InfoBytes Blog
Filter
Subscribe to our InfoBytes Blog weekly newsletter and other publications for news affecting the financial services industry.
9th Circuit revives data breach class action against French cryptocurrency wallet provider
On December 1, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part a district court’s dismissal of a putative class action brought against a French cryptocurrency wallet provider and its e-commerce vendor for lack of personal jurisdiction. As previously covered by InfoBytes, plaintiffs—customers who purchased hardware wallets through the vendor’s platform between July 2017 and June 2020—alleged violations of state-level consumer protection laws after a 2020 data breach exposed the personal contact information of thousands of customers. Plaintiffs contended, among other things, that when the breach was announced in 2020, the wallet provider failed to inform them that their data was involved in the breach, downplayed the seriousness of the attack, and did not disclose that the attack on its website and the vendor’s data theft were connected. The district court held that it did not have jurisdiction over the French wallet provider, and ruled, among other things, that the plaintiffs did not establish that the wallet provider “expressly aimed” its activities towards California in a way that would establish specific jurisdiction, and “did not cause harm in California that it knew was likely to be suffered there.” The district court further held that the fact that the vendor was headquartered in California at the time the breach occurred was not sufficient to establish general jurisdiction because the vendor moved to Canada before the class action was filed. “Courts have uniformly held that general jurisdiction is to be determined no earlier than the time of filing of the complaint,” the district court wrote, dismissing the case with prejudice.
On appeal, the 9th Circuit concluded that dismissal was improper because the French wallet provider’s contracts with California were sufficient to establish jurisdiction under the “purposeful availment” framework. The appellate court explained that because the French wallet provider sold roughly 70,000 wallets in the state, collected California sales tax, and shipped wallets directly to California addresses, the “facts suffice to establish purposeful availment because [the French wallet provider’s] contacts with the forum cannot be characterized as ‘random, isolated, or fortuitous.’” However, the 9th Circuit limited the claims to only those brought by California residents under the state’s consumer protection laws. A forum-selection clause in the French wallet provider’s privacy policy and terms of use documents provided that disputes would be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of French courts, the appellate court said, which was enforceable except with respect to the class claims of California residents brought under California law “because it violated California public policy against waiver of consumer rights under California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act.”
The 9th Circuit also determined that the district court abused its discretion in disallowing any jurisdictional discovery concerning the defendant e-commerce vendor. Explaining that the e-commerce vendor employs more than 200 people who work remotely from California, including a data-protection officer (DPO) who may have played a role related to the data breach, the appellate court wrote that “[b]ecause more facts are needed to determine whether those activities support the exercise of jurisdiction, we reverse the district court’s denial of jurisdictional discovery with respect to the DPO’s role and responsibilities and his relationship to [the e-commerce vendor], which processed and stored the data.”
States say student loan trusts are subject to the CFPA’s prohibition on unfair debt collection practices
On November 15, a bipartisan coalition of 23 state attorneys general led by the Illinois AG announced the filing of an amicus brief supporting the CFPB’s efforts to combat allegedly illegal debt collection practices in the student loan industry. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in February, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware stayed the Bureau’s 2017 enforcement action against a collection of Delaware statutory trusts and their debt collector after determining there may be room for reasonable disagreement related to questions of “covered persons” and “timeliness.” The district court certified two questions for appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit related to (i) whether the defendants qualify as “covered persons” subject to the Bureau’s enforcement authority; and (ii) whether the case can be continued after the Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in Seila Law v. CFPB (which determined that the director’s for-cause removal provision was unconstitutional but was severable from the statute establishing the Bureau—covered by a Buckley Special Alert). Previously, the district court concluded that the suit was still valid and did not need ratification because—pointing to the majority opinion in the Supreme Court’s decision in Collins v. Yellen (covered by InfoBytes here)—“‘an unconstitutional removal restriction does not invalidate agency action so long as the agency head was properly appointed[,]’” and therefore the Bureau’s actions are not void and do not need to be ratified, unless a plaintiff can show that “the agency action would not have been taken but for the President’s inability to remove the agency head.” The district court later acknowledged, however, that Collins “is a very recent Supreme Court decision” whose scope is still being “hashed out” in lower courts, which therefore “suggests that there is room for reasonable disagreement and thus supports an interlocutory appeal here.”
The states argued that they have a “substantial interest” in protecting state residents from unlawful debt collection practices, and that this interest is implicated by this action, which addresses whether the defendant student loan trusts are “covered persons” subject to the prohibition on unfair debt collection practices under the CFPA. Urging the 3rd Circuit to affirm the district court’s decision to deny the trusts’ motion to dismiss, the states contended among other things, that hiring third-party agencies to collect on purchased debts poses a large risk to consumers. These types of trusts, the states said, “profit only when the third parties that they have hired are able to collect on the flawed debt portfolios that they have purchased.” Moreover, “[d]ebt purchasing entities, including entities like the [t]rusts, are thus often even more likely than the original creditors to resort to unlawful tactics in undertaking collection activities,” the states stressed, explaining that in order to combat this growing problem, many states apply their prohibitions on unlawful debt collection practices “to all debt purchasers that seek to reap profits from these illegal activities, including those purchasers that outsource collection to third parties.” The Bureau’s decision to do the same is therefore appropriate under the CFPA, the states wrote, adding that “as a practical matter, these debt purchasers are as problematic as debt purchasers that collect on their own debt. The [t]rusts’ request to be treated differently because of their decision to hire third party agents to collect on the debts that they have purchased (and reap the profits on) should be rejected.”
District Court: Defendants cannot use CFPB funding argument to dismiss deceptive marketing lawsuit
On November 18, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled that the CFPB can proceed in its lawsuit against a credit reporting agency, two of its subsidiaries (collectively, “corporate defendants”), and a former senior executive accused of allegedly violating a 2017 enforcement order in connection with alleged deceptive practices related to their marketing and sale of credit scores, credit reports, and credit-monitoring products to consumers. According to the court, a recent decision issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which found that the Bureau’s funding structure violates the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution (covered by a Buckley Special Alert), is a persuasive basis to have the lawsuit dismissed.
As previously covered by InfoBytes, the Bureau sued the defendants in April claiming the corporate defendants, under the individual defendant’s direction, allegedly violated the 2017 consent order from the day it went into effect instead of implementing agreed-upon policy changes intended to stop consumers from unknowingly signing up for credit monitoring services that charge monthly payments. The Bureau further claimed that the corporate defendants’ practices continued even after examiners raised concerns several times, and that the individual defendant had both the “authority and obligation” to ensure compliance with the 2017 consent order but did not do so.
The defendants sought to have the lawsuit dismissed for several reasons, including on constitutional grounds. The court disagreed with defendants’ constitutional argument, stating that, other than the 5th Circuit, courts around the country have “uniformly” found that Congress’ choice to provide independent funding for the Bureau conformed with the Constitution. “Courts are ill-equipped to second guess exactly how Congress chooses to structure the funding of financial regulators like the Bureau, so long as the funding remains tethered to a law passed by Congress,” the court wrote. The court also overruled defendants’ other objections to the lawsuit. “[T]his case is only at the pleading stage, and all the Bureau must do is plausibly allege that [the individual defendant] was recklessly indifferent to the wrongfulness of [the corporate defendants’] actions over which he had authority,” the court said, adding that the Bureau “has done so because it alleges that because of financial implications, [the individual defendant] actively ‘created a plan to delay or avoid’ implementing the consent order.”
The Bureau is currently seeking Supreme Court review of the 5th Circuit’s decision during its current term. (Covered by InfoBytes here.)
FTC, CFPB weigh in on servicemembers’ right to sue under the MLA
On November 22, the FTC and CFPB (agencies) announced the filing of a joint amicus brief with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit seeking the reversal of a district court’s decision that denied servicemembers the right to sue to invalidate a contract that allegedly violated the Military Lending Act (MLA). (See corresponding CFPB blog post here.) The agencies countered that the plain text of the MLA allows servicemembers to enforce their rights in court. Specifically, the agencies argued that Congress made it clear that when a lender extends a loan to a servicemember that fails to comply with the MLA, the loan is rendered void in its entirety. Moreover, Congress amended the MLA to unambiguously provide servicemembers certain legal rights, including an express private right of action and “the right to rescind and seek restitution on a contract void under the criteria of the statute.”
The case involves an active-duty servicemember and his spouse who financed the purchase of a timeshare from the defendants. Plaintiffs entered into an agreement with the defendants, made a down payment, and agreed to pay the remaining balance in monthly installments carrying an interest rate of 16.99 percent, in addition to annual assessments and club dues. None of the loan documents provided to the plaintiffs discussed the military annual percentage rate, nor did the defendants make any supplemental oral disclosures. Additionally, the agreement contained a mandatory arbitration clause (the MLA prohibits creditors from requiring servicemembers to submit to arbitration) and purportedly waived plaintiffs’ right to pursue a class action and their right to a jury trial. Plaintiffs filed a putative class action lawsuit alleging the agreement violated the MLA on several grounds, and sought an order declaring the agreement void. Plaintiffs also sought recission of the agreement, restitution, statutory, actual, and punitive damages, and an injunction requiring defendants to comply with the MLA going forward.
Defendants moved to dismiss, countering “that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they had not suffered any concrete injury and, even if they had, whatever injury they suffered was not traceable to the alleged MLA violations.” Defendants also argued that the loan was exempt under the MLA’s exemption for residential mortgages, and claimed that the MLA does not authorize statutory damages, nor did the plaintiffs state a claim for declaratory or injunctive relief. Further, defendants stated the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The district court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of standing, agreeing with the magistrate judge that, among other things, plaintiffs “failed to allege ‘that the inclusion of the arbitration provision impacted [their] decision to accept the contract,’ and that they could not ‘seek[] relief based on a mere technicality that has not impacted them in any way.’”
Disagreeing with the district court’s ruling, the agencies argued that plaintiffs have a legal right to challenge the contract in court because (i) they made a down payment on an illegal and void loan; (ii) the injuries are traceable to the challenged conduct since “their monetary losses are the product of the illegal and void loan"; and (iii) their injuries “are redressable by an order of the court awarding restitution for the amounts that plaintiffs have already paid on the loan, and by a declaration confirming that the loan is void and that the plaintiffs have no obligation to make additional payments going forward.” The agencies asserted that courts have recognized that economic injury is exactly the sort of injury that courts have the power to redress.
Moreover, the agencies pointed out that the district court’s ruling “risks substantially curtailing private enforcement of the MLA and limiting servicemembers’ ability to vindicate their rights under the statute. It does so by reading the MLA’s voiding provision out of the statute and reading into the statute an atextual materiality requirement. But it may be very difficult, if not impossible, for servicemembers to demonstrate that certain MLA violations had a direct effect on their decision to procure a financial product or caused them to pay money they would not otherwise have paid.”
Supreme Court to fast-track review of student debt relief program
On December 1, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the Biden administration’s appeal of an injunction entered by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that temporarily prohibits the Secretary of Education from discharging any federal loans under the agency’s student debt relief plan (announced in August and covered by InfoBytes here). In a brief unsigned order, the Supreme Court deferred the Biden administration’s application to vacate, pending oral argument. The Supreme Court said it will treat the Biden administration’s application as a “petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment,” and announced a briefing schedule will be established to allow the case to be argued in the February 2023 argument session to resolve the legality of the program.
The Biden administration filed its application last month asking the Supreme Court to vacate, or at minimum narrow, the 8th Circuit’s injunction. Among other things, the Biden administration claimed that the 8th Circuit failed to “analyze the merits of the respondents’ claims, much less determine they are likely to succeed” when it granted an emergency motion for injunction pending appeal filed by state attorney generals from Nebraska, Missouri, Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, and South Carolina. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the 8th Circuit determined that “the equities strongly favor an injunction considering the irreversible impact the Secretary’s debt forgiveness action would have as compared to the lack of harm an injunction would presently impose,” and pointed to the fact that the collection of student loan payments and the accrual of interest have both been suspended.
The appellate court’s “erroneous injunction leaves millions of economically vulnerable borrowers in limbo, uncertain about the size of their debt and unable to make financial decisions with an accurate understanding of their future repayment obligations,” the Biden administration said, adding that if the Supreme Court “declines to vacate the injunction, it may wish to construe this application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment, grant the petition, and set the case for expedited briefing and argument this Term to avoid prolonging this uncertainty for the millions of affected borrowers.”
