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OFAC settles with Danish company for routing prohibited financial transactions though a U.S. bank
On December 30, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a more than $4.3 million settlement with a multinational Danish manufacturer to resolve allegations that its wholly owned United Arab Emirates (UAE)-based subsidiary directed customers in Iran, Syria, and Sudan to make payments to its bank account at the UAE branch of a U.S. financial institution. According to OFAC’s enforcement release, between November 2013 and August 2017, the subsidiary sold products to customers in Sudan, Syria, and Iran. Customers were instructed to remit payments to at least three accounts at banks located in the UAE, including the parent company’s U.S. branch account. OFAC further contended that the subsidiary used third-party payers to make five transfers (disguising the originator or beneficiary of the transactions) from its U.S. branch account to parties in Syria and Iran, which prevented the bank’s transactional screen filters from stopping the payments. The total value of all the transfers was roughly $16,959,683, OFAC said, claiming that by causing a U.S. financial institution to facilitate prohibited financial transactions and export financial services, the parent company violated the Iranian, Syrian, and Sudanese sanctions regulations.
While OFAC found no evidence that the parent company willfully engaged third-party payers to evade sanctions, it determined that the subsidiary “was aware since at least 2011 that using a U.S. financial institution to send or receive payments related to sanctioned jurisdictions could be prohibited.” Moreover, the subsidiary allegedly received communications from the parent company and various financial institutions regarding concerns flagged in its banking activity but continued to use the U.S. branch account to collect payments from customers in sanctioned jurisdictions. These alleged violations, OFAC stated, occurred primarily due to deficiencies in the parent company’s global sanctions compliance program.
OFAC noted that while the parent company disclosed the alleged violations, the agency was already in possession of the relevant information and therefore the submission did not qualify as a voluntary self-disclosure. However, OFAC considered various mitigating factors, including that the parent company had not received a penalty notice from OFAC in the preceding five years, and the parent company took quick action to determine the root causes of the alleged conduct and undertook significant remedial measures to prevent future violations.
Providing context for the settlement, OFAC stated that the “enforcement action highlights the risks to multinational companies, including to non-U.S. entities, that involve the U.S. financial system in commercial activity involving an OFAC- sanctioned country, region, or person,” and emphasized that “[c]ommercial activity that might not otherwise violate OFAC regulations—such as the sale of non-U.S. goods by a non-U.S. person to an entity in an OFAC-sanctioned country—can nonetheless cause a violation when the financial transactions related to that activity are processed through or involve U.S. financial institutions.”
Counter ISIS Finance Group wants group isolated from international financial system
On November 18, the U.S. Treasury Department announced the release of a joint statement by the Counter ISIS Finance Group (CIFG) of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, which coordinates efforts to isolate the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) from the international financial system and eliminate revenue sources. CIFG held its seventeenth meeting on November 8-9 to discuss ongoing efforts to combat ISIS financing worldwide. During the meeting, attendees discussed ISIS financing in the Middle East, Europe, Africa, and South and Southeast Asia, as well as “key systemic vulnerabilities in the global anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime.” CIFG noted that ISIS facilitators prefer informal funds transfer methods, and to a lesser degree, virtual asset service providers most likely “because they offer anonymity, lack oversight across many jurisdictions, charge relatively low service fees, and often conduct quicker transactions than banks and registered money services businesses.” Attendees also exchanged case studies of recent investigations and prosecutions, and discussed other efforts to implement AML/CFT reforms to disrupt ISIS fundraising and financial facilitation networks. With a focus on international cooperation, CIFG members said they will continue to closely work with counterterrorism partners to disrupt ISIS funding sources and methods.
OFAC sanctions individuals and entities tied to ISIS
On November 7, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced sanctions pursuant to Executive Order 13224 against four members of an Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) cell operating in South Africa, along with eight companies owned, controlled, or directed by the individuals in the ISIS cell. According to OFAC, the individuals provided technical, financial, or material support to the terrorist group. As a result of the sanctions, all property and interests in property belonging to the sanctioned individuals and entities, and of “any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by them, individually, or with other blocked persons” that are subject to U.S. jurisdiction are blocked. U.S. persons are also generally prohibited from engaging in any dealings involving the property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons. Persons that engage in certain transactions with the designated individuals or entities may themselves be exposed to designation, OFAC warned, adding that foreign financial institutions that knowingly conduct or facilitate significant transactions to any of the sanctioned persons could also be subject to U.S. sanctions.
OFAC sanctions terrorist weapons trafficking network tied to ISIS-Somalia
On November 1, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced sanctions pursuant to Executive Order 13224 against the Islamic State in Somalia (ISIS-Somalia) — marking the first time this affiliate of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is being designated. The action follows designations taken by OFAC earlier in the month against a network of financial facilitators who hold leadership roles and are key interlocutors between the group and local companies in Somalia (covered by InfoBytes here). According to OFAC, the designated persons serve as “critical nodes for a weapons trafficking network that is closely integrated with ISIS-Somalia,” and maintain “strong ties to al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Shabaab.” Addressing the significance of the sanctions, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian E. Nelson said “[t]oday, we take direct aim at the networks funding and supplying both ISIS-Somalia and al-Shabaab that support their violent acts. The involvement of those designated today in other criminal activity, including piracy and illegal fishing, demonstrates the extent of ISIS-Somalia’s integration with illicit networks and other terrorist organizations operating in the region.” “Treasury is committed to working with partners in the region to disrupt the financing of ISIS and al-Shabaab,” Nelson said.
As a result of the sanctions, all property and interests in property belonging to the sanctioned persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. Additionally, “any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.” U.S. persons are also generally prohibited from engaging in any dealings involving the property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons. Persons that engage in certain transactions with the individuals or entities designated today may themselves be exposed to designation, OFAC warned, adding that foreign financial institutions that knowingly facilitate significant transactions or provide significant financial services to any of the sanctioned persons could also be subject to U.S. sanctions.
OFAC, FinCEN take action against virtual currency exchange
On October 11, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), together with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), announced two settlements for more than $24 million and $29 million, respectively, with a Washington state-based virtual currency exchange. According to OFAC’s announcement, this is the agency’s largest virtual currency enforcement action to date, and represent the first parallel actions taken by FinCEN and OFAC in this space.
OFAC settlement. OFAC’s web notice stated that between March 28, 2014 and December 31, 2017, the exchange operated 1,730 accounts that processed 116,421 virtual currency-related transactions totaling roughly $263,451,600.13, in apparent violation of OFAC sanctions against Cuba, Ukraine, Iran, Sudan, and Syria. Specifically, due to alleged deficiencies in the exchange’s sanctions compliance procedures, the exchange failed to prevent persons located in the sanctioned jurisdictions from using its platform to engage in more than $263,000,000 worth of virtual currency-related transactions. OFAC claimed that while the IP addresses and physical address information collected on each customer at onboarding should have given the exchange reason to know that the persons were located in jurisdictions subject to sanctions, the exchange did not “screen customers or transactions for a nexus to sanctioned jurisdictions.” Rather, the exchange only screened transactions for hits against lists including OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons. In arriving at the settlement amount of $24,280,829.20, OFAC considered various aggravating factors, including that the exchange did not exercise due caution or care for its sanctions compliance obligations and conveyed economic benefit to persons located in jurisdictions subject to OFAC sanctions, thus causing harm to the integrity of multiple sanctions programs. OFAC also considered various mitigating factors, including that the exchange provided substantial cooperation throughout the investigation, most of the transactions were for a relatively small amount and represented a small percentage when compared to the exchange’s annual volume of transactions, and the exchange has undertaken remedial measures intended to minimize the risk of recurrence of similar conduct.
FinCEN settlement. According to FinCEN’s press release, an investigation found that from February 2014 through December 2018, the exchange failed to maintain an effective AML program, resulting in its inability to appropriately address risks associated with its products and services, including anonymity-enhanced cryptocurrencies. The exchange also failed to effectively monitor transactions on its trading platform, and relied “on as few as two employees with minimal anti-money laundering training and experience to manually review all of the transactions for suspicious activity, which at times were over 20,000 per day.” FinCEN claimed that the exchange conducted more than 116,000 transactions valued at over $260 million with persons located in jurisdictions subject to OFAC sanctions, including those operating in Iran, Cuba, Sudan, Syria, and the Crimea region of Ukraine, and failed to file suspicious activity reports (SARs) between February 2014 and May 2017. The exchange also “failed to file SARs on a significant number of transactions involving sanctioned jurisdictions, including the processing of over 200 transactions that involved $140,000 worth of virtual assets—nearly 100 times larger than the average withdrawal or deposit on the Bittrex platform—and 22 transactions involving over $1 million worth of virtual assets,” FinCEN said in its announcement. Under the terms of the consent order, the exchange—which admitted to willfully violating the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and its implementing regulations—will pay a $29,280,829.20 civil money penalty. FinCEN stated it will credit the $24,280,829.20 the exchange has agreed to pay for the OFAC violations.
During remarks delivered at the Association of Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialists, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian Nelson discussed, among other topics, Treasury’s efforts to counter illicit finance. Nelson highlighted the aforementioned settlements, stressing that failing to comply with BSA/AML requirements and SARs filing obligations “are not something that companies focused on growth can simply put off to a later day.” He also emphasized that Treasury will continue to strengthen ties with interagency partners and international counterparts to identify and pursue potential violations.
OFAC announces settlement with electronic rewards company
On September 30, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a $116,000 settlement with a Washington-based company that supplies and distributes electronic rewards, for allegedly processing transactions in violation of multiple U.S sanctions regulations. According to OFAC’s notice, the company allegedly “transmitted 27,720 merchant gift cards and promotional debit cards, totaling $386,828.65, to individuals with email or IP addresses associated with Cuba, Iran, Syria, North Korea, or the Crimea region of Ukraine.” In arriving at the settlement amount, OFAC considered various aggravating factors, including that the company (i) “failed to impose risk-based geolocation rules using tools at its disposal to identify the location of its reward recipients, despite having reason to know that it was transmitting rewards to recipients in sanctioned jurisdictions”; and (ii) “conferred up to $386,828.65 in economic benefit to jurisdictions and regions subject to sanctions.” OFAC also considered various mitigating factors, including that the company has not received a penalty notice from OFAC in the preceding five years, “represents that it undertook various measures to strengthen its OFAC compliance processes,” voluntarily self-disclosed the alleged violations, and substantially cooperated with the investigation.
OFAC settles with banks for multiple sanctions violations
On September 26, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a $720,258 settlement with an indirect subsidiary of a Switzerland-based bank for allegedly processing transactions in violation of the Cuba, Ukraine-related, Iran, Sudan, and Syria sanctions programs. According to OFAC’s web notice, from April 2013 to April 2016, the bank processed 273 transactions totaling approximately $3,076,180 on behalf of individuals residing in Cuba, Crimea, Iran, Sudan, and Syria. Specifically, OFAC noted that customers in sanctioned jurisdictions were able to continue to purchase and sell securities through the U.S. financial system and to receive related dividend and interest payments until the bank took further steps to prevent such payments.
In arriving at the settlement amount of $720,258, OFAC considered various aggravating factors, including that bank personnel “had reason to know they were processing transactions through the U.S. financial system for individual customers located in comprehensively sanctioned jurisdictions based on the underlying [know-your-customer (KYC)] data obtained by [the bank], which included address information indicating the customers’ location,” and “conferred approximately $3,076,180 in economic benefit to persons in Cuba, Crimea, Iran, Sudan, and Syria,” which caused harm to multiple sanctions programs' integrity. OFAC also considered various mitigating factors, including that the bank cooperated with OFAC throughout the investigation, and has undertaken remedial measures intended to minimize the risk of recurrence of similar conduct.
