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Two California Appellate Courts Invalidate Auto Installment Contract Arbitration Clauses
Recently, the California Court of Appeals for the First and Second Appellate Districts affirmed lower court orders denying two automobile dealerships’ petitions to compel arbitration, holding that the arbitration clause in the vehicle retail installment sales contracts (RISC) was procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Norton v. Ford of Santa Monica, B237273, 2012 WL 6721400 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2012); Natalini v. Import Motors, Inc., A133236, 2013 WL 64611 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2013). Both trial courts rejected the dealerships’ motions to compel arbitration of complaints alleging multiple causes of action, including violations of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Automobile Sales Finance Act, and Business and Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices Act, holding that the arbitration clauses in the RISCs were unconscionable. On appeal, the courts agreed that the arbitration provisions were substantively unconscionable because they were systematically structured to provide only the dealer a right and opportunity to appeal and, because the arbitration agreement provided no fee waiver for the consumer, the financial ramifications of the clause favored the corporate dealership over the individual consumer. Both courts also held that the arbitration clauses were procedurally unconscionable because they contained elements of surprise, with the First Appellate District also holding that the RISC contained elements of oppression since the contract was one of adhesion. Applying a “sliding scale” to the relative importance of each element, the courts found the arbitration clauses sufficiently substantively and procedurally unconscionable and upheld the trial courts’ denial of the dealerships’ petitions to compel arbitration.
Ninth Circuit Vacates Restitution Order in Overdraft Ordering Case, Allows State Fraud Claims to Proceed
On December 26, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a national bank’s practice of posting payments to checking accounts in a particular order is a federally authorized pricing decision, and that federal law preempts the application of state law to dictate a national bank’s order of posting. Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 10-16959, 2012 WL 6684748 (9th Cir. Dec. 26, 2012). In this case, after trial the district court enjoined the bank’s practice of ordering withdrawals from “high-to-low” and ordered the bank to pay $203 million in restitution. The court agreed with customers who had sued the bank on behalf of a class that the bank’s ordering practice was designed to maximize the number of customer overdrafts and related fees and as such violated the California Unfair Competition Law (UCL). On appeal, the court held that the bank’s ordering practice is a pricing decision the bank can pursue under federal law, and that the National Bank Act (NBA) preempts the unfair business practices prong of the UCL. The court also held that both the imposition of affirmative disclosure requirements and liability based on failure to disclose are preempted. However, the court held that the NBA does not preempt the customers’ claim of affirmative misrepresentations under the fraudulent prong of the UCL. The court also considered as an issue of first impression the effect of the Supreme Court’s intervening ruling in Concepcion on a judgment on appeal after trial. The court declined to grant arbitration, reasoning that the bank’s post-judgment arbitration request was contrary to its conduct throughout the litigation, and that granting the request would prejudice the plaintiff and frustrate the purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act. The court vacated the district court’s injunction and its $203 million restitution order, and directed the district court to determine appropriate relief on the state fraud claims.
Tenth Circuit Enforces Electronic Agreement Entered Into on an Installation Technician's Laptop
On December 11, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims concerning AT&T’s U-Verse services, based on forum selection and arbitration clauses in the agreements between the parties. Hancock v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 11-6233, 2012 WL 6132070 (10th Cir. Dec. 11, 2012). In support of the motion to dismiss, AT&T offered declarations from its employees concerning its standard practices for entering into agreements with customers obtaining U-Verse services. Under those practices, customers purchasing U-Verse TV and Voice services agreed to terms of service (TV Terms) that included a forum selection clause. The TV Terms were provided to customers in writing by the installation technician at the time the services were installed. The customers agreed to the TV Terms by clicking on an acknowledgement and acceptance box on the technician’s laptop after being given the printed terms – the acknowledgement and acceptance stated that the customer had received and reviewed the TV Terms. Details of each acceptance were captured and stored on AT&T’s servers at the time of acceptance. Also under AT&T’s standard practices, customers purchasing U-Verse Internet Services agreed to separate terms of service (Internet Terms) during the online registration process – to complete registration, customers had to click on an “I Agree” button underneath the Internet Terms. For two of the plaintiffs, the Internet Terms included a mandatory arbitration clause at the time of registration. For another plaintiff, the mandatory arbitration clause was added after a notice of amendment, describing the new arbitration clause, was provided to the plaintiff via email. On appeal, the court held that the declarations concerning AT&T’s standard practices were admissible in evidence, and since they were not contradicted by the plaintiffs’ affidavits, the district court did not abuse its discretion by accepting the declarations as true. The court went on to hold that under AT&T’s standard practices both the TV Terms and the Internet Terms were clearly presented, and that enforceable contracts were formed between the plaintiffs and AT&T. The court also concluded that the e-mail notification process used to add the arbitration clause to the Internet Terms was sufficient to make the amendment effective.
Nevada's Federal District Court Declines to Enforce Browsewrap Arbitration Agreement
On September 27, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada followed other federal courts and held that an arbitration clause within the Terms of Use agreement on Zappos.com was unenforceable given that users were neither provided with notice of the agreement nor an opportunity to affirmatively assent to the agreement. In re Zappos.com, Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 12-325, 2012 WL 4466660 (D. Nev. Sep. 27, 2012). Customers sued Zappos in several federal district courts for damages resulting from a security breach of the company’s website. After those actions were consolidated, Zappos filed a motion to compel arbitration based on the argument that by using the website the customers accepted and agreed to its Terms of Use, which included an agreement to arbitrate all claims arising from use of the website, and which were available through a hyperlink on each page of Zappos.com. Such hyperlinked Terms of Use are known as “browsewrap” agreements. The court held that despite the broad federal policy in favor of arbitration, the company had provided no evidence that the customers clicked on, viewed, or expressly manifested assent to the Terms of Use agreement, there was no acceptance of the Terms of Use provisions by customers, and thus those provisions, including the arbitration clause, were unenforceable. Moreover, the court held that because Zappos retained the unilateral right to revise the Terms of Use, the contract was illusory and therefore unenforceable. Accordingly, the court denied Zappos motion to compel arbitration.
Second Circuit Holds Email Notice of Arbitration Agreement Insufficient
On September 7, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that three plaintiff consumers were not bound to arbitrate certain claims related to their purchase of a discount club membership because email notice of the arbitration clause was insufficient. Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., No. 11-1311 WL 3871366 (2nd Cir. Sep. 7, 2012). On appeal of the district court's denial of its motion to compel arbitration, the membership club marketer argued that it provided the plaintiffs with notice of an arbitration provision (i) through a hyperlink appearing on the page the plaintiffs would have seen before enrolling in a service offered by the defendants and (ii) through an email sent to the plaintiffs after their enrollment. The Second Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district court's decision. According to the court, the email notice containing the arbitration clause "was both temporally and spatially decoupled from the plaintiffs' enrollment in and use of [the membership]; the term was delivered after initial enrollment and . . . members such as the plaintiffs would not be forced to confront the terms while enrolling in or using the service or maintaining their memberships." As such, "the email did not provide sufficient notice to the plaintiffs of the arbitration provision, and the plaintiffs therefore could not have assented to it solely as a result of their failure to cancel their enrollment in the defendants' service." The court did not provide a substantive ruling on notice via a hyperlink, holding instead that the defendants forfeited their argument by failing to raise it in the district court.
Federal District Court Declines to Enforce Browsewrap Arbitration Agreement
On August 28, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California held that a retailer's so-called browsewrap agreement failed to provide the consumer with constructive notice of an agreement to arbitrate disputes and declined to enforce arbitration. Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., No 12-0812, WL 3711081 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2012). The consumer filed suit under New York's and California's unfair competition and false advertising laws and other state statutes, alleging that the retailer canceled his online purchase of two sale items, causing him to have to later purchase substitute products at more expense. The retailer responded that by making the purchase through the company's website, the consumer accepted the website's Terms of Use, which contained an agreement to arbitrate any claims arising out of the use of that website. On the retailer's motion to compel arbitration, the court explained that the website's browsewrap agreement stated that any user of the site is deemed to have accepted its terms by, among other things, making a purchase. The court held that the retailer cannot show that the consumer had constructive notice of the Terms of Use because the site did not require that the consumer affirmatively assent to the terms. The court denied the retailer's motion to compel arbitration and allowed the litigation to proceed.
California Appeals Court Holds Brokerage Agreement Sufficiently Incorporated Arbitration Provision
On June 21, the California Second District Court of Appeal held that a defendant brokerage firm had established an agreement to arbitrate, where the brokerage account application signed by the plaintiffs incorporated by reference certain arbitration provisions of a separate client agreement. Rodriguez v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., No. B230310, 2012 WL 2354637 (Cal. Ct. App. June 21, 2012). The appeals court observed that the plaintiffs had signed an account application that explicitly stated that any signatories had also agreed to all terms of a separate client agreement. Another paragraph of the same application, located directly above the signature lines, included an express acknowledgement that the client agreement included an arbitration provision. The court rejected several arguments proffered by the plaintiffs, including that (i) the references to the arbitration provision were unreadable, (ii) the plaintiffs had never received the client agreement containing the arbitration provision, (iii) the client agreement itself was not signed, and (iv) the client agreement was confusing.
CFPB Begins Study of Arbitration Clauses, Extends Comment Period for Overdraft Inquiry
On April 24, the CFPB released a request for information to inform its study of the use and impact of arbitration clauses in consumer financial services agreements. Through June 23, 2012, the CFPB is seeking information from the public regarding (i) the prevalence of use of these arbitration clauses, (ii) what claims consumers bring in arbitration against financial services companies, (iii) whether claims are brought by financial services companies against consumers in arbitration, and (iv) how consumers and companies are affected by actual arbitrations and outside of actual arbitrations. The study is required by the Dodd-Frank Act and must be completed before the CFPB can begin exercising its Dodd-Frank authority to conduct rulemakings regarding arbitration agreements. Therefore, at this time the CFPB is not seeking comments on whether and how the use of such agreements should be regulated.
The CFPB also this week extended through June 29, 2012, the comment period for its inquiry into overdraft programs and their costs, benefits, and risks to consumers.
Federal District Court Enforces Arbitration Clause Included in Clickwrap Terms
On March 26, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois required arbitration of a dispute regarding alleged overcharging by an Internet service provider (ISP) because the consumer had agreed to an arbitration provision included in the ISP’s clickwrap terms of service. Sherman v. AT&T Inc., No. 11-C-5857, 2012 WL 1021823 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 26, 2012). The court held that the plaintiff’s assent to the terms during the online activation process constituted acceptance of those terms, regardless of when he believed the contract was formed. To activate his Internet service, the plaintiff was required to confirm through an online process that he had read and agreed to the ISP’s terms of service. The activation and confirmation page included a link to the terms of service, which included an agreement to arbitrate all disputes. The plaintiff argued (i) that his contract with the ISP was formed during a phone call with an ISP customer service agent pursuant to which he ordered the service, prior to the online activation process, and therefore the terms of service do not apply, and (ii) the terms were not expressly incorporated into the broader conditions of his contract and were procedurally unconscionable. The district court granted the ISP’s motion to compel arbitration of the plaintiff’s allegation (made on behalf of a putative class) that the ISP systematically overcharged consumers for residential Internet service by advertising promotional plans while actually charging standard rates.. The court reasoned that vendors may enclose the full legal terms with their products rather than reciting them prior to purchase, for practical purposes, even if the full terms are not delivered until after the consumer’s order and payment. The court also held that the terms were not procedurally unconscionable, as they were not difficult to find, read or understand, and the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to review the terms prior to activation.
Federal Circuit Courts Issue More Rulings Enforcing Arbitration Agreements
On March 7, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a national bank could compel arbitration of a dispute involving student loans. Kilgore v. KeyBank, Natl Assn, No. 09-16703, 2012 WL 718344 (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 2012). A group of students filed a class action in state court alleging that KeyBank violated state law in its offering of loans to students of a helicopter pilot school, which subsequently misappropriated the student loan funds. KeyBank removed the action to federal court and moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion and KeyBank appealed. While the case was on appeal, the Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), set a new standard for assessing the enforceability of arbitration clauses. That new standard required the Ninth Circuit to hold in KeyBank that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts Californias rule prohibiting arbitration of claims for broad, public injunctive relief. The court also held that the arbitration clause was not procedurally unconscionable because it clearly provided a sixty-day opt-out provision and a conspicuous and comprehensive explanation of the arbitration agreement. The court did not address the issue of whether the arbitration agreement was substantively unconscionable. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently issued two separate, but substantively similar, opinions regarding arbitration agreements, both in cases consolidated in the multidistrict overdraft fee litigation pending in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Hough v. Regions Financial Corp., No. 11-14317, 2012 WL 686311 (11th Cir. Mar. 5, 2012); Buffington v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., No. 11-14316, 2012 WL 660974 (11th Cir. Mar. 1, 2012). In both cases, based on Concepcion, the court previously vacated district court rulings that the banks arbitration clauses were substantively unconscionable under Georgia law because they contained a class action waiver. On remand, the banks renewed their motions to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motions again, this time on the ground that the arbitration clauses were substantively unconscionable under Georgia law because a provision granting the banks the unilateral right to recover their expenses for arbitration allocated disproportionately to the plaintiffs the risks of error and loss inherent in dispute resolution. The Eleventh Circuit held that, under Georgia law, an agreement is not unconscionable because it lacks mutuality of remedy. It also rejected the district courts holding that the clauses were procedurally unconscionable because the contract did not meet the Georgia standard that for an agreement to be procedurally unconscionable it must be so one-sided that no sane man not acting under a delusion would make [it] and no honest man would participate in the transaction. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district courts orders and remanded both cases with specific instructions to compel arbitration.