In its application, the Biden administration argued that the universal injunction was overbroad. The application further argued that the states lack standing because the debt relief plan “does not require respondents to do anything, forbid them from doing anything, or harm them in any other way.” Moreover, the Secretary of Education was acting within the bounds of the HEROES Act when he put together the debt relief plan, the application contended. “The COVID-19 pandemic is a ‘national emergency declared by the President of the United States,’” the application said. “Both the Trump and Biden Administrations previously invoked the HEROES Act to categorically suspend payments and interest accrual on all Department-held loans in light of the pandemic.” The application further argued that the states “have not disputed that those actions were lawful,” and that the Secretary of Education “reasonably ‘deem[ed]’ relief ‘necessary to ensure’ that a subset of these affected individuals—namely, those with lower incomes—‘are not placed in a worse position’ in relation to their student-loan obligations ‘because of their status as affected individuals.’”
Meanwhile, on December 1, the 5th Circuit denied the Department of Education’s (DOE) opposed motion for stay pending appeal, following a ruling issued by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas related to whether the agency’s student debt relief plan violated the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the district court determined that while the HEROES Act expressly exempts the APA’s notice-and-comment obligations, the court stressed that the HEROES Act “does not provide the executive branch clear congressional authorization to create a $400 billion student loan forgiveness program,” and, moreover, does not mention loan forgiveness.
Earlier, on November 22, the Department of Education (DOE) extended the pause on student loan repayments, interest, and collections in an effort to alleviate uncertainty for borrowers. Saying “it would be deeply unfair to ask borrowers to pay a debt that they wouldn’t have to pay,” the DOE stated that payments will resume 60 days after it is allowed to implement the debt relief plan or the litigation is resolved, explaining that this will give the Supreme Court time to resolve the case during its current term. However, if the debt relief plan has not been implemented and litigation has not been resolved by June 30, 2023, borrowers’ payments will resume 60 days after that, the DOE explained.
9th Circuit says number generator does not violate TCPA
On November 16, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a district court’s dismissal of a proposed TCPA class action, holding that in order for technology to meet the definition of an “automatic telephone dialing system” (autodialer), the system must be able to “generate and dial random or sequential telephone numbers under the TCPA’s plain text.” Plaintiff claimed he began receiving marketing texts from the defendant after he provided his phone number to an insurance company on a website. Plaintiff sued alleging violations of the TCPA and asserting that the defendant used a “sequential number generator” to select the order in which to call customers who had provided their phone numbers. This type of number generator qualifies as an autodialer under the TCPA, the plaintiff contended, referring to a footnote in the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Facebook v. Duguid (covered by a Buckley Special Alert), which narrowed the definition of an autodialer under the TCPA and said “an autodialer might use a random number generator to determine the order in which to pick phone numbers from a preproduced list.” Defendant countered, however, that its system is not an autodialer, and “that the TCPA defines an autodialer as one that must generate telephone numbers to dial, not just any number to decide which pre-selected phone numbers to call.”
The 9th Circuit was unpersuaded by the plaintiff’s argument, calling it an “acontextual reading of a snippet divorced from the context of the footnote and the entire opinion.” The appellate court pointed out that nothing in Facebook suggests that the Supreme Court “intended to define an autodialer to include the generation of any random or sequential number.” The 9th Circuit further explained that “[u]sing a random or sequential number generator to select from a pool of customer-provided phone numbers would not cause the harms contemplated by Congress.”
2nd Circuit: Convicted SEC whistleblower cannot claim award
On November 15, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied a petition from a plaintiff to review a decision by the SEC to not grant him his whistleblower award because he pled guilty to participating in the crime he reported. According to the order, the plaintiff provided information to the SEC that assisted in a successful agency enforcement action with respect to an international bribery scheme. The plaintiff timely filed an application for a whistleblower award in connection with both the action for which he had provided information and another related action. He pled guilty to bribery charges but had not yet been sentenced. The order further noted that because of the guilty plea, the SEC determined that the plaintiff had been “convicted of a criminal violation related to” the bribery scheme that was at issue in both actions. The order noted that, generally, the SEC is required under federal law to pay a monetary award to a whistleblower when that whistleblower “voluntarily provided original information to the Commission that led to the successful enforcement” of “any judicial or administrative action brought by the Commission under the securities laws that results in monetary sanctions exceeding $1,000,000.” The order further noted that the SEC may not make an award "to any whistleblower who is convicted of a criminal violation related to the judicial or administrative action for which the whistleblower otherwise could receive an award.”
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that he was not “convicted” under 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(2)(B). The plaintiff also claimed that the fact that he had not yet been sentenced—even though a court has accepted his guilty plea—means that he had not been “convicted.” The appellate court found that he did not raise this issue before the agency and therefore it need not address the plaintiff’s argument about the meaning of “convicted.” But even if it were to excuse the forfeiture, the plaintiff’s argument would fail, the appellate court concluded. The plaintiff also argued that the bribery charges to which he pled guilty were not connected to the actions he was a whistleblower on, and that the SEC did not support its finding of a connection with any substantial evidence. The appellate court disagreed with this argument as well, stating the SEC and the plaintiff interpret the meaning of “related to” differently. The appellate court further explained that “[t]he SEC interprets the term to mean that 'the conduct underlying the criminal conviction must be connected to or stand in some relation to the Covered Action.'" The order stated, “[the plaintiff] suggests that the term requires the whistleblower to have been 'a part of the conduct underlying the ... enforcement action' and to have known about the conduct during its occurrence.’”
CFPB asks Supreme Court to review 5th Circuit decision
On November 14, the DOJ, on behalf of the CFPB, submitted a petition for a writ of certiorari asking the U.S. Supreme Court to review whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit erred in holding that the Bureau’s funding structure violates the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution. The Bureau also asked the court to consider the 5th Circuit’s decision to vacate the agency’s 2017 final rule covering “Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans” (Payday Lending Rule) on the premise that it was promulgated at a time when the Bureau was receiving unconstitutional funding.
The Bureau’s funding is derived through the Federal Reserve instead of the annual congressional appropriations process—a process, the appellate court said, that violates the Constitution. Specifically, the 5th Circuit’s October 19 holding (covered by a Buckley Special Alert) found that although the Bureau spends money pursuant to a validly enacted statute, the structure violates the Appropriations Clause because (i) the Bureau obtains its funds from the Federal Reserve (not the Treasury); (ii) the agency maintains funds in a separate account; (iii) the Appropriations Committees do not have authority to review the agency’s expenditures; and (iv) the Bureau exercises broad authority over the economy. The 5th Circuit also rejected the Bureau’s arguments that the funding structure was necessarily constitutional because it was created by and subject to Congress, and distinguished other agencies that are funded outside of the annual appropriations process.
The case involves a challenge to the Bureau’s Payday Lending Rule, which prohibits lenders from attempting to withdraw payments for covered loans from consumers’ accounts after two consecutive withdrawal attempts have failed due to insufficient funds. As a result of the 5th Circuit’s decision, lenders’ obligation to comply with the rule (originally set for August 19, 2019, but repeatedly delayed) will be further delayed while the constitutional issue winds its way through the courts.
“No other court has ever held that Congress violated the Appropriations Clause by passing a statute authorizing spending,” the Bureau argued as it requested a prompt Supreme Court review, asserting that the 5th Circuit’s decision “threatens to inflict immense legal and practical harms on the CFPB, consumers, and the Nation’s financial sector.” The agency also stressed that “[n]ew challenges to the Bureau’s rules and other actions can be expected to multiply in the weeks and months to come, and will presumably be filed in the 5th Circuit whenever possible.” The decision also has the potential to impact past enforcement actions and rulemaking as well, the Bureau said.
The Bureau further asserted that while the 5th Circuit concluded that “‘an appropriation is required’ to authorize spending” and that “‘[a] law’ providing an agency with a funding source and spending authority ‘does not suffice,’” the appellate court failed to specify what would be required for such a law to qualify as an appropriation.
Moreover, the 5th Circuit’s reasoning was incorrect, the Bureau argued, because Congress specified that the agency could claim up to 12 percent of the Fed’s budget to fund its operations, and it is subject to, among other things, budget and financial oversight, government audits, and requirements that its director prepare and submit annual reports to the Senate and House appropriations committees concerning its fiscal operating plans and forecasts. These safeguards, the Bureau stressed, should assuage concerns about whether the agency is insulated from congressional oversight. “The court of appeals’ novel and ill-defined limits on Congress’s spending authority contradict the Constitution’s text, historical practice, and this Court’s precedent,” the Bureau said, adding that the decision also conflicts with a holding issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit where the appellate court recognized that “Congress can, consistent with the Appropriations Clause, create governmental institutions reliant on fees, assessments, or investments rather than the ordinary appropriations process.”
