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Georgia District Court Rules SEC's Use of Administrative Law Judges In Insider Trading Case "Likely Unconstitutional"
On June 8, in Hill v. Securities And Exchange Commission, Civ. Action No. 1:15-CV-1801-LMM, a Georgia federal judge ruled that the Securities and Exchange Commission’s use of an in-house Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to preside over an insider-trading case was “likely unconstitutional.” In Hill, after a nearly two-year investigation, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) served Charles Hill, a self-employed real estate developer who was not registered with the SEC, with an Order Instituting Cease-And-Desist Proceedings under Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), alleging liability for insider trading in violation of Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14e-3. The SEC alleged that Hill, using inside information he received, purchased and then sold a large quantity of Radiant Systems, Inc. stock, profiting approximately $744,000. In addition to the cease-and-desist order, the SEC sought a civil penalty and disgorgement from Mr. Hill. The SEC sought to collect the civil penalty through an administrative hearing using an in-house ALJ. Mr. Hill filed this action to challenge the SEC’s decision to use an administrative proceeding, and asked the Court to (i) declare the proceeding unconstitutional; and (ii) enjoin the proceeding from occurring until the Court issues its ruling. The Court granted, in part, and denied, in part, his request. After rejecting the SEC’s argument that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Hill’s constitutional claims, the Court rejected Mr. Hill’s arguments that the Dodd-Frank Act, which delegates to the SEC the power to choose between an administrative forum and a federal district court to adjudicate violations of the Exchange Act, constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, and that the SEC’s decision to prosecute claims against him administratively violated his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. However, the Court determined that the SEC’s manner of appointment of administrative judges likely violated the Appointments Clause, because those judges are “inferior officers” that the President or an agency head must appoint. Because the ALJ in this case had not been so appointed, the Court found that Mr. Hill had a likelihood of success on his claims, and entered a preliminary injunction enjoining the SEC administrative proceeding. The Court, however, noted that its decision “may seem unduly technical” because the SEC could easily cure the issue by having the SEC Commissioners appoint the ALJ, or by presiding over the matter themselves.
Second Circuit Rules National Security Agency's Collection of Phone Data Unlawful Under USA PATRIOT Act
In ACLU et al. v. Clapper et al., No. 14-42-CV, --- F.3d ----, 2015 WL 2097814, (2d Cir. May 7, 2015), the Second Circuit reversed a lower court’s ruling that the NSA’s bulk collection of phone data can be lawfully conducted under the USA Patriot Act. The district court had dismissed the ACLU’s complaint, holding that the program was authorized under the Patriot Act. The Second Circuit vacated that ruling and remanded the matter back to the District Court.
In remanding the matter back to the district court, the Court held “the district court erred in ruling that § 215 [of the USA Patriot Act] authorizes the telephone metadata collection program, and instead hold that the telephone metadata program exceeds the scope of what Congress has authorized and therefore violates § 215.” Id. at *33. The Court found that “[s]uch expansive development of government repositories of formerly private records would be an unprecedented contraction of the privacy expectations of all Americans.” Id. at *25. Because the Court decided the issue on statutory grounds, it declined to determine the constitutionality of the program. Id. at *1, *31. Although the Second Circuit vacated the lower court judgment, it fell short of stopping the program and affirmed the District Court’s denial of a request for a preliminary injunction, given that parts of Section 215 were set to expire on June 1, 2015. Id. at *32.
Supreme Court to Hear Historic FCRA Standing Case During October 2015 Term
On April 27, the United States Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of a hotly-debated question with potentially far-reaching implications: whether a mere violation of a federal statute, without more, satisfies the “injury-in-fact” standard required for constitutional standing under Article III. The case at issue involves a plaintiff alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA); specifically, the plaintiff argued that he suffered actual harm when an online search engine, acting as a credit reporting agency (CRA), published inaccurate information about his background and character in violation of FCRA provisions requiring a CRA to ensure accuracy and provide notice regarding the information it disseminates. The district court ruled that plaintiff failed to demonstrate injury-in-fact without showing more than mere violations of the FCRA. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the violation of federal statutory rights is sufficient to show constitutional standing, and that a plaintiff need not demonstrate any actual damages in order to file suit. Notably, the Ninth Circuit did not opine that the “harm” alleged by the plaintiff – the online search engine portrayed him as wealthier and more educated than he actually was – affected him economically by impeding his employment prospects.
