InfoBytes Blog
Filter
Subscribe to our InfoBytes Blog weekly newsletter and other publications for news affecting the financial services industry.
Internet provider and states agree to nearly $12.5 million for false advertising, hidden fees
On December 19, the Colorado attorney general announced that an internet service provider (ISP) agreed to pay nearly $8.5 million in order to resolve allegations that it “unfairly and deceptively charg[ed] hidden fees, falsely advertis[ed] guaranteed locked prices, and fail[ed] to provide discounts and refunds it promised” to Colorado consumers in violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act. According to the announcement, in 2017 the AG’s office investigated the ISP and compiled information that the ISP had “systematically and deceptively overcharged consumers for services” since 2014 (see the complaint filed by the AG here). In the settlement, the ISP agreed to an order that requires it, among other things, to (i) refrain from making false and misleading statements to consumers in the marketing, advertising and sale of its products and services; (ii) accurately communicate monthly base charges as well as one-time fees, taxes, and other fees and surcharges to consumers; (iii) disclose any “internet cost recovery fee” or “broadband recovery fee” to consumers being charged the fees and allow the affected consumers to switch to different services if they wish to avoid the fees; (iv) refrain from charging an “internet or broadband cost recovery fee” on new orders; and (v) provide refunds to customers who were overcharged for services and to those customers who did not previously receive discounts that the ISP promised.
In a separate action, on December 31, the Oregon attorney general’s office announced that it entered into a $4 million Assurance of Voluntary Compliance with the same ISP to resolve similar claims of deceptive acts and practices in the advertising, sale, and billing of the ISP’s internet, telephone and cable services in violation of the Oregon Unlawful Trade Practices Act. According to the announcement, the Oregon DOJ started an investigation of the ISP in 2014 for allegedly “misrepresenting the price of services, failing to inform consumers of terms and conditions that could affect the price, and billing consumers for services they never received.” The ISP agreed to requirements that are very similar to those in the Colorado settlement. The announcement notes that the “Oregon DOJ will continue to lead a separate securities class action lawsuit arising from the same conduct.”
California Court of Appeal: Borrowers allowed opportunity to cure default on missed loan modification payments
On December 16, the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District allowed borrowers who missed payments on their modified mortgage loan to reinstate the loan and avoid foreclosure by paying the amount in default under the terms of the modified loan, rather than the amount that would have been in default under the original loan terms. According to the court, the borrowers missed four monthly payments on their modified loan, which had deferred certain amounts due on the original loan (including principal). The loan-modification agreement stated that any future default would allow the lender to void the loan modification and enforce the original loan terms. According to the lender, in order to reinstate their account and avoid foreclosure, the borrowers would have to pay the amount that would have been past due on the original loan principal before the loan was modified, plus the four missed monthly payments, associated late charges, and fees and costs. The borrowers filed suit, alleging violations of California Civil Code §§ 2924c and 2953. Section 2924c overrides typical mortgage acceleration clauses to give the borrower the right to cure a default by paying the amount in default rather than the entire principal balance, plus specified fees and expenses. Section 2953 provides that the right of reinstatement created by § 2924c cannot be waived in “[a]ny express agreement made or entered into by a borrower at the time of or in connection with the making of or renewing of any loan secured by a deed of trust, mortgage, or other instrument creating a lien on real property.”
The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the lender. It held that the loan modification at issue was “appropriately viewed as the making or renewal of a loan secured by a deed of trust . . . and is thus subject to the anti-waiver provisions of Section 2953.” Therefore, the court held that the lender had failed to show that the borrowers “could not prevail on their claim” that the lender violated § 2924c and was accordingly not entitled to summary judgment, and remanded the matter to the trial court.
9th Circuit: Student loan guaranty agency is not a debt collector under FDCPA
On December 18, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a nonprofit guaranty agency that collected delinquent student loans was exempt from the FDCPA because its “collection activity was incidental to its fiduciary obligation to the Department of Education.” According to the opinion, the matter dates back decades, where a judgment on the borrower’s three defaulted student loans was eventually assigned to the defendant, which began collection efforts on behalf of the Department of Education (the Department had previously repaid the guarantor of the loans). The defendant sent the borrower a notice in 2009 that it would begin collecting the Department’s claim by having the Department of Treasury “offset ‘all payment streams authorized by law,’ including his Social Security benefits,” to which the borrower did not respond. The borrower eventually disputed the debt in 2012 once the offset took effect, and filed a lawsuit in 2015 claiming FDCPA and Fifth Amendment due process violations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, ruling that the defendant was not a debt collector subject to the FDCPA and was not subject to due process because it was not a state actor.
On appeal, the 9th Circuit agreed with the district court, concluding that while the defendant satisfied the general criteria for debt collectors because it regularly collected debts that were owed to someone else, the defendant qualified for an exception because its debt collection activities were “incidental to a bona fide fiduciary obligation.” Specifically, the appellate court held that “incidental to” a fiduciary obligation meant that debt collection could not be the “sole or primary” reason the judgment had been assigned to the defendant. The appellate court explained that the defendant had a broader role beyond the collection of debts, because it had also accepted recordkeeping and administrative duties. Finally, concerning the borrower’s argument that the defendant had “arbitrarily and maliciously” garnished his benefits in violation of his due process rights, the 9th Circuit concluded that there was no due process violation because the defendant (i) had provided the borrower with a notice of the debt and its intention to recover the claim from his Social Security benefits; (ii) the notice was sent to the correct address; and (iii) the defendant’s misstatement that the debt arose from one loan rather than the total of three loans was not a due process violation.
Bank and Philadelphia reach $10 million settlement in redlining suit
On December 16, a national bank and the city of Philadelphia agreed to a $10 million settlement in a fair lending suit filed against a national bank in 2017 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The settlement resolves claims against the bank alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act, as previously covered in InfoBytes. Specifically, the city alleged that the bank engaged in discriminatory mortgage lending practices by placing minority borrowers in loans with less favorable terms than loans to similar non-minority borrowers. According to the complaint, these allegedly discriminatory loans increased foreclosure rates and resulted in falling property values, particularly in minority and low-income neighborhoods in Philadelphia. The empty properties and lower property values in turn reduced tax revenues and increased costs to the city to pay for municipal services including police, fire fighting, housing programs, and also maintenance for the growing number of empty properties. The court had previously denied the bank’s motion to dismiss, (prior InfoBytes coverage here), which argued, among other things, that the city had failed to show that the bank’s alleged lending practices were the proximate cause of the city’s harm.
FTC asks Supreme Court to delay review of $1.3 billion judgment
On December 13, the FTC filed a brief in a U.S. Supreme Court action that is currently awaiting the Court’s decision to grant certiorari. The question presented to the Court asks whether the FTC is empowered by Section 13(b) of the FTC Act to demand equitable monetary relief in civil enforcement actions. The petitioners, who include a Kansas-based operation and its owner, filed the petition for a writ of certiorari in October, appealing a December 2018 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (covered by InfoBytes here), which upheld a $1.3 billion judgment against the petitioners for allegedly operating a deceptive payday lending scheme. Among other things, the 9th Circuit rejected the petitioners’ argument that the FTC Act only allows the court to issue injunctions, concluding that a district court may grant any ancillary relief under the FTC Act, including restitution. The 9th Circuit also rejected the petitioners’ request to revisit those precedents in light of the Court’s 2017 holding in Kokesh v. SEC—which limited the SEC’s disgorgement power to a five-year statute of limitations period applicable to penalties and fines under 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (previously covered by InfoBytes here)—concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in calculating the award. Additionally, the 9th Circuit referenced the Court’s statement in Kokesh that noted “[n]othing in [its] opinion should be interpreted as an opinion on whether courts possess authority to order disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceedings.”
In response to the petition, the FTC asked the Court to delay reviewing the appeal, stating that the Court should hold the petition pending the disposition in a matter that was recently granted cert “to decide whether district courts may award disgorgement to the [SEC] under analogous provisions of the securities laws.” The FTC acknowledged that while the “relevant statutory schemes are not identical, and the FTC’s and the SEC’s authority to seek monetary relief will not necessarily rise and fall together,” the questions presented in both cases overlap.
Lawsuit says Prepaid Accounts Rule is “arbitrary and capricious”
On December 11, a payments company filed a lawsuit against the CFPB in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that the Bureau’s Prepaid Account Rule (Rule), which took effect April 1 and provides protections for prepaid account consumers, exceeds the agency’s statutory authority and is “arbitrary and capricious” under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The company further asserts that the Rule violates its First Amendment rights by requiring it to make confusing disclosures that contain categories not relevant to the company’s products. According to the complaint, the Rule mandates that the company send “short form” fee disclosures to customers that include references to fees for ATM balance inquiries, customer service, electronic withdrawal, international transactions, and other categories, and “prohibits [the company] from including explanatory phrases within the disclosure box to describe the nature of these fee categories.” These disclosures, the company asserts, have confused many customers who mistakenly believe the company charges fees to access funds stored as a balance with the company, to make a purchase with a merchant, or to send money to friends or family in the U.S. The company also claims that the Bureau erroneously lumped it into the same category as providers of general purpose reloadable cards (GPR cards), and argues that the Rule ignores how prepaid cards fundamentally differ from digital wallets, which has resulted in several unintended consequences.
The company asserts that the Rule is unlawful and invalid under the APA and the Constitution for three principal reasons:
- The Rule contravenes the Bureau’s statutory authority by (i) establishing a mandatory and misleading disclosure regime that is not authorized by federal law; and (ii) “impos[ing] a 30-day ban on consumers linking certain credit cards to their prepaid account—a prohibition the law nowhere authorizes the Bureau to impose.”
- Even if the Bureau possesses the statutory authority it claims to have, the rulemaking process was “fundamentally flawed” due to its one-size-fits-all Rule that misunderstands the different characteristics of digital wallets compared to GPR cards. By treating digital wallets as if they are GPR cards, the Rule violates the APA’s reasoned decision-making requirement. Additionally, the Rule is marked by “an insufficient cost-benefit analysis that failed to properly weigh the limited benefits consumers might derive from the Rule against the costs” stemming from the Rule’s changes.
- The Rule violates the First Amendment by failing to satisfy the heightened standard that a law or regulation “directly advances a substantial government interest” because it requires the company to makes certain disclosures that are irrelevant to its digital wallet product. Moreover, the Rule’s disclosure obligations “functionally impair the speech in which [the company] might otherwise engage” by mandating that it provide confusing and misleading disclosures about the nature of its offerings.
The complaint asks that the Rule be vacated and declared arbitrary, an abuse of discretion, not in accordance with the law, and unconstitutional, and additionally seeks injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees and costs.
Written request for HAMP assistance resets foreclosures limitations
On December 13, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s grant of summary judgement in favor of a bank and mortgage servicer defendants in an action brought by a consumer to prevent foreclosure of his property. According to the unpublished opinion, in 2016, the consumer, who was struggling with his mortgage payments, submitted loan modification requests on three occasions. In each request, the consumer provided written acknowledgment of the original debt and expressed his desire to pay in order to keep his property. The consumer asserted that Washington state law and the FDCPA prohibited the defendants from instituting foreclosure proceedings on his mortgage because the six-year statute of limitations for filing for foreclosure had expired. On appeal, the three judge panel rejected the consumer’s argument, determining that the limitation on filing for foreclosure had not run, explaining that because the consumer had not communicated to defendants “an intent not to pay,” and each of the modification requests acknowledged the debt in writing, the foreclosure statute of limitations period was restarted each of the three times he submitted his loan modification requests.
Hospitality company's bid to dismiss data breach suit rejected
On December 13, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland denied an international hospitality company’s motion to dismiss a data breach suit brought by the City of Chicago. According to the city’s complaint, the company violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act by, among other things, allegedly failing to (i) “protect Chicago residents’ personal information”; (ii) implement and maintain reasonable security measures; (iii) disclose that it did not maintain reasonable security measures; and (iv) provide “prompt notice” of the breach to Chicago residents. According to the opinion, the city had established standing to sue the company because it adequately alleged injury to its municipal interests. Additionally, the court rejected the company’s assertion that the suit is unconstitutional under the Illinois Constitution, stating that the consumer protection ordinance the company was alleged to have violated “addresses a local problem, making it a legitimate exercise of the City’s home rule authority” under the state’s constitution. The company had released a statement in November 2018, which is at the center of the city’s action, stating that the breach was discovered in September 2018, had exposed personal information from 500 million guests, and been ongoing since 2014.
District Court’s reversal of jury verdict in FDCPA case overturned
On December 12, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling overturning a jury verdict in favor of the consumer for a debt collection company’s (company) violation of the FDCPA and the Texas Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Texas Act). The consumer sued the company claiming that after she sent the company a letter disputing a debt, the company failed to report to the credit bureaus that the debt was “disputed.” At trial, the jury awarded the consumer $61,000 for the company’s alleged FDCPA and Texas Act violations. Afterwards, the district court granted the company’s post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law, overturned the jury’s verdict, and dismissed the case, ruling that the consumer failed to provide evidence that the disputed debt was a consumer debt.
On appeal, the 5th Circuit held that it is within the jury’s discretion to make credibility determinations and that it was permissible for the jury to credit the consumer’s testimony about the consumer nature of the debt—a determination which cannot be disturbed unless it is impossible that the testimony is true. In addition, the appellate court noted that the jury has discretion to draw inferences and that it reasonably inferred that the disputed debt was, in fact, a consumer debt, as the consumer claimed.
Payday lenders’ $12 million settlement approved
On December 13, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted final approval of a $12 million settlement to resolve allegations including unjust enrichment, usury, and violations of RICO against tribe-related lenders (lenders) that plaintiffs claim charged extremely high interest rates on consumer payday loans. According to the memorandum in support of the settlement, one lender’s “operation constituted a “rent-a-tribe,” where it originated high-interest loans through entities formed under tribal law in an attempt to evade state and federal laws.” The parties filed a preliminary settlement agreement in June. According to the approval order, the court found that “the settlement agreement is fair, adequate and reasonable,” reaffirmed certification of a final settlement class, and additionally found that “the class representatives have and continue to adequately represent settlement class members.” This settlement ends three separate putative class actions against the lenders.