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Plaintiffs file suit challenging Biden’s latest student debt relief plan
On August 4, two nonprofit entities filed a lawsuit against the federal government aimed at blocking the Biden administration’s recent effort to provide debt relief to student borrowers. The administration’s efforts were implemented in response to the Supreme Court’s June 30 decision striking down the DOE’s student loan debt relief program that would have canceled between $10,000 and $20,000 in debt for certain student borrowers (covered by InfoBytes here). The lawsuit, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, targets the administration’s efforts to credit borrowers participating in the Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) plan and Income-Driven Repayment (IDR) plan by providing credit for periods when loans were in forbearance or deferment, which would affect more than 804,000 borrowers, forgiving approximately $39 billion in loan payments, according to the DOE.
As an initial matter, plaintiffs assert that they are injured by the administration’s actions because, as 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations, they benefit from the PSLF program by allowing them to “attract and retain borrower-employees who might otherwise choose higher-paying employment with non-qualifying employers in the private sector.” Thus, according to plaintiffs, cancellation of PSLF loans would reduce the incentive for borrowers to work at public service employers and the decision “unlawfully deprives [PSLF] employers of the full statutory benefit to which they are entitled under PSLF.”
Plaintiffs accuse the administration of putting the plan on an “accelerated schedule apparently designed to evade judicial review.” The plaintiffs assert that the DOE lacks authority to classify “non-payments as payments,” and that the statutes for the PSLF and IDR programs require actual payments to qualify for forgiveness under each plan. The suit brings four claims against the administration: (i) violation of the Appropriation Clause of the U.S. Constitution by canceling debt that Congress did not authorize; (ii) violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by issuing a final agency decision without appropriate statutory authority; (iii) violation of the APA by taking an arbitrary and capricious agency action by failing to “explain why [DOE] has changed its policy from not crediting non-payments during periods of loan forbearance to crediting such payments for purposes of PSLF and IDR forgiveness” and “entirely fail[ing] to consider the cost to taxpayers of crediting periods of forbearance toward PSLF and IDR forgiveness,” among other reasons; and (iv) violation of the APA by failing to undertake notice-and-comment procedures in implementing the changes.
CFPB files reply brief supporting its constitutional structure
On August 3, the CFPB filed a Reply Brief in support of its request to overturn the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, in which the 5th Circuit found that the CFPB’s funding structure violated the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause (covered by InfoBytes here, here, and here, and in a firm article here).
In its Reply Brief, the CFPB argues that Congress did not violate the Appropriations Clause by failing to specify a specific dollar amount to fund the CFPB because “the Appropriations Clause contains no dollar-amount requirement.” In support of that argument, the CFPB points to the Founders’ appropriation of funds for the Post Office and the National Mint where they did not decide the specific amounts of annual funding, the funding structure for the OCC and the Federal Reserve Board, and to current federal appropriations for Social Security payments and unemployment assistance.
The Bureau then argues that even if there was a specific dollar amount requirement, that requirement is nonetheless satisfied because “Congress fixed the CFPB’s maximum annual funding.” According to the Bureau, the fact that it has the discretion to ask for less than the maximum authorized is commonplace and “[t]o this day, Congress routinely appropriates sums ‘not to exceed’ a particular amount;’ that phrase appears more than 400 times in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022.”
The Bureau then aims to refute plaintiff’s arguments that the Appropriations Clause requires time-limited funding laws and imposes special rules for law enforcement agencies. The Bureau argues that the fact that the Constitution includes a specific restriction limiting Congress from funding the army for more than two years dictates that by negative implication there is no such prohibition of a standing appropriation for a different appropriation.
Finally, the Bureau argues that its combination of features is not as unique as CFSA contends, and that even if the Supreme Court ultimately finds the funding structure unconstitutional vacating the Payday Lending Rule is an inappropriate remedy because the 5th Circuit failed “to consider whether the defect it perceived could be cured by severing portions of Section 5497.”
Judge stays CFPB, NY AG lawsuit against auto lender
On August 7, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted a defendant’s motion to stay a lawsuit against an alleged predatory auto lender until the Supreme Court determines the constitutionality of the CFPB’s funding in a separate lawsuit (CFSA Case; covered by InfoBytes here).
