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$550 million preliminary settlement reached in biometric privacy class action
On May 8, plaintiffs in a biometric privacy class action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California filed a motion requesting preliminary approval of a $550 million settlement deal. The preliminary settlement, reached between a global social media company and a class of Illinois users, would resolve consolidated class claims that alleged the social media company’s face scanning practices violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA). As previously covered by InfoBytes, last August the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit affirmed class certification and held that the class’s claims met the standing requirement described in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins because the social media company’s alleged development of a face template that used facial-recognition technology without users’ consent constituted an invasion of an individual’s private affairs and concrete interests. According to the motion for preliminary approval, the settlement would be the largest BIPA class action settlement ever and would provide “cash relief that far outstrips what class members typically receive in privacy settlements, even in cases in which substantial statutory damages are involved.” If approved, the social media company must also provide “forward-looking relief” to ensure it secures users’ informed, written consent as required under BIPA.
District court grants preliminary injunction against PPP Ineligibility Rule
On May 11, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) Ineligibility Rule, concluding that the rule—which excludes “banks, political lobbying firms, certain private clubs with restrictive admissions practices, and sexually oriented businesses that present entertainment or sell products of a ‘prurient’ (but not unlawful) nature” from PPP loan eligibility—contravenes the purpose of the PPP. According to the opinion, a group of businesses that “provide lawful ‘clothed, semi-nude, and/or nude performance entertainment’” filed suit against the SBA seeking a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the PPP Ineligibility Rule, after they were prevented from obtaining the loans and/or participating in the PPP because their businesses were deemed to be “of a ‘prurient sexual nature.’” The SBA argued that Congress could not have intended to support businesses that the SBA has historically denied financing, saying it would lead to “absurd results.” The court rejected this argument, stating, “these are no ordinary times, and the PPP is no ordinary legislation.” The court reasoned that because the intent of the CARES Act, which houses the PPP, is to protect workers in need, it is “not absurd to conclude” that in order to support workers from all businesses, Congress would temporarily permit SBA financial assistance to previously excluded business types. Finding that the Rule is in conflict with the Congressional purpose of the PPP, the court granted the preliminary injunction barring the SBA from enforcing the Rule.
California Supreme Court: No jury trial for UCL and FAL claims seeking civil penalties in addition to injunctive or other equitable relief
On April 30, the California Supreme Court issued an opinion holding that under the state’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and the False Advertising Law (FAL), government enforcement actions seeking civil penalties in addition to injunctive or other equitable relief should be decided by a judge instead of by a jury. The decision overturns a Court of Appeal decision holding that a jury must weigh in when civil penalties are involved. The decision stems from a suit filed in 2015 by the California Department of Business Oversight and several district attorneys (collectively, “People”) against a national debt payment service operation for alleged violations of the UCL and FAL. While the debt payment service operation demanded a jury trial, the People filed a motion to strike, which the trial court granted. The Court of Appeal overturned the trial court decision, holding that under certain provisions of the California Constitution the debt payment service operation had a right to a jury trial.
The California Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeal concluding that, among other things, (i) the causes of action established by the UCL and FAL at issue in this case are equitable rather than legal actions, which should be tried by a court rather than by a jury; and (ii) the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Tull v. United States, relied upon by the Court of Appeal, does not govern this case for various reasons, including that the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the civil jury trial provision of the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution applies only to federal court proceedings—not state court proceedings—and that the “constitution right to a jury trial in state court civil proceedings is governed only by the civil jury trial provisions of each individual state’s own state constitution.” (Emphasis in the original.)
6th Circuit holds condo company and law firm did not act as debt collectors in non-judicial foreclosure
On May 4, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a condominium management company, condominium association, and its law firm (collectively, “defendants”) acted as “security-interest enforcers” and not debt collectors and therefore, did not violate the FDCPA. According to the opinion, the homeowners lost their condominium to a non-judicial foreclosure after they fell behind on condominium association dues. The homeowners filed suit against the defendants alleging various violations of the FDCPA during the foreclosure process. The homeowners did not assert a violation of Section 1692f(6), which applies to security-interest enforcers. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that the homeowners failed to allege facts that the defendants did more than act as security-interest enforcers.
