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2nd Circuit: Unsolicited text messages are sufficient injury under TCPA
On April 30, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit held that the receipt of unsolicited text messages, absent any additional injury, is sufficient to demonstrate injury-in-fact in a TCPA class action. According to the opinion, consumers filed a class action lawsuit against a retail store for sending unsolicited text messages in violation of the TCPA. The district court approved a settlement between the parties and certified the class despite various objections, including one from a third-party defendant who argued the consumers lacked standing under the 2016 Supreme Court opinion Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, because “they alleged only a bare statutory violation and statutory damages cannot substitute for concrete harm.”
On appeal, the appellate court first rejected the third-party defendant’s standing to appeal the district court’s decision because it had not been “‘formally strip[ped]’ of any claim or defense, it lacks standing to pursue its appeal” in the underlying class action. Notwithstanding the lack of standing by the third-party defendant, the appellate court then went on to address the jurisdictional standing issues raised against the consumers. The court reasoned that, even though the third party that raised the jurisdictional question had been dismissed, the court had an “independent obligation to satisfy [itself] of the jurisdiction” of the appellate and district court. The appellate court concluded that the consumers sufficiently alleged “nuisance and privacy invasion” by the unsolicited text messages, which “are the very harms with which Congress was concerned when enacting the TCPA.” Because the harms identified are “of the same character as harms remediable by traditional causes of action,” the appellate court held the consumers sufficiently demonstrated injury-in-fact as required by Article III.
FDIC fines banks for TCPA, BSA violations; releases March enforcement actions
On April 26, the FDIC announced a list of administrative enforcement actions taken against banks and individuals in March. The 13 orders include “three consent orders; two orders terminating consent orders; four Section 19 orders; one removal and prohibition order; two voluntary terminations of insurance orders; and two orders to pay civil money penalty.” The FDIC assessed, among other things, a $200,000 civil money penalty against an Oklahoma-based bank for allegedly violating the FTC Act and the TCPA by (i) using telemarketers who misrepresented themselves as employees or affiliates of the federal government; and (ii) placing calls to consumers who appeared on the National Do Not Call Registry or who requested to be added to the bank’s internal Do Not Call List.
The FDIC also assessed a consent order against an Illinois-based bank related to alleged weaknesses in its Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) compliance program. Among other things, the bank is ordered to (i) designate a senior official to enforce and take corrective action related to its BSA compliance policy; (ii) implement a revised, comprehensive written BSA compliance program and system of internal controls to address provisions, including currency transaction reporting, customer identification program, beneficial ownership, and information sharing requirements; (iii) adopt a written Customer Due Diligence Program to assure the reasonable detection of suspicious activity, specifically for money services businesses and privately-owned ATM customers; (iv) implement a process for account transaction monitoring; (v) implement a comprehensive BSA training program for appropriate personnel; (vi) conduct a look back review to ensure certain transactions were appropriately identified and reported; and (vii) revise its internal control programs to correct the identified deficiencies.
4th Circuit: TCPA debt collection exemption is unconstitutional
On April 24, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit vacated a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the FCC, concluding that an exemption under the TCPA that allows debt collectors to use an autodialer to contact individuals on their cell phones when collecting debts guaranteed by the federal government violates the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. According to the opinion, several political consultant groups (plaintiffs) argued that a statutory exemption enacted by Congress as a means of allowing automated calls to be placed to individuals’ cell phones “that relate to the collection of debts owed to or guaranteed by the federal government” is “facially unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause” of the First Amendment. The plaintiffs argued that the debt-collection exemption to the automated call ban contravenes their free speech rights. Moreover, the plaintiffs claimed that “the free speech infirmity of the debt-collection exemption is not severable from the automated call ban and renders the entire ban unconstitutional.” The FCC, however, argued that the applicability of the exemption depended on the relationship between the government and the debtor and not on the content. The district court awarded summary judgment in favor of the FCC after applying a “strict scrutiny review,” ruling that the exemption does not violate the Free Speech Clause.
On appeal the 4th Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs that the exemption contravenes the Free Speech Clause, and found that the challenged exemption was a content-based restriction on free speech that did not hold up to strict scrutiny review. “Under the debt-collection exemption, the relationship between the federal government and the debtor is only relevant to the subject matter of the call. In other words, the debt-collection exemption applies to a phone call made to the debtor because the call is about the debt, not because of any relationship between the federal government and the debtor.” And because the exemption is a content-based restriction on speech, it must satisfy strict scrutiny review to be constitutional, which it fails to do, the 4th Circuit opined. “The exemption thus cannot be said to advance the purpose of privacy protection, in that it actually authorizes a broad swath of intrusive calls. . . [and] therefore erodes the privacy protections that the automated call ban was intended to further.” However, the appellate court sided with the FCC to sever the debt collection exemption from the automated call ban. “First and foremost, the explicit directives of the Supreme Court and Congress strongly support a severance of the debt-collection exemption from the automated call ban,” the panel stated. “Furthermore, the ban can operate effectively in the absence of the debt-collection exemption, which is clearly an outlier among the statutory exemptions.”
District Court rejects business owners’ Do Not Call Registry TCPA claims
On April 16, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted in part and denied in part a telemarketing company’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring some of his claims under the TCPA. According to the opinion, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the company for various claims under the TCPA, alleging that he received ten calls from the company to a phone number he had listed on the “National Do Not Call Registry” (Registry), nine of which were allegedly placed using an automatic dialing system (autodialer). The plaintiff requested orally, and later in writing, that the company cease calling the number, but the company allegedly continued to do so. The company moved to dismiss the action, arguing that the plaintiff created a business model to “encourage telemarketers to call his cellphone number so that he can later sue the telemarketers under the TCPA,” and therefore, has not suffered an injury-in-fact that the TCPA was designed to protect. The court agreed with the company on two claims related to the Registry, holding that the plaintiff does not have standing to bring claims under the TCPA’s prohibition of contacting numbers on the Registry because the phone was for business use and “business numbers are not permitted to be registered on the [Registry].” The court denied the motion to dismiss as to the remaining TCPA claims and ordered the company to respond.
District Court approves final $7.5 million TCPA class action settlement with payment processor
On April 16, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted final approval to a $7.5 million class action settlement resolving allegations that a payment processor and its sales representative violated the TCPA by using an autodialer for telemarketing purposes without first obtaining consumers’ prior express consent. The settlement terms also require the defendants to pay roughly $1.8 million in attorneys’ fees. According to the second amended complaint, the sales representative placed pre-recorded calls to potential clients on behalf of the payment processor through the use of an autodialer, including consumers who had not consented to receiving the calls. The plaintiff further alleged that the payment processor also violated the TCPA by sending facsimile advertisements that did not contain a “Compliant Opt Out Notice” to recipients. The parties reached a preliminary settlement last August following discovery and mediation.
District Court rejects alarm company’s bid to escape vicarious liability under TCPA
On April 3, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia denied an alarm company’s motion for summary judgment in multi-district litigation consisting of approximately 30 cases alleging the company is vicariously liable for the telemarketing conduct of its authorized retailers in violation of the TCPA. The company moved for summary judgment arguing, among other things, that it is not a “seller” governed by the TCPA and no evidence exists of an agency relationship between the company and the authorized retailers.
The court rejected these arguments, finding a genuine dispute of material fact as to the agency relationship based on “substantial evidence of the [the company’s] control over its dealers’ sales tactics,” including “the right to control the manner and means by which its Authorized dealers sold [the company]’s services and exercis[ed] that control.” Moreover, the court determined that the company was aware of the allegedly unlawful telemarketing calls through “dozens of complaints involving hundreds of consumers” but failed to take measures to address the problem. As for whether the company was considered a “seller” under the TCPA, the court noted that the authorized dealers worked exclusively for the company, the company had the right of first refusal to purchase the contracts sold by the dealers, the company was “totally dependent” on the dealers’ success, and the telemarketing calls were made to increase the flow of consumers to both the dealers and the company, therefore making the company a “seller” under the TCPA.
District Court finds text messages were not sent by autodialer
On March 29, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted a telecommunication company’s summary judgment motion in a putative TCPA class action involving text messages. The plaintiff asserted that the company sent him text messages asking survey questions, even though he did not consent and was registered on the Do Not Call list. The company argued that it did not use an automated dialing system (autodialer) to send the text messages to the plaintiff. The court agreed. Citing to the D.C. Circuit’s decision in ACA International v. FCC and analyzing the definition of an autodialer under the TCPA, the court concluded that the system used by the company to send the text messages was not an autodialer because it could not “generate telephone numbers randomly or sequentially.” The court also rejected the consumer’s argument that the system had “the capacity” to generate numbers randomly by selecting numbers to dial from a compiled list of accounts, noting that the TCPA “does not support a reading where ‘using a random or sequential number generator’ refers to the order numbers from a list are dialed.”
