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FinCEN Recognizes Law Enforcement Agencies for Use of BSA Reporting
On May 9, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) announced its third annual Law Enforcement Awards to law enforcement agencies that use Bank Secrecy Act data provided by financial institutions in their criminal investigations. The program seeks to recognize law enforcement agencies that made effective use of financial institution reporting to obtain a successful prosecution, and to demonstrate to the financial industry the value of its reporting to law enforcement. The following agencies were recognized:
- Suspicious Activity Report Review Task Force Category—New York State Police. Based on a financial institution reporting an unusual pattern of cash deposits, the New York State Police Special Investigations Unit identified suspicious transactions occurring in the Hudson Valley Region indicative of money laundering. The investigations led to the identification of expansive criminal organizations responsible for bringing large quantities of narcotics into the region, operating business fronts used for money laundering, and extensive gang activity.
- Transnational Organized Crime/Third Party Money Launderers Category—FBI. After receiving a referral from local law enforcement regarding an individual suspected of carrying out various fraud and money laundering schemes, the FBI conducted an investigation, and its review of sensitive financial information resulted in investigators uncovering a network of criminal actors located in the U.S. and Canada, which was bringing in $100-$300 million in annual criminal proceeds in North America alone.
- Transnational Security Threats Category—FBI. The FBI used a high volume of sensitive financial information obtained in connection with its investigation into a criminal organization moving hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars to support foreign nuclear and ballistic missile programs, to identify two families that operated a network of exchange houses, precious metals companies, trading companies, and front companies throughout the Middle East to carry out financial activity for the benefit of multiple OFAC-sanctioned entities, as well as several entities with close ties to foreign military organizations.
- Cyber Threats Category—Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI). A multi-year, multi-agency investigation led by IRS-CI focused on several targets selling narcotics on the dark web and distributing them throughout the U.S. The investigation identified sensitive financial information, which enabled investigators to corroborate the financial and personal information of the targets. The data also indicated that the subjects used Bitcoins in an effort to conceal their illicit proceeds. The information identified in the financial data and from subpoenas issued to numerous financial institutions and Bitcoin exchangers helped clarify the series of transactions conducted to launder the funds.
- Significant Fraud Category—Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS). DCIS initiated a long-term investigation based on structuring and excessive credit card charges identified by multiple financial institutions on a single individual. Investigators determined that one of the subjects was transferring funds to a shell company owned by a U.S. military official. A detailed analysis of sensitive financial information and contract documents revealed that the U.S. military official had received bribes from the primary target in exchange for helping the primary target win military contracts in Afghanistan.
- Third-Party Money Launderers Category—Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations (HSI). HSI investigators utilized an extensive volume of sensitive financial information to assist in their investigation into a large-scale illegal third-party money laundering organization. The investigation began based largely on information gleaned from a FinCEN-issued Geographic Targeting Order (GTO). The GTO information used by investigators allowed them to identify an “armored car company, which was importing U.S. dollars and Mexican pesos from casas de cambio in Mexico and depositing them into shell company bank accounts that were opened and operated by the two individuals who owned and operated the company.”
Federal Regulators Enter Settlement Agreement with Former Chief Compliance Officer Following AML Program Investigation
On May 4, FinCEN and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York announced a $250,000 settlement with the former chief compliance officer of an international money transfer company over allegations that he failed to report suspicious activity and knowingly participated in the company’s failure to maintain an effective anti-money laundering program. The settlement resolves a lawsuit filed in December of 2014 against the defendant, in which the district court dismissed the defendant’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the Bank Secrecy Act’s (BSA) general civil penalty provision, § 5321(a)(1), could subject a partner, director, officer, or employee of a financial institution to civil penalties for violations of any provision of the BSA or its regulations, excluding the specifically excepted provisions, and that because § 5318(h) was not listed as one of those exceptions, “the plain language of the statute provides that a civil penalty may be imposed on corporate officers and employees like [the defendant], who was responsible for designing and overseeing [the company's] AML program.” U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Haider, No. 15-cv-01518, WL 107940 (Dist. Ct. Minn. Jan. 8, 2016). (See previous InfoBytes summary.) In the stipulation and order of settlement and dismissal, the defendant (i) accepted responsibility for failing to further investigate consumer fraud reports; (ii) is required to pay $250,000 to the Department of the Treasury; and (iii) is banned for three years from performing compliance functions for other U.S.-based money transmitters. Notably, in February 2016, the money transfer company agreed to pay $13 million to settle claims from 49 states and the District of Columbia over charges that it transferred money to third parties that were defrauding customers. As part of the company’s settlement, it was required to ensure its agents attend mandatory compliance training, enhance its comprehensive anti-fraud compliance program, and implement a hotline system for employees to report noncompliance.
House Financial Services Subcommittee Explores Ways to Safeguard Financial System from Terrorist Financing
On April 27, the Financial Services Subcommittee on Terrorism and Illicit Finance held a hearing entitled Safeguarding the Financial System from Terrorist Financing to examine information sharing and data collection practices at the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and assess how the process could be improved. According to a Committee memorandum released in advance of the hearing, the hearing was also called for the purposes of considering whether to amend the Bank Secrecy Act and USA PATRIOT Act to improve FinCEN’s effectiveness in disrupting terrorist financing and money laundering.
Jamal El-Hindi, the Acting Director of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) at the Department of the Treasury, was the only witness. For just over an hour, the Acting Director offered testimony and answered questions concerning, among other things, the collection, analysis and dissemination of Bank Secrecy Act data and information sharing between the public and private sectors. Mr. El-Hindi also discussed several new and evolving money laundering and terrorist financing challenges, including potential money laundering vulnerabilities associated with “all cash” real estate transactions, virtual currency, and cybersecurity.
In a statement delivered by Rep. Maxin Waters (D-CA), the Ranking Member of the Committee on Financial Services, the Congresswoman noted, among other things, that “high-end U.S. real estate is a key sector used by corrupt foreign leaders, drug traffickers and other criminals to launder illicit money.” The Ranking Member explained further that she “find[s] it disturbing that FinCEN continues to largely exempt the real-estate sector from even the most basic anti-money laundering requirements,” and urged the regulator to “take more urgent action to address these risks nationwide and on a permanent basis.”
A video recording of the hearing may be accessed here.
FinCEN Seeks Comments on Proposed Renewal of its AML, Due Diligence Program Requirements for Correspondent Banks
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCen) published a notice and request for comments in the March 30 Federal Register. The notice sought public comment on its proposed renewal, without change, of the regulation implementing Section 5318(i)(1) & (2) of the Bank Secrecy Act (found at 31 CFR 1010.610). The regulation generally requires covered financial institutions (as defined in 31 CFR 1010.605(e)(1)) to establish due diligence policies, procedures, and controls reasonably designed to detect and report money laundering through correspondent accounts that covered U.S. financial institutions establish or maintain for certain foreign financial institutions. Written comments must be received on or before May 30.
FinCEN Releases Third Edition of SAR Stats Technical Bulletin
On March 9, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network released SAR Stats Issue 3, which is a yearly report of Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) statistics compiled through Dec. 31, 2016. This report provides nationwide and state/territory-specific suspicious activity data. Issue 3 covers the following industry types: depository institutions, money services business, securities and futures firms, insurance companies, casinos and card clubs, loan or finance companies, housing government sponsored entities, and other types of financial institutions.
FinCEN and OCC Penalize CA Bank for BSA/AML Violations
On February 27, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) announced that it had assessed a $7 million civil money penalty against a bank specializing in providing services for check-cashers and money transmitters, for alleged “willful violations” of several Bank Secrecy Act provisions. The OCC also identified deficiencies in the bank’s practices and assessed a $1 million civil money penalty for “violations of previous consent orders entered into by [the bank].” As noted in the release, the bank’s payment of the $1 million OCC penalty will go towards satisfying the FinCEN penalty. According to FinCEN, the bank allegedly failed to (i) “establish and implement an adequate anti-money laundering program;” (ii) “conduct required due diligence on its foreign correspondent accounts;” and (iii) “detect and report suspicious activity.” Furthermore, FinCEN claims $192 million in high-risk wire transfers were processed through some of these accounts.
FinCEN Renews GTOs for Title Insurance Companies in Six Major Metropolitan Areas Upon Finding that GTOs Provide ‘Valuable Data’
On February 23, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) announced the renewal of its existing GTOs Geographic Targeting Orders (GTOs), each of which temporarily require U.S. title insurance companies to identify the natural persons behind shell companies used to pay “all cash” for high-end residential real estate in six major metropolitan areas. Generally, the GTOs require all title insurance companies in the targeted cities to file a FinCEN Form 8300 within 30 days of closing a covered transaction, identifying the buyer, any beneficial owner of the buyer, and the individual primarily responsible for representing the buyer in an “all-cash” purchase of high-end residential real estate. Covered businesses must also retain their records for at least five years after the GTO expires.
Notably, the decision to continue the GTO program for another 180 days—beginning on February 24, 2017—was based largely on FinCEN’s finding that the first GTOs issued back in July are producing “valuable data” that is assisting both law enforcement and FinCEN’s efforts to address money laundering through real estate transactions. Nearly one-third of the targeted transactions covered by the July GTOs ended up involving a beneficial owner or representative who is already the subject of a previous suspicious activity report. The results appear to validate the concerns underlying FinCEN’s rationale for issuing GTOs in the first place, namely the use of shell companies to buy luxury real estate in all-cash transactions.
The targeted geographic areas and corresponding closing price thresholds include: (i) Manhattan ($3 million) and all other boroughs of New York City ($1.5 million); (ii) Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach counties ($1 million); (iii) Los Angeles County ($2 million); (iv) San Francisco, San Mateo, and Santa Clara counties ($2 million); (v) San Diego County ($2 million); and (vi) Bexar County, Texas, which includes San Antonio ($500,000). In targeting the above-listed metropolitan areas, FinCEN clarified that “GTOs do not imply any derogatory finding by FinCEN with respect to the covered companies.” Rather, as explained by FinCEN Acting Director Jamal El-Hindi, “Money laundering and illicit financial flows involving the real estate sector is something that we have been taking on in steps to ensure that we continue to build an efficient and effective regulatory approach.”
For additional information concerning GTO compliance, FAQs released by FinCEN in August 2016 are available here.
FinCEN Proposes SAR Data Fields Revisions
FinCEN published, at 82 FR 9109 in the Federal Register, a notice and request for comment on proposed updates and revisions to the collection of information filings by financial institutions required to file such reports under the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”). While the notice does not propose any new regulatory requirements or changes to the requirements related to suspicious activity reporting, it suggests changes to the required data fields used when filing SARs under the BSA. The majority of the proposed changes would alter the "checklist" of violations in Part II of the filings, including the addition of several fields related to cyber events. Written comments must be received on or before April 3.
FinCEN Issues Advisory Regarding FATF-Identified Jurisdictions with AML/CFT Deficiencies
As part of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s (FinCEN’s) Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF’s) listing and monitoring process to ensure compliance with its international Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) standards, the FATF identifies certain jurisdictions as having “strategic deficiencies” in their AML/CFT regimes. The identified jurisdictions are listed in either of two documents: (i) the “FATF Public Statement”—which includes jurisdictions that are subject to the FATF’s call for countermeasures or are subject to Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD) due to their AML/CFT deficiencies, and (ii) “Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: on-going process 21 October 2016”—which includes jurisdictions identified by the FATF to have AML/CFT deficiencies.
On January 19, FinCEN released an advisory updating the list of jurisdictions in which any such “strategic deficiencies” have been identified. FinCen urged financial institutions to consider these lists, including any and all updates thereto when reviewing due diligence obligations and risk-based policies, procedures, and practices.
The jurisdictions identified in the FATF Public Statement included:
- Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and
- Iran.
The jurisdictions identified in Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance included:
- Afghanistan,
- Bosnia and Herzegovina,
- Iraq,
- Lao PDR,
- Syria,
- Uganda,
- Vanuatu, and
- Yemen.
Notably, Guyana, which was previously listed, has been removed from the October 2016 list.
FinCEN Issues Guidance on Sharing Suspicious Activity Reports with U.S. Parents and Affiliates of Casinos
On January 4, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued guidance to “confirm that, under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and its implementing regulations, a casino that has filed a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) may share the SAR, or any information that would reveal the existence of the SAR, with each office or other place of business located within the United States of either the casino itself or a parent or affiliate of the casino.” As explained in the guidance, FinCEN expects that the anti-money laundering efforts of the casino’s affiliates could be enhanced by virtue of their access to a clearer and more comprehensive picture of the activities the casino has identified as suspicious. The guidance also specified that casinos may not share SARs or information that would reveal the existence of a SAR with non-U.S. offices or affiliates, individuals or entities within the casino’s corporate famile that perform functions unrelated to gaming, a financial institution without an independent SAR obligation, or unaffialited money services businesses located within the casino. Finally, the guidance specified that a domestic affiliate that receives a SAR or revealing information from a casino may not further share that SAR with an affiliate of its own.