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District court enters $13.9 million judgment in FTC robocall action
On July 27, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida entered a nearly $13.9 million partially suspended judgment against six corporate and three individual defendants (collectively, “defendants”) allegedly operating an illegal robocall scheme offering consumers credit card interest rate reduction services in violation of the FTC Act and the Telemarketing Sales Rule. The action is part of a 2019 FTC crackdown on illegal robocalls named “Operation Call it Quits,” which included 94 enforcement actions from around the country brought by the FTC and 25 other federal, state, and local agencies (covered by InfoBytes here). According to the complaint, the defendants made deceptive guarantees to consumers that, for a fee, they could lower their credit card interest rates to zero percent permanently for the life of the credit card debt. However, the FTC alleged that not only do consumers not see a permanent reduction on their credit card interest rates, in some instances, the defendants obtained new credit cards with promotional “teaser” zero percent interest rates that only lasted a limited time, after which the interest rates increased significantly. Moreover, the defendants allegedly failed to tell consumers that they would have to pay additional bank or transaction fees. In addition, the complaint contended that the defendants also (i) initiated illegal telemarketing calls to consumers, including many whose phone numbers appear in the National Do Not Call Registry; (ii) tricked consumers into providing personal financial information, including social security numbers and credit card numbers; and (iii) in many instances, applied for credit cards on behalf of consumers who did not agree to use the service without their knowledge, authorization, or express informed consent.
The court’s order enters a nearly $13.9 million judgment, which will be partially suspended due to inability to pay. The defendants are also prohibited from collecting or assigning any right to collect payments from consumers who purchased the service, and are permanently banned from, among other things, engaging in the illegal behaviors involved in the action and from using the information obtained from consumers during the robocall operation.
Massachusetts Appeals Court holds deficiency debt notice should be applied retroactively
On July 21, the Massachusetts Appeals Court held that a 2018 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s (SJC) decision in Williams v. American Honda Fin. Corp., which resolved a conflict in state law regarding the proper way for a creditor to calculate a consumer’s deficiency debt in an automobile repossession notice, should be applied retroactively. After a consumer defaulted on his car loan, his creditor sent him a presale repossession notice advising him that the amount owed would be reduced by the money received from the sale of the vehicle. This notice was insufficient under Williams, but the creditor argued that the decision should only apply prospectively, and the Superior Court agreed and dismissed the consumer’s complaint. The consumer appealed.
In Williams, the SJC resolved a conflict as to whether the Massachusetts Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), G. L. c. 106, §§ 9-600, or the Massachusetts Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act (RISA), G. L. c. 255B should be used to calculate a consumer’s deficiency debt in an automobile repossession notice. While both statutes contain similar elements, they also contain conflicting provisions, which the SJC resolved in Williams by holding that all automobile repossession notices are required to state that the consumer’s deficiency debt will be calculated, in accordance with RISA, based on the difference between the unpaid balance and the vehicle’s fair market value. The SJC further determined that the fair market value language in RISA displaces the UCC’s inconsistent safe harbor provision.
The Appeals Court first noted that decisions in Massachusetts construing a statute are presumptively given retroactive effect. The Appeals Court further held that Williams is intended “to give effect to the clear meaning of a statute designed to protect consumers,” which was “best accomplished through retroactive application.” In agreeing with the consumer, and noting that because Williams does not include a retroactive-prospective analysis, the Appeals Court stated that “there are no exceptional circumstances that would justify departure from the presumption of retroactivity.”
9th Circuit affirms $142 million settlement in bank sales practices action
On July 20, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed (in a published and an unpublished opinion) a $142 million class action settlement between a nationwide class of consumers and a national bank, concluding the class was unified by a claim under federal law. The published opinion specifically affirmed the district court’s holding that the class satisfied the predominance requirement under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the unpublished memorandum disposition, the 9th Circuit affirmed the district court’s certification of the settlement class, approval of the settlement, award of attorneys’ fees, and approval of notice.
As previously covered by InfoBytes, the settlement covers a 2015 class action lawsuit regarding retail sales practices that involved bank employees creating deposit and credit card accounts without obtaining consent to do so. In April 2017, the bank agreed to expand the original settlement class to include claims dating back to May 2002, resulting in a settlement amount of $142 million. The district court certified the class and approved the settlement. Objectors appealed, arguing that the class did not satisfy the predominance requirement, because the court did not do a choice-of-law analysis.
On appeal, the 9th Circuit upheld the district court’s rulings on the settlement, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding the class met the federal predominance requirements. Specifically, the appellate court held that the FCRA claim unified the class, allowing the class to “show that the FCRA’s elements were proven by a common course of conduct.” Moreover, the appellate court concluded that the “existence of potential state-law claims did not outweigh the FCRA claim’s importance.” In a separate unpublished memorandum opinion, the appellate court affirmed, among other things, the award of attorney’s fees, which were “well below the 25% benchmark.”
