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Financial Services Law Insights and Observations

Fifth Circuit Holds State AG Credit Card Add-On Suit Not Subject To Federal Jurisdiction

Credit Cards State Attorney General Ancillary Products

Fintech

On December 2, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a set of parens patriae suits filed by the Mississippi Attorney General (AG) against credit card issuers is not subject to federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) or National Bank Act (NBA) preemption. Hood v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., No. 13-60686, 2013 WL 6230960 (5th Cir. Dec. 2, 2013). The consolidated appeal involves cases originally filed by the AG in state court against six credit card issuers for allegedly violating the Mississippi Consumer Protection Act in connection with the marketing, sale, and administering of certain ancillary products, including payment protection plans. After the card issuers removed the cases, a federal district court denied the state’s motion to remand, holding that it had subject matter jurisdiction because: (i) the cases were CAFA mass actions; (ii) the NBA (and the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act for one state-chartered bank defendant) preempted some of the state law claims; and (iii) it had supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. The Sixth Circuit disagreed and held that the card issuers failed to prove that any card holder met CAFA’s individual amount in controversy requirement, rejecting the issuers’ argument that the state is the real party in interest and its claims for restitution and civil penalties exceed the threshold. The court also rejected the issuers’ argument—and the district court’s holding—that the payment protection plans were part of the loan agreement and the fees associated with the plans constitute “interest,” such that the state’s challenge to the plans was an implicit usury claim preempted by the NBA. Instead, the court held that while the plans could conceivably fit within the definition of “interest,” there is no clear rule on this subject that demands removal. Moreover, the court held that even if the payment protection plan fees are “interest,” the claims still would not be preempted because the state does not allege that the issuers charged too much interest, but rather challenges the alleged practice of improperly enrolling customers in the plans. The court reversed the district court and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.