On appeal, the 6th Circuit agreed, citing to the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, which held that parties who assist creditors with the non-judicial foreclosure of a home fall within the separate definition under Section 1692f(6) as security-interest enforcers and not the general debt collector definition (previously covered by InfoBytes here). The appellate court noted that the homeowners’ complaint did not allege the defendants’ regular business activity was debt collection. Moreover, the appellate court rejected the homeowners’ argument that the defendants recording of a lien on their condo was a step beyond enforcing a security interest. According to the court, Michigan law requires the recording of the lien in order to enforce a security-interest and therefore, the action “falls squarely within Obduskey’s central holding.”
7th Circuit: Bank avoids breach of contract claims in HAMP loan modification offer
On April 30, in a split opinion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued a decision affirming a district court order holding that a consumer’s claims against a bank failed because the bank never counter-signed the Trial Period Plan (TPP) it offered the consumer in connection with the Home Affordable Mortgage Program (HAMP). According to the opinion, the consumer signed his name to the TPP and returned the TPP to the bank along with what the consumer believed to be the other required documents and the first of this three payments. However, the bank never returned a fully executed copy of the TPP to the consumer. Instead, it sent the consumer multiple notices stating that necessary documentation was still missing. Ultimately, the consumer made all three payments required by the TPP, but never received a permanent modification of his loan. On that basis, the consumer filed suit, alleging breach of contract, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress due to the bank’s alleged failure to honor its loan-modification offer. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings for the bank and denied the plaintiff’s request to amend the complaint, concluding, among other things, that the consumer failed to state a plausible claim for relief.
On appeal, the majority agreed with the district court, holding, among other things, that the bank never actually agreed to modify the consumer’s mortgage under HAMP. Specifically, the majority stated that “[i]f an offer contains a conditional precedent, a contract does not form until the condition is satisfied,” referencing language in which the bank reserved the right not to send the consumer a counter-signed copy of the Trial Period Plan (TPP) if the borrower did not qualify for HAMP relief. Because the TPP never went into effect, it imposed no contractual obligations on the bank.
California small business sues nonbank lender over PPP prioritization
On May 6, a small California business filed a proposed class action against a nonbank lender, accusing the lender of a “scheme to enrich itself at the expense of small businesses in connection with the federal government’s Paycheck Protection Program (PPP),” in violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law. In the complaint, the plaintiff alleges she submitted an application for less than $25,000 to the lender on March 28 and received an email response that same day acknowledging receipt of her application. On March 29, the plaintiff received another email from the lender, which asked her to gather documentation and stated that she would receive an invitation to a secure portal in the next “48 business hours.” According to the complaint, however, by April 13, the plaintiff had not yet received a link to the portal, but the lender had sent an email acknowledging the delay. The complaint states that the plaintiff “informed and believes, and on that basis alleges” that the lender “chose to prioritize higher loans that would yield higher fees,” and did not disclose to the public that “it was prioritizing loans not on a first come, first served basis, but on criteria relating to the value of the loan.” The plaintiff alleges she would have chosen a different lender had she known the lender was going to prioritize larger loans. The complaint seeks injunctive relief, restitution, as well as compensatory and punitive damages.
11th Circuit will not rehear en banc city’s Fair Housing Act suit
On April 27, a majority panel for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied the City of Miami Gardens’s petition for rehearing en banc after determining that the City “faced an uphill battle” to establish standing to bring a Fair Housing Act lawsuit against a national bank because it mainly relied on “an attenuated theory of injury.” As previously covered by InfoBytes, last July the 11th Circuit dismissed the City’s lawsuit against the bank for lack of standing after concluding, among other things, that the City’s evidence that certain loans may go into foreclosure at some point in the future “does not satisfy the requirement that a threatened injury be ‘imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical,’” and that the City failed to provide evidence that certain foreclosed loans had an effect on property-tax revenues or municipal spending or were issued on discriminatory terms. In explaining their decision to not rehear its 2019 ruling en banc, the majority stated that its decision—that the City failed to satisfy its burden of establishing standing—respects “the concerns and fairness and notice demanded by” both U.S. Supreme Court and 11th Circuit precedent. Two dissenting judges countered, however, that the rehearing should have been granted because, among other things, the 11th Circuit’s dismissal for lack of standing was done sua sponte “even though the City received neither proper notice that it failed to prove standing nor a legitimate opportunity to discover or produce the requisite evidence.”
District Court enjoins Massachusetts AG from enforcing emergency debt collection regulation
On May 6, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts entered a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the Massachusetts attorney general from enforcing an emergency regulation that made numerous standard debt collection actions an unfair or deceptive act or practice during the Covid-19 pandemic. As previously covered by InfoBytes, a debt collection trade association filed a complaint last month contending that the emergency regulation is a content-based restriction on free speech and unconstitutional because it, among other things, excludes six classes of collectors from the prohibition on placing collection calls, and does not treat all “communications” equally by excluding certain types of collections communications. The trade association argued that the emergency regulation, among other things, bars debt collectors from being able to initiate phone conversations with individuals who have unpaid debts. In granting the TRO, the court wrote that the measure violates debt collection agencies’ First Amendment rights without adding meaningful consumer protections, and that, “[w]hile the [r]egulation promises some relief from unwanted telephone calls, it does not pretend to offer any relief from the debt itself or the obligation to repay it in full.” The court also noted that the emergency regulation “singles out one group debt collectors and imposes a blanket suppression order on their ability to use what they believe is their most effective means of communication, the telephone. If what the Attorney General meant to accomplish by way of the [r]egulation was a strict liability ban on all deceptive and misleading debt collection calls, the [r]egulation is redundant as that is already the law, both state and federally.”
11th Circuit affirms no unilateral revocation under TCPA
On May 1, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the TCPA does not permit a consumer (plaintiff) to later revoke her consent to be contacted by telephone when the consent was given in a bargained-for contract. The plaintiff entered into an agreement with the defendant that provided express authorization to be contacted by the defendant through the use of an automated telephone dialing system to recover unpaid obligations. The plaintiff’s attorneys later sent the defendant faxes to, among other things, revoke the plaintiff’s consent to be contacted. Notwithstanding those faxes, the defendant continued to place calls to collect debt, and the plaintiff filed suit alleging violations of the TCPA, among other allegations. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant, ruling that the automated calls did not violate the TCPA because consent cannot be unilaterally revoked when provided as part of a bargained-for contract.
On appeal, the 11th Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment order on the plaintiff’s TCPA claims because “common law contract principles do not allow unilateral revocation of consent when given as consideration in a bargained-for agreement.” Referencing a decision issued in 2017 concerning the same situation (covered by InfoBytes here), the appellate court wrote, “[w]e, like the Second Circuit, are also unpersuaded by the argument that unilateral revocation of consent given in a legally binding agreement is permissible because it comports with the consumer-protection purposes of the TCPA.”
Lawsuit claims Treasury, SBA PPP loan eligibility guidance is contrary to CARES Act
On May 4, a group of businesses filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against the Small Business Administration (SBA) and the U.S. Department of Treasury (defendants) challenging guidance issued by the defendants in April that they claim “directly contradicts and changes the CARES Act.” The guidance, issued in the form of FAQs #31 and 37 (covered by InfoBytes here and here), addresses whether businesses owned by large companies or private companies with adequate sources of liquidity are eligible for a Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan. Among other things, the guidance instructs borrowers to consider other sources of liquidity other than PPP funds, and states that while lenders may rely on the borrower certification of need, a borrower must still certify in good faith that their PPP loan request is necessary.
The plaintiffs argue that the guidance is contrary to the CARES Act because it imposes a requirement that borrowers must be unable to get credit elsewhere before they can qualify, and suggests that businesses may be ineligible for PPP loans if they qualify for “other sources of liquidity sufficient to support their ongoing operations in a manner that is not significantly detrimental to the business.” The consequences of the guidance, they argue, is that they may now be required to repay PPP funds with money they either do not have or must borrow since they could have obtained “credit elsewhere,” thus damaging their financial stability. The plaintiffs seek injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from enforcing the guidance, as well as a declaration that the guidance is contrary to law and must be withdrawn.