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International bank’s motion to dismiss denied in RMBS suit
On December 10, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York issued a memorandum and order denying an international bank’s motion to dismiss a DOJ suit filed in 2018. As previously covered in InfoBytes, the DOJ alleges the bank and several affiliates violated the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) by misleading investors and rating agencies in offering documents and presentations regarding the underwriting quality and other important attributes of the mortgages they securitized into residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) for sale to investors during the financial crisis. Specifically, the complaint alleges (i) “mail fraud affecting federally-insured financial institutions (FIFIs)”; (ii) wire fraud affecting FIFIs; (iii) bank fraud; (iv) “fraudulent benefit from a transaction with a covered financial institution (FI)”; and (v) “false statements made to influence the actions of a covered FI.” The DOJ seeks the maximum civil penalty.
According to the district court’s memorandum, the bank’s motion to dismiss sets forth a number of arguments, including, among other things, a failure to sufficiently plead fraudulent intent and the particular circumstances constituting fraud, and a lack of personal jurisdiction, all with which the court rejected. Specifically, the bank suggested that the DOJ’s complaint did not show that the bank “acted with fraudulent intent,” or that the bank committed “bank fraud, [made] fraudulent bank transactions, and [made] false statements to banks.” The memorandum rejects the bank’s claims, adding that personal jurisdiction over the bank and its affiliates is shown “based on [the bank’s] origination of loans” in New York.
Supreme Court holds FDCPA filing limit starts on date of violation
On December 10, the U.S. Supreme Court, in an eight-to-one decision, held that the one-year time limit for filing an FDCPA action starts on the date of the violation, and that no “discovery rule” applies. According to the opinion, the respondent law firm sued the petitioner seeking payment of credit card debt. The respondent attempted service on the petitioner at his old address, where the occupant accepted service. After the petitioner did not respond, a default judgment was entered against him in 2009. The petitioner claimed that he had no knowledge of the default judgement until 2014. He then sued the respondent in district court in 2015 alleging that the respondent “purposely served process in a manner that ensured he would not receive service,” and that the respondent violated the FDCPA by filing the debt collection suit against the petitioner “after the state-law limitations period expired,” and thus had no “lawful ability to collect.” The district court dismissed the action, rejecting the petitioner’s assertion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit holding that a “discovery rule” exists, which delays the one-year limit to the date when the violation is discovered. The district court held that the FDCPA does not include a discovery rule, relying on the FDCPA’s “plain language.”
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that “there is no default presumption” of a discovery rule in the FDCPA.
Upon review by the Court, Justice Thomas, who penned the majority opinion, averred that the FDCPA explicitly provides a one-year limitation starting on “the date on which the violation occurs.” Moreover, the opinion points out that Congress would have added a provision to delay that limitation until after a violation was discovered if it meant for the FDCPA to have such a provision.
According to Justice Ginsberg’s dissenting opinion, though she agreed with the one-year limitation for filing suit under the FDCPA, she added that the discovery rule should be observed when fraud prevents the petitioner from filing within the one-year period, distinguishing the “fraud-based discovery rule” from general “equitable tolling” principles.
Briefs filed in Supreme Court CFPB constitutionality challenge
On December 9, parties filed briefs in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the U.S. Supreme Court granted cert in Seila to answer the question of whether an independent agency led by a single director violates the Constitution’s separation of powers under Article II, while also directing the parties to brief and argue whether 12 U.S.C. §5491(c)(3), which sets up the CFPB’s single director structure and imposes removal for cause, is severable from the rest of the Dodd-Frank Act, should it be found to be unconstitutional. While both parties are in agreement on the CFPB’s single-director leadership structure, they differ on how the matter should be resolved.
