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District Court issues judgment against student debt relief operation
On June 10, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California entered a stipulated final judgment and order against an individual defendant who participated in a deceptive debt-relief operation. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in 2019, the Bureau, along with the Minnesota and North Carolina attorneys general, and the Los Angeles City Attorney (together, the “states”), announced an action against the student loan debt relief operation for allegedly deceiving thousands of student-loan borrowers and charging more than $71 million in unlawful advance fees. In the third amended complaint, the Bureau and the states alleged that since at least 2015, the debt relief operation violated the CFPA, TSR, FDCPA, and various state laws by charging and collecting improper advance fees from student loan borrowers prior to providing assistance and receiving payments on the adjusted loans. In addition, the Bureau and the states claimed that the debt relief operation engaged in deceptive practices by, among other things, misrepresenting: (i) the purpose and application of fees they charged; (ii) their ability to obtain loan forgiveness for borrowers; and (iii) their ability to actually lower borrowers’ monthly payments. Moreover, the debt relief operation allegedly failed to inform borrowers that it was their practice to request that the loans be placed in forbearance and also submitted false information to student loan servicers to qualify borrowers for lower payments.
Under the terms of the final judgment, in addition to various forms of injunctive relief, the individual defendant must pay a $1 civil money penalty to the Bureau and $5,000 each to Minnesota, North Carolina, and California. The individual defendant is also “liable, jointly and severally, in the amount of $95,057,757, for the purpose of providing redress to Affected Consumers,” although his obligation to pay this amount is “suspended based on [his] inability to pay.”
9th Circuit to rehear en banc whether tribal lenders can arbitrate RICO claims
On June 6, a majority of nonrecused active judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated a previously issued opinion that said tribal lenders could arbitrate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) class action claims, saying it will rehear the case en banc. As previously covered by InfoBytes, last September the 9th Circuit panel majority concluded that “an agreement delegating to an arbitrator the gateway question of whether the underlying arbitration agreement is enforceable must be upheld unless that specific delegation provision is itself unenforceable.” The panel reviewed whether California residents who received loans from an online lender were allowed to pursue class RICO claims based on allegations that they were charged interest rates exceeding state limits from lenders claiming tribal immunity. The district court granted class certification and ruled that the entire arbitration agreement, including provisions containing a class action waiver, was unenforceable. On appeal, the panel majority cited to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, which determined, among other things, that when a party challenges an entire agreement—not just an arbitration provision—deciding “gateway” issues such as enforceability must be delegated to an arbitrator. “[W]hen there is a clear delegation provision, that question is . . . for the arbitrator to decide so long as the delegation provision itself does not eliminate parties’ rights to purse their federal remedies,” the majority wrote. The dissenting judge held, however, that the panel majority “misunderstood the effect of the choice-of-law provisions in the agreements,” arguing that the provisions curtail an arbitrator’s authority by allowing application of “only tribal law and a small and irrelevant subset of federal law,” thus preventing an arbitrator “from applying the law necessary to determine whether the delegation provisions and the arbitration agreements are valid.” He further contended that the panel majority’s decision diverged from decisions reached by several sister circuits, which “have consistently condemned the arbitration agreements embedded in tribal internet payday loan agreements, including those used by the very same lenders as in this case.”
Judges disagree that “psychological states” can never support standing under FDCPA
On June 8, a majority of judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied a plaintiff-appellee’s petition for rehearing en banc in a case concerning the collection of time-barred debt. In April, the 7th Circuit vacated a $350,000 jury award against a debt collector in an FDCPA action, holding that the plaintiff lacked Article III standing. The defendant sent the plaintiff a letter offering to resolve her defaulted credit card debt at a discount. The letter included a disclosure stating that “because of the age of the debt” it would not sue or report the debt to a credit agency and that payment or nonpayment would not affect her credit score. The plaintiff sued, claiming the letter “surprised and confused” her and was in violation of Sections 1692e(2), 1692e(10), and 1692f of the FDCPA. The district court certified a class and granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff “reasoning that the misleading nature of the letter risked real harm to the interests that Congress sought to protect with the FDCPA.” A jury awarded the class $350,000 in damages. On appeal, the panel disagreed, explaining that the plaintiff never made a payment as a result of receiving the letter, nor did she “promise to do so or otherwise act to her detriment in response to anything in or omitted from the letter.” Calling the defendant to dispute the debt and contacting an attorney for legal advice “are not legally cognizable harms” and not enough to provide the “basis for a lawsuit,” the court wrote, adding that “[p]sychological states induced by a debt collector’s letter” are not enough to establish standing.