The Supreme Court’s decision to hear the widely-followed case has the attention of many. Ten amicus briefs have been filed over the past year, all highlighting the “substantial impact” the Court’s decision could have. Currently, numerous federal statutes allow a plaintiff to recover damages based on statutory violations without a showing of actual or concrete injury, including those prominent in the financial industry such as the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), and the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), among others. Despite the Solicitor General’s recommendation against hearing the case, in which the government argued that courts have traditionally provided redress for statutory violations alone, the Supreme Court’s decision will affect the degree to which consumers and classes can utilize federal statutes to recover without proving additional causal injury. A decision affirming the Ninth Circuit’s decision could arguably open the floodgates to “no-injury” lawsuits, coercing defendants to pay millions in damages without a showing of any actual harm. Oral arguments for the case will be heard this coming October, at the beginning of the Court’s 2015 term. Reply and supplemental briefs to the petition can be found here and here, respectively.
D.C. Federal District Court Dismisses Lawsuit Seeking to Block $13 Billion DOJ Settlement
On March 18, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed a lawsuit brought by a non-profit organization challenging the $13 billion global settlement agreement entered by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and a national financial services firm and banking institution arising out of the 2008 financial crisis. Better Markets, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, No. CV 14-190 (BAH), 2015 WL 1246104 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2015). The plaintiff—an advocacy group founded to “promote the public interest in the financial markets”—alleged that the DOJ’s decision to enter into the 2013 settlement agreement with the firm was in violation of the Constitution, the Administrative Procedure Act, and FIRREA. The court dismissed the lawsuit on grounds that the advocacy group lacked standing, concluding that the group had failed to show “a cognizable harm, or that the relief it seeks will redress its alleged injuries.”
Eleventh Circuit Ruling Gives Large Bank Another Chance at Arbitration
On an appeal of five putative class actions alleging the unlawful charging of overdraft fees on consumer checking accounts, On February 10, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated a lower court order holding that the defendant’s waiver of its right to compel arbitration with the named plaintiffs precludes the Bank from compelling arbitration with any unnamed members of the putative classes. In re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation, No. 13-12082 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2015). The panel held that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to resolve the question. Additionally, it held that the named plaintiffs lacked standing, under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, to advance claims on behalf of those unnamed putative class members, who—in the absence of class certification—have “no justiciable controversy” with the Bank.
Nevada District Court Bars Foreclosure Sale of First Lien HUD-Insured Mortgage
Recently, a federal district court held that a homeowners association (HOA) foreclosure sale is not valid against HUD-insured loans. The District Court noted that the Ninth Circuit has held that federal rather than state law applies in cases involving FHA-insured mortgages to assure the protection of the federal program against loss, state law notwithstanding. The court reasoned, therefore, that in situations where a mortgage is insured by a federal agency under the FHA insurance program, state laws cannot operate to undermine the federal agency’s ability to obtain title after foreclosure and resell the property. Because an HOA foreclosure on property insured under the FHA insurance program would have the effect of limiting the effectiveness of the remedies available to the United States, the District Court held that the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution bars such foreclosure sales and renders them invalid. Washington & Sandhill Homeowners Association v. Bank of America and HUD, U.S. Dist. Ct., District of Nevada, No. 2:13-cv-01845-GMN-GWF (Sept. 25, 2014).
CFPB Issues Guidance On Ensuring Equal Treatment For Married Same-Sex Couples
On July 8, the CFPB released guidance designed to ensure equal treatment for legally married same-sex couples in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). Windsor held unconstitutional section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, which defined the word “marriage” as “a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife” and the word “spouse” as referring “only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”
The CFPB's guidance, which took the form of a memorandum to CFPB staff, states that regardless of a person’s state of residency, the CFPB will consider a person who is married under the laws of any jurisdiction to be married nationwide for purposes of enforcing, administering, or interpreting the statutes, regulations, and policies under the Bureau’s jurisdiction. The Bureau adds that it “will not regard a person to be married by virtue of being in a domestic partnership, civil union, or other relationship not denominated by law as a marriage.”
The guidance adds that the Bureau will use and interpret the terms “spouse,” “marriage,” “married,” “husband,” “wife,” and any other similar terms related to family or marital status in all statutes, regulations, and policies administered, enforced or interpreted by the Bureau (including ECOA and Regulation B, FDCPA, TILA, RESPA) to include same-sex marriages and married same-sex spouses. The Bureau’s stated policy on same-sex marriage follows HUD’s Equal Access Rule, which became effective March 5, 2012, which ensures access to HUD-assisted or HUD-insured housing for LGBT persons.
Supreme Court Holds President May Make Recess Appointments During Intra-Session Recesses Of Sufficient Length
On June 26, the Supreme Court rejected the federal government’s challenge to a January 2013 decision by the D.C. Circuit that appointments to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) made by President Obama in January 2012 during a purported Senate recess were unconstitutional. NLRB V. Noel Canning, No. 12-1281, 2014 WL 2882090 (U.S. Jun. 26, 2014). A five-member majority of the Court held that Presidents are permitted to exercise authority under the Recess Appointments Clause to fill a vacancy during both intra-session and inter-session recesses of sufficient length, and that such appointments may fill vacancies that arose prior to or during the recess.
The Court determined that the phrase “recess of the Senate” is ambiguous, and that based on the functional definition derived from the historical practice of past presidents and the Senate, it is meant to cover both types of recesses. Further, the court held that although the Clause does not indicate how long a recess must be before a president may act, historical practice suggests that a recess less than 10 days is presumptively too short. The Court did not foreclose the possibility, however, that appointments during recesses of less than 10 days may be permissible in unusual circumstances. The Court also validated the Senate’s practice of using pro forma sessions to avoid recess appointments, holding the Senate is in session when it says it is, provided it retains capacity to conduct business. Because the Senate was in session during its periodic pro forma sessions, and because the recess appointments at issue were made during a three-day recess between such sessions, the appointments were invalid.
A minority of the Court concurred in the judgment, but endorsed a narrower reading of the President’s authority to make recess appointments and the Senate’s ability to avoid triggering the President’s recess-appointment power. Writing for that minority, Justice Scalia explained that the plain constitutional text limits the President’s recess appointment power to filling vacancies that first arise during the recess. The minority reading of the Clause also limits the President’s recess appointment power to recesses between legislative sessions, and not intra-session ones. CFPB Director Richard Cordray was appointed in the same manner and on the same day as the NLRB members whose appointments were at issue in this case, but was subsequently re-nominated and confirmed for the position. He later ratified CFPB actions taken during the period he served as a recess appointee.
Texas Supreme Court Allows Capitalization Of Interest, Fees, Escrow Items For Home Equity Loan Modifications
On May 16, The Texas Supreme Court held that the state constitution does not prohibit the restructuring of a home equity loan as long as the original loan met constitutional requirements and terms of the original extension of credit are maintained. Sims v. Carrington, No. 13-638, 2014 WL 1998397 (Tex. May 16, 2014). The court’s holding came in response to a series of questions certified by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which asked whether (i) a modification agreement that capitalizes past due interest, fees, property taxes or insurance premiums into the principal, but does not satisfy or replace the original note, is a modification or refinance for purposes of the constitutional home equity lending provisions; (ii) the capitalization of past-due interest, fees, property taxes, or insurance premiums constitutes an impermissible “advance of additional funds” under regulations implementing the constitutional provisions; (iii) a modification must comply with constitutional requirements that a home equity loan have a maximum loan-to-value ratio of 80%; and (iv) repeated modifications convert a home equity loan into an open-end account that must comply with certain constitutional requirements related to home equity lines of credit. The Texas Supreme Court determined that the restructuring of a home equity loan that involves capitalization of past-due amounts owed under the terms of the initial loan and a lowering of the interest rate and the amount of installment payments, but does not involve the satisfaction or replacement of the original note, an advancement of new funds, or an increase in the obligations created by the original note, is not a new extension of credit, and is thus not required to comply with the constitutional requirements. The court further held that such a restructuring (i) is not an “advance of additional funds” if those amounts were related to the original loan; and (ii) is not subject to LTV limits because it is not a new extension of credit. Finally, the court held that repeated restructurings, as described, do not convert the loan into a line of credit subject to other restrictions, explaining that in the case of a line of credit repeat transactions are contemplated upfront, a situation that “does not remotely resemble” the modification at issue here.
Minnesota Appeals Court Upholds State Regulation Of Online Payday Lender
On March 31, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the Minnesota state legislature may regulate the activities of online payday lenders that extend loans to individuals residing within the state’s borders, even if the lender’s operations are based in a different state. State of Minn. v. Integrity Advance, LLC, No. 62-CV-11-7168, 2014 WL 1272279 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2014). The state of Minnesota alleged that an online payday lender violated Minnesota law by charging high annual interest rates, automatically rolling-over loans for extended periods, and failing to obtain a state lending license. The lender argued that the dormant commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits states from discriminating against or unduly burdening interstate commerce, prevented the Minnesota legislature from regulating the lender because the lender received and accepted Minnesotans’ loan applications at its place of business in Delaware, where the loans were consummated. The court rejected the lender’s argument and held that the U.S. Constitution permits states to regulate commercial transactions that affect their citizens so long as the transactions are not “wholly extraterritorial” – that is, occurring entirely outside of the state’s borders. The court determined that the online lender’s loans were not “wholly extraterritorial” because the lender (i) accepted loan applications online from Minnesota residents that indicated the applicant resided and worked in Minnesota; (ii) contacted Minnesotans in their home state approximately 27,944 times for loan underwriting and other business purposes; and (iii) deposited loan funds directly into Minnesota borrowers’ bank accounts. The court also upheld the district court’s award of $7 million in civil and statutory damages against the lender, finding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion since the award amounted to only 21% of the statutorily-allowed amount.