According to Seila Law’s brief, the CFPB’s single-director leadership structure is a blatant violation of the Constitution’s separation of powers clause. Seila Law proposes that the Court eliminate the CFPB entirely, leaving Congress to determine how to address the unconstitutionality of the Bureau, rather than save the law by making the director an at-will employee of the President. Removing the director at will, Seila Law argues, “would radically reshape the CFPB, creating a mutant version of the agency that Congress envisioned—one that would still be unaccountable to Congress, yet fully within presidential control.” Discussing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s reliance in part on a 1935 Supreme Court decision in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (which dealt with removal protections for members of a nonpartisan, multimember commission) in its May ruling which held that the Bureau’s single-director structure is constitutional (InfoBytes coverage here), Seila Law states that the Court’s ruling in Humphrey’s Executor was “badly reasoned, wrongly decided, and should be overruled,” and, in any event, is distinguishable when addressing the CFPB’s single-director leadership structure. Whether the Court distinguishes or overturns Humphrey’s Executor’s precedent, Seila Law argues, it should hold that the Bureau’s structure violates the separation of powers clause and reverse the 9th Circuit’s judgment.
“By insulating the director of the CFPB from removal at will by the President while empowering him to exercise substantial executive power, Congress breached the President’s core prerogatives under Article II of the Constitution,” Seila Law further asserts, claiming that the appropriate remedy for the constitutional violation would be to deny the CFPB’s petition to enforce the CID and ultimately let Congress determine how to address the “constitutional defect in the CFPB’s structure.” Seila Law also argues that should the Court decide to engage in severability analysis, it should invalidate all of Title X of Dodd-Frank, which does not allow the current leadership structure to be altered to a multi-member commission.
In contrast, though the CFPB concedes that Dodd-Frank’s restriction on the President’s ability to remove the Bureau’s director violates the “separation of powers” principles of the Constitution, it contends in its brief that, should the removal provision be found unconstitutional, it should be severed from the rest of the law in accordance with Dodd-Frank’s express severability clause. “Even considering only the Bureau-specific provisions contained in Title X . . . , there is no basis to conclude that Congress would have preferred to have no Bureau at all rather than a Bureau headed by a Director who would be removable like almost all other single-headed agencies,” the CFPB wrote. “Nothing in the statutory text or history of the Bureau’s creation suggests, much less clearly demonstrates, that Congress would have preferred, for example, that the regulatory authority vested in the Bureau revert back to the seven federal agencies that previously administered those responsibilities if a court were to invalidate the Director’s removal restriction.”
Oral arguments are scheduled for March 3, 2020.
Connecticut Supreme Court reverses in favor of consumer in unfair trade practices appeal
On November 26, the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed a trial court’s ruling on a mortgage servicer’s motion to dismiss a Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) action brought by a consumer. The trial court had ruled in favor of the servicer, stating, among other things, that ruling in the consumer’s favor might dissuade servicers from engaging in loan modifications for fear of negligence claims and additional liability. According to the Connecticut Supreme Court opinion, the consumer defaulted on his mortgage and his servicer instituted foreclosure proceedings, at which time the consumer requested a loan modification under the HAMP program. The complaint claims that over the next five years, the servicer mishandled the loan modification process, failed to respond to the consumer’s inquiries about the modification status, and repeatedly requested applications and additional documents from the consumer.
Based on the facts stated in the complaint, the consumer claims that when the servicer finally extended a HAMP modification (which capitalized accrued but unpaid interest, default fees, and the servicer’s attorney fees), the consumer filed a complaint against the servicer for violation of CUTPA, alleging that the servicer “committed unfair or deceptive acts in the conduct of trade or commerce by failing to exercise reasonable diligence in reviewing and processing the [consumer’s] loan modification applications.” Additionally, the consumer alleged negligence, claiming that the servicer “owed the [consumer] a duty of care arising out of the servicing standards imposed by RESPA, the 2011 federal consent order, the national mortgage settlement, and the Connecticut foreclosure mediation statutes.”
The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s ruling striking the consumer’s CUTPA claim on a motion to strike (similar to a federal motion to dismiss), stating that, “viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the complaint’s legal sufficiency, we agree with the [consumer] and conclude that these allegations describe conduct that was not merely a technical violation of these provisions or negligent or incompetent, but involved a conscious, systematic departure from known, standard business norms” and that the allegations, if true, could show that the servicer “deliberately engage[d] in a pattern of conduct intended to prevent” the consumer from getting a loan modification. However, the court agreed with the lower court regarding the negligence claim, rejecting the consumer’s claim that the servicer had a common-law duty “to use reasonable care in the review and processing of” his loan modification application.