District Court: “Ringless” voicemail is a “call” under the TCPA
On March 25, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted in part and denied in a part a motion to dismiss a putative class action alleging that an auto dealer violated the TCPA by using a “ringless” voicemail platform to leave pre-recorded telemarketing voicemails on consumers’ cell phones without obtaining prior express consent. The defendant moved to dismiss the putative class claims arguing that (i) the plaintiff lacked standing and failed to state a claim because he did not receive a “call” within the meaning of the TCPA; (ii) the plaintiff lacked standing to seek declaratory or injunctive relief; (iii) the TCPA was unconstitutional; and (iv) the complaint failed to adequately allege that the defendant “willfully or knowingly violated the TCPA.”
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff did not receive a “call” as defined by the TCPA, concluding that a ringless voicemail is a call subject to the TCPA restrictions. The court found that the plaintiff had Article III standing because he sufficiently alleged an injury-in-fact and actual harm, including, among other things, invasion of privacy, aggravation, annoyance, and intrusion. The court further found that the plaintiff’s complaint alleged sufficient facts to support the TCPA claim and the allegation that defendant acted willfully or knowingly. The court also rejected defendant’s challenge to the TCPA’s constitutionality. However, the court found the plaintiff could not seek declaratory or injunctive relief because the plaintiff failed to show real and immediate threat of future harm or proffer a basis that would allow the court to infer that the defendant would ever send ringless voicemails again.
9th Circuit: Administrator vicariously liable for debt collectors’ alleged TCPA violations
On March 22, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit reversed a lower court’s decision to dismiss TCPA claims against a student loan administrator (defendant), finding that the administrator could be held vicariously liable for a contractor’s alleged debt collection attempts. The plaintiff claimed in her suit that the companies hired by the contracted student loan servicer violated the TCPA by using an autodialer when attempting to contact borrowers to collect payment. The plaintiff argued that the defendant was “vicariously liable” for the alleged TCPA violations of the companies that were hired to collect the plaintiff’s debts, and that the defendant was “similarly liable under the federal common law agency principles of ratification and implied actual authority.” The claims against the collectors and the servicer were dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the lower court ruled on summary judgment that a jury could not hold the defendant responsible for the actions of the servicer.
On appeal, the split three-judge panel held that a reasonable jury could find that the defendant knew of the alleged TCPA violations, and that because the defendant “ratified the debt collectors’ calling practices by remaining silent,” or alternatively, willfully ignored potential violations through its collections arrangement with the servicer, a jury could find a “principal-agent” relationship—even if one did not exist in the contract—and the court should hold it liable for the collectors’ TCPA violations. According to the panel, there was evidence in the record that the defendant “had actual knowledge” of the alleged violations through audit reports provided by the servicer and “did nothing” to ensure that the debt collectors complied with the law. However, the entire panel agreed that the defendant was not per se vicariously liable for the debt collectors’ alleged TCPA violations.
In dissent, Judge Bybee agreed with the panel that the defendant is not per se vicariously liable for the debt collectors’ practices, and noted in addition that there is not enough evidence to show that the defendant consented to practices that violate the TCPA or that it granted the debt collectors authority to violate the law. He wrote, “there is no evidence whatsoever that [the defendant] approved of such practices. In fact, the only evidence in the record is to the contrary: when [the defendant] learned of wrongful practices, it reported them to [the servicer] and asked [the servicer] to correct the problem.”
District Court dismisses FDCPA and TCPA claims against online retailer
On March 5, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted an online retailer’s motion to dismiss an action alleging the retailer violated the FDCPA and the TCPA. According to the opinion, the plaintiff received a $300 credit line with the retailer for a laptop computer, which the plaintiff alleges he never received. The plaintiff alleges that the retailer continued to seek payment for the laptop and repeatedly contacted the plaintiff by phone after the plaintiff disputed the payment and informed the retailer to only communicate in writing. The retailor subsequently sent the plaintiff a letter acknowledging his request to only be contacted in writing, revoking prior consent to be contacted by phone. The plaintiff then filed the FDCPA and TCPA claims against the retailer after the plaintiff sought to collect $150,000 from the retailer for expenses defending against the retailer’s collection attempts, which the plaintiff argued the retailer “tacitly agreed” to pay. The retailer moved to dismiss the claims arguing the plaintiff failed to allege the retailer was a “debt collector” under the FDCPA and that the plaintiff failed to establish the retailer called the plaintiff without his prior consent under the TCPA. The court agreed, noting that the retailer had serviced the plaintiff’s account “well before” the plaintiff owed an actual debt and therefore, is not a debt collector under the FDCPA. As for the TCPA claim, the court found that the plaintiff failed to show the retailer called him after the parties agreed to revoke the prior consent. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that he had revoked consent prior to the retailer’s acknowledgment of the revocation, noting that a party cannot unilaterally revoke consent under the TCPA. Because the plaintiff failed to state plausible claims under the FDCPA and the TCPA, the court dismissed the action and denied the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint.