InfoBytes Blog
Filter
Subscribe to our InfoBytes Blog weekly newsletter and other publications for news affecting the financial services industry.
6th Circuit affirms dismissal of certain TCPA class action claims, reverses decision on survivability issue
On July 20, in a matter of first impression for the Courts of Appeals, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit held that claims under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) survive the death of a plaintiff and may be brought by a successor in interest. In so doing, the court reversed the lower court’s decision that held the opposite and remanded the case back to the lower court for further proceedings. The 6th Circuit opined that the lower court erred in holding that TCPA was penal rather than remedial in nature, and thus could not survive a plaintiff’s death. “The purpose of the TCPA [is] to redress individual wrongs felt by individual consumers . . . [and] recovery under the statute runs to the harmed individual and not the public,” both of which suggest that TCPA claims were remedial, and thus survive a party’s death. Separately, the court affirmed the district court’s order granting a motion to sever and motion to dismiss.
8th Circuit reverses district court’s decision, rules compound interest not contractually agreed upon violates FDCPA
On July 16, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit reversed a district court’s decision, holding that under Minnesota law, compound interest cannot be collected unless specifically agreed to in a contract. The decision results from a suit filed by a consumer alleging that a law firm violated the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act (FDCPA) when it sent a debt collection letter seeking payment of credit card debt while asserting that the consumer owed compound interest. The consumer’s suit alleged that the debt’s owner, debt collector, and law firm (defendants) “used a false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means . . . and an unfair or unconscionable means” when attempting to collect the debt. Specifically, the consumer alleged the principal balance included interest on the contractual interest—which he claimed he did not agree to in the underlying credit card agreement—and that as a result, the defendants misrepresented the amount of debt and attempted to collect interest that was not permitted under Minnesota law. The district court dismissed the consumer’s claim, finding that he failed to state an FDCPA claim because he did not allege a materially false statement in the collection letter. The 8th Circuit reversed however, finding that the consumer stated a claim under the FDCPA because a demand to pay an amount of debt that is unauthorized under state law is actionable as a false statement or unfair collection attempt, and that a false representation of the amount of a debt that overstates what is owed under state law is a material violation of the FDCPA. The appellate court also rejected the law firm’s argument that there was no FDCPA violation because the agreement authorized the total amount of interest stated in the letter, further declining to calculate the interest under the credit-card terms provided by the law firm because the consumer had contested the terms as unauthenticated.
New Jersey appeals court says statute of limitations does not apply in allegedly fraudulent mortgage application
On July 13, the Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division reversed a trial court’s decision, ruling that a deceased homeowner’s family (defendants) had provided sufficient evidence to show that a division of a national bank (lender) had knowingly engaged in predatory lending practices when it approved a fraudulent mortgage application in violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (Act). According to the opinion, in 2007 when the now deceased homeowner purchased a house, the lender may have been complicit in creating and approving a fraudulent loan application that, among other things, stated falsely that (i) the homeowner was a small business owner with a monthly income of $30,000 rather than $1,500, and (ii) the down payment came from the homeowner, when it supposedly came from a second mortgage offered to him from the same lender. The homeowner defaulted on payments in 2010 and passed away in 2012. In 2015, the defendants responded to a foreclosure complaint filed by the bank, alleging that the Act barred plaintiff’s claims due to the lender’s fraudulent actions, including the aforementioned material misrepresentations. However, the trial court granted summary judgment to the lender on the grounds that claims of fraud brought by the defendants were “untenable” and outside the statute of limitations. The appellate court disagreed and remanded to allow for discovery, ruling that the defendants were permitted to introduce evidence of fraud in defense of the homeowner’s estate even through the statute of limitations had expired. “The doctrine of equitable recoupment permits a defendant to assert an otherwise stale claim and avoid the statute of limitations, where the defendant uses the claim as a shield instead of a sword,” the appellate court stated.
5th Circuit rules FHFA structure violates Constitution’s separation of powers
On July 16, in a divided opinion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part a lower court’s decision that addressed two claims brought by a group of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (government-sponsored entities or GSEs) shareholders: (i) whether the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) acted within its statutory authority when it adopted a dividend agreement, which requires the GSEs to turn over every quarter “dividends equal to their entire net worth” to the Treasury Department; and (ii) whether the structure of the FHFA is unconstitutional and in violation of the separation of powers. The lower court previously dismissed the shareholder’s statutory claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the Treasury Department and the FHFA on the constitutional claim. In addressing the first claim, the appellate court agreed with the lower court and found the government-sponsored entities’ payments acceptable under the agency’s statutory authority and that the FHFA was lawfully established by Congress through the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, which places restrains on judicial review. However, the appellate court reversed the lower court’s decision as to the second claim and agreed with shareholders that Congress went too far in insulating the FHFA’s single director from removal by the president for anything other than cause, ruling that the agency’s structure violates Article II of the Constitution. “We hold that Congress insulated the FHFA to the point where the Executive Branch cannot control the FHFA or hold it accountable,” the opinion stated. The divided appellate panel remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
Earlier this year, in response to a challenge to the CFPB's single-director structure, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit en banc upheld the CFPB’s constitutionality in a 7-3 decision (see Buckley Sandler Special Alert). The 5th Circuit is also scheduled to hear a challenge by two Mississippi-based payday loan and check cashing companies to the constitutionality of the CFPB’s single-director structure, in which 14 state Attorney General filed an amici curiae brief encouraging the appellate court to disagree with the en banc decision of the D.C. Circuit. (See previous InfoBytes coverage here and here.)
6th Circuit affirms no breach of contract for processing ACH transactions in order received
On July 6, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision, holding that there was no breach of contract between a consumer and a bank arising from the order in which the bank processed automated clearing house (ACH) transactions against the consumer’s checking account. According to the opinion, the consumer brought two state law breach of contract claims against the bank alleging that the order in which the bank processed ACH transactions against his checking account resulted in eight initial overdraft fees. Addressing the first breach of contract claim, the appeals court rejected the consumer’s argument that the agreement required the bank to process ACH transactions in the order incurred by the consumer. According to the agreement, “transactions will be processed ‘as they occur on their effective date for the business day on which they are processed’”—not necessarily the actual date that the transaction was initiated. Under the ACH Guidelines, the “effective date” is the date when the merchant presents the transactions to the ACH Operator (the Federal Reserve). Specifically, the bank processed the transactions in the order presented in the Federal Reserve’s batch files. The 6th Circuit also rejected the consumer’s second breach of contract claim, which asserted that the bank’s initial debiting of eight overdraft fees violated the parties’ agreement. Under the terms of the parties’ agreement, the consumer was not required to pay more than five overdraft fees per day, and while the initial debiting of the eight charges constituted a breach, the next-business-day reversal eliminated any damages. Accordingly, the appeals court affirmed the lower court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the bank.
California Court of Appeal: State required to return $331 million to mortgage settlement fund
On July 10, the California Third District Court of Appeal reversed in part a Superior Court’s 2015 decision to abstain from issuing a writ directing the Legislature to appropriate funds to restore the money the state allegedly unlawfully took out of the National Mortgage Settlement Deposit Fund (the NMS Deposit Fund). The NMS Deposit Fund was created in 2012 to hold the state’s share of $2.5 billion allocated as part of a settlement agreement reached between the federal government, 49 states, and five of the largest U.S. mortgage servicers. (See previous InfoBytes coverage here on the 2012 settlement.) According to the opinion, three groups filed a lawsuit in 2014 against California Governor Jerry Brown and the state’s director of finance and controller alleging they unlawfully diverted money from the NMS Deposit Fund to make bond payments and offset general fund expenditures. The groups sought a writ of mandate compelling the state government to pay back approximately $350 million in diverted funds. While the Superior Court agreed that the money had been improperly diverted, the court asserted it lacked “constitutional authority” to restore the funds; however, the court ordered the state to restore the funds “as soon as there is a sufficient appropriation ‘reasonably’ and ‘generally’ available for such purpose.” Conversely, the Third District Court of Appeal disagreed, citing to case law supporting the groups’ position that the court could order the money back. Among other things, under the law, the money still belongs in the NMS Deposit Fund, and not in the state’s General Fund. Furthermore, the fact that the state’s director of finance unlawfully diverted the money in contravention of state law and the settlement’s terms only makes for a “more compelling case” that the Superior Court should have issued a writ.
CFPB Succession: Leandra English steps down, seeks to dismiss appeal; Mulvaney selects close advisor to be new deputy
On July 9, Leandra English filed a motion for voluntary dismissal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, effectively ending her eight-month legal battle over the appointment of Mick Mulvaney as acting director of the CFPB. The motion follows an announcement released via Twitter on July 6 that English will be stepping down from her position as deputy director of the Bureau “in light of the recent nomination of a new Director.” (As previously covered by InfoBytes, President Trump nominated Kathy Kraninger, currently serving as the associate director for general government at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to be the director of the Bureau for a five-year term.) In April, the D.C. Circuit heard oral arguments in English’s litigation. Unlike previous arguments, which focused on the president’s authority to appoint Mulvaney under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA), the court spent considerable time discussing Mulvaney’s concurrent role as head of the OMB, and whether that dual role is inconsistent with the Bureau’s independent structure as established by the Dodd-Frank Act. A decision was pending at the time English submitted her dismissal of the case.
Following English’s resignation, Mulvaney announced the selection of Brian Johnson as the Bureau’s acting deputy director. Johnson was Mulvaney’s first advisor hire at the Bureau, and he currently serves as a principal policy director. Prior to joining the Bureau, Johnson was a senior counsel at the House Financial Services Committee.