10th Circuit affirms $5 million disgorgement in Kokesh
On December 6, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed a district court’s revised disgorgement order in SEC v. Kokesh. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a unanimous ruling in Kokesh and rejected the SEC’s position that disgorgement is an equitable remedy and not a penalty. The Court’s decision limited the SEC’s disgorgement power to a five-year statute of limitations period applicable to penalties and fines under 28 U.S.C. § 2462. Following the Court’s ruling, in 2018, the 10th Circuit, on remand, directed the district court to enter an order for a lower disgorgement amount of $5 million (from nearly $35 million), holding that only a portion of the SEC’s claims were not time-barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2462. At the district court, the SEC also argued that prejudgment interest of more than $2.6 million should apply to the disgorgement penalty, as well as nearly $2.3 million in civil penalties, and the district court awarded such amounts, rejecting Kokesh’s argument that “the district court should reject any relief other than an order of disgorgement.” Kokesh again appealed, arguing, among other things, that “§ 2462 is jurisdictional and precludes this action in its entirety,” and that the permanent injunction and civil penalties were invalid.
On appeal, the 10th Circuit refused to address Kokesh’s jurisdictional argument, stating that, among other things, the appellate court had previously found that “each act of misappropriation should be considered separately” and that not all of the SEC’s claims were time-barred. The appellate court further concluded that because it had previously found that some alleged misappropriations happened within the five-year limit, the $5 million disgorgement calculation that the SEC requested was warranted. Moreover, the appellate court noted that Kokesh failed to show any reason that its 2018 decision was “clearly erroneous,” and during remand, “rather than. . .contesting timeliness or the SEC’s calculations, Kokesh conceded the district court should enter the disgorgement order and instead focused on the SEC’s new request for prejudgment interest.” Additionally, the appellate court refused to consider Kokesh’s challenges to the permanent injunction and the civil penalty ordered because they were first raised in Kokesh’s reply brief.
TRO issued against VoIP service provider in card interest reduction scam
On December 5, the FTC and the Ohio attorney general announced that the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) against a VoIP service provider and its foreign counterpart for facilitating (or consciously avoiding knowing of) a “phony” credit card interest rate reduction scheme committed by one of its client companies at the center of a joint FTC/Ohio AG action. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the original complaint alleged that a group of individuals and companies—working in concert and claiming they could reduce interest rates on credit cards—had violated the FTC Act, the Telemarketing Sales Rule, and various Ohio consumer protection laws. In addition to obtaining a TRO against the most recent alleged participants, the FTC and Ohio AG amended their July complaint to add the telecom companies as defendants alleging the companies “played a key role in robocalling consumers to promote a credit card interest reductions scheme.”
Appeals Court affirms enforceability of arbitration agreement
On November 27, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, affirmed an order requiring arbitration between a consumer and the buyer of the consumer’s debt (debt collector) in a lawsuit filed by the consumer claiming that the debt collector was not licensed to collect debts in New Jersey. According to the decision, the consumer had opened a credit card account with a bank, which included an arbitration agreement, then defaulted on the account. The debt collector then bought the debt and collected the consumer’s debt. The consumer subsequently sued the debt collector for its purported unlicensed collection of debts, but the trial court dismissed the complaint and compelled arbitration between the parties. The consumer appealed, arguing in part that the trial court erred by allowing an arbitrator to decide the validity of the assignment to the debt collector, and, therefore, the enforceability of the arbitration agreement. The appellate division court sided with the trial court that the arbitration clause “clearly and expressly stated claims relating to the ‘application, enforceability or interpretation of this Agreement, including this arbitration provision’ are subject to arbitration.” Moreover, the court concurred that the agreement did not violate the state’s plain language statute. However, the appellate division remanded the case to the trial court for issuance of an order to stay—rather than dismiss—the matter pending arbitration.
