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NIST updates its Cybersecurity Framework
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recently unveiled a proposed update to its Cybersecurity Framework, which was originally developed to provide information security guidelines for “critical infrastructure” like banking and energy industries. (Covered by InfoBytes here). The update includes a new, sixth pillar called “govern” that provides categories to facilitate executive oversight; manage enterprise risk (including supply chain risk); and effective alignment of enterprise resources, strategies, and risk, emphasizing that “cybersecurity is a major source of enterprise risk and a consideration for senior leadership.” This pillar will also guide organizations’ leadership in making internal decisions to support its cybersecurity strategy. The framework draft also updated its implementation guidance, especially for creating profiles that tailor guidance for certain situations. Additionally, NIST included implementation examples that are particularly beneficial for smaller firms. The framework’s lead developer, Cherilyn Pascoe, mentioned the framework has proven useful across many different sectors like small businesses and foreign governments, therefore it was updated to be a useful tool to sectors, regardless of type or size, outside of those designated as critical. A major goal of the updated version of the framework is to show organizations how to leverage existing technology frameworks, standards, and guidelines to implement NIST’s framework. Furthermore, the framework title changed from “Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity” to “The Cybersecurity Framework” to reflect its expanded inclusivity and wide adoption.
Public comments must be received by November 4.
Governor Hochul unveils statewide cybersecurity strategy for New York
On August 9, Governor Hochul announced New York’s first-ever statewide cybersecurity strategy to protect the state’s digital infrastructure from cyber threats. The cybersecurity strategy articulates a set of high-level objectives and agency roles and responsibilities, as well as outlines how existing and planned initiatives will be weaved together in a unified approach. The central principles of the strategy are unification, resilience, and preparedness, with a focus on state agencies working together with local governments to strengthen the entire state’s defenses. Included in the plan was a $600 million commitment to improve cybersecurity, including (i) a $90 million investment for cybersecurity in Fiscal Year 2024; (ii) $500 million to enhance healthcare information technology; and (iii) $7.4 million for law enforcement entities to expand their cybercrime capabilities.
Fed suggests enhancing supervision of “novel activities” by banks
On August 8, the Federal Reserve Board announced the issuance of two supervision letters that elaborate on the its program to supervise “novel activities” such as fintech partnerships, crypto-related activities, and activities using distributed ledger or “blockchain” technology. The first letter, SR 23-7, announces the establishment of the “Novel Activities Supervision Program,” a program designed to “ensure that the risks associated with innovation” supported by new technologies are managed appropriately by the bank. The program will focus on (i) technology-driven partnerships with non-banks; (ii) crypto-asset related activities such as asset custody, crypto-collateralized lending, asset trading, and crypto issuance and distribution; (iii) exploration or use of distributed ledger technology; and (iv) concentration of banking services to crypto-asset related entities and fintech companies. Supervisory teams will be tasked with monitoring and examining these novel activities within the existing supervisory portfolios and will take a risk-based approach on the level and intensity of supervision. The letter concludes that “the Program will also operate in keeping with the principle that banking organizations are neither prohibited nor discouraged from providing banking services to customers or any specific class or type” as permitted by law.
In the second supervisory letter, SR 23-8, the Fed announced a “nonobjection process” for banks seeking to engage in certain dollar token activities. Previously, the OCC issued an interpretive letter permitting national banks to use distributed ledger technology (or similar) to conduct payments using dollar tokens, as long as the bank could demonstrate adequate controls. (Covered by InfoBytes here). The letter clarifies that any bank supervised by the Fed that wishes to engage in those same activities must first obtain a written notice of supervisory nonobjection from the Fed. In order to do so, the bank must be able to demonstrate it has implemented adequate risk management practices, taking into account operational, cybersecurity, liquidity, illicit finance, and consumer compliance risks, among others. The bank must also demonstrate that it is aware of and can comply with laws applicable to the activities.
Fed’s annual report: cybersecurity risk management & emerging threats
On August 1, the Fed released its 2023 Cybersecurity and Financial System Resilience Report. Required annually by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, the report describes the measures the Fed has taken to strengthen cybersecurity within the financial services sector and its supervision and regulation of financial institutions and service providers across the past year. The report details the Fed’s activities in the space, including issuing regulations and guidance for supervised institutions, examining and monitoring supervised institutions’ risk management, and collecting data on relevant cybersecurity incidents. Recent actions highlighted in the report include the publication of an updated Cybersecurity Resource Guide for Financial Institutions, a proposal to update the operational risk management requirements in Regulation HH for systematically important financial market utilities, and final joint guidance issued in conjunction with the FDIC and OCC regarding banking organizations’ risk management of third-party relationships. The Fed also describes the steps it is taking to protect its own operations and assets from cybersecurity threats.
