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  • OFAC Announces New Ukraine-Related Designations, Includes Russian National Bank

    Federal Issues

    On March 11, OFAC updated its Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) list comprising of individuals and entities including a Russian national bank, Russian National Commercial Bank. The SDN list identifies persons and entities with which U.S. citizens and permanent residents are prohibited from doing business and whose assets or interests in assets that come within U.S. jurisdiction must be frozen.

    OFAC Ukraine Russia Sanctions

  • New York DFS Takes Action Against Bank for BSA/AML Compliance Deficiencies

    State Issues

    On March 12, the New York DFS issued a consent order against a Germany-based global bank for alleged Bank Secrecy Act and other anti-money laundering (BSA/AML) compliance violations that occurred between 2002 and 2008. According to the DFS’s press release, certain bank employees were selected “to manually process Iranian transactions — specifically, to strip from SWIFT payment messages any identifying information that could trigger OFAC-related controls and possibly lead to delay or outright rejection of the transaction in the United States.” The DFS also alleges that the bank’s New York branch failed to implement proper BSA/AML compliance thresholds, allowing certain alerts regarding suspicious transactions to be excluded. Under the terms of the consent order, the bank must pay a $1.45 billion penalty, to be distributed as follows: $610 million to the DFS; $300 million to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York; $200 million to the Federal Reserve; $172 million to the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office; and $172 million to the U.S. DOJ. Additionally, the order requires that the bank “terminate individual employees who engaged in misconduct, and install an independent monitor for Banking Law violations in connection with transactions on behalf of Iran, Sudan, and a Japanese corporation that engaged in accounting fraud.”

    Federal Reserve Anti-Money Laundering Bank Secrecy Act DOJ Enforcement SDNY NYDFS

  • Treasury Eases Cuba Regulations

    Federal Issues

    On January 15, the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a final rule amending its Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) to reflect policy changes previously announced by President Obama on December 17. The amendments (i) allow U.S. financial institutions to maintain correspondent accounts at Cuban financial institutions; (ii) allow U.S. financial institutions to enroll merchants and process credit and debit card transactions for travel-related and other transactions consistent with the CACR; (iii) increase the limit of remittances to $2,000 from $500 per quarter; and (iv) under an expanded license, allow U.S. registered brokers or dealers in securities and registered money transmitters to process authorized remittances without having to apply for a specific license. In addition, OFAC released a FAQ sheet to help explain the new amendments, which are effective January 16.

    Department of Treasury Sanctions Remittance OFAC

  • FinCrimes Webinar Recap: Dealing with PEPs - AML & Corruption Risks

    BuckleySandler hosted a webinar, Dealing with PEPs: AML & Corruption Risks, on December 18, 2014 as part of its ongoing FinCrimes Webinar Series. Panelists included Mary Butler, Deputy Chief, International Unit, at the Asset Forfeiture & Money Laundering Section, Criminal Division at the U.S. Department of Justice; Paul Dougherty, Managing Director of the anti-money laundering program for the United States and Canada at Bank of America; and Noreen Fierro, Vice President and Chief Compliance Officer of the Group Insurance Division of Prudential Financial. The following is a summary of the guided conversation moderated by Jamie Parkinson, partner at BuckleySandler, and key take-aways you can implement in your company.

    Key Tips and Take-Aways:

    1. Make sure that the organization has appropriate procedures in place to identify Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) and that those procedures appropriately explain how a PEP is defined by the institution.

    1. Understand the different global standards for PEP compliance and, where appropriate, have country-specific policies and procedures to manage onboarding and monitoring.

    1. Encourage cooperation among the different financial crime compliance disciplines within your institution to assist in identifying and monitoring PEPs.

    Onboarding and Monitoring PEP Accounts

    The session began with a discussion of the basic regulatory requirements associated with the onboarding of PEP accounts. The panel addressed the significance of having specific policies and established procedures to identify PEPs on the front end. Specifically, the panelists noted the importance of having procedures that discuss the borrower approval process, the steps taken to onboard the customer and how those steps differ from normal customer onboarding steps, and who is involved in the process. The panelists further noted that regulators pay significant attention to how transactions are monitored for PEPs in comparison to normal customers and what the organization does when an account is flagged. With regard to the actual onboarding procedures, the panelists noted that the primary concern is associated with identifying risks associated with the PEP and investigating the source of the PEPs funds.

    Global Approaches to PEP Programs

    The panelists then discussed the complications that arise when dealing with the global application of PEP requirements. Specifically, the panelists noted the significant differences from country to country regarding who qualifies as a PEP and whether or not an individual’s status as a PEP continues after the individual leaves his position. Significantly, one of the panelists noted that their company took a country by country approach with regard to PEP onboarding and monitoring in order to address the differences. Panelists further noted a concern regarding the duplication of names between OFAC screening lists and local country lists. Panelists also noted that because of the global nature of PEP regulations, they tend to refer to Senior Foreign Political Figures as Senior Political Figures, even though official guidance uses the foreign distinction.

    Intersection of PEPs, Money Laundering and Corruption

    Panelists next discussed how the DOJ views the intersection of programs dealing with money laundering and corruption. The panel noted the significant cooperation that exists between individuals working in different areas associated with AML and bribery. The panel highlighted the importance of Suspicious Activity Reports and their use in investigating alleged illegal conduct. The panel also noted that with the increase in disclosure requirements, it is becoming easier to find evidence of money laundering and to eventually recover those illegal proceeds.

    Dealing with Local Political Officials

    In response to questions from attendees, the panelists then shifted to discussing the domestic application of PEP policies and procedures. The key points discussed were associated with how local political officials are categorized when dealing with PEPs. Specifically, the panelists noted the difficulties associated with deciding how broadly to extend the definition of a PEP with regard to local political officials. The panel suggested that the primary concern when defining local PEPs was to make sure that an organization’s policies and procedures are clearly defined and at least reasonably defensible. Panelists observed that the key regulatory concern is not that the definitions should be identical, but that entities have reasonable definitions that are enforced uniformly.

    Monitoring Techniques and Metrics

    The panel also discussed the specific complications associated with dealing with the monitoring of PEP accounts. The panelists noted that one of the key aspects of account monitoring is to leverage any AML programs currently in place and allowing that process to help identify any particularly suspicious practices. Furthermore, the panelists pointed out that a key aspect of dealing with suspicious PEP activity is the filing of SARs. One panelist also noted that, while not required statutorily, cooperation with local law enforcement can greatly assist the DOJ with recovering any illegal proceeds.

    Anti-Money Laundering Anti-Corruption Financial Crimes

  • OFAC Settles with Independent Manufacturer for Alleged Violations of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations

    Federal Issues

    Recently, OFAC settled with a Portland, Oregon based manufacturer for allegedly violating the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 515. The manufacturer agreed to pay $2,057,540 for the actions of its subsidiary, which “purchased nickel briquettes made or derived from Cuban-origin nickel between on or about November 7, 2007, and on or about June 11, 2011.” OFAC concluded that the manufacturer self-disclosed the supposed violations and such violations “constitute a non-egregious case.” Under the Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines, OFAC noted that the manufacturer “acted with reckless disregard for Cuba sanctions program,” and caused “significant harm to…its policy objectives by conducting large-volume and high-value transactions in products made or derived from Cuban-nickel.”

    Enforcement Sanctions OFAC

  • NY DFS Takes Action Against Foreign Bank Regarding Transactions with Sanctioned Countries

    State Issues

    On November 18, the New York DFS announced a consent order with a foreign bank for allegedly misleading regulators regarding its transactions with sanctioned countries, most notably Iran, Sudan, and Myanmar. According to the press release and consent order, from approximately 2007 through 2008, the bank convinced a consulting firm to “water down” reports submitted to regulators on its transactions. Specifically, the bank pressured the consulting firm to alter an historic transaction review (HTR) report to exclude key information, such as: (i) the English translation of the bank’s wire transfer instructions, which included a statement that the bank conducted business with “’enemy countries’ of the U.S.;” (ii) a majority of the consultant’s description of the bank’s wire transfer activities; and (iii) information “concerning [the bank’s] potential misuse of OFAC screening software” in connection with its wire transfer activities. The DFS ordered the bank to pay $315 million in penalties, in addition to the $250 million the DFS ordered the bank to pay June 2013 in connection with its sanctioned transactions.

