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U.S. Solicitor General: Supreme Court can decide on severability clause without deciding CFPB's future
On February 14, U.S. Solicitor General Noel J. Francisco filed a reply brief for the CFPB in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court could decide whether the CFPB’s single-director structure violates the Constitution’s separation of powers under Article II without deciding whether the Bureau as a whole should survive. “Although the removal restriction is unconstitutional, Congress has expressly provided that the rest of the Dodd-Frank Act shall be unaffected,” Francisco said, replying in part to arguments made by Paul D. Clement, the lawyer selected by the Court to defend the leadership structure of the Bureau. As previously covered by InfoBytes, Clement argued, among other things, that Seila Law’s constitutionality arguments are “remarkably weak” and that “a contested removal is the proper context to address a dispute over the President’s removal authority.” Clement also contended that “there is no ‘removal clause’ in the Constitution,” and that because the “constitutional text is simply silent on the removal of executive officers” it does not mean there is a “promising basis for invalidating an Act of Congress.” According to Francisco, Seila Law’s arguments for invalidating the entirety of Title X of Dodd-Frank “are insufficient to overcome the severability clause’s plain text,” and its “arguments for ignoring the severability questions altogether are both procedurally and substantively wrong.” Francisco further emphasized that “refusing to apply the severability provision . . .would be severely disruptive” because the Bureau is the only federal agency dedicated solely to consumer financial protection.
Seila Law also filed a reply brief the same day, countering that Clement offered “no valid justification” for the Court to rule on the severability question separately, and arguing that a “civil investigative demand issued and enforced by an unaccountable director is void, and the only appropriate resolution is to order the denial of the CFPB’s petition for enforcement.” Seila Law further contended that the Court should reverse the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision from last May—which deemed the CFPB to be constitutionally structured and upheld a district court’s ruling enforcing Seila Law’s obligation to comply with a 2017 civil investigative demand—and “leave to Congress the quintessentially legislative decision of how the CFPB should function going forward.”
Notably, Francisco disagreed with Seila Law’s argument that the 9th Circuit’s judgment should be reversed outright, stating that to do so “would deprive the Bureau of ratification arguments” that the 9th Circuit chose not to address by instead upholding the removal restriction’s constitutionality. The Bureau’s ratification arguments at the time, Francisco stated, contended that even if the removal restriction was found to be unconstitutional, “the CID could still be enforced because the Bureau’s former Acting Director—who was removable at will—had ratified it.” As such, Francisco recommended that the Court “confirm that the severability clause means what it says and remand the case to the [9th Circuit] to resolve any remaining case-specific ratification questions.”
The same day, the Court approved Seila Law’s motion for enlargement of time for oral argument and for divided argument. The time will be divided as follows: 20 minutes for Seila Law, 20 minutes for the solicitor general, 20 minutes for the court-appointed amicus curiae, and 10 minutes for the House of Representatives.
Find continuing InfoBytes coverage on Seila here.
District court dismisses FCA claims against student loan collectors
On February 11, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed a relator’s False Claims Act claims, which alleged that a group of prime private student loan debt collectors (defendants) defrauded the federal government of funds intended for small businesses in relation to contracts to service student loans with the Department of Education (Department). The 2015 lawsuit filed by the relator accused the defendants of, among other things, allegedly concealing that “the purportedly small business subcontractors were affiliated with ‘co-conspirator’ larger businesses, ‘making them ineligible to be claimed as small businesses by the prime contractors on the [Department’s private collection agency] task orders.’” The relator also claimed that the defendants convinced the Department to award contracts and provide bonuses they did not deserve. According to the relator, the defendants made claims that hinged “on the factual allegation of undisclosed affiliation and associated submission of false claims and/or misrepresentations concerning business size.”
In the order, the court determined, among other things, that the relator fell short of alleging the specific facts necessary to convince the court that the defendants engaged in fraudulent inducement and implied certification. The court held that “despite [the relator’s] contrary contentions, [the relator’s] pleading does not establish with the requisite particularity the time and place of the false misrepresentations, what constitutes the allegedly false claim for each discrete defendant, and what, precisely, ‘was retained or given up as a consequence of the fraud.’” Specifically, the court stated that the relator “fail[ed] to connect several critical dots in the alleged scheme, leaving the [c]ourt unclear as to what, precisely, was allegedly actionably false and/or fraudulent.” However, the court allowed the relator leave to file an amended complaint, stating that “because the allegation of further facts might cure the identified deficiencies (although the [c]ourt has its doubts, given the length of the investigation and [the relator’s] counsel’s central role in the investigation), the [c]ourt sees no reason to deviate from the general rule [allowing leave].”
District court voids debt collectors’ $2.5 million jury award
On February 6, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas vacated a jury award of $2.5 million in favor of two nationwide debt collection agencies (plaintiffs), in an action alleging fraud by a law firm and vendor (defendants) in their provision of credit repair services. According to the opinion, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants ran “a fraudulent credit repair scheme” in which the defendants “prey[ed] on financially troubled consumers by drafting, signing, and mailing frivolous dispute correspondences—all using [the defendant’s] patented software that generates context-based unique letters—in the name of consumers, without the consumer’s specific knowledge or consent, and without identifying that the letters are from a law firm, rather than a consumer,” in violation of the FDCPA and the FCRA. The defendant law firm responded that all of its credit repair clients provided consent for the law firm to send the letters on their behalf in an effort to improve their credit. After a six day trial, the defendants filed an amended motion for judgment as a matter of law, claiming the plaintiffs had not met their burden of proof on several elements of their fraud claims. The court “reserved ruling on the motion and stated that it would consider the arguments raised in the motion post-verdict, as necessary.” After the jury found in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded them $2.5 million in damages, the defendants filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that the plaintiffs had not shown any “material misrepresentation” or “material false statement” by the defendants, and further, that the plaintiffs did not show a “reasonable reliance” on such statements, or that the defendants had any duty to disclose facts to the plaintiffs.
According to the opinion, the defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law called into question the “legal sufficiency” of the plaintiffs’ evidence in support of the jury’s verdict. In granting the motion and vacating the jury award in favor of the plaintiffs, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to show a material false statement by the defendants, and therefore the evidence could not support the jury’s fraud verdict.
Washington AG sues timeshare exit defendants for unfair and deceptive practices
On February 4, the Washington state attorney general filed a complaint in King County Superior Court against a group of defendants who market services claiming they can release consumers from timeshare contracts. The AG alleges that since 2012, the defendants have unfairly and deceptively contracted with over 32,000 consumers seeking to release timeshare contracts, collecting millions in upfront fees. According to the complaint, the defendants, among other things, advertise their timeshare exit services as being “risk-free” with a 100 percent money-back guarantee; however, the defendants allegedly refuse to issue refunds to clients who face foreclosure, damaged credit ratings, and other negative financial consequences claiming that such outcomes are successful because the clients “technically” no longer own the timeshares. In addition, the AG alleges that the defendants charge clients upfront fees for each timeshare to be exited, and then outsource more than 95 percent of their clients’ files to third-party vendors for significantly discounted rates. These vendors are allegedly left to accomplish the timeshare exits without input or supervision from the defendants and often without a contract governing their work. The complaint alleges violations of the Consumer Protection Act, the Debt Adjusting Act, and the Credit Services Organization Act. The AG seeks numerous remedies including injunctive relief prohibiting the defendants from selling their services and $2,000 in civil penalties per violation of the Consumer Protection Act.
District court: Banks' claims against hospitality company for data breach may proceed
On February 7, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland ruled in a multidistrict litigation action that a proposed class of banks may proceed with negligence claims under Louisiana law and pursue declaratory and injunctive relief against an international hospitality company. In this case, the company’s data breach allegedly required the banks to cancel or reissue credit and debit cards, and issue refunds and credit associated with unauthorized transactions. The Louisiana bank brought the action as the representative of a class of banks that reimbursed customers for fraud on payment card accounts identified as potentially compromised because of the data breach. According to the opinion, the proposed class “has alleged facts sufficient to establish injury and causation under the Article III standing requirements.” The court rejected the company’s argument that the negligence claims are barred by Louisiana’s economic loss doctrine—which precludes recovery when the only alleged damages are economic—stating that Louisiana does not employ the doctrine in the strict sense that is applied in other states, but rather employs “a ‘duty-risk’ analysis.” The court stated that plaintiffs suing for only economic damages “must prove that there is an ‘ease of association between the rule of conduct, the risk of injury, and the loss sought to be recovered.’” The court concluded that “a reasonable trier of fact” may find an association between the company’s data collection practices and economic loss to payment card issuers. Here, the court stated, the banks are attempting to recover economic damages incurred after credit and debit cards were compromised due to the alleged negligent storage of sensitive payment card information. Moreover, the banks alleged they were forced to reimburse cardholders for fraudulent activity and incur costs to prevent future activity on those compromised cards.
11th Circuit: Guaranty agency collecting nonexistent DOE loans is not a debt collector
On February 7, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued a split opinion holding that a student loan guaranty agency that mistakenly attempted to collect nonexistent student loans cannot be sued under the FDCPA because, as a guaranty agency operating on behalf of the Department of Education (Department), it does not qualify as a “debt collector” under the Act. According to the opinion, the plaintiff alleged that during a scheduled deferment period, the agency notified the plaintiff that it had paid a default claim on the loans and demanded full repayment. The plaintiff alleged that she called to dispute the demand and was told the agency had no record of her debt. Subsequently, the agency ordered the plaintiff’s employer to garnish her wages, and the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging, among other things, that the defendant violated the FDCPA by making false or misleading representations and failing to validate the debt. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant engaged in fraudulent business practices. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, ruling that the defendant was not a debt collector subject to the FDCPA because it was acting “incidental to a bona fide fiduciary obligation” to the Department. While the plaintiff conceded that a guaranty agency’s actions are incidental to a fiduciary obligation when it attempts to collect valid defaulted student loans, she argued that the exemption does not apply when the guaranty agency attempts to collect debts that do not exist.
On appeal, the majority agreed with the district court, holding that determining whether the defendant was a debt collector subject to the FDCPA did not depend on the validity of the claimed debt. The majority held that as long as the defendant was acting in good faith, its collection efforts would be incidental to its fiduciary obligation to the Department and exempted from the definition of “debt collector.” Specifically, the majority referenced language from the FDCPA establishing that the fiduciary obligation exemption applies when an agency attempts to collect a debt that is “owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another,” holding that such language must apply to efforts to collect debts that do not exist or that phrase would have no meaning. According to the majority, “Congress easily could have written the [FDCPA] to impose liability on persons who attempt to collection nonexistent debts pursuant to a fiduciary obligation,” but Congress chose not to.
Massachusetts AG reaches $1.25 million settlement with online lender
On January 21, the Massachusetts attorney general announced a $1.25 million settlement with an online marketplace lender to resolve allegations that it violated the state’s Small Loan Statute by facilitating the origination of loans with excessive interest rates to Massachusetts borrowers. According to an assurance of discontinuance (AOD) filed in the Suffolk Superior Court, the company allegedly facilitated personal loans to Massachusetts residents with interest rates exceeding the statutory interest rate cap set by the Small Loan Statute, which regulates terms for consumer loans of $6,000 or less. “Small loans” are defined by the statute as those where the disbursed amount is $6,000 or less. To determine whether a loan is a “small loan,” the Small Loan Statute provides that if, after all deductions or payments (whether on account of interest, expenses, or principal made substantially contemporaneously with the making of the loan), the amount retained by the borrower is $6,000 or less, the transaction will be deemed to be a loan in the amount of the sum retained by the borrower after deductions or payments, notwithstanding that the loan was nominally for a greater sum (the “deduction provision”). Among other things, the AG’s office claimed the company facilitated “small loans” with interest rates above the maximum permitted rate for non-licensed small loan companies, and that after the company obtained a small loan company license, it allegedly facilitated loans that exceeded the maximum permitted rate for licensed small loan companies based in part on its reading of the Act’s “deduction provision.” The company admitted no liability, agreed to pay $1.25 million to the Commonwealth, comply with Massachusetts law, and stop facilitating small loans to state residents with interest rates that exceed the maximum permissible rate based on the AG’s reading.
CFPB settles UDAAP allegations with Texas payday lender
On February 5, the CFPB announced a settlement with a Texas-based payday lender and six subsidiaries (defendants) for allegedly assisting in the collection of online installment loans and online lines of credit that consumers were not legally obligated to pay based on certain states’ usury laws or licensing requirements. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the Bureau filed a complaint in 2017—amended in 2018—against the defendants for allegedly violating the CFPA’s prohibitions on unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices by, among other things, making deceptive demands and originating debit entries from consumers’ bank accounts for loans that the defendants knew were either partially or completely void because the loans were void under state licensing or usury laws. The defendants—who operated in conjunction with three tribal lenders engaged in the business of extending and collecting the online installment loans and lines of credit—also allegedly provided material services and substantial assistance to two debt collection companies that were also involved in the collection of these loans.
Under the stipulated final consent order, the defendants are prohibited from (i) extending, servicing, or collecting on loans made to consumers in any of the identified 17 states if the loans violate state usury limits or licensing requirements; and (ii) assisting others engaged in this type of conduct. Additionally, the settlement imposes a $1 civil money penalty against each of the seven defendants. The Bureau’s press release notes that the order “is a component of the global resolution of the [defendants’] bankruptcy proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, which includes settlements with the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office and private litigants in a nationwide consumer class action.” The press release also states that “[c]onsumer redress will be disbursed from a fund created as part of the global resolution, which is anticipated to have over $39 million for distribution to consumers and may increase over time as a result of ongoing, related litigation and settlements.”
Miami voluntarily dismisses FHA suits against banks
On January 30, the city of Miami dismissed fair housing lawsuits against four of the largest banks in the U.S. (see orders here, here, here and here). The suits—filed in 2013—claimed that redlining by the banks led to a high rate of mortgage loan defaults, foreclosures, and property vacancies, causing property values to go down, which resulted in reduced tax revenues to the city. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in May, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit determined that Miami made plausible claims that the lending practices of two of the banks violated the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and eventually reduced property tax revenues. Philadelphia recently reached a settlement with a large bank after making similar allegations regarding discriminatory mortgage lending practices. (Covered by InfoBytes here.)
Maryland court of appeals: state consumer protection act covers HOA collections
On January 27, the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the dismissal of a homeowners association’s (HOA) confessed judgment complaint against a consumer, and stated that the HOA could not file an amended complaint. According to the opinion, the consumer owned a home that is part of an HOA, which makes annual assessments to cover the costs of general upkeep of the common areas. When she fell behind in paying her HOA assessments, the HOA drafted and the consumer signed, a promissory note (note) that contained a confessed judgment clause. The consumer defaulted on the note and the HOA filed a complaint for judgment by confession along with the note and an affidavit that stated the note did not involve a consumer transaction. The district court entered judgment for the HOA. The consumer filed a motion to vacate the judgment, claiming that the note arose from a consumer transaction, and the confessed judgment clause was prohibited under the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (MCPA). The district court agreed that the note evidenced a consumer transaction and vacated the confessed judgment and set the matter for trial. After the consumer received a notice regarding the trial on the issue, she filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied, and she appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court held that the confessed judgment was prohibited and that the complaint was required to be dismissed. The HOA filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Court of Appeals granted.
Upon review, the Court of Appeals found that under the MCPA (i) the HOA assessments are consumer debt; (ii) the HOA’s note was an extension of consumer credit; and (iii) confessed judgment clauses in contracts involving consumer transactions are prohibited. Further, the Court of Appeals determined that the HOA could not “circumvent the protections afforded to a debtor under the [M]CPA by inserting language into a confessed judgment clause which purports to preserve a debtor’s legal defenses.” The Court of Appeals also rejected the consumer’s assertion that the note was void as a result of the confessed judgment clause, finding instead that though the HOA should not be allowed to file an amended complaint in the current action, the HOA could file a separate action for breach of contract if the unlawful clause was severed from the note. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals stated that the current action should be dismissed without prejudice.