With respect to supervisory activities, the Fed notes that it “has observed improvement in cybersecurity practices over the past several years resulting from supervised institutions’ efforts to address supervisory findings as well as proactive steps taken by the institutions.” The report notes that the Fed is taking measures to address OIG recommendations relating to the effectiveness of its cybersecurity incident response process, including updating the cybersecurity incident response process’s mission and governance structure and enhancing guidance and training. The report describes the Fed’s close coordination with other participants in the global financial system in addressing cybersecurity risk, including domestic and international agencies, governance bodies, financial regulators, and industry.
Finally, the report describes current and emerging threats to the financial system, including (i) geopolitical tensions and accompanying cyberattacks; (ii) cyber-criminal activity involving ransomware as a service, targeting of authentication mechanism weaknesses, and collaboration among cyberthreat actors; (iii) increasing potential of a supply chain or third-party attack; (iv) cyber risks associated with third-party providers; (v) insider threats; and (vi) other emerging technology-related threats, such as risks inherent to machine learning and quantum computing capabilities.
SEC adopts breach-reporting rules, establishes requirements for cybersecurity risk management
On July 26, a divided SEC adopted a final rule outlining disclosure requirements for publicly traded companies in the event of a material cybersecurity incident. The final rule (proposed last year and covered by InfoBytes here) also requires companies to periodically disclose their cybersecurity risk management processes and establishes requirements for how cybersecurity disclosures must be presented. The final rule requires that material cybersecurity incidents be disclosed within four days from the time a company determines the incident was material (a disclosure may be delayed should the U.S. attorney general notify the SEC in writing that immediate disclosure poses a substantial risk to national security or public safety). Companies must also identify material aspects of the incident’s nature, scope, and timing, as well as its impact or reasonably likely impact on the company, and are required to describe their board’s and management’s oversight of risks from cybersecurity threats and previous cybersecurity incidents. These disclosures will be required in a company’s annual report. The final rule will also mandate foreign private issuers to provide comparable disclosures on forms related to material cybersecurity incidents and risk management, strategy, and governance.
The final rule is effective 30 days following publication of the adopting release in the Federal Register. The SEC noted that incident-specific disclosures will be required in Forms 8-K and 6-K beginning either 90 days after the final rule’s publication in the Federal Register or on December 18, whichever is later, though smaller reporting companies are provided an extra 180 days before they must begin providing such disclosures. Annual disclosures on cyber risk management, strategy, and governance will be required in Form 10-K and Form 20-F reports starting with annual reports for fiscal years ending on or after December 15. In terms of structured data requirements, all companies must tag disclosures in the required format beginning one year after initial compliance with the related disclosure requirement.
SEC Chair Gary Gensler commented that, in response to public comments received on the proposed rule, the final rule “streamlines required disclosures for both periodic and incident reporting” and requires companies “to disclose only an incident’s material impacts, nature, scope, and timing, whereas the proposal would have required additional details, not explicitly limited by materiality.”
In voting against the final rule, Commissioner Hester M. Pierce raised concerns that the final rule’s compliance timelines are overly aggressive even for large companies and that the short incident disclosure period could potentially mislead otherwise uninformed investors and “lead to disclosures that are ‘tentative and unclear, resulting in false positives and mispricing in the market.’” The final rule allows a company to update its incident disclosure with new information in subsequent reports that was unavailable at first and could impact investors who may suffer a loss due to the mispricing of the company’s securities following the initial reporting, Pierce said. She also criticized the risk to national security or public safety exemption as being overly narrow. Commissioner Mark Uyeda also opposed the adoption, writing that “[n]o other Form 8-K event requires such broad forward-looking disclosure that needs to be constantly assessed for a potential amendment.” Uyeda also questioned whether “[p]remature public disclosure of a cybersecurity incident at one company could result in uncertainty of vulnerabilities at other companies, especially if it involves a commonly used technology provider, [thus] resulting in widespread panic in the market and financial contagion.”
Biden administration releases roadmap for National Cybersecurity Strategy
On July 13, the Biden administration published the National Cybersecurity Strategy Implementation Plan (NCSIP), outlining a roadmap for carrying out the administration’s National Cybersecurity Strategy. The strategy was released earlier this year to introduce several key pillars for countering threats to the digital ecosystem and improving the nation’s digital security (covered by InfoBytes here). Designed to build and enhance collaboration, the NCSIP identifies 65 federal initiatives assigned to various agencies with timelines for completion. According to the announcement, 18 agencies are spearheading initiatives in this “whole-of-government” plan, which also factors in “continued collaboration with the private sector, civil society, international partners, Congress, and state, local, Tribal, and territorial governments.”
Pillars include measures to:
- Defend critical infrastructure (the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency will implement measures to update the National Cyber Incident Response Plan to, among other things, provide clear guidance to external partners on the roles and capabilities of federal agencies in incident response and recovery);
- Disrupt and dismantle threat actors (including focusing on virtual asset providers that enable the laundering of ransomware proceeds);
- Shape market forces and drive security and resilience;
- Invest in a resilient future (the National Institute of Standards and Technology will convene an interagency working group to coordinate major issues in international cybersecurity standardization); and
- Forge international partnerships to facilitate coordination with partner nations. The administration expects to update the plan annually.
NCUA annual report to Congress covers cybersecurity
On June 28, the NCUA released its annual report on cybersecurity and credit union system resilience to the House and Senate banking committees. The report outlines measures the agency has taken to strengthen cybersecurity within the credit union system, outlines significant risks and challenges facing the financial system due to the NCUA’s lack of authority over third-party vendors, and addresses current and emerging threats. Explaining that cybersecurity is one of the NCUA’s top supervisory priorities with cyberattacks being a top-tier risk under the agency’s enterprise risk management program, the report discusses ways the NCUA continues to enhance the cybersecurity resilience of federally insured credit unions (FICUs). Measures include continually improving the agency’s examination program, providing training and support, and implementing a final rule in February, which requires FICUs to report any cyberattacks that disrupt its business operations, vital member services, or a member information system as soon as possible (and no later than 72 hours) after the FICU’s “reasonable belief that it has experienced a cyberattack.” The final rule takes effect September 1. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) The report also raises concerns regarding the NCUA’s lack of authority over third-party vendors that provide services to FICUs. Calling this a “regulatory blind spot” with the potential to create significant risks and challenges, the agency stresses that one of its top requests to Congress is to restore the authority that permits the agency to examine third-party vendors.
Court delays enforcement of California privacy regulations
The Superior Court for the County of Sacramento adopted a ruling during a hearing held June 30, granting the California Chamber of Commerce’s (Chamber of Commerce) request to enjoin the California Privacy Protection Agency (CPPA) from enforcing its California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA) regulations until March 2024. Enforcement of the CPRA regulations was set to begin July 1.
The approved regulations (which were finalized in March and took effect immediately) update existing California Consumer Privacy Act regulations to harmonize them with amendments adopted by voter initiative under the CPRA in November 2020. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) In February of this year, the CPPA acknowledged that it had not finalized regulations regarding cybersecurity audits, risk assessments, and automated decision-making technology and posted a preliminary request for comments to inform this rulemaking. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) The June 30 ruling referred to a public statement issued by the CPPA, in which the agency explained that enforcement of those three areas would not commence until after the applicable regulations are finalized. However, the CPPA stated it intended to “enforce the law in the other twelve areas as soon as July 1.”
In March, the Chamber of Commerce filed a lawsuit in state court seeking a one-year delay of enforcement for the new regulations. The Chamber of Commerce argued that the CPPA had finalized its regulations in March 2023 (rather than the statutorily-mandated completion date of July 1, 2022), and as a result businesses were not provided the required one-year period to come into compliance before the CPPA begins enforcement. The CPPA countered that the text of the statute “is not so straightforward as to confer a mandatory promulgation deadline of July 1, 2022, nor did the voters intend for impacted business to have a 12-month grace period between the [CPPA’s] adoption of all final regulations and their enforcement.”
The court disagreed, finding that the CPPA’s failure “to timely pass final regulations” as required by the CPRA “is sufficient to grant the Petition.” The court stated that because the CPRA required the CPPA to pass final regulations by July 1, 2022, with enforcement beginning one year later, “voters intended there to be a gap between the passing of final regulations and enforcement of those regulations.” The court added that it was “not persuaded” by the CPPA’s argument “that it may ignore one date while enforcing the other.” However, staying enforcement of all the regulations for one year until after the last of the CPRA regulations have been finalized would “thwart the voters’ intent.” In striking a balance, the court stayed the CPPA’s enforcement of the regulations that became final on March 29 and said the agency may begin enforcing those regulations on March 29, 2024. The court also held that any new regulations issued by the CPPA will be stayed for one year after they are implemented. The court declined to mandate any specific date by which the CPPA must finalize the outstanding regulations.