District court approves MDL data breach settlement
On July 21, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California issued an order approving a $117.5 million class action settlement, including $23 million in attorneys’ fees, with a global internet company to resolve multidistrict litigation concerning the exposure of class members’ sensitive information stemming from multiple data breaches. The settlement approval follows a fairness hearing, as the court originally denied preliminary approval due to several identified deficiencies (covered by InfoBytes here), including that the settlement inadequately disclosed the sizes of the settlement fund and class, as well as the scope of non-monetary relief, and “appear[ed] likely to result in an improper reverter of attorneys’ fees.” Last July, the court preliminarily signed off on a revised settlement, conditionally certifying a class of U.S. and Israeli residents and small businesses with accounts between 2012 and 2016 that were affected by the breaches. These class members have been certified in the final approved settlement, which requires the company to provide class members with either two years of credit monitoring services or alternative compensation for members who already have credit monitoring. Among other things, the company will allocate at least $66 million each year to its information security budget until 2022, will increase the number of full-time security employees from current levels, and will “align its information security program with the National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework” and “undertake annual third-party assessments to ensure compliance” with the framework.
4th Circuit affirms arbitration clause waiving statutory rights is unenforceable
On July 21, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, holding that the arbitration agreements operated as prospective waivers of federal law and were thus unenforceable. According to the opinion, a group of Virginia borrowers filed suit against two online lenders owned by a sovereign Native American tribe and their investors (collectively, “defendants”). In the action, the plaintiffs contended that they obtained payday loans from the defendants, which included annual interest rates between 219 percent to 373 percent—an alleged violation of Virginia’s usury laws and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The defendants moved to compel arbitration, which the district court denied, concluding that choice-of-law provisions—such as “‘[t]his agreement to arbitrate shall be governed by Tribal Law’; ‘[t]he arbitrator shall apply Tribal Law’; and the arbitration award ‘must be consistent with this Agreement and Tribal Law’”—prospectively excluded federal law, making them unenforceable.
On appeal, the 4th Circuit agreed with the district court despite a “strong federal policy in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements.” Most significantly, the appellate court rejected the defendants’ assertion that the choice-of-law provisions did not operate as a prospective waiver. The court noted that while the choice-of-law provisions “do not explicitly disclaim the application of federal law, the practical effect is the same,” as they limit an arbitrator’s award to “remedies available under Tribal Law,” effectively preempting “the application of any contrary law—including contrary federal law.” Moreover, the appellate court concluded that under the arbitration agreement, borrowers would be unable to effectively pursue RICO claims against the defendants, and more specifically, would be unable to “effectively vindicate a federal statutory claim for treble damages” under RICO. Thus, because federal statutory protections and remedies are unavailable to borrowers under the agreement, the appellate court concluded the entire agreement is unenforceable.
Foreclosure relief operation ordered to pay $40,000 penalty in CFPB action
On July 23, the CFPB announced that the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California entered a stipulated final judgment and order against a foreclosure relief services company, along with the company’s president/CEO (defendants), resolving CFPB allegations that the defendants engaged in deceptive and abusive acts and practices in connection with the marketing and sale of purported financial-advisory and mortgage-assistance-relief services to consumers. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in September 2019, the CFPB filed a complaint alleging that since 2014, the defendants violated the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA) and Regulation O by, among other things, making deceptive and unsubstantiated representations about the efficacy and material aspects of its mortgage assistance relief services, as well as making misleading or false claims about the experience and qualifications of its employees. The Bureau also alleged the defendants’ misrepresentations constituted abusive acts and practices because consumers “generally did not understand and were not in a position to evaluate the accuracy of [the defendants’] marketing representations or the quality of the mortgage-assistance-relief services that [the defendants] sold.” Moreover, the Bureau claimed the defendants further violated Regulation O by charging consumers advance fees before rendering services.
The stipulated final judgment suspends $3 million in consumer redress based upon the defendants’ sworn financial statements and disclosures of material assets that detailed their inability to pay, but orders the defendants to pay $40,000 in civil money penalties. Additionally, the judgment permanently restrains the defendants from offering mortgage relief and financial advisory services and subjects the defendants to certain reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
5th Circuit affirms arbitration in UDAAP action
On July 16, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court’s order compelling arbitration in a lawsuit brought by consumers refuting their liability on a commercial loan, arguing that a Mississippi-based bank “violated numerous state and federal consumer protection laws throughout the loan process.” According to the opinion, the consumers allege a bank representative instructed them to form an LLC and purchase a large plot of land with a commercial loan, as opposed to a consumer loan, in order to receive a “lower interest rate and protection from personal liability[.]” As a part of the transaction, the consumers signed an arbitration agreement that covered “‘any dispute or controversy’ arising from the transaction.” The consumers subsequently filed suit, arguing, among other things, that the bank committed “an unfair, deceptive, abusive act, or practice…by coaxing the [consumers] into forming an LLC and taking out a less favorable commercial loan” rather than a consumer loan, which they originally sought. The bank moved to compel arbitration, and the district court granted the motion and dismissed the action with prejudice.
