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California appellate court affirms arbitration denial
On November 8, the Sixth Appellate District Court in the Court of Appeal in California affirmed a lower court’s decision denying a defendant collection agency’s motion to compel arbitration in a California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (RFDCPA) suit. According to the order, the defendant was hired to collect unpaid credit card debt from the plaintiff on behalf of a creditor. The plaintiff asserted that the defendant “engaged in a routine practice of sending initial communications that failed to provide notice as required by Civil Code section 1788.14, subdivision (d)(2), which governs attempts to collect ‘time-barred’ debts—those that are ‘past the date of obsolescence set forth in Section 605(a) of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act.’” The defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration, submitting two cardholder agreements produced by the original creditor that did not reference the plaintiff’s name, account number, or the plaintiff’s signature. The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the defendant failed to link the plaintiff to the “generic documents” and denied ever seeing or receiving the agreements before. The trial court ruled the documents were not admissible because there was no evidence that they were ever sent to the plaintiff. The trial court concluded that failing to show evidence of mutual assent, the defendant “could not show that the card agreements were enforceable binding arbitration agreements, and thus it denied the motion to compel arbitration.” The defendant appealed.
The appellate court noted that while the custodian of records for the original creditor declared that the agreements submitted by the defendant were linked to the plaintiff’s account, the custodian did not declare how or if the agreements were provided to the plaintiff for his review and acceptance. The appellate court further found that since the plaintiff declared that he never received the agreements, the burden to prove the existence of a valid arbitration agreement shifted back to the defendant.
3rd Circuit says defendants conducted reasonable investigations into FCRA claims
On November 9, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a district court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of defendants in an FCRA reasonable investigation suit. According to the opinion, the plaintiff obtained a credit card from one of the defendants, exceeded her credit limit, and was past due on payments. Another of the defendants (furnishing defendant) acquired her account and reported the outstanding debt to the consumer reporting agencies (CRAs). Plaintiff disputed the tradeline as inaccurate with two of the CRAs claiming several alleged inaccuracies, including that the date the account was opened and the original balance were inaccurate, and the payment history was incomplete, among other things. The CRAs notified the furnishing defendant of the disputes, and the furnishing defendant conducted an investigation in accordance with its FCRA dispute policies and procedures, which revealed that the account status, payment history, current balance, amount past due, and account number were accurate. Discrepancies in the spelling of the plaintiff’s name and street address were corrected however. It was not until after the plaintiff sued the defendants for violations of the FCRA that she asserted the furnishing defendant should have been aware she was enrolled in a credit protection program and that it was therefore liable for the original creditor’s failure to apply the program’s benefits to her credit card account. The opinion noted that the plaintiff also filed a “similarly vague dispute” against a student loan servicer for allegedly misreporting information about her account with the CRAs.
In agreeing with the district court, the 3rd Circuit concluded that summary judgment in favor of the defendants was properly granted as the plaintiff “failed to introduce any direct or circumstantial evidence” showing either of the defendants failed to “conduct reasonable investigations with respect to the disputed information.” Additionally, the plaintiff’s disputes were vague and failed to provide specifics as to the alleged errors or explain why the information was inaccurate or incomplete. “To the extent that [plaintiff] claims that the investigations were unreasonable because a reasonable investigation would have revealed the inaccuracies alleged, her conclusory assertion is insufficient to defeat summary judgment,” the appellate court wrote.
District Court: Unclear when networking site became aware of data scraping
On November 3, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California issued an order ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment in an action concerning whether a now-defunct plaintiff data analytics company breached a user agreement with a defendant professional networking site by using an automated process to extract user data (a process known as “scraping”) for the purposes of selling its analytics services to businesses. The defendant claimed that the user agreement prohibits scraping, and sent the plaintiff a cease-and-desist letter demanding it stop and alleging violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) as well as various state laws. In response, the plaintiff sued the defendant, arguing that it had a right to access the public pages, and later sought a preliminary injunction, which the district court granted.
As previously covered by InfoBytes, earlier this year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, affirmed the district court’s order preliminarily enjoining the defendant from denying the plaintiff access to publicly available member profiles. The 9th Circuit had previously affirmed the preliminary injunction, but was called to further consider whether the CFAA applies to the plaintiff’s data scraping after the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the appellate court’s judgment in light of its ruling in Van Buren v. United States. The 9th Circuit found that the ruling in Van Buren, in which the Supreme Court suggested the CFAA only applies in cases where someone is accused of hacking into or exceeding their authorized access to a network that is protected, or in situations where the “gates are up,” narrowed the CFAA’s scope and most likely did not apply to cases involving data scraped in bulk by automated bots from public websites. The appellate court concluded, among other things, that the defendant showed that it “currently has no viable way to remain in business other than using [the networking site’s] public profile data” for its analytic services and “demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction.” Moreover, the 9th Circuit rejected the defendant’s claims that the plaintiff violated the CFAA.
In partially granting the defendant’s motion and denying the plaintiff’s, the district court ruled that the plaintiff breached its user agreement by directing the creation of fake accounts and copying of url data as part of its scraping process. Nonetheless, the district court noted there remains a legitimate dispute over whether the defendant waived its right to enforce the user agreement after the plaintiff openly discussed its business model, including its reliance on scraping, at conferences it organized that were attended by defendant’s executives. Moreover, questions remain for trial as to when the defendant became aware of the plaintiff’s scaping, whether it should have taken “steps to legally enforce against known scraping” sooner, and whether the defendant can raise certain defenses to its breach of contract claim tied to the plaintiff’s data scraping and unauthorized use of data.
North Carolina Supreme Court orders appeals court to review HAMP fraud claims
On November 4, the Supreme Court of North Carolina determined that an appeals court erred by remanding a case concerning a defendant bank’s Home Affordable Modification Program to a trial court with instructions to make factual findings and conclusions of law on the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs sued the defendant alleging fraud and other related claims arising out of the bank’s mortgage modification program. The trial court dismissed the claims for failure to state a claim pursuant to North Carolina’s Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), after concluding that plaintiffs’ claims were time barred and “that ‘the claims of all [p]laintiffs who were parties to foreclosure proceedings [were] barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.’” Plaintiffs appealed. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court claiming that “it could not ‘determine the reason behind the grant’ and could not ‘conduct a meaningful review of the trial court’s conclusions of law.’” The North Carolina Supreme Court countered, however, that there exists “no legal basis or practical reason for the Court of Appeals to remand the case to the trial court to make factual findings and conclusions of law” as “a trial court is not required to make factual findings and conclusions of law to support its order unless requested by a party”—a request neither party made. According to the North Carolina Supreme Court, the appeals court erred by not conducting a de novo review of the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ allegations. The North Carolina Supreme Court ordered the appeals court to address whether the plaintiffs’ allegations, if treated as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
6th Circuit affirms FCRA summary judgment
On November 4, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a district court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of a credit reporting agency (defendant) accused of violating the FCRA. According to the opinion, a father and son (plaintiff) filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy petitions just over a year apart with the same attorney. Both petitions had their similar names, identical address, and, mistakenly, the plaintiff’s social security number. Although the attorney corrected the social security number on the father’s bankruptcy petition the day after it was filed, the defendant allegedly failed to catch the amendment and erroneously reported the father’s bankruptcy on the plaintiff’s credit report for nine years. When the plaintiff noticed the error, he sent the defendant a letter and demanded a sum in settlement. The defendant removed the father’s bankruptcy filing from the plaintiff’s credit report. The plaintiff sued two credit reporting agencies, alleging they violated the FCRA by failing to “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy” of his reported information. One of the agencies settled with the plaintiff. A district court granted the other defendant’s motion for summary judgment, which the plaintiff appealed.
On the appeal, the 6th Circuit noted that the plaintiff “has standing to bring this action, but also agree that he cannot establish that [defendant’s] procedures were unreasonable as a matter of law.” The appellate court found that, because the defendant gathered information from reliable sources and because someone “with at least some legal training” would have had to manually review the bankruptcy docket to notice that the Social Security number had been updated, the defendant did not violate the FCRA. The appellate court wrote that the defendant’s “processes strike the right balance between ensuring accuracy and avoiding ‘an enormous burden’ on consumer credit reporting agencies.” Furthermore, the 6th Circuit stated that, “[g]iven the sheer amount of data maintained by these companies, we know that consumers are ‘in a better position . . . to detect errors’ in their credit reports and inquire about a fix.”
4th Circuit says website does not qualify for Section 230 immunity
On November 3, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court’s summary judgment ruling that a public records website, its founder, and two affiliated entities (collectively, “defendants”) could use Section 230 liability protections under the Communications Decency Act (CDA) to shield themselves from credit reporting violations. As previously covered by InfoBytes, plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that because the defendants’ website collects, sorts, summarizes, and assembles public record information into reports that are available for third parties to purchase, it qualifies as a consumer reporting agency (CRA) under the FCRA, and as such, must follow process-oriented requirements that the FCRA imposes on CRAs. However, the district court determined that the immunity afforded by Section 230 of the Communication and Decency Act applied to the FCRA and that the defendants qualified for such immunity and could not be held liable for allegedly disseminating inaccurate information and failing to comply with the law’s disclosure requirements.
On appeal, the 4th Circuit reviewed whether a consumer lawsuit alleging violations of the FCRA’s procedural and disclosure requirements and seeking to hold the defendants liable as the publisher or speaker of information provided by a third party is thereby preempted by Section 230. The appellate court agreed with an amicus brief filed in 2021 by the FTC, CFPB, and the North Carolina Department of Justice, which urged the appellate court to overturn the district court ruling on the basis that the court misconstrued Section 230—which they assert is unrelated to the FCRA—by extending immunity to “claims that do not seek to treat the defendant as the publisher or speaker of any third-party information.” According to the amicus brief, liability turns on the defendants’ alleged failure to comply with FCRA obligations to use reasonable procedures when preparing reports, to provide consumers with a copy of their files, and to obtain certifications and notify consumers when reports are furnished for employment purposes.
The 4th Circuit held that Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA “extends only to bar certain claims, in specific circumstances, against particular types of parties,” and that the four claims raised in this case were not subject to those protections. “Section 230(c)(1) provides protection to interactive computer services,” the appellate court wrote, “[b]ut it does not insulate a company from liability for all conduct that happens to be transmitted through the internet.” Specifically, the appellate court said two of the counts—which allege that the defendants failed to give consumers a copy of their own report when requested and did not follow FCRA requirements when providing reports for employment purposes—do not seek to hold the defendants liable as a speaker or publisher, and therefore fall outside Section 230 protections. As for the remaining two counts related to claims that the defendant failed to ensure records for employment purposes were complete and up-to-date, or adopt procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy when preparing reports, the 4th Circuit concluded that the defendants “made substantive changes to the records’ content that materially contributed to the records’ unlawfulness. That makes [defendants] an information content provider, under the allegations, for the information relevant to Counts Two and Four, meaning that it is not entitled to § 230(c)(1) protection for those claims.”
4th Circuit vacates $10.6 million judgment, orders district court to reevaluate class standing
On October 28, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit remanded a $10.6 million damages award it had previously approved in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in January, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment against the defendants and ordered the 4th Circuit to reexamine its decision in light of TransUnion (which clarified the type of concrete injury necessary to establish Article III standing, and was covered by InfoBytes here). Previously, a divided 4th Circuit affirmed a district court’s award of $10.6 million in penalties and damages based on a summary judgment that an appraisal practice common before 2009 was unconscionable under the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (covered by InfoBytes here). During the appeal, the defendants argued that summary judgment was wrongfully granted and that the class should not have been certified since individual issues predominated over common ones, but the appellate court majority determined, among other things, that there was not a large number of uninjured members within the plaintiffs’ class because plaintiffs paid for independent appraisals and “received appraisals that were tainted.” At the time, the 4th Circuit “concluded that the ‘financial harm’ involved in paying for a product that was ‘never received’ was ‘a classic and paradigmatic form of injury in fact.’” On remand, the 4th Circuit considered questions of standing and ultimately determined that TransUnion requires the district court to reevaluate the standing of class members.
4th Circuit says AMG Capital does not alter FTC’s $120.2 million judgment
On November 1, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit predominantly upheld a district court’s final judgment in an FTC action involving a Belizean real estate scheme. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the FTC initiated the action in 2018 against several individuals and corporate entities, along with a Belizean bank, asserting that the defendants violated the FTC Act and the Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR) by advertising and selling parcels of land that were part of a luxury development in Belize through the use of deceptive tactics and claims. In 2019, a settlement was reached with the Belizean bank requiring payment of $23 million in equitable relief, and in 2020, the district court ordered the defaulted defendants to pay over $120.2 million in redress and granted the FTC’s request for permanent injunctions (covered by InfoBytes here and here). Later, in 2021, the district court denied a request to set aside the $120.2 million default judgment, disagreeing with the defendants’ argument that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in AMG Capital Management, LLC v. FTC (which unanimously held that Section 13(b) of the FTC Act “does not authorize the Commission to seek, or a court to award, equitable monetary relief such as restitution or disgorgement”—covered by InfoBytes here) nullified the judgment. The district court stated that the AMG Capital decision does not render judgments in the case void, and that “[i]n its Opinion rendered before the Supreme Court reached its decision, the Court considered the effect that a decision in AMG Capital adverse to the FTC might have, reasoning that: ‘this Court’s findings of fact and determinations as to liability—including contempt of court and violations of the Telemarketing Services Rule []—would not be affected by a decision in AMG.’” (Covered by InfoBytes here.)