The CFPB and the New York Attorney General (AG) brought the complaint in January, accusing the lender of UDAAP and TILA violations that involved tricking consumers into loans financing used cars with high interest rates (typically above 22 percent) and add-on products they could not afford. The CFPB and AG alleged the dealers affiliated with the company (i) engaged in deceptive conduct; (ii) used high pressures sales tactics; (iii) pressured consumers into unaffordable auto loans; (iv) pressured family and friends to cosign the loans; (v) withheld prices of vehicles; and (vi) misrepresented key financial terms of the purchase, violating the CFPB, the Martin Act, and fraud and UDAP statutes, among other allegations.
In its decision, the district court reasoned that the stay awaiting the Supreme Court’s decision would (i) allow for clarity and guidance on the legal issues at hand and it may help the defendant avoid unnecessary litigation costs; and (ii) promote judicial efficiency and minimize the possibility of conflicts with other courts. Furthermore, the court determined that although it would be in the public interest to enforce consumer protection laws, the potential harm to the public caused by the stay is outweighed by the benefit to consumers “in proceeding in a streamlined fashion.” The order requires the parties to file a joint letter updating the court by the earlier of November 3 or one week after a major development in the CFSA case.
CFPB's small biz loan data rule stifled for many banks
On July 31, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas entered an order granting in part and denying in part a motion for a preliminary injunction against the CFPB. The injunction, filed by a bank and two trade associations (collectively “plaintiffs”), aims to prevent the CFPB from enforcing its new final rule, implementing section 1071 of the CPA, which would require financial institutions to collect and provide to the Bureau data on lending to small businesses (covered by InfoBytes here). A 2022 5th Circuit ruling (covered by an Orrick Special Alert here) in a different suit, however, deemed the CFPB’s funding structure unconstitutional.
Plaintiffs urged the 5th Circuit to enjoin enforcement of the small business lending rule pending Supreme Court resolution of the constitutionality of the CFPB’s funding structure, estimating that the burden of complying with the final rule would be $100,000 per community bank, and “the nonrecoverable costs of complying with an invalid regulation constitute irreparable harm,” among other things. The court held that the plaintiff bank had standing because its injury is imminent and not speculative based on the effective date of the final rule, and the costs of preparation for compliance. The court also held that there is a “substantial likelihood” that the plaintiffs would prevail in asserting the final rule is invalid based on the claim that the Bureau’s funding is unconstitutional. The court agreed with plaintiffs’ claim that the costs of compliance with the final rule are “more than de minimis and thus constitute irreparable harm,” despite the CFPB’s argument that the costs of compliance would not be incurred now. Finally, the court held that the CFPB failed to show any evidence that a stay of the final rule will cause harm. While the court entered an injunction, it limited it to the plaintiffs and their members, declining to enter a nationwide injunction as requested by plaintiffs, because “generic reasons such as ‘nationwide scope’ or ‘need for uniformity’ without more are insufficient.”
The final rule is scheduled to go into effect on August 29.
11th Circuit changes course, says one text message sufficient for TCPA standing
On July 24, the full U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit unanimously held that a plaintiff who receives a single, unwanted text message has standing to sue the sender of the message under the TCPA. The decision departs from precedent set by the same court in 2019, in which it determined in a different case that receiving one unsolicited text message is not enough of a concrete injury to establish standing under the statute. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) Plaintiff filed a putative class action against a web-hosting company alleging the defendant violated the TCPA by using a prohibited autodialer to send promotional calls and text messages selling services and products. The settlement agreement reached between the parties also resolved claims brought against the defendant by parties in two other actions.
During settlement discussions, the district court cited the aforementioned 2019 11th Circuit decision and asked the parties to brief how their case, which includes individuals who received only one text message, was distinguishable from the 2019 action. The district court ultimately ruled that class members who only received one text message “lacked a viable claim” in the 11th Circuit under the 2019 precedent, but noted that because the case involves a nationwide settlement, “those class members ‘do have a viable claim in their respective Circuit.’” An objector to the settlement appealed the ruling on various grounds to the 11th Circuit, which dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and held that the class definition did not meet Article III standing requirements, as it included individuals who received a single text message. Plaintiff moved for rehearing en banc, asking the 11th Circuit to reevaluate the 2019 precedent and to clarify the elements necessary to pursue a TCPA claim.
