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OFAC reaches $1.5 million settlement with electronics company for alleged Iranian sanctions violations
On September 13, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a $1.5 million settlement with a California-based electronics company for alleged violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations when it sold equipment to a Dubai-based distributor it knew or had reason to know distributed most, if not all, of its products to Iran. The settlement resolves litigation between the California company and OFAC stemming from a 2014 lawsuit challenging OFAC’s initial $4.07 million civil penalty. While the lower count ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of OFAC after finding enough evidence that the company knew the distributor’s business was primarily in Iran at the time the shipments were made, upon appeal, the D.C. Circuit reached a split decision in May 2017 setting aside OFAC’s initial penalty. While the appellate court affirmed that 34 of 39 shipments in question were in violation of the sanctions regulations, the company had produced emails indicating that the other shipments were intended for a retail store in Dubai. Because the penalty was calculated in such a way that the two shipments categories were “intertwined,” the court remanded the matter to OFAC for further consideration of the total penalty calculation.
In arriving at the settlement amount, OFAC considered the following aggravating factors: (i) “the [a]lleged [v]iolations constituted or resulted in a systematic pattern of conduct”; (ii) the company exported goods valued at over $2.8 million; and (iii) the company had no compliance program in place at the time of the alleged violations. However, OFAC also considered mitigating factors such as the company’s status as a small business, the company not receiving a penalty or finding of a violation in the five years prior to the transactions at issue, and some cooperation with OFAC. OFAC further noted that following litigation, the company “took additional remedial actions to address the conduct that led to the [a]lleged [v]iolations, including terminating its relationship with [the Dubai-based distributor] and instituting an OFAC sanctions compliance program.”
3rd Circuit: Failure to provide job applicants consumer reports has standing under Spokeo
On September 10, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit issued a precedential order reversing in part and affirming in part a lower court’s dismissal of claims brought by three individuals who claimed a company violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) when it failed to provide them with copies of their consumer reports. According to the opinion, the three plaintiffs applied for jobs with the company and were ultimately not hired due to information discovered in their background checks. The plaintiffs filed a putative class action asserting the company did not send them copies of their background checks before it took adverse action when deciding not to hire them, and also failed to provide them with notices of their rights under the FCRA. The district court dismissed the claims against the company, finding there was only a “bare procedural violation,” and not a concrete injury in fact as required under the Supreme Court’s 2016 ruling in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (covered by a Buckley Sandler Special Alert). On appeal, the 3rd Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision, concluding that the plaintiffs had standing to assert that the company violated the FCRA by taking adverse action without first providing copies of their consumer reports. Additionally, the court noted that “taking an adverse employment action without providing the required consumer report is ‘the very harm that Congress sought to prevent, arising from prototypical conduct proscribed’ by the FCRA.” However, the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claim alleging the company failed to provide them with a notice of their FCRA rights, finding that the claim was a “‘bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm,’” and lacked Article III standing under Spokeo. The 3rd Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with their findings.
District of Columbia moves to dismiss lawsuit alleging city’s student loan servicer regulations are preempted by federal law
On September 7, the District of Columbia filed a memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss a lawsuit claiming that the city’s regulations and requirements for student loan servicers are preempted by federal law. The plaintiff, a D.C.-based trade group whose membership consists of national student loan servicers, argues in its complaint that various provisions of District of Columbia Law 21-214, and rules promulgated thereunder, are preempted by the Federal Higher Education Act (HEA). For example, the complaint alleges that the licensing, examination, and annual reporting requirements are expressly preempted by the HEA, and the requirement to provide records to the D.C. Commissioner of Securities and Banking, upon request, violates the requirement that third party requests for records be made directly to the Department of Education.
The city countered that the potential harm is “hypothetical” and the plaintiff’s preemption claims are insufficient to establish standing. Several nonprofit groups filed an amicus brief in support of the city, stating that the lawsuit “is part of a strenuous effort by the Department and loan servicers not to protect federal interests, but to reach an outcome whereby no government entity provides meaningful regulation.” Moreover, the amicus brief claims that the lawsuit was filed following the Department’s Interpretation issued last March (as previously covered in InfoBytes here), which took the position that state regulation of Direct Loan servicing is broadly preempted by the HEA because it “impedes uniquely Federal interests,” and state regulation of the servicing of Federal Family Education Program Loans “is preempted to the extent that it undermines uniform administration of the program.”
CFPB files lawsuit against pension advance company citing alleged CFPA and TILA violations
On September 13, the CFPB filed a complaint against a pension advance company, its owner, and related entities (defendants) based upon alleged violations of the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA) and the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). In a complaint filed with the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, the Bureau charged that the defendants engaged in deceptive practices in violation of the CFPA when they allegedly misrepresented to customers that “lump-sum” pension advances were not loans and carried no applicable interest rate, even though customers were required to pay back advances at amounts equivalent to a 183 percent interest rate and often incurred fees such as one-time $300 set up fees, monthly management fees, and 1.5 percent late fees. According to the Bureau, the defendants allowed customers to take out advance payments ranging from $100 to $60,000. The defendants then allegedly provided the income streams as 60- or 120-month cash flow payments to third-party investors, promising between 6 and 12 percent interest rates. Moreover, the defendants allegedly failed to provide customers with TILA closed-end-credit disclosures. The complaint seeks civil penalties, monetary and injunctive relief.
As previously covered in InfoBytes, the pension advance company initiated a suit against the CFPB in January 2017 after the Bureau declined to set aside or keep confidential a civil investigative demand served against the company. The suit challenged the Bureau’s constitutionality and argued that the company was likely to suffer irreparable harm from being identified as being under investigation. However, in a split decision, the D.C. Circuit Court ultimately denied the company’s bid for an emergency injunction, citing the now-vacated majority opinion in PHH v. CFPB.
NYDFS files lawsuit over OCC’s fintech charter decision
On September 14, New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) Superintendent, Maria T. Vullo, filed a lawsuit against the OCC arguing that the agency’s decision to allow fintech companies to apply for a Special Purpose National Bank Charter (SPNB) is a “lawless” and “ill-conceived” move that will destabilize financial markets more effectively regulated by the state. As previously covered in InfoBytes, last December the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed NYDFS’ previous challenge because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over NYDFS’ claims since the OCC had yet to finalize its plans to actually issue SPNBs. However, in light of the OCC’s July announcement welcoming nondepository fintech companies engaged in one or more core banking functions to apply for a SPNB (previously covered by Buckley Special Alert here), Superintendent Vullo once again issued a challenge to the OCC’s decision, arguing that it is unlawful and grants federal preemptive powers over state law. Among other things, NYDFS requests the court to (i) declare that the OCC’s decision to grant SPNBs exceeds its statutory authority under the National Bank Act, and specifically that the decision improperly defines the “‘business of banking’ to include non-depository institutions,” and (ii) enjoin the OCC “from taking further actions to implement its provisions.”
Court dismisses NYAG’s claims under CFPA after determining Title X is invalid
On September 12, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an order dismissing the New York Attorney General’s (NYAG) claims against a New Jersey-based finance company and its affiliates (defendants) under the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA). In doing so, the court reversed its June ruling that the NYAG could proceed with its CFPA claims despite the court’s conclusion that the CFPB’s organizational structure, as defined by Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act, is unconstitutional and therefore, the CFPB lacks authority to bring claims against the defendants, as previously covered by InfoBytes.
According to the new order, the remedy for Title X’s constitutional defect is to invalidate Title X in its entirety, which therefore invalidates the NYAG’s statutory basis for bringing claims under the CFPA. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over NYAG’s remaining state law claims and dismissed the NYAG’s action against the defendants in its entirety.
The amended order is the culmination of a process that began with an August request by the CFPB for the court to enter a final judgment with respect to its dismissal of the CFPB’s claims, which would allow the Bureau to appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit. (Previously covered by InfoBytes here.) After numerous letters were submitted by all the parties, the court granted the CFPB’s request for entry of final judgment and granted the defendant’s request to stay the NYAG claims during the pendency of the CFPB’s appeal. The NYAG subsequently responded with a letter requesting clarity on the court’s jurisdiction over the claims, which resulted in the new order dismissing the NYAG claims in their entirety.
District court rules U.S. securities law may cover initial coin offering in criminal case
On September 11, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York issued a ruling that the U.S. government can proceed with a case for purposes of federal criminal law against a New York-based businessman who allegedly made “materially false and fraudulent representations and omissions” connected to virtual currencies/digital tokens backed by investments in real estate and diamonds sold through associated initial coin offerings (ICOs). The defendant—who was charged with conspiracy and two counts of securities fraud for his role in allegedly defrauding investors in two ICOs—claimed that the ICOs at issue were not securities but rather currencies, and that U.S. securities law was unconstitutionally vague as applied to ICOs. However, the U.S. government asserted that the investments made in the tokens were “investment contracts” and thereby “securities” as defined by the Securities Exchange Act. The U.S. government further argued that the jury should apply the central test used by the U.S. Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. to determine if a financial instrument “constitutes an ‘investment contract’ under the federal securities laws.” The judge commented that “simply labeling an investment opportunity as ‘virtual currency’ or ‘cryptocurrency’ does not transform an investment contract—a security—into a currency.” Moreover, while the judge cautioned that it was too early to determine whether the virtual currencies sold in the ICOs were covered by U.S. securities law, he concluded that a “reasonable jury” may find that the allegations in the indictment support such a finding.
