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CFPB files lawsuit against pension advance company citing alleged CFPA and TILA violations
On September 13, the CFPB filed a complaint against a pension advance company, its owner, and related entities (defendants) based upon alleged violations of the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA) and the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). In a complaint filed with the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, the Bureau charged that the defendants engaged in deceptive practices in violation of the CFPA when they allegedly misrepresented to customers that “lump-sum” pension advances were not loans and carried no applicable interest rate, even though customers were required to pay back advances at amounts equivalent to a 183 percent interest rate and often incurred fees such as one-time $300 set up fees, monthly management fees, and 1.5 percent late fees. According to the Bureau, the defendants allowed customers to take out advance payments ranging from $100 to $60,000. The defendants then allegedly provided the income streams as 60- or 120-month cash flow payments to third-party investors, promising between 6 and 12 percent interest rates. Moreover, the defendants allegedly failed to provide customers with TILA closed-end-credit disclosures. The complaint seeks civil penalties, monetary and injunctive relief.
As previously covered in InfoBytes, the pension advance company initiated a suit against the CFPB in January 2017 after the Bureau declined to set aside or keep confidential a civil investigative demand served against the company. The suit challenged the Bureau’s constitutionality and argued that the company was likely to suffer irreparable harm from being identified as being under investigation. However, in a split decision, the D.C. Circuit Court ultimately denied the company’s bid for an emergency injunction, citing the now-vacated majority opinion in PHH v. CFPB.
NYDFS files lawsuit over OCC’s fintech charter decision
On September 14, New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) Superintendent, Maria T. Vullo, filed a lawsