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Regulators tackle company offering relief from student loans
On October 30, the CFPB, along with the Minnesota and North Carolina attorneys general, and the Los Angeles City Attorney (together, the “states”), announced an action against a student loan debt relief operation for allegedly deceiving thousands of student-loan borrowers and charging more than $71 million in unlawful advance fees. In the complaint filed October 21 and unsealed on October 29 in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, the Bureau and the states alleged that since at least 2015 the defendants have violated the Consumer Financial Protection Act, the Telemarketing Sales Rule, and various state laws by charging and collecting improper advance fees from student loan borrowers prior to providing assistance and receiving payments on the adjusted loans. In addition, the Bureau and the states claim the defendants engaged in deceptive practices by misrepresenting (i) the purpose and application of fees they charged; (ii) their ability to obtain loan forgiveness; and (iii) their ability to actually lower borrowers’ monthly payments. The defendants also allegedly failed to inform borrowers that they automatically requested that the loans be placed in forbearance and submitted false information to student loan servicers to qualify borrowers for lower payments. The complaint seeks injunctive relief, as well as damages, restitution, disgorgement, and civil money penalties.
On November 15, the court entered a preliminary injunction enjoining the alleged violations of law in the complaint, continuing the asset freeze, and appointing a receiver against the defendants.
Department of Education held in contempt for continuing to collect certain student loans
On October 24, a magistrate judge for the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California held the Department of Education and Secretary Betsy DeVos in civil contempt and ordered them to pay $100,000 in sanctions for violating a May 2018 preliminary injunction that prohibited them from collecting on student loans used for programs at a now defunct for-profit college (previously covered by InfoBytes here). According to the October 24 order, the defendants allegedly showed “only minimal efforts to comply with the preliminary injunction.” Moreover, a compliance report filed in September was “silent as to the normal actions one would expect from an entity facing a binding court order: multiple in-person meetings or telephone calls to explain the preliminary injunction and to confirm that the contractors were complying with the preliminary injunction.” The court further stated that the defendants acknowledged in their compliance report, among other things, that (i) more than 16,000 former student were told they had payments due on their student loans after the court-ordered prohibition went into effect in May 2018; (ii) nearly 3,300 of the borrowers made one or more payments; and (iii) more than 1,800 other borrowers had wages or tax returns garnished to collect on unpaid student loans. In addition to the finding of contempt and the monetary penalty, the defendants are required to file monthly status reports on their compliance with the injunction and “submit a revised notice to be sent to the entire potential class regarding [d]efendants’ noncompliance with the preliminary injunction and their forthcoming efforts to fully comply.”
District Court holds debt collection letter properly named creditor
On October 21, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted judgment for a debt collection law firm, concluding the law firm properly identified the current owner of the consumer’s debt in its collection letter. According to the opinion, the law firm sent a letter in March 2018 seeking to collect a debt from the consumer. The letter acknowledges the law firm is a debt collector and provides the balance due, a reference number, the last four digits of the associated bank account, and in two places, states “Re: [bank name].” The consumer filed the action against the law firm, alleging it violated the FDCPA because the least sophisticated consumer would be confused as to whether the bank or the law firm is “the creditor to whom the alleged debt is now purportedly owed.” Both parties moved for judgment and the court agreed with the law firm. Specifically, the court noted that the letter refers to the original creditor twice by stating, “Re: [bank name],” and also the subject line of the letter “identifies both the creditor, [the bank], and plaintiff’s account number with that institution,” which “strongly suggests” that the listed bank is the current creditor. Moreover, the court rejected the consumer’s argument that the least sophisticated consumer would understand the bank is the “source” of the debt but would not understand the bank is the “owner” of the debt, concluding that the least sophisticated consumer would “not likely make such a leap” to assume the debt may have been subsequently sold to another party not mentioned in the letter.
3rd Circuit affirms summary judgment in bankruptcy, FDCPA action
On October 23, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for a debt collection law firm and attorney (collectively, “defendants”) in an action alleging the defendants violated the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA. According to the opinion, the plaintiffs had to make monthly payments to their condominium association as part of a special assessment to pay for an improvement project. The plaintiffs made payments until filing for bankruptcy in 2014. After the bankruptcy closed, the plaintiffs did not resume payments to the association for the improvement project. The balance continued to accrue and a lien was filed for the outstanding balance of $10,137.38. The association also created a “Certificate of Amount of Unpaid Assessments” that referenced the outstanding balance and explained over $8,000 of the total balance had been discharged in the 2014 bankruptcy. The plaintiffs sued the defendants, asserting that the bankruptcy discharged all the debt owed, including the post-discharge payments, and that the defendants’ collection efforts “were coercive and misleading.” The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
On appeal, the 3rd Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the payment owed to the condominium association was a “fee or assessment” under the Bankruptcy Code that was not discharged here because the plaintiffs retained ownership interest in the property and the assessment payment became due after the bankruptcy. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ FDCPA claims against the defendants. The court explained that the defendants were not responsible for the amount listed in the condominium association’s certificate and, in any event, the amount the defendants’ attempted to collect did not include the discharged amount. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence that would create an issue of material fact on the FDCPA claim and affirmed the district court’s summary judgment ruling.
District Court denies request to enforce modified CID, says CFPB can issue third-party CID
On October 18, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia denied defendants’ request to enforce a modified Civil Investigative Demand (CID) and prevent the CFPB from obtaining personal information about the defendants’ clients via CIDs to third parties. In August 2017, the CFPB issued a CID to the defendants requesting various documents and information. The defendants challenged the scope of the original CID and, following mediation, the parties stipulated to a modified CID that no longer sought personal information of the defendants’ clients who obtained products or services related to immigration bonds. The CFPB subsequently issued third party CIDs and requested the personal information of the defendants’ clients from certain other parties. In March 2019, the defendants moved to enforce the modified CID, claiming that the CFPB “reneged on its stipulation and [acted] in bad faith” by seeking this personal information from third parties. The court, however, denied the defendants’ request to enforce the modified CID, ruling that “the modified CID makes no mention of CIDs issued to other parties,” and that the parties’ stipulation did not “preclude the CFPB from acquiring any type of information from third parties.” The court also explained that it was unclear whether the defendants had standing to contest the CFPB’s CID to a third party, noting that the defendants failed to state how they would suffer an injury if the pertinent information was disclosed by a third party.
Massachusetts AG sues Department of Education for failure to discharge loans
On October 22, the Massachusetts attorney general filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts challenging the U.S. Department of Education’s (DOE) continued collection of federal student loan debt incurred by over 7,000 individuals to attend a now closed for-profit college. The complaint alleges that, in 2015, the attorney general submitted an application to the DOE on behalf of the individuals who attended the for-profit school to have their federal loans forgiven due to the institution’s allegedly fraudulent conduct. The attorney general asserts that its application for loan discharge was supported by evidence of the institution’s various wrongful conduct towards Massachusetts students, and its submission established a defense to the enforceability of the underlying federal student loan debt. However, the complaint asserts that the DOE did not grant the requested loan relief and instead has continued collection efforts on debts subject to discharge under the attorney general’s application. The attorney general is seeking an order to set aside the DOE’s decision to continue collection efforts as “arbitrary and capricious” in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act and to declare that Massachusetts borrowers have established a defense to repayment of their federal student loans.
Supreme Court to decide CFPB constitutionality
On October 18, the U.S. Supreme Court granted cert in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, to answer the question of whether an independent agency led by a single director violates the Constitution’s separation of powers under Article II. The Court also directed the parties to brief and argue whether 12 U.S.C. §5491(c)(3), which sets up the Bureau’s single director structure and imposes removal for cause, is severable from the rest of the Dodd-Frank Act, should it be found to be unconstitutional. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the law firm filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Court, appealing the May decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held that (i) the Bureau’s single-director structure is constitutional, and (ii) the district court did not err when it granted the Bureau’s petition to enforce the law firm’s compliance with a 2017 Civil Investigative Demand (previously covered by InfoBytes here). In response to the petition, the Bureau and the DOJ filed a brief arguing that the for-cause restriction on the president’s authority to remove the Bureau’s single director violates the Constitution’s separation of powers. While the Bureau previously defended the single-director structure to the 9th Circuit, the brief notes that since the May decision was issued, “the Director has reconsidered that position and now agrees that the removal restriction is unconstitutional.”
In response to the Court’s decision to grant cert, an online loan servicer that operated on tribal lands has withdrawn its appeal from the 9th Circuit challenging the Bureau’s structure pending the Court’s decision in Seila Law. In the original action, the district court found that an online loan servicer that operated on tribal lands engaged in deceptive practices by collecting on loans that exceeded the usury limits in various states, and ordered it and its affiliates to pay a $10 million penalty, far short of the Bureau’s request. (Previously covered by InfoBtyes here and here.)
Class action over mortgage modification denial error moves forward
On October 18, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington granted in part a national bank’s motion to dismiss, but allowed the plaintiffs’ claim under the Washington Consumer Protection Act (WCPA) to move forward. According to the opinion, in 2011, a national bank denied the plaintiffs’ mortgage modification, and in 2012, the plaintiffs’ home was foreclosed upon. In August 2018, the national bank disclosed that approximately 625 mortgage modification applications were improperly denied due to a calculation error in the bank’s software. The bank informed the plaintiffs of the error, provided a check for $15,000, and after mediation, paid the plaintiffs another $25,000. The plaintiffs filed a class action against the bank, asserting claims for violation of the WCPA and unjust enrichment. The bank moved to dismiss the action, arguing, among other things, that the WCPA claim was an “impermissible attempt to enforce the federal Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), which creates no private right of action.” The court disagreed with the bank, determining that while the mortgage modification application was filed pursuant to HAMP, the plaintiffs “do not seek to enforce HAMP.” Instead, the plaintiffs argue that the wrongful denial of their application and failure to disclose the calculation error for three years “constitutes unfair or deceptive conduct in violation of the [WCPA].” The court concluded that the WCPA claim “is not an improper attempt to enforce” HAMP, as HAMP is merely “a ‘component’ of the [WCPA] claim.” The court went on to grant the bank’s motion to dismiss as to the unjust enrichment claim, while granting the plaintiffs’ request to amend their complaint.
District Court enters final judgment: Only depository institutions can receive OCC fintech charter
On October 21, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York entered a final judgment in NYDFS’s lawsuit against the OCC challenging the agency’s Special Purpose National Bank Charter (SPNB), concluding that the regulation should be “set aside with respect to all fintech applicants seeking a national bank charter that do not accept deposits.” As previously covered by InfoBytes, in May the district court denied the OCC’s motion to dismiss the complaint by NYDFS, which argued that the agency’s decision to allow fintech companies to apply for a SPNB is a move that will destabilize financial markets more effectively regulated by the state. The court stated that because the OCC failed to rebut NYDFS’s claims that the proposed national fintech charter posed a threat to the state’s ability to establish its own laws and regulations, the challenge “is ripe for adjudication.” After the May decision, the OCC informed the court that it would be seeking final judgment in the case, and on October 7, each party submitted proposed final orders (available here and here). The proposals were “nearly identical,” according to the court, as both (i) “direct the Clerk of Court to enter final judgment in favor of plaintiff [NYDFS] and close the case,” and (ii) “provide that each party shall bear its own fees and costs.” However, NYDFS proposed “that the regulation be ‘set aside with respect to all fintech applicants seeking a national bank charter that do not accept deposits,’” while the OCC suggested the regulation only be set aside “‘with respect to all fintech applicants seeking a national bank charter that do not accept deposits, and that have a nexus to New York State…in a manner that would subject them to regulation by [NYDFS].’” The court agreed with NYDFS, concluding that the OCC “failed to identify a persuasive reason to deviate from ordinary administrative law procedure,” which requires “vacatur” of the regulation.
District Court allows claims to proceed against car dealership
On October 17, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey issued an opinion allowing consumer protection claims to proceed against a car dealership related to fees added to vehicle purchase prices, while granting two other related entities’ motions to dismiss. The plaintiff’s complaint against the dealership and related entities alleged that the dealership charged her additional mandatory fees when purchasing the vehicle, required her to spend $3,500 on a service contract in order to obtain financing, and charged interest on the contract even though, the plaintiff alleged, the contract constituted a fee related to the extension of credit and therefore was not subject to interest. These actions, the plaintiff alleged, violated TILA, the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act, and the Consumer Service Contract Act (CSCA). According to the plaintiff, the contracts contained cancellation provisions that guaranteed a full refund if a request was submitted within a specified period with a guaranteed 10 percent penalty for each 30-day period for which the refund was unpaid. The plaintiff executed timely refund requests but claimed that the entities failed to refund the fees within the allotted contractual period. In separate motions to dismiss, the entities argued that, while the allegations could be considered contractual breaches, they were not sufficient to constitute violations under the alleged consumer protection statutes. The court agreed and granted the entities’ motions, ruling that their contract language complied with the CSCA and that, although the entities allegedly failed to perform under their contracts, they would only have violated the CFA if they knew at the time the contract was formed that they did not intend to fulfill their contractual duties. Moreover, the court referred to a New Jersey Supreme Court holding, which said that a breach of warranty or contract, “‘is not per se unfair or unconscionable. . .and. . .alone does not violate a consumer protection statute” unless there are “substantial aggravating circumstances.” As such, the court determined, the entities’ alleged breaches of the cancellation provisions were not “‘unconscionable commercial practices’” as required under the CFA. However, the plaintiff can amend her claims.
Moreover, the court ruled that the allegations against the dealership can proceed, and denied the dealership’s bid to send the case to arbitration. According to the court, the dealership’s argument that it never received notices that the plaintiff had initiated arbitration proceedings because of a “clerical error” or a wrong mailing address were unpersuasive, and referred to the American Arbitration Association’s decision to decline “to administer the case due to the failure of [the dealership] to pay the required arbitration fees.”