District Court holds Department of Education stay of student loan regulations is procedurally invalid
On September 12, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of a consolidated action brought by a coalition of 19 state Attorneys General and the District of Columbia as well as two student borrowers (collectively, the plaintiffs), holding that the Department of Education’s (Department) decision to delay the enactment of Final Regulations (81 FR 75926) (also known as the “Borrower Defense Regulations” or “regulations”) was “procedurally invalid.” The Borrower Defense Regulations, published November 2016, afford students protections against misleading and predatory practices by postsecondary institutions (see previous InfoBytes coverage here), and were set to take effect July 1, 2017. However, the Department delayed the effective date pending the resolution of a lawsuit challenging certain portions of the regulations filed by the California Association of Private Postsecondary Schools; delayed the effective date further through an interim rule issued in October 2017; and last February, issued a final rule further delaying the effective date until July 1, 2019.
The Department argued it was entitled to a stay under Section 705 of the Administrative Procedure Act because the lawsuit “raised serious questions concerning the validity of certain provisions of the final regulations and ha[d] identified substantial injuries that could result if the final regulations [went] into effect before those questions [were] resolved.” The court disagreed with the Department’s argument, finding that in order to justify a Section 705 stay, “an agency must, in short, do more than simply assert—without elaboration—that the litigation raises unspecified ‘serious questions’ for resolution and that a stay will save regulated parties the cost of compliance.” Moreover, the court concluded that (i) plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Department’s delay actions; (ii) the Department’s 2017 interim final rule “is based on an unlawful construction of the Higher Education Act”; (iii) the February final rule is “procedurally invalid”; and (iv) the Section 705 stay is “judicially reviewable” and “arbitrary and capricious.”
CFPB argues structure is constitutional under current precedent
On September 10, the CFPB rejected the arguments made by two Mississippi-based payday loan and check cashing companies (appellants) challenging the constitutionality of the CFPB’s single director structure. The challenge results from a May 2016 complaint filed by the CFPB against the appellants alleging violations of the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA) for practices related to the companies’ check cashing and payday lending services, previously covered by InfoBytes here. The district court denied the companies’ motion for judgment on the pleadings in March 2018, declining the argument that the structure of the CFPB is unconstitutional and that the CFPB’s claims violate due process. The following April, the 5th Circuit agreed to hear an interlocutory appeal on the constitutionality question and subsequently, the appellants filed an unopposed petition requesting for initial hearing en banc, citing to a July decision by the 5th Circuit ruling the FHFA’s single director structure violates Article II of the Constitution (previously covered by InfoBytes here).
In its September response to the appellants’ arguments, which are similar to previous challenges to the Bureau’s structure—specifically that the Bureau is unconstitutional because the president can only remove the director for cause—the Bureau argues that the agency’s structure is consistent with precedent set by the U.S. Supreme Court, which has held that for-cause removal is not an unconstitutional restriction on the president’s authority. The brief also cited to the recent 5th Circuit decision holding the FHFA structure unconstitutional and noted that the court acknowledged the Bureau’s structure as different from FHFA in that it “allows the President more ‘direct[] control.’” The Bureau also argues that the appellants are not entitled to judgment on the pleadings because the Bureau’s complaint— which was filed under the previous Director, Richard Cordray— has been ratified by acting Director, Mick Mulvaney, who is currently removable at will under his Federal Vacancies Reform Act appointment and therefore, any potential constitutional defect in the filing is cured. Additionally, the Bureau argues that even if the single-director structure were deemed unconstitutional, the provision is severable from the rest of the CFPA based on an express severability clause in the Dodd-Frank Act.
8th Circuit holds employee failed to plead injuries in FCRA suit against employer, law firm, and credit reporting agency
On September 6, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit held that an employee lacked standing to bring claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) because she failed to sufficiently plead she suffered injuries. An employee brought a lawsuit against her former employer, a law firm, and a credit reporting agency (defendants) alleging various violations of the FCRA after the employee’s credit report that was obtained as part of the hiring process background check was provided to the employee in response to her records request in a wrongful termination lawsuit she had filed. The district court dismissed the claims against the employer and the law firm and granted judgment on the pleadings for the credit reporting agency. Upon appeal, the 8th Circuit, citing the Supreme Court’s 2016 ruling in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (covered by a Buckley Sandler Special Alert), concluded the former employee lacked Article III standing to bring the claims. The court found that the former employee authorized her employer to obtain the credit report and failed to allege the report was used for unauthorized purposes, therefore there was no intangible injury to her privacy. Additionally, the court determined that the injuries to her “reputational harm, compromised security, and lost time” were “‘naked assertion[s]’ of reputational harm, ‘devoid of further factual enhancement.’” As for claims against the law firm and credit reporting agency, the court found that the injury was too speculative as to the alleged failures to take reasonable measures to dispose of her information. Further, whether the credit reporting agency met all of its statutory obligations to ensure the report was for a permissible purpose was irrelevant, as she suffered no injury because she provided the employer with consent to obtain her credit report.