Separately, the same day OFAC announced a $401,039 settlement with a different indirect subsidiary of the Switzerland-based bank for allegedly processing transactions in violation of the Cuba, Ukraine-related, Iran, Sudan, and Syria sanctions programs. According to OFAC’s web notice, from December 2011 until July 2016, the bank processed 426 transactions totaling approximately $1,233,967 on behalf of individuals ordinarily resident in Cuba, Iran, and Syria.
In arriving at the settlement amount of $401,039, OFAC considered various aggravating factors, including that bank personnel “had reason to know they were processing transactions through the U.S. financial system for individual customers located in comprehensively sanctioned jurisdictions based on the underlying KYC data [the bank had] obtained,” and the bank “conferred approximately $1,233,967 in economic benefit to persons in Cuba, Iran, and Syria,” which caused harm to multiple sanctions programs' integrity. OFAC also considered various mitigating factors, including that the bank cooperated with OFAC throughout the investigation, and has undertaken remedial measures intended to minimize the risk of recurrence of similar conduct.
OFAC issues Notification of Blocked Property to sanctioned Russian oligarch’s trust
On June 30, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a Notification of Blocked Property to a Delaware-based trust in which an OFAC-designated Russian oligarch holds a property interest. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in April 2018, OFAC sanctioned seven Russian oligarchs, including the Russian oligarch who holds a property interest, along with 12 companies they own or control, 17 senior Russian government officials, and a state-owned Russian weapons trading company and its Russian bank subsidiary pursuant to the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 (CAATSA) and Executive Orders 13661, 13662, and 13582. According to OFAC, the trust holds assets valued at over $1 billion; therefore, this enforcement action ensures that those assets continue to be blocked and inaccessible to the OFAC-designated Russian oligarch. As a result of the Notification of Blocked Property, the trust is subject to the same prohibitions applicable to the OFAC-designated Russian oligarch. All transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the U.S. involving any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons are prohibited, unless exempt or authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC. These prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person and the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.
OFAC issues Covid-related general licenses and FAQs
On June 10, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Syria General License (GL) 21A, Venezuela GL 39A, and Iran GL N-1, “Authorizing Certain Activities to Respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic.” Each GL authorizes certain Covid-19-related transactions through June 17, 2023. Additionally, OFAC updated Frequently Asked Questions regarding the purposes of the GLs and provided clarifying information.
OFAC updates Syrian sanctions guidance; issues DPRK advisory on information technology workers
On May 12, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) amended a Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) and published a new General License (GL) regarding Syrian sanctions. Back in April (covered by InfoBytes here), OFAC published FAQ 884, which relates to non-U.S. persons’ (including nongovernmental organizations and foreign financial institutions) exposure to U.S. secondary sanctions under the Caesar Syrian Civilian Protection act of 2019 (Caesar Act). Specifically, FAQ 884 addresses sanctions exposure for activities authorized under the Syrian Sanctions Regulations. OFAC’s recent update of FAQ 884 clarifies that “OFAC will not consider transactions to be ‘significant’ for the purpose of a sanctions determination under the Caesar Act if U.S. persons would not require a specific license from OFAC to participate in such a transaction.” Additionally, GL 22 now authorizes “activities in certain economic sectors in non-regime held areas of Northeast and Northwest Syria.”
Later in the week, OFAC announced that Treasury, the Department of State, and the FBI issued an advisory regarding an attempt by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and DPRK information technology (IT) workers to obtain employment while posing as non-DPRK nationals. Among other things, the advisory provides information on how DPRK IT workers operate and identifies red flags for companies to avoid hiring DPRK freelance developers. A Fact Sheet was also published to provide information on the advisory.