorized withdrawals within 60 days of their appearance on her bank statements, as the EFTA ordinarily requires.” The plaintiff sued, claiming that the defendant violated the EFTA or, alternatively, California’s EFTA counterpart, and asserting various other state law claims. The district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, ruling that because the plaintiff “failed to report the withdrawals at issue” within the required time frame, “the EFTA bars her claim as a matter of law.”
On appeal, the 9th Circuit determined that the plaintiff plausibly alleged sufficient facts under the EFTA to suggest that “the subsequent unauthorized transfers for which she sought reimbursement would still have occurred.” While the plaintiff did not dispute that she failed to report any of the unauthorized withdrawals to the defendant within EFTA’s 60-day reporting period, she argued that her compliance was excused based on her limited access to her banking records and that the defendant “was already aware of the initial $29,000 withdrawal in November 2017[.]” The appellate court agreed with the district court that the plaintiff failed to “plausibly explain how someone with [her] financial means lacked adequate internet access to view her banking records for more than a year.” The 9th Circuit also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that she did not need to report the unauthorized withdrawals by virtue of the defendant’s communications with the other bank, agreeing that the EFTA “says nothing about a bank receiving notice from third-party sources unaffiliated with the consumer”
However, the 9th Circuit disagreed with the district court’s decision to dismiss the EFTA claim or its California counterpart, after concluding that the plaintiff satisfied her pleading burden by alleging facts “plausibly suggesting that even if she had reported an unauthorized transfer within the 60-day period, the subsequent unauthorized transfers for which she [sought] reimbursement would still have occurred.” The panel emphasized that a consumer may be held liable for unauthorized transfers occurring after the 60-day period only where the bank establishes that those transfers “‘would not have occurred but for the failure of the consumer’” to report the earlier unauthorized transfer within the 60-day period. The district court “overlooked this requirement, and the error was not harmless,” the appellate court explained.
CFPB’s debt-collection suit can proceed
On December 13, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware ruled that the CFPB can proceed with its 2017 enforcement action against a collection of Delaware statutory trusts and their debt collector for, among other things, allegedly filing lawsuits against consumers for private student loan debt that they could not prove was owed or that was outside the applicable statute of limitations. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) According to the court’s opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Seila Law v. CFPB (which determined that the director’s for-cause removal provision was unconstitutional but was severable from the statute establishing the Bureau—covered by a Buckley Special Alert) upended its previous dismissal of the case, which had held that the Bureau lacked enforcement authority to bring the action when its structure was unconstitutional. The court also previously ruled that the Bureau’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that former Director Kathy Kraninger’s subsequent ratification of the action came after the limitations period had expired. (Covered by InfoBytes here.)
In now finding that the CFPB can proceed with the 2017 enforcement action, the court rejected the statute of limitations argument because, under the Supreme Court’s ruling that unconstitutional removal protections do not automatically void agency actions, the Bureau’s action in 2017 was valid and it stopped the three-year clock when it sued. While the court recognized the defendants’ argument that the Bureau first discovered the alleged violations on September 4, 2014, when it issued a civil investigative demand and then sued on September 18, 2017 (allegedly exceeding the three-year limit by two weeks), the court noted that at this stage it could not find a time bar because nothing on the “face of the complaint” supports the defendants’ argument that the allegations are untimely.
The court also held that the Bureau did not need to ratify the suit. Pointing to the majority opinion in the Supreme Court’s decision in Collins v. Yellen (covered by InfoBytes here), the court stated that “‘an unconstitutional removal restriction does not invalidate agency action so long as the agency head was properly appointed[,]’” and therefore the agency’s actions are not void and do not need to be ratified, unless a plaintiff can show that “the agency action would not have been taken but for the President’s inability to remove the agency head.” The court wrote: “This suit would have been filed even if the director had been under presidential control. It has been litigated by five directors of the CFPB, four of whom were removable at-will by the President. . . . And the CFPB did not change its litigation strategy once the removal protection was eliminated. This is strong evidence that this suit would have been brought regardless.”
The court also disagreed with the defendants’ argument that, as trusts, they are not “covered persons” under the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA). While the defendants argued that they used subservicers to collect debt and therefore did not “engage in” providing services listed in the CFPA, the court stated that the trusts were still “engaged” in their business and the alleged misconduct even though they contracted it out. “[I]f Congress wanted to allow enforcement against only those who directly engage in offering or providing consumer financial services, it could have said so,” the court said.
District Court grants SBA’s summary judgment in Covid-19 relief disclosure case
On December 13, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in a Freedom of Information (FOIA) case in favor of the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) (defendant), resolving allegations that the agency improperly withheld loan payment status and tax-identification numbers for recipients of loans under its Paycheck Protection Program (PPP). As previously covered by InfoBytes, national-news organizations filed an action against the SBA seeking disclosure of loan recipient information, after the rejection of their FOIA requests. The court previously ordered the SBA to disclose some information—loan amounts, names, addresses—but later gave the SBA a second chance to argue against disclosure of default status and tax-identification numbers.
According to the most recent opinion, the SBA ultimately satisfied Exemption 4 to FOIA (related to confidential or privileged commercial or financial information) as to the current loan status of the PPP loans by filing declarations from lenders stating that they “customarily and actually treat interim PPP loan status as confidential.” The court also concluded that disclosure would concretely cause harm to an interest protected by the FOIA exemption, accepting the agency’s arguments that identifying a delinquent borrower, even if that status is temporary or ultimately irrelevant, could “negatively impact the borrower’s reputation or creditworthiness, or adversely affect its survivability and growth,” and that “disclosure would cause ‘regulated lenders [to] lose confidence in the agency’s future ability to protect confidential information . . . creat[ing] an incentive not to participate in the agency’s programs.’” Regarding tax-identification numbers, the court accepted the SBA’s assertion that it could not separate Social Security Numbers (SSN) from Employer Identification Numbers (EIN) and only release the EINs. Withholding the identification number data set was therefore permissible under Exemption 6 to FOIA, regarding “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” The SBA had attempted to get the help of the IRS and Social Security Administration to differentiate the numbers, but both agencies concluded they could not legally release that information to the SBA.
District Court: Debt collectors may rely on information supplied by credit card issuer
On December 2, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment in an FDCPA action over an alleged disputed debt, ruling that defendants are allowed to rely on information supplied by a credit card issuer that a “debt owned has been verified and is owed.” The plaintiff opened a credit card in 2015 and stopped making payments on the card in June 2018. After she stopped making payments, the plaintiff sent notices of dispute to the credit card issuer contesting, among other things, whether the issuer owned the account, and received correspondence back from the issuer with information about where disputes about the debt should be directed. The issuer also explained that based on an investigation into her account, the issuer believed the account to be valid. Several months later, the defendants sent a demand letter on behalf of the issuer to the plaintiff using the address associated with the account, and later filed a collection lawsuit in state court seeking judgment to recover the unpaid balance.
The plaintiff sued, accusing the defendants of violating Sections 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(5), and 1692e(10) of the FDCPA when they initiated the collections action. Among other claims, the plaintiff argued that she never received the demand letter. She also contended that the defendants should have known about the disputes. The court, however, agreed with the magistrate judge’s final orders and judgment, which ruled that it is not a requirement of the FDCPA for the defendants to confirm that a notice was received as a condition of filing the state court action. According to the court, the plaintiff identified no evidence that mail sent to the address used by the defendants was returned as undeliverable. The court also agreed that the plaintiff’s notices of dispute “did not challenge that she opened the account or was responsible for the charges,” and that the defendants submitted bank statements showing that the plaintiff made payments on the account.
6th Circuit affirms decision compelling arbitration in data breach case
On December 2, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision dismissing a nationwide putative class action against an e-commerce provider, holding that challenges raised to the validity of an agreement to arbitrate were for the arbitrator to decide, not the court. According to the opinion, the plaintiff class, including four minor individuals, filed suit after the defendant allegedly failed to protect millions of customers’ personal account information that was then obtained in a 2019 data breach. The opinion noted that the defendant’s Terms of Service contained an arbitration agreement, a delegation provision, a class action waiver, and instructions regarding how to opt-out of the arbitration agreement. The district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration after rejecting the plaintiffs’ arguments that the arbitration clause is “invalid” and “unenforceable” as to the minor plaintiffs under the infancy doctrine.
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that there was an issue of fact regarding whether four of the plaintiffs had agreed to the Terms of Service, and that the defenses of infancy and unconscionability rendered the Terms of Service invalid. According to the appellate court, though “a contract exists and . . . the delegation provision itself is valid, the arbitrator must decide in the first instance whether the defenses of infancy and unconscionability allow plaintiffs to avoid arbitrating the merits of their claims.” The appellate court further agreed with the district court that “[i]t’s not about the merits of the case. It’s not even about whether the parties have to arbitrate the merits. Instead, it’s about who should decide whether the parties have to arbitrate the merits.”
District Court says bank’s arbitration clauses apply to PPP loans
On November 23, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey granted a national bank’s motion to compel arbitration in an action concerning the bank’s alleged mishandling of Paycheck Protection Plan (PPP) loan applications. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit claiming the bank’s PPP loan disbursement process allegedly favored wealthy clients over smaller, less wealthy clients to maximize the bank’s origination fees. The plaintiff alleged that because the bank did not process applications on a “first-come, first-served” basis, the plaintiff did not receive its PPP loan in a timely manner. The bank moved to compel arbitration, “arguing that questions of arbitrability are for the arbitrator to decide in the first instance.” The plaintiff argued that the arbitration clauses in the bank’s agreements applied only to disputes regarding bank deposit accounts, and not to other financial products such as PPP loans. The court stayed the case and granted the bank’s motion to compel arbitration, noting that the bank’s deposit account agreement and online services agreement both include arbitration clauses. These clauses, the court stated, are “clear evidence” that the bank intended an arbitrator to decide questions related to scope. “Accordingly, Plaintiff must bring its claim before the arbitrator in the first instance, even if it contests the scope of arbitrability,” the court wrote.