The majority of the 7th Circuit agreed with the panel’s ruling and voted not to hold an en banc rehearing. However, four judges dissented, arguing that the plaintiff’s claims “should easily satisfy” standing requirements established by the U.S. Supreme Court. “The emotional distress, confusion, and anxiety suffered by [plaintiff] in response to this zombie debt collection effort fit well within the harms that would be expected from many of the abusive practices,” the dissent said. “That’s true regardless of whether the debtor actually made a payment or took some other tangible action in response to them.” According to the dissent, the majority is “painting with too broad a brush” in finding that “[e]motional distress and other ‘psychological states’ can never support standing under the FDCPA.” This reasoning also overlooks close historical parallels in common and constitutional law that provide remedies for intangible injuries caused by many violations of the FDCPA and other consumer-protection statutes, the dissent added.
9th Circuit affirms lower court’s decision in TCPA suit
On June 10, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a lower court’s ruling on summary judgment that an individual’s text messages sent to a financial institution provided the express consent required under the TCPA to be contacted via an autodialer system. According to the opinion, the plaintiff, who was not a customer of the defendant, sent 11 text messages to the defendant’s short code number. Ten of the messages were unrelated to the defendant’s business, and the plaintiff’s messages were replied to with an automated message providing instructions about how to stop receiving text messages and how to contact the defendant. The remaining text message from the plaintiff to the defendant consisted of the word “STOP” to which the defendant replied with the response that plaintiff is not subscribed and will not receive alerts. These reply texts were the only text messages the defendant sent to the plaintiff’s mobile phone. Based on these facts, the plaintiff filed suit in the District of Connecticut, alleging that the defendant violated the TCPA by replying to his text messages using an automatic call-generating capability without obtaining the plaintiff’s consent. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on procedural grounds, and plaintiff voluntarily withdrew the suit and subsequently sued in the District of Hawaii under similar facts and claims. The court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that each of the texts sent to the defendant by the plaintiff constituted prior express consent to receive reply texts. The court also awarded attorneys’ fees to defendant as “costs” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(d).
The 9th Circuit agreed with the district court’s determination that the plaintiff “expressly consented to receive reply text messages.” With respect to the awarding of attorney’s fees, the appellate court recognized a circuit split on the issue of whether Rule 41(d) costs included attorney’s fees, and held that, (i) “costs” under Rule 41(d) does not include attorney’s fees as a matter of right and (ii) for purposes of the TCPA, “cost” does not include attorney’s fees because “it is undisputed that the TCPA does not provide for the award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.”
District Court approves data breach settlement
On June 8, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted a plaintiffs’ motion for final approval of a class action settlement resolving claims that several retail businesses failed to establish reasonable safeguards that led to a data breach. According to the opinion, the plaintiff alleged that a syndicate accessed cardholder information and sold it on the so-called dark web. The plaintiffs also claimed that the breach caused them to spend time monitoring their accounts, safeguarding account information, and, for some plaintiffs, resolving fraudulent charges and withdrawals. The settlement provides for two different levels of payments to affected consumers. Tier 1 claimants, who must provide proof of a payment transaction during the period of the breach and confirm that they spent time monitoring account information after the breach, will receive $30. Tier 2 claimants will be reimbursed for documented out-of-pocket expenses incurred as a result of the breach, such as costs and expenses related to identity theft or fraud, late fees, and unauthorized charges and withdrawals, in an amount not to exceed $5,000. The total amount to be paid to class members is approximately $278,000.
District Court grants defendant’s summary judgment in TCPA case
On June 6, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted a national bank’s (defendant) motion for summary judgment in a case alleging it violated the TCPA by placing unwanted telephone calls and text messages. According to the order, the plaintiff filed suit in April 2021, alleging the defendant called him 88 times without his consent regarding a debt using an automated dialing system in violation of the TCPA. The court found that the plaintiff had given his consent to be contacted when he signed a signature card for his account that included his number. The court noted that his consent permitted the defendant “to use text messaging, artificial or prerecorded voice messages and automatic dialing technology for informational and account service calls, but not for telemarketing or sales calls.” The court further concluded that “prior express consent permits a creditor to contact a debtor by any telephonic means,” and emphasized that the “TCPA is not intended to stop a bank from calling its customers, but rather to stop telemarketers from making random, sequentially generated ‘robocalls’ to consumers who do not wish to receive them.”
District Court dismisses suit alleging improper inspection fees
On June 6, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey granted a defendant bank’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the plaintiff’s inspection fee allegations are barred on collateral estoppel grounds. The plaintiff filed a class action suit claiming the defendant’s computer software orders property inspections after borrowers’ loans are in default and then charges borrowers for the improper inspection fees. According to the opinion, the defendant initiated foreclosure proceedings in 2012 against the plaintiff in state court after she missed payments. The parties litigated the matter for several years in state court, and in 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion for leave to add class action claims related to the defendant’s inspection fee collection system. The state court denied plaintiff’s motion, finding the proposed claims to be without merit and futile. Final judgment of foreclosure was granted to the bank. Similar proceedings involving the same class action counterclaims occurred after the defendant requested that the judgment be vacated to add an additional lien holder as a defendant. The defendant again applied for entry of final judgment, but withdrew this application allegedly in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Ultimately the state court dismissed the foreclosure action without prejudice for lack of prosecution. The plaintiff filed an instant complaint in federal court.
The defendant argued that the plaintiff “should be collaterally estopped from bringing these claims because the New Jersey Superior Court ruled on the exact issues [plaintiff] raises here in the prior foreclosure action brought by [defendant] against [plaintiff] in state court, ultimately dismissing them with prejudice.” The plaintiff countered “that because the foreclosure action was dismissed without entry of judgment, collateral estoppel does not apply.” In agreeing with the defendant, the court stated that “the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies whenever an action is ‘sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect,” adding that the state court’s orders in the foreclosure action are “sufficiently firm as to warrant conclusive effect.” According to the court, “[t]hese decisions—particularly the second dismissal with prejudice—were clearly intended to be the final adjudication of the precise issues that [plaintiff] is now attempting to relitigate in the instant action.”
District Court granted final approval of a $63 million data breach settlement
On June 7, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted final approval of a class action settlement resolving claims that a government agency and its contractor (collectively, defendants) did not detect hackers because they failed to establish reasonable safeguards that led to a data breach. According to the memorandum of law in support of the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary approval, a data breach occurred in June 2015 that compromised financial records, Social Security numbers, and other personal information of anyone who underwent a background check at the agency since 2000. The agency allegedly controlled numerous electronic systems without valid authorizations, failed to implement multi-factor authentication for accessing systems, failed to patch, segment, and continuously monitor systems, and failed to implement centralized data security protocols. According to the plaintiff’s motion, the settlement (if granted final approval) would require the U.S. government to pay $60 million of the settlement fund and the contractor to pay $3 million. The settlement agreement provides that “[e]ach valid claim will be paid at $700, except that if the actual amount of documented loss exceeds $700, the claim will be paid in that amount, up to $10,000.”
District Court: Company must face data breach claims
On June 1, the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona ruled that a health care company must face a proposed class action related to claims that its failure to implement cybersecurity safeguards led to a data breach that compromised individuals’ personal health information. In granting in part and denying in part defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court declined to dismiss several of the plaintiffs’ claims for negligence, ruling that the second amended complaint sufficiently alleged that the defendant employed inadequate data security and that plaintiffs suffered an actual injury as a result of the data breach because the monitoring services offered by the defendant were insufficient and offered for too short of time causing certain plaintiffs to purchase additional identity protection products and/or services. However, other negligence claims were dismissed after the court determined that some of the plaintiffs failed to allege any actual damages or out-of-pocket expenses. Additionally, while the court allowed several state law claims to proceed, it dismissed claims brought under the California Consumer Protection Act due to the plaintiff’s failure to provide the requisite pre-suit notice within the 30-day time period as required by law, finding the failure could not be cured by the passage of time. Other state law claims, involving violations of the Wisconsin Deceptive Trade Practices Act and Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, were also dismissed due to a failure to articulate cognizable losses.
Special Alert: Eleventh Circuit upholds terms of arbitration agreement in challenge under Dodd-Frank
On May 26, 2022, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued a published decision holding that the Dodd-Frank Act does not prohibit the enforceability of delegation clauses contained in consumer arbitration agreements “in any way.” This opinion is of potentially broad significance in the class action and arbitration space since it is one of the first appellate decisions in the country concerning Dodd-Frank’s arbitration provision and supports broad enforcement of delegation clauses even where a statute could allegedly prohibit arbitration of the underlying claim.
In Attix v. Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC, the Eleventh Circuit reversed a decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denying Carrington’s motion to compel arbitration that was based on the plaintiff’s argument that the anti-waiver provision in the Dodd-Frank Act, prohibited enforcement of the arbitration agreement. The anti-waiver provision of the Dodd-Frank Act provides that “no other agreement between the consumer and the creditor relating to the residential mortgage loan or extension of credit . . . shall be applied or interpreted so as to bar a consumer from bringing an action in an appropriate district court of the United States.” The district court agreed with the plaintiff’s argument that the Dodd-Frank Act prohibited arbitration of the underlying dispute and in doing so, side-stepped the delegation clause that delegated such threshold determinations to an arbitrator.
In a 52-page published opinion, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision of the district court, holding that the Dodd-Frank Act does not prohibit enforcing delegation clauses, such as the clause at issue, which “clearly and unmistakably” delegates to the arbitrator “threshold arbitrability disputes.” The circuit court found that in such circumstances, all questions of arbitrability are delegated to an arbitrator “unless the law prohibits the delegation of threshold arbitrability issues itself.”
The court went on to broadly hold that the Dodd-Frank Act does not prohibit the enforceability of delegation clauses “in any way.” In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit explained that if Dodd-Frank had been intended to prohibit the enforcement of delegation clauses, then it could have been drafted that way, but instead, “the actual statute is silent as to who may decide whether a particular contract falls within the scope of its protections.” While the Dodd-Frank Act prohibits arbitration agreements from being applied or interpreted in a particular manner, it does not prohibit the enforcement of delegation clauses, and as a result, the court held that under the terms of Carrington and the plaintiff’s agreement, the arbitrator (and not the court) must determine the threshold question of whether the Dodd-Frank Act prohibits enforcement of Carrington’s arbitration agreement since it is a “quintessential arbitrability question.”
Significantly, the court also held that a challenge to an agreement to arbitrate on the basis that a statute precludes its enforcement is not a “specific challenge” to a delegation clause found within the arbitration agreement, such that the court lacks jurisdiction to review the enforceability of the delegation clause. In other words, where a challenge “is only about the enforceability of the parties’ primary arbitration agreement” and there is a delegation clause, “an arbitrator must resolve it.” As the Eleventh Circuit explained, “when an appeal presents a delegation agreement and a question of arbitrability, we stop. We do not pass go.”
This case has significance for anyone considering drafting an arbitration agreement particularly in a class action context. A threshold drafting question is whether or not to delegate issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator or allow a court to resolve the issue. Under this decision, a question of whether a statute bars arbitration of claims is for the arbitrator to decide when there is a delegation clause, unless the statute also explicitly bars delegation clauses. This decision reinforces that inclusion of a properly drafted delegation clause in an arbitration agreement can result in a case improperly filed in court being more quickly sent to arbitration, even where the dispute is whether a statute prohibits the claim from being arbitrated in the first instance.
Buckley represented Carrington on appeal with a team comprising Fredrick Levin, who argued the appeal, Scott Sakiyama, Brian Bartholomay, and Sarah Meehan. For questions regarding the case, please contact one of the team members or a Buckley attorney with whom you have worked in the past.