    NYDFS

  • OFAC Fines Commodity Trading Advisor for Apparent Sanctions Violations

    Consumer Finance

    On September 9, OFAC released an enforcement action against a CFTC-registered Introducing Broker and Commodity Trading Advisor that operates an electronic trading platform that allows customers to automatically place currency foreign exchange (FX) trades with broker-dealers. The company agreed to pay $200,000 to settle potential civil liability for apparent violations of Iran, Syria, and Sudan sanctions rules. According to OFAC, over “a number of years” the company maintained accounts for over 400 persons in Iran, Sudan, and Syria, and exported services to these customers by placing FX trades via its platform. The company also (i) originated eight funds transfers totaling $10,264.36 destined for two individuals located in Iran; and (ii) failed to screen or otherwise monitor its customer base for OFAC compliance purposes at the time of the apparent violations. OFAC determined that the company did not voluntarily self-disclose the apparent violations, and that the apparent violations constitute a non-egregious case. The base penalty for the apparent violations was $844,090,000. The lower settlement amount reflects OFAC’s consideration of the matter’s facts and circumstances, including the following mitigating factors: (i) the company is small with limited business operations; (ii) the company has taken remedial action in response to the apparent violations; (iii) the company has not received a penalty notice or Finding of Violation in the five years preceding the earliest date of the transactions giving rise to the apparent violations; and (iv) the company substantially cooperated with OFAC’s investigation.

    OFAC Sanctions Foreign Exchange Trading

  • OFAC Announces Substantial Settlement With Bank Over Apparent Sanctions Violations

    Consumer Finance

    On July 24, the OFAC released a settlement agreement with a large bank to resolve apparent violations of narcotics sanctions regulations. The settlement agreement states that during separate periods from September 2005 through March 2009, the bank allowed transactions to be processed for certain individuals designated under the narcotics sanctions regulations, and failed to timely file blocked property reports regarding accounts owned by other designated individuals. The bank did not admit to any allegation made or implied by the apparent violations, but agreed to pay approximately $16.5 million to resolve the matter. The agreement explains that most of the apparent violations were disclosed by the bank to OFAC as a result of remedial action designed to correct a screening deficiency giving rise to the apparent violations, but that such disclosures do not qualify as voluntarily self-disclosed to OFAC within the meaning of OFAC's Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines because they were substantially similar to apparent violations of which OFAC already was aware.

    Department of Treasury Enforcement Sanctions OFAC

  • FDIC Restricts Bank's Card Businesses Pending BSA Compliance Enhancements

    Fintech

    On June 5, the FDIC and a Delaware bank entered a consent order that prohibits the bank from entering into any new relationships with third-party prepaid card processors or prepaid card program managers until the FDIC approves a written report from the bank that details the steps taken by the bank to (i) implement new BSA compliance policies and procedures; (ii) improve staff training; (iii) implement controls sufficient to mitigate BSA and safety and soundness risk associated with prepaid card, credit card merchant acquiring, and ACH activities; and (iv) perform a BSA risk assessment. The order similarly restricts the bank’s activities related to credit card merchant acquiring and ACH merchant payment processing. The order does not prohibit the bank from issuing prepaid cards through existing distribution channels under existing contracts with third-parties, but does restrict certain activities related to existing credit card and ACH processing activities. In addition, the bank must (i) retain and designate BSA and OFAC officers; (ii) conduct a suspicious activity reporting look-back review; and (iii) submit periodic progress reports. Finally, the order requires increased board supervision of the bank’s BSA compliance program and mandates the creation of a board-level BSA committee.

    FDIC Credit Cards Payment Systems Prepaid Cards Anti-Money Laundering Bank Secrecy Act Enforcement ACH

  • Treasury Department Announces $21 Million Resolution Of Alleged Iran and Sudan Sanctions Violations

    Financial Crimes

    On June 5, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Controls (OFAC) announced a Dutch aerospace firm has agreed to pay $21 million to resolve allegations that the company violated U.S. sanctions on Iran and Sudan. OFAC alleged that from 2005 to 2010, the company indirectly exported or re-exported aircraft spare parts to Iranian or Sudanese customers, which the company either specifically procured from or had repaired in the United States, and required the issuance of a license by a federal agency at the time of shipment. The company self-reported 1,112 apparent violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, and 41 apparent violations of the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations. The settlement includes the payment of a $10.5 million civil penalty to OFAC and the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, a forfeiture of an additional $10.5 million pursuant to a deferred prosecution agreement reached with the DOJ, and the acceptance of responsibility for its alleged criminal conduct. OFAC stated that the base penalty for the alleged violations was over $145 million, however it agreed to a lower settlement after considering that the company self-disclosed the violations and the company: (i) had no OFAC sanctions history in the five years preceding the date of the earliest of the alleged violations; (ii) adopted new and more effective internal controls and procedures, and (iii) provided substantial cooperation during the investigation.

    Department of Treasury DOJ Sanctions OFAC

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