NYDFS publishes new proposal on cybersecurity regs
On June 28, NYDFS published an updated proposed second amendment to the state’s cybersecurity regulation (23 NYCRR 500) reflecting revisions made by the department in response to comments received on proposed expanded amendments published last November. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) NYDFS’ cybersecurity regulation, effective in March 2017, imposes a series of cybersecurity requirements for banks, insurance companies, and other financial services institutions. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) Proposed changes include:
- New and amended definitions. The proposed second amendment defines “Chief Information Security Office or CISO” to mean “a qualified individual responsible for overseeing and implementing the covered entity’s cybersecurity program and enforcing its cybersecurity policy, who has adequate authority to ensure cybersecurity risks are appropriately managed, including the ability to direct sufficient resources to implement and maintain an effective cybersecurity program.” Certain references to a CISO’s responsibilities have been moved and slightly modified throughout. The amendments also clarify that affiliates should only include “those that share information systems, cybersecurity resources or all or any part of a cybersecurity program with the covered entity” for the purposes of calculating the number of employees and gross annual revenue for consideration as a “Class A Company.” The definition of a “privileged account” has also been modified to remove a condition that an authorized user account or service account be able to affect a material change to the technical or business operations of the covered entity. Risk assessments also no longer include a requirement that a covered entity “take into account the specific circumstances of the covered entity, including but not limited to its size, staffing, governance, businesses, services, products, operations, customers, counterparties, service providers, vendors, other relations and their locations, as well as the geographies and locations of its operations and business relations.” Additionally, “senior governing body” now specifies that for “any cybersecurity program or part of a cybersecurity program adopted from an affiliate under section 500.2(d) of this Part, the senior governing body may be that of the affiliate.”
- Notice of a cybersecurity event. Under 23 NYCRR 500, entities are required to notify NYDFS within 72 hours after a determination has been made that a cybersecurity event has occurred at a covered entity, its affiliates, or a third-party service provider. The amendments remove a 90-day period for covered entities to provide the superintendent with requested information, and instead provides that “[e]ach covered entity shall promptly provide any information requested regarding such event. Covered entities shall have a continuing obligation to update and supplement the information provided.” Covered entities will be required to maintain for examination, and now inspection by the department upon request, all records, schedules, and supporting data and documentation.
- Exemptions. The proposed second amendment now offers that “[a]n employee, agent, wholly-owned subsidiary, representative or designee of a covered entity, who is itself a covered entity, is exempt from this Part and need not develop its own cybersecurity program to the extent that the employee, agent, wholly-owned subsidiary, representative or designee is covered by the cybersecurity program of the covered entity.”
- Additional modifications. Other slight modifications have been made throughout that include removing a requirement that covered entities “document material issues found during testing and report them to its senior governing body and senior management,” and deleting a requirement that Class A companies use external experts to conduct risk assessments at least once every three years. The proposed second amendment makes changes to third-party service provider policy requirements and multi-factor authentication provisions and replaces a reference to a covered entity’s board of directors or equivalent with the “senior governing body.” Language defining these responsibilities has been slightly modified. Additionally, incident response plans must also now include a root cause analysis describing “how and why the event occurred, what business impact it had, and what will be done to prevent reoccurrence.” Furthermore, when assessing penalties, the superintendent may now also consider “the extent to which the relevant policies and procedures of the company are consistent with nationally recognized cybersecurity frameworks, such as NIST.”
The proposed second amendment is subject to a 45-day comment period expiring August 14.
OCC updates cybersecurity exam procedures
On June 26, the OCC issued Bulletin 2023-22 announcing recent updates to the agency’s approach to cybersecurity assessment procedures. The Cybersecurity Supervision Work Program (CSW) provides high-level examination objectives and procedures aligned with the National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework (NIST-CFS) and is part of the agency’s risk-based bank information technology supervision process. The CSW is intended to provide examiners an effective approach for identifying cybersecurity risks in supervised banks.
According to an overview provided by the OCC, the CSW “provides examiners with a common framework and terminology in discussions with bank management” and is structured according to the following NIST-CSF functions: identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover (as well as related categories and subcategories). The OCC also developed an additional function, Specialty Areas, to address areas of risk that may be part of OCC cybersecurity assessments, where applicable. Examiners will use these procedures to supplement those outlined in the “Community Bank Supervision,” “Large Bank Supervision,” and “Federal Branches and Agencies Supervision” booklets of the Comptroller’s Handbook, the FFIEC’s Information Technology Examination Handbook booklets, and other related supervisory guidance.
The OCC encourages supervised banks to use standardized approaches to assess and improve cybersecurity preparedness. Banks may choose from a variety of standardized tools and available frameworks, and should use the agency’s CSW cross-references table for further guidance. No new regulatory expectations are established with the issuance of the CSW.