The Bureau asked the Supreme Court to review the case during its current term, which would ensure resolution of the issue by the summer of 2023.
District Court approves payday settlement
On November 10, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi issued a final settlement order resolving allegations that a Mississippi-based payday lender violated the CFPA in connection with check cashing services and small dollar loans. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the CFPB filed a complaint against two Mississippi-based payday loan and check cashing companies for allegedly violating the CFPA’s prohibition on unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices.
In March 2018, a district court denied the payday lenders’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, rejecting the argument that the Bureau's structure unconstitutional and that the agency’s claims violate due process. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed to hear an interlocutory appeal on the constitutionality question, and, prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, a divided panel held that the CFPB’s single-director structure is constitutional, finding no constitutional defect with allowing the director of the Bureau to only be fired for cause (covered by InfoBytes here). The order noted that the 5th Circuit voted sua sponte to rehear the case en banc and issued an opinion in which the majority vacated the district court’s opinion as contrary to Seila Law. The majority did not, however, direct the district court to enter judgment against the Bureau because, though the Supreme Court had found that the director’s for-cause removal provision was unconstitutional, it was severable from the statute establishing the Bureau (covered by a Buckley Special Alert). The majority determined that the “time has arrived for the district court to proceed” and stated it “place[s] no limitation on the matters that that court may consider, including, without limitation, any other constitutional challenges.”
According to the settlement, the owner and president of the company must pay a civil money penalty of $899,350 to the Bureau “by reason of the [UDAAP violations] alleged in the Complaint.” However, the order further noted that the amount is remitted by $889,350 because he paid “that amount in fines to the Mississippi Department of Banking and Consumer Finance.” The district court also entered a separate order dismissing the lawsuit with prejudice.
8th Circuit pauses student debt relief program
On November 14, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted an emergency motion for injunction pending appeal filed by state attorneys general from Nebraska, Missouri, Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, and South Carolina to temporarily prohibit the Secretary of Education from discharging any federal loans under the agency’s student debt relief plan (announced in August and covered by InfoBytes here). Earlier in October, the 8th Circuit issued an order granting an emergency motion filed by the states, which requested an administrative stay prohibiting the discharge of any student loan debt under the cancellation plan until the appellate court had issued a decision on the states’ motion for an injunction pending an appeal. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) The October order followed a ruling issued by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, which dismissed the states’ action for lack of Article III standing after concluding that the states—which attempted “to assert a threat of imminent harm in the form of lost tax revenue in the future”— failed to establish imminent and non-speculative harm sufficient to confer standing.
In granting the emergency motion, the appellate court disagreed with the district court’s assertion that the states lacked standing. The 8th Circuit reviewed whether the state of Missouri could rely on any harm the Missouri Higher Education Loan Authority (MOHELA) might suffer as a result of the Department of Education’s cancellation plan. The appellate court found that the relationship between MOHELA and the state is relevant to the standing analysis, especially as Missouri law specifically directs MOHELA (which receives revenue from the student loan accounts it services) to distribute $350 million into the state’s treasury. As such, “MOHELA may well be an arm of the State of Missouri” under this reasoning, the appellate court wrote, adding that several district courts have concluded that MOHELA is an arm of the state. However, regardless of whether MOHELA is an arm of the state, the resulting financial impact due to the cancellation plan would, among other things, affect the state’s ability to fund public higher education institutions, the 8th Circuit noted. “Consequently, we conclude Missouri has shown a likely injury in fact that is concrete and particularized, and which is actual or imminent, traceable to the challenged action of the Secretary, and redressable by a favorable decision,” the appellate court wrote, adding that since one party likely has standing it does not need to address the standing of the other states. The appellate court also determined that “the equities strongly favor an injunction considering the irreversible impact the Secretary’s debt forgiveness action would have as compared to the lack of harm an injunction would presently impose.” The 8th Circuit explained that it considered several criteria, including the fact that the collection of student loan payments and the accrual of interest have both been suspended. The Missouri attorney general released a statement applauding the 8th Circuit’s decision.
The 8th Circuit’s decision follows a recent ruling issued by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, which found that the student loan forgiveness program is “an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s legislative power.” (Covered by InfoBytes here.)