On appeal, the 5th Circuit agreed with the district court, rejecting the consumers’ argument that there was not a valid agreement to arbitrate. The appellate court concluded that the agreement was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable, noting that the consumers voluntarily entered into the agreement and the provision entitling “the victor in arbitration to recover fees from the losing party” was not “one-sided or oppressive.” Moreover, the appellate court concluded that the consumers failed to provide any federal policy or statute that would support their additional argument that the bank’s alleged UDAAP violation would void an otherwise valid arbitration agreement. Thus, the panel affirmed the district court’s order.
9th Circuit: FCRA claim cannot prevail without first providing notice of disputed information
On July 14, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of a group of defendants, including a credit reporting agency (CRA) and furnisher, after determining that a consumer plaintiff failed to adequately notify the CRA of an error on her credit report. According to the opinion, the plaintiff questioned the accuracy of certain information on her credit report and requested that these inaccuracies be investigated. Defendants investigated and corrected the inaccuracies and informed the plaintiff that if she further disputed the accuracy of the reported information, she could submit additional documentation to support her claim. Plaintiff continued to believe her credit report contained inaccuracies; specifically, she contended that the CRA was misreporting the date on which her bankruptcy was discharged. But rather than notify the CRA, she instead filed suit in federal district court alleging violations under the FCRA. The defendants filed for summary judgment which the district court granted, concluding that while “the date of the bankruptcy may have continued to be misreported after the conclusion of the reinvestigation,’ there was no genuine dispute of material fact on whether [the plaintiff] notified [the CRA] of that specific reporting error.” The 9th Circuit agreed, starting that because the plaintiff failed “to provide adequate notice of this reporting error” the scope of the defendants’ duties were limited. Moreover, the 9th Circuit held that a consumer cannot prevail on a “FCRA claim without first putting the [CRA] on notice of the information that is disputed.”
District court denies interlocutory appeal request in escrow interest action
On July 9, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland denied a national bank’s request for interlocutory appeal of the court’s February decision denying the bank’s motion to dismiss an action, which alleged that the bank violated Maryland law by not paying interest on escrow sums for residential mortgages. As previously covered by InfoBytes, after the bank allegedly failed to pay interest on a consumer’s mortgage escrow account, the consumer filed suit against the bank alleging, among other things, a violation of Section 12-109 of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), which “requires lenders to pay interest on funds maintained in escrow on behalf of borrowers.” The court rejected the bank’s assertion that the state law is preempted by the National Bank Act (NBA) and by the OCC’s 2004 preemption regulations. The court concluded that under the Dodd-Frank Act, national banks are required to pay interest on escrow accounts when mandated by applicable state or federal law.
The bank subsequently moved for an interlocutory appeal. In denying the bank’s request, the court explained that there was not a difference of opinion among courts as to whether the NBA preempts Maryland’s interest on escrow law. Specifically, the court noted that its “conclusion aligns with the only other two courts that have examined [the] particular question,” citing to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lusnak v Bank of America and the Eastern District of New York’s decision in Hymes v. Bank of America (covered by InfoBytes here and here, respectively). After finding there is no “difference of opinion as to any ‘controlling legal issue,’” the court concluded the motion failed to satisfy the requisite elements for an interlocutory appeal.
3rd Circuit: Arbitration clause limiting borrowers’ statutory rights is unenforceable
On July 14, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, holding that an arbitration clause contained within an online tribal lender’s payday loan agreement impermissibly strips borrowers of their right to assert statutory claims and is therefore unenforceable. Specifically, because this “limitation constitutes a prospective waiver of statutory rights,” the lender’s arbitration agreement “violates public policy and is therefore unenforceable.” The plaintiffs filed a putative class action contending that they obtained payday loans from the lender, which included annual interest rates between 496.55 percent to 714.88 percent—an alleged violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and various Pennsylvania consumer protection laws. The defendants moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied the defendants’ arbitration request, ruling that “the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because the arbitrator is permitted only to consider tribal law,” and, therefore, the arbitrator could not consider any of plaintiffs’ federal or state law claims. The 3rd Circuit agreed, rejecting, among other things, the defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs could bring RICO-like claims under tribal law and possibly receive “similar relief.” The appellate court noted: “The question is whether a party can bring and effectively pursue the federal claim—not whether some other law is a sufficient substitute.”