2nd Circuit says loan requests at Fed banks are claims under the FCA
On November 21, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the dismissal of a relator’s qui tam action, concluding that allegedly fraudulent loan requests made to one or more of the Federal Reserve Banks (FRBs) qualify as claims within the meaning of the False Claims Act (FCA). In the case, two qui tam relators brought an action under the FCA against a national bank and its predecessors-in-interest (defendants), alleging the defendants presented false information to FRBs in connection with their applications for loans. However the district court dismissed the action, holding that allegations of false or fraudulent claims being presented to the FRBs cannot form the basis of an FCA action because the FRBs cannot be characterized as the federal government for purposes of the FCA. In addition, the district court agreed with the defendants’ argument that the bank’s loan requests did not create FCA liability for claims, because the relators did not, and could not, “allege that the [g]overnment either provided any portion of the money loaned to the defendants, or reimbursed FRBs for making the loans.” (Previously covered by InfoBytes here.)
On appeal, the 2nd Circuit concluded that although the FRBs are not a “part of any executive department or agency,” the FRBs still act as agents of the U.S. because the U.S. “created the FRBs to act on its behalf in extending emergency credit to banks; the FRBs extend such credit; and the FRBs do so in compliance with the strictures enacted by Congress and the regulations promulgated by the [Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System], an independent agency within the executive branch.” The 2nd Circuit also held that the loan requests qualified as claims under the FCA because the money requested by the defendants is provided from the Federal Reserve System’s (Fed’s) emergency lending facilities and “is to be spent to advance a [g]overnment program or interest.” In supporting its conclusion, the appellate court stated that the U.S. “is the source of the purchasing power conferred on the banks when they borrow from the Fed’s emergency lending facilities.” The 2nd Circuit also referred to a U.S. Supreme Court holding in Rainwater v. United States, which stated that “the objective of Congress was broadly to protect the funds and property of the government from fraudulent claims, regardless of the particular form or function, of the government instrumentality upon which such claims were made.”
CFPB reaches $8.5 million settlement with background screening company
On November 22, the CFPB announced a settlement with an employment background screening company resolving allegations that the company violated the FCRA. In the complaint, the Bureau asserts that the company failed to “employ reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy” in the consumer reports it prepared. Specifically, the Bureau claims that until October 2014, the company matched criminal records with applicants based on only two personal identifiers, which created a “heightened risk of false positives” in commonly named individuals. The company also had a practice of including “high-risk indicators,” sourced from a third party, in its consumer reports and did not follow procedures to verify the accuracy of the designations. Additionally, the Bureau asserts that the company failed to maintain procedures to ensure that adverse public record information was complete and up to date, resulting in reporting outdated adverse information in violation of the FCRA. Under the stipulated judgment, in addition to injunctive relief, the company will be required to pay $6 million in monetary relief to affected consumers and a $2.5 million civil money penalty.
District Court rejects sampling-related expert discovery in RMBS action
On November 18, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York denied an investment company’s request to use “sampling-related expert discovery” in its action against a trustee of five residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), concluding that the proposal was not proportional to the needs of the case. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the investment company filed suit against the trustee alleging the trustee “failed to fulfil certain contractual duties triggered by the discovery of breaches of ‘representations and warranties’” when the underlying mortgages allegedly were found not to be of the promised quality. The investment company also alleged that the trustee failed to exercise its rights to require the companies that sold the mortgages in question “to cure, substitute, or repurchase the breaching loans.” After being denied class certification by the court in February, the investment company preemptively moved for an order from the court allowing it to use sampling-related expert discovery—a process which “engage[s] experts to select samples of mortgage loans from each of the five trusts and to perform analyses on those samples of loans to extrapolate information about the quality of all of the loans in the trusts.”
The court denied the request, calling the proposed sampling a “blind corner.” The court noted that the “breach rate evidence” that would be discovered by the sampling “only provides substantial probative value for [the investment company’s] claims if [the investment company] can demonstrate that [the trustee] was under an obligation to conduct an investigation of the loans in each of the trusts,” which the investment company has failed to do. Because “the probative value of that discovery hinges upon a factual theory that [the investment company] has yet to demonstrate is viable,” the court could not justify allowing the parties to expend hundreds of thousands of dollars on the proposed sampling.