On appeal, the 4th Circuit determined that the defendants advanced “a mixed bag of factual and legal challenges” to various contempt orders, equitable monetary judgments, permanent injunctions, and default judgments, finding that there was no abuse of discretion by the district court. While the appellate court reversed the $120.2 million judgment after finding it to be invalid under the Supreme Court’s decision in AMG Capital, it noted that because the defendants violated the FTC Act and the TSR they cannot escape the judgment. “The findings made by the district court show that [the defendant’s] Belizean business venture was dishonest to the core,” the 4th Circuit wrote. “The district court correctly surmised that this sort of deception lies at the heart of what the FTC is empowered to seek out and stop.” According to the appellate court, while “the FTC may seek injunctive relief under Section 13, the Supreme Court held in AMG Capital that it does not authorize the FTC to seek, or a court to award, ‘equitable monetary relief such as restitution or disgorgement.’” However, the defendant “latches onto this last point, claiming that the judgment in the [] case must be thrown out under AMG Capital. ... Vacating that judgment does not help [him], however, because he already has a $120.2 million judgment against him for contempt of the telemarketing injunction, and the FTC has conceded that it is not seeking $240.4 million against [him].” Essentially, AMG Capital “does not undercut the injunctive relief entered under Section 13(b), and the $120.2 million order can be upheld under the contempt judgment, so AMG does not in fact change the bottom line,” the 4th Circuit concluded.
District Court stays CFPB payday action following 5th Circuit decision
On October 31, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas stayed an enforcement action filed by the CFPB against a defendant Texas-based payday lender until after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issues its mandate in CFSA v. CFPB. As previously covered by a Buckley Special Alert, a three-judge panel unanimously held in CFSA that the CFPB’s funding structure created by Congress violated the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution. The parties filed a joint motion saying there was “good cause” to pause further proceedings in the litigation, explaining that the “agreed stay pending issuance of the mandate in CFSA will promote efficient resolution of the case, as the final decision in CFSA will control the resolution of key issues presented in [defendant’s] pending motion to dismiss.” One of the arguments raised in the defendant’s motion to dismiss centers around the assertion that the Bureau’s complaint should be dismissed because the agency’s funding structure violates the Constitution’s separation of powers.
In July, the Bureau sued the defendant for allegedly engaging in illegal debt-collection practices and allegedly generating $240 million in reborrowing fees from borrowers who were eligible for free repayment plans, in violation of the CFPA (covered by InfoBytes here). According to the Bureau, the defendant allegedly “engaged in unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts or practices by concealing the option of a free repayment plan to consumers who indicated that they could not repay their short term, high-cost loans originated by the defendant.” The defendant also allegedly attempted to collect payments by unfairly making unauthorized electronic withdrawals from over 3,000 consumers’ bank accounts.
7th Circuit affirms dismissal of NSF fees action
On October 25, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s ruling dismissing a putative class action alleging an internet credit union improperly charged account holders non-sufficient funds (NSF) fees. Plaintiff claimed she signed an account agreement with the credit union, which required the use of a ledger-balance method when assessing NSF fees, and that only one NSF fee is permitted per transaction. According to the plaintiff, the credit union breached its contract by charging her a $25 NSF fee when she attempted to pay a $6,000 bill, even though her account’s ledger balance was $6,670.94 at the time. She further claimed the credit union charged multiple NSF fees for the same item. The credit union maintained, however, that the contract allowed it to use the “available-balance method” to assess such fees instead. The opinion explained that the ledger-balance method calculates a balance based on posted debits and deposits (and does not incorporate transactions until they are settled), whereas the available-balance method considers holds on deposits and transactions that have been authorized but not yet settled when calculating a customer’s balance. The district court granted the credit union’s motion to dismiss, rejecting the plaintiff's account balance theory by “explaining that ‘the plain, unambiguous language states that a member needs sufficient available funds’ and reasoning that [plaintiff’s] proposed reading would render [the contract’s] use of the word ‘available’ meaningless.” The district court also maintained that the plural use of the word “fees” permitted the credit union to charge multiple fees when a merchant presented the same transaction more than once.
On appeal, the 7th Circuit agreed with the district court that the agreement did not prohibit the credit union from “charging multiple NSF fees for a transaction that is presented and rejected several times.” While recognizing that the credit union “could have drafted the [a]greement more clearly than it did,” the appellate court determined that the credit union never promised “not to use the available-balance method to assess NSF fees or not to charge multiple fees when a transaction is presented to it multiple times,” and upheld the dismissal of plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim.