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District court rescinds arbitration order in ATM and overdraft fee case
On August 10, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California agreed to reconsider a prior decision, which granted a bank’s motion to compel arbitration in connection with a lawsuit concerning the bank’s assessment of two types of fees. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the court compelled arbitration of a plaintiff’s lawsuit asserting claims for breach of contract and violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law due to the bank’s alleged practice of charging fees for out-of-network ATM use and overdraft fees related to debit card transaction timing. The court concluded that even if the California Supreme Court case McGill v. Citibank rule— which held that an arbitration agreement is unenforceable if it constitutes a waiver of the plaintiff’s substantive right to seek public injunctive relief (covered by a Buckley Special Alert here)—was applicable to a contract, it would not survive preemption as the U.S. Supreme Court has “consistently held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts states’ attempts to limit the scope of arbitration agreements,” and “the McGill rule is merely the latest ‘device or formula’ intended to achieve the result of rendering an arbitration agreement against public policy.”
The plaintiff moved for the court’s reconsideration after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued opinions in Blair v. Rent-ACenter, Inc. et al and McArdle v. AT&T Mobility LLC). In Blair (and similarly in McArdle), the 9th Circuit concluded that McGill was not preempted by the FAA. The appellate court found that McGill does not interfere with the bilateral nature of a typical arbitration, stating “[t]he McGill rule leaves undisturbed an agreement that both requires bilateral arbitration and permits public injunctive claims.” (Covered by InfoBytes here.)
The court granted the plaintiff’s motion, concluding that the public injunction waiver in the account agreement is “encompassed by McGill” and therefore, the arbitration agreement is “invalid and unenforceable,” and because the arbitration agreement includes a non-severability clause, the “clause plainly invalidates the entire arbitration agreement section as a result of the invalidity and unenforceability of the public injunction waiver provision therein.”
4th Circuit: Arbitration agreement applies to acquired company
On August 7, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued a split opinion vacating a district court’s decision against arbitration in a proposed class action, which accused a satellite TV provider (defendant) of violating the TCPA by allegedly making automated and prerecorded telemarketing calls to an individual even though her number was on the National Do Not Call Registry. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant and several other entities and individuals seeking class certification as well as statutory damages and injunctive relief. The defendant moved to compel arbitration, claiming that the plaintiff’s dispute was covered by an arbitration agreement in the contract governing her cell phone service with a telecommunications company, which is an affiliate of the defendant. The district court denied the request, ruling that the allegations “did not fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement.” The plaintiff appealed, “defend[ing] the district court’s scope ruling,” but arguing that no agreement was formed.
On appeal, the majority concluded that not only did the plaintiff form an agreement to arbitrate with the defendant, the allegations fit within the broad scope of the arbitration agreement. Specifically, the appellate court determined that an arbitration agreement signed by the plaintiff with the telecommunications company in 2012 when she opened a new line of service was extended to potential TCPA allegations against the defendant when the telecommunications company acquired the defendant in 2015. Even though the acquisition happened several years after the plaintiff signed the contract, the majority stated the arbitration agreement had a “forward-looking nature” and that it seemed unlikely that the telecommunications company and its affiliates “intended to restrict the covered entities to those existing at the time the agreement was signed.” According to the majority, “[w]e need not define the outer limits of this arbitration agreement to conclude, based on the arbitration provisions and the contract as a whole, that [the plaintiff’s] TCPA claims about [the defendant’s] advertising calls fall within its scope.” As to the plaintiff’s argument that she only signed the account on behalf of her husband who was the account holder, the majority said the agreement covered “all authorized or unauthorized users,” which the plaintiff was at the time.
4th Circuit affirms arbitration clause waiving statutory rights is unenforceable
On July 21, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, holding that the arbitration agreements operated as prospective waivers of federal law and were thus unenforceable. According to the opinion, a group of Virginia borrowers filed suit against two online lenders owned by a sovereign Native American tribe and their investors (collectively, “defendants”). In the action, the plaintiffs contended that they obtained payday loans from the defendants, which included annual interest rates between 219 percent to 373 percent—an alleged violation of Virginia’s usury laws and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The defendants moved to compel arbitration, which the district court denied, concluding that choice-of-law provisions—such as “‘[t]his agreement to arbitrate shall be governed by Tribal Law’; ‘[t]he arbitrator shall apply Tribal Law’; and the arbitration award ‘must be consistent with this Agreement and Tribal Law’”—prospectively excluded federal law, making them unenforceable.