11th Circuit: No FCRA violation for reporting as delinquent during forbearance plan
On June 27, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed summary judgment for a mortgage servicer, concluding that reporting the consumer as delinquent to credit bureaus during a forbearance plan is neither inaccurate nor materially misleading under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). According to the opinion, a borrower enrolled in a forbearance plan with her mortgage servicer, which allowed for a “monthly forbearance plan payment” of $25 while the remaining payment balance accrued and became due at the end of the plan. Before the borrower agreed to the plan, a representative for the servicer explained to the borrower that because she was not paying the actual contractual payment under the note, the monthly payments would still be considered late. The mortgage servicer reported the borrower past due for the duration of the plan, and the borrower subsequently filed suit alleging violations of the FCRA. In affirming the lower court’s decision, the appeals court found that while the borrower made timely payments under the forbearance plan, the payments were not the ones she was contractually bound to make under the mortgage note. Additionally, the appeals court found that the borrower did not establish that the forbearance plan legally modified the original note and, therefore, the information the servicer reported to the credit bureaus was not inaccurate and was also not materially misleading “particularly in light of [the servicer’s] additional affirmative statement that [the borrower] was paying under a partial payment agreement.”
9th Circuit holds that judicial foreclosure proceedings to collect unpaid HOA fees is debt collection under FDCPA
On June 25, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit held that judicial foreclosure proceedings to collect delinquent assessments and other charges that were owed to a homeowners association (HOA) represented by a law firm that was also a defendant in the case constitute “debt collection” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The decision results from unpaid assessments owed to the HOA that had previously been settled in two prior suits. However, the homeowner (plaintiff-appellant) defaulted on both settlement agreements, and foreclosure proceedings commenced due to an acknowledgment contained within the second agreement, which recognized the HOA’s right to collect the debt by foreclosing on and selling her property. According to the order, the 9th Circuit first drew a distinction between judicial foreclosures and nonjudicial foreclosures. Nonjudicial foreclosures, the 9th Circuit opined, are not debt collections under the FDCPA because, under California law, they present no possibility of a deficiency judgment against the homeowner and recover nothing from the homeowner. However, the Court held that in this case, the judicial foreclosure created the possibility for a deficiency judgment against the homeowner and subsequent collection of money. Furthermore, since the law firm regularly collected debts owed to others, it was a debt collector, and the lower court’s contrary decision “cannot be reconciled with the language of the FDCPA.” The 9th Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling that the defendants were not engaged in “debt collection” as defined by the FDCPA.
However, because the lower court granted summary judgment to the defendants, it did not assess whether the plaintiff-appellant had suffered any damages from her claim that the defendants “misrepresented the amount of her debt and sought attorneys’ fees to which they were not entitled” during judicial proceedings. The 9th Circuit held that the law firm’s application for a writ of special execution included “accruing attorney fees,” implying that the fees had been approved by a court, as required by state law, when they had not. The 9th Circuit noted that the state trial court’s subsequent approval of the fee request did not mean the representation was accurate when it was made. The 9th Circuit remanded to allow the lower court to determine what damages, if any, were due the homeowner due to this violation.
In a separate memorandum disposition, the 9th Circuit, however, affirmed in part the lower court’s order granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment concerning the plaintiff-appellant’s time-barred claims, holding that “even the ‘least sophisticated debtor’ would not likely be misled by the communication—and lack of communication—at issue here, as Plaintiff cannot have reasonably believed that she had paid off the debt in question.”
3rd Circuit affirms summary judgment for internet company in TCPA action
On June 26, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit affirmed summary judgment for a global internet media company holding that the plaintiff failed to show the equipment the company used fell within the definition of “automatic telephone dialing system” (autodialer) based the recent holding by the D.C. Circuit in ACA International v. FCC. (Covered by a Buckley Sandler Special Alert.) The decision results from a lawsuit filed by a consumer alleging the company’s email SMS service, which sent a text message every time a user received an email, was an “autodialer” and violated the TCPA. The consumer had not signed up for the service, but had purchased a cellphone with a reassigned number and the previous owner had elected to use the SMS service. Ultimately, the consumer received almost 28,000 text messages over 17 months. In 2014, the district court granted summary judgment for the company concluding that the email service did not qualify as an autodialer. In light of the FCC’s 2015 Declaratory Ruling—which concluded that an autodialer is not limited to its current functions but also its potential functions—the 3rd Circuit vacated the lower court’s judgment. On remand, the lower court again granted summary judgment in favor of the company.
In reaching the latest decision, the 3rd Circuit interpreted the definition of an autodialer as it would prior to the 2015 Declaratory Ruling in light of the D.C. Circuit’s recent holding, which struck down the part of the FCC’s 2015 Ruling expanding the definition to potential capacity. The appellate court held that the consumer failed to show that the email SMS service had the present capacity to function as an autodialer.