Reviewing de novo the threshold jurisdiction question of whether plaintiffs have standing to sue, the 11th Circuit said that “the harm that underlies a lawsuit for the common-law claim of intrusion upon seclusion” shares a “close relationship” with a “traditional harm.” The appellate court explained that because “[b]oth harms reflect an intrusion into the peace and quiet in a realm that is private and personal[,] [a] plaintiff who receives an unwanted, illegal text message suffers a concrete injury. Because [plaintiff] has endured a concrete injury, we remand this matter to the panel to consider the rest of the appeal.” Recognizing that a single unsolicited text message may not be considered “highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable man” it “is nonetheless offensive to some degree to a reasonable person.” The 11th Circuit also referred to seven other circuit courts that “have declined to consider the degree of offensiveness required to state a claim for intrusion upon seclusion at common law,” and have instead chosen to conclude that “receiving either one or two unwanted texts or phone calls resembles the kind of harm associated with intrusion upon seclusion.” Moreover, the 11th Circuit noted that Congress is given authority under the Constitution “to decide what degree of harm is enough so long as that harm is similar in kind to a traditional harm,” which is “exactly what Congress did in the TCPA when it provided a cause of action to redress the harm that unwanted telemarketing texts and phone calls cause.”
Illinois Supreme Court declines to reconsider BIPA accrual ruling
On July 18, the Illinois Supreme Court declined to reconsider its February ruling, which held that under the state’s Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA or the Act), claims accrue “with every scan or transmission of biometric identifiers or biometric information without prior informed consent.” Three justices, however, dissented from the denial of rehearing, writing that the ruling leaves “a staggering degree of uncertainty” by offering courts and defendants little guidance on how to determine damages. The putative class action stemmed from allegations that the defendant fast food chain violated BIPA sections 15(b) and (d) by unlawfully collecting plaintiff’s biometric data and disclosing the data to a third-party vendor without first obtaining her consent. While the defendant challenged the timeliness of the action, the plaintiff asserted that “a new claim accrued each time she scanned her fingerprints” and her data was sent to a third-party authenticator, thus “rendering her action timely with respect to the unlawful scans and transmissions that occurred within the applicable limitations period.”
In February, a split Illinois Supreme Court held that claims accrue under BIPA each time biometric identifiers or biometric information (such as fingerprints) are scanned or transmitted, rather than simply the first time. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) The dissenting judges wrote that they would have granted rehearing because the majority’s determination that BIPA claims accrue with every transmission “subvert[s] the intent of the Illinois General Assembly, threatens the survival of businesses in Illinois, and consequently raises significant constitutional due process concerns.” The dissenting judges further maintained that the majority’s February decision is confusing and lacks guidance for courts when determining damages awards. While the majority emphasized that BIPA does not contain language “suggesting legislative intent to authorize a damages award that would result in the financial destruction of a business,” it also said that it continues “to believe that policy-based concerns about potentially excessive damage awards under [BIPA] are best addressed by the legislature,” and that it “respectfully suggest[s] that the legislature review these policy concerns and make clear its intent regarding the assessment of damages under [BIPA].”
9th Circuit denies en banc hearing on COPPA preemption question
On July 13, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit entered an order amending an opinion filed on December 28, 2022 and denied a petition for rehearing en banc in a putative class action accusing a multinational technology company and search engine and its affiliated video-sharing platform of collecting children’s data and tracking their online behavior surreptitiously without parental consent in violation of state law and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA). The panel unanimously voted against defendant’s en banc rehearing request, commenting that no other 9th Circuit judge has requested a vote on whether to consider the matter en banc.
Claiming the defendant used “persistent identifiers” — which the FTC’s regulations define as information “that can be used to recognize a user over time and across different Web sites or online services” — class members alleged state law claims arising under the constitutional, statutory, and common laws of California, Colorado, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Tennessee. Last December, the three-judge panel reversed and remanded the district court’s dismissal of the suit, disagreeing that the allegations were squarely covered, and preempted, by COPPA (covered by InfoBytes here.) On appeal, the 9th Circuit considered whether COPPA preempts state law claims based on underlying conduct that also violates COPPA’s regulations. The panel determined that “COPPA’s preemption clause does not bar state-law causes of action that are parallel to, or proscribe the same conduct forbidden by, COPPA. Express preemption therefore does not apply to the children’s claims.” The panel further noted that the U.S. Supreme Court and others have long held “that a state law damages remedy for conduct already proscribed by federal regulations is not preempted.”
The panel, however, amended its prior opinion to note that the FTC supports its conclusion that COPPA does not preempt the asserted state law privacy claims on the basis of either express preemption or conflict preemption. At the end of May, at the 9th Circuit’s request, the FTC filed an amicus brief (covered by InfoBytes here) arguing that COPPA does not preempt state laws that are consistent with the federal statute’s treatment of regulated activities. The panel concluded that neither express preemption nor conflict preemption bar the plaintiffs’ claims.
States urge Supreme Court to find CFPB funding unconstitutional
On July 10, the West Virginia attorney general, along with 26 other states, filed an amicus brief in support of respondents in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Association of America, arguing that the CFPB’s funding structure violates the Constitution and that by operating outside the ordinary appropriations process states are often left “out in the cold.” In their brief, the states urged the U.S. Supreme Court to uphold the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s decision in which it found that the Bureau’s “perpetual self-directed, double-insulated funding structure” violated the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause (covered by InfoBytes here and a firm article here). The 5th Circuit’s decision also vacated the agency’s Payday Lending Rule on the premise that it was promulgated at a time when the Bureau was receiving unconstitutional funding.
Arguing that the Bureau is operating beyond the boundaries established by the Constitution, the states maintained that the current funding mechanism limits Congress’s ability to oversee the agency. “Even if the CFPB has done some good—and some would even dispute that premise—it wouldn't matter,” the states said, warning that “sidelining Congress can greenlight an agency to wreak havoc,” especially if the “agency wields broad regulatory and enforcement powers over the entire U.S. financial system, acts under the control of a single powerful figure, and lacks other protections from meaningful oversight.”
The appropriations process plays a crucial role in enabling states to influence agency actions indirectly, the states maintained, explaining that when an agency initiates a new enforcement initiative or significant rulemaking endeavor, it is required to publicly outline its projected work in order to secure the necessary funding to carry it out. “Disclosure on the front end of the appropriations process can empower affected parties—including the [s]tates—to take quick, responsive actions beyond lobbying their representatives (up to suing to stop illegal action, if need be).” In contrast, the Bureau’s insulation from this process has allowed it to hide its actions from public view, the states wrote. As an example, the Bureau has repeatedly declined to interpret or provide further clarity on how the provisions governing unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices work.
The brief also highlighted examples of when Congress used funding cuts through the appropriations process to curtail agencies’ powers. Additionally, unlike the challenges of amending authorizing statutes, appropriations bills must be passed by Congress each year to avoid a government shutdown, which can be “a painful pill to swallow for the sake of standing up for an agency’s policy choice,” the states noted, adding that “[b]ecause appropriations involves both oversight committees and appropriations committees, agencies may have ‘less flexibility to ally themselves with executive branch officials or interest groups.’”
The states also urged the Court to “ignore doomsaying” about the consequences of finding the funding structure unconstitutional. Should the Court agree to invalidate the funding structure, Congress can pass a proper appropriations bill for the Bureau, the states explained, adding that “a rebuke from this Court would no doubt grease the sticky wheels of the legislative process and move them a bit faster.” Moreover, states could also fill any gaps should Congress somehow pare back the CFPB’s funding, the brief stressed.
Several amicus briefs were also filed this week in support of CFSA, including an amici curiae brief filed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and several banking associations and an amici curiae brief filed by 132 members of Congress, including 99 representatives and 33 senators, which urged the Court to uphold the 5th Circuit’s decision.
CFSA says CFPB funding violates Constitution
On July 3, the Community Financial Services Association of America (CFSA) and the Consumer Service Alliance of Texas filed their brief with the U.S. Supreme Court, urging the high court that the CFPB’s independent funding structure is “unprecedented and must be stopped before it spreads without limit.” Respondents asked the Court to affirm the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, where the appellate court found that the Bureau’s “perpetual self-directed, double-insulated funding structure” violated the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause (covered by InfoBytes here and a firm article here). The 5th Circuit’s decision also vacated the agency’s Payday Lending Rule on the premise that it was promulgated at a time when the Bureau was receiving unconstitutional funding.
The Bureau expanded on why it believes the 5th Circuit erred in its holding in its opening brief filed with the Court in May (covered by InfoBytes here), and explained that even if there were some constitutional flaw in the statute creating the agency’s funding mechanism, the 5th Circuit should have looked for some cure to allow the remainder of the funding mechanism to stand independently instead of presuming the funding mechanism created under Section 5497(a)-(c) was entirely invalid. Vacatur of the agency’s past actions was not an appropriate remedy and is inconsistent with historical practice, the Bureau stressed.
In their brief, the respondents challenged the Bureau’s arguments, writing that the “unconstitutionality of the CFPB’s funding scheme is confirmed by both its unprecedented nature and lack of any limiting principle. Whether viewed with an eye toward the past or the future, the threat to separated powers and individual liberty is easy to see.” Disagreeing with the Bureau’s position that the Constitution gives Congress wide discretion to exempt agencies from annual appropriations and that independent funding is not uncommon for a financial regulator, the respondents stated that Congress gave up its appropriations power to the Bureau “without any temporal limit.” The respondents further took the position that the Bureau “can continue to set its own funding ‘forever’” unless both chambers agree and can persuade or override the president. Moreover, because the Federal Reserve Board is required to transfer “the amount determined by the Director to be reasonably necessary to carry out the [CFPB’s] authorities, . . . it ‘foreclose[s] the application of any meaningful judicial standard of review.’”
The respondents also argued that the Bureau’s funding structure is clearly distinguishable from other assessment-funded agencies in that these financial regulators are held to “some level of political accountability” since “they must consider the risk of losing funding if entities exit their regulatory sphere due to imprudent regulation.” Additionally, the respondents claimed that the fundamental flaws in the funding statute cannot be severed, reasoning, among other things, that courts “cannot ‘re-write Congress’s work’” and are not able to replace the Bureau’s self-funding discretion with either a specific sum or assessments from regulated parties.
With respect to the vacatur of the Payday Lending Rule and the potential for unintended consequences, the respondents urged the Court to affirm the 5th Circuit’s rejection of the rule, claiming it was unlawfully promulgated since a valid appropriation was a necessary condition to its rulemaking. “Lacking any viable legal argument, the Bureau resorts to fear-mongering about ‘significant disruption’ if all ‘the CFPB’s past actions’ are vacated,” the respondents wrote, claiming the Bureau “grossly exaggerates the effects and implications of setting aside this Rule.” According to the respondents, the Bureau does not claim that any harm would result from setting aside the rule, especially since no one has “reasonably relied” on the rule as it has been stayed and never went into effect. As to other rules issued by the agency, the respondents countered that Congress could “legislatively ratify” some or all of the agency’s existing rules and that only “‘timely’ claims can lead to relief” in past adjudications. Additionally, the respondents noted that many of the Bureau’s rules were issued outside the six-year limitations period prescribed in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). This includes a substantial portion of its rules related to mortgage-related disclosure. Even for challenges filed within the time limit, courts can apply equitable defenses such as “laches” to deny retrospective relief and prevent disruption or inequity, the respondents said.
Biden announces FTC nominees
On July 3, President Biden announced his intention to nominate Andrew N. Ferguson and Melissa Holyoak to serve as Republican members of the FTC. Ferguson currently serves as the solicitor general of the Commonwealth of Virginia where he oversees appellate litigation of the state and its agencies. Prior to his time as solicitor general, Ferguson served as chief counsel to U.S. Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell, chief counsel for nominations and constitution to then-Judiciary Committee Chairman Lindsey Graham (R-SC), and senior special counsel to then-Judiciary Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley (R-IA). Ferguson also has extensive antitrust experience, including in litigation before the FTC and DOJ.
Holyoak is currently the solicitor general with the Utah Attorney General’s Office where she oversees areas including civil appeals, criminal appeals, constitutional defense, and the antitrust and data privacy divisions. She is an experienced litigator, where much of her 20 years of practice has focused on consumer protection, Biden said. Before joining the Utah Attorney General’s Office, Holyoak was president and general counsel of the Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based public interest firm that represents consumers challenging unfair class actions and regulatory overreach.
Following the announcement, FTC Chair Lina M. Khan issued a statement congratulating the nominees. The two seats have been vacant since former Commissioner Christine Wilson announced her resignation earlier in the year (covered by InfoBytes here).