On appeal, the 4th Circuit agreed with the district court despite a “strong federal policy in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements.” Most significantly, the appellate court rejected the defendants’ assertion that the choice-of-law provisions did not operate as a prospective waiver. The court noted that while the choice-of-law provisions “do not explicitly disclaim the application of federal law, the practical effect is the same,” as they limit an arbitrator’s award to “remedies available under Tribal Law,” effectively preempting “the application of any contrary law—including contrary federal law.” Moreover, the appellate court concluded that under the arbitration agreement, borrowers would be unable to effectively pursue RICO claims against the defendants, and more specifically, would be unable to “effectively vindicate a federal statutory claim for treble damages” under RICO. Thus, because federal statutory protections and remedies are unavailable to borrowers under the agreement, the appellate court concluded the entire agreement is unenforceable.
5th Circuit affirms arbitration in UDAAP action
On July 16, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court’s order compelling arbitration in a lawsuit brought by consumers refuting their liability on a commercial loan, arguing that a Mississippi-based bank “violated numerous state and federal consumer protection laws throughout the loan process.” According to the opinion, the consumers allege a bank representative instructed them to form an LLC and purchase a large plot of land with a commercial loan, as opposed to a consumer loan, in order to receive a “lower interest rate and protection from personal liability[.]” As a part of the transaction, the consumers signed an arbitration agreement that covered “‘any dispute or controversy’ arising from the transaction.” The consumers subsequently filed suit, arguing, among other things, that the bank committed “an unfair, deceptive, abusive act, or practice…by coaxing the [consumers] into forming an LLC and taking out a less favorable commercial loan” rather than a consumer loan, which they originally sought. The bank moved to compel arbitration, and the district court granted the motion and dismissed the action with prejudice.
On appeal, the 5th Circuit agreed with the district court, rejecting the consumers’ argument that there was not a valid agreement to arbitrate. The appellate court concluded that the agreement was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable, noting that the consumers voluntarily entered into the agreement and the provision entitling “the victor in arbitration to recover fees from the losing party” was not “one-sided or oppressive.” Moreover, the appellate court concluded that the consumers failed to provide any federal policy or statute that would support their additional argument that the bank’s alleged UDAAP violation would void an otherwise valid arbitration agreement. Thus, the panel affirmed the district court’s order.
3rd Circuit: Arbitration clause limiting borrowers’ statutory rights is unenforceable
On July 14, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, holding that an arbitration clause contained within an online tribal lender’s payday loan agreement impermissibly strips borrowers of their right to assert statutory claims and is therefore unenforceable. Specifically, because this “limitation constitutes a prospective waiver of statutory rights,” the lender’s arbitration agreement “violates public policy and is therefore unenforceable.” The plaintiffs filed a putative class action contending that they obtained payday loans from the lender, which included annual interest rates between 496.55 percent to 714.88 percent—an alleged violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and various Pennsylvania consumer protection laws. The defendants moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied the defendants’ arbitration request, ruling that “the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because the arbitrator is permitted only to consider tribal law,” and, therefore, the arbitrator could not consider any of plaintiffs’ federal or state law claims. The 3rd Circuit agreed, rejecting, among other things, the defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs could bring RICO-like claims under tribal law and possibly receive “similar relief.” The appellate court noted: “The question is whether a party can bring and effectively pursue the federal claim—not whether some other law is a sufficient substitute.”
9th Circuit: Payday arbitration remanded because of new California interest rate law
On June 9, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded a case against a payday lender back to district court because a newly issued California amendment took effect—which prohibits lenders from issuing loans between $2,500 and $10,000 with charges over 36 percent calculated as an annual simple interest rate (covered by InfoBytes here)—which may impact the court’s analysis. As also previously covered by InfoBytes, plaintiffs filed a putative class action suit against the payday lender alleging the lender sells loans with usurious interest rates, which are prohibited under California’s Unfair Competition Law and Consumer Legal Remedies Act. The lender moved to compel arbitration, but the district court concluded the arbitration provision was unenforceable. In addition to finding the arbitration provisions procedurally unconscionable, the court found that the provision contained a waiver of public injunctive relief, which was substantively unconscionable based on the California Supreme Court decision in McGill v. Citibank, N.A (covered by a Buckley Special Alert here).
On appeal, the 9th Circuit remanded the case back to the district court to reconsider whether the consumer’s requested injunction enjoining the payday lender from issuing loans above $10,000 would actually prevent a threat of future harm in light of the new California law and considering the operative complaint does not allege the lender issued or continues to issue loans above $10,000. Additionally, the appellate court rejected the lender’s arguments that McGill was preempted under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and agreed with the district court’s application of California law, because “Kansas law is contrary to California policy and [] California holds a materially greater interest in this litigation.”
District court denies arbitration in mobile app BIPA suit
On June 1, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied a mobile application company’s motion to, among other things, compel arbitration in a class action alleging the company used face-geometry scan technology in violation of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA). According to the opinion, the plaintiff brought the proposed class action against the company alleging the company used “facial recognition technology to scan, collect, and store his and other users' face geometries from videos and photographs they uploaded to [the company’s photo editing app] without satisfying [BIPA]’s requirements.” The company moved to compel arbitration of the claims on an individual basis. The court concluded that the plaintiff received reasonable notice of the terms of service when he signed up for his account and subscription plan in the app. However, the court noted that while the company’s terms of service include a binding arbitration agreement, the agreement does not cover potential violations of BIPA. Specifically, the court highlighted that the arbitration clause contained exceptions for “allegations of theft, piracy, invasion of privacy or unauthorized use,” and concluded that the BIPA claim is not within the scope of the agreement to arbitrate.
District court compels arbitration of biometric privacy suit
On May 15, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted an online photography company’s motion to compel arbitration in a biometric privacy lawsuit, notwithstanding the company’s unilateral modification of arbitration terms after the lawsuit was filed. According to the opinion, the plaintiffs created an account on the company’s website in August 2014. In May 2015, the company added an arbitration provision to its Terms of Use. In June 2019, the plaintiffs filed the proposed class action alleging the company violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) “by using facial-recognition technology to extract biometric identifiers for ‘tagging’ individuals and by ‘selling, leasing, trading, or otherwise profiting from Plaintiffs’…biometric information.’” In September 2019, the company sent an email to all of its users that its account Terms of Use were updated, including provisions regarding arbitration. The email stated that if users continued to use the website or did not close their account by October 1, 2019, they were deemed to have accepted the updated terms. The plaintiffs’ account remained open as of October 2, 2019. The company moved to compel arbitration of the plaintiffs’ claims. The plaintiffs argued that the September 2019 email did not create a binding agreement to arbitrate and that it should not apply retroactively to the June 2019 claim.
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments, concluding that they were already bound to arbitration by the 2015 update to the company’s terms of use, because the terms accepted in 2014 included a “change-in-terms” provision, allowing the company to revise terms from time to time by posting revisions. Moreover, the court disagreed with the plaintiffs that the September 2019 email was “an attempt by [the company] to ‘surreptitiously’ bind unwitting putative class members to arbitration agreements,” noting that the 2019 modifications did not significantly alter users’ rights under the arbitration agreement and the court would “not rely on the 2019 email to find that any putative class members agreed to arbitrate.”
District court grants debt collector’s arbitration request
On May 11, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey granted a debt collector’s renewed motion to compel arbitration, concluding that the previously-ordered discovery demonstrated that the plaintiff’s FDCPA claim fell within the bounds of the arbitration clause in the underlying credit card agreement. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the plaintiffs filed a proposed class action alleging that the debt collection company’s collection letters violated the FDCPA because they did not “properly identify the name of the current creditor to whom the debt is owed.” The debt collectors filed an initial motion to compel arbitration, arguing that the debts described in the plaintiffs’ amended complaint arose pursuant to credit card agreements that include an arbitration clause. In February 2019, the court denied the motion concluding that discovery was needed in order to determine whether an arbitration clause applied to the plaintiffs’ claims regarding FDCPA violations. After the parties engaged in discovery, the plaintiff argued that only the card issuer has a right to compel arbitration under the agreement. The court rejected this argument, concluding that the collection agency was an agent of the creditor and as an agent, the collector may enforce the arbitration agreement. Moreover, the court determined that the debt collection letter relates to the consumer’s credit account as the debt is a result of the credit card use and the FDCPA claim “is statuary, as explicitly provided for in the card agreement.”
5th Circuit: Non-signatories not compelled to arbitrate FCRA claims
On April 21, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court’s order denying a plaintiff’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that two credit reporting agencies (CRAs) are not subject to arbitration because of their contractual relationships with a bank. The plaintiff sued the bank and the CRAs, alleging violations of the FCRA and that the bank additionally violated the TCPA and the Fair Credit Billing Act in connection with disputed, unfamiliar charges that appeared on his credit card. The bank moved to compel arbitration pursuant to a provision in its credit card agreement, and the CRA defendants moved to stay the claims against them pending the outcome of the arbitration between the plaintiff and the bank. While the plaintiff opposed the bank’s motion to compel arbitration, he simultaneously moved to compel the CRAs to arbitration in the event that the bank’s motion was granted. The district court granted the bank’s motion to compel arbitration and denied the plaintiff’s motion to compel the CRAs to arbitration, reasoning that “‘there is a rebuttable presumption that non-signatories to a contract cannot be bound by arbitration agreements.’”
On appeal, the 5th Circuit agreed with the district court, concluding that because the CRAs were not signatories to the credit card agreement and were neither expressly nor implicitly parties to the agreement, they could not be compelled to arbitrate the plaintiff’s FCRA claims. Furthermore, while Alabama law governed the agreement, the appellate court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that equitable estoppel and third-party beneficiary theories under Alabama common law required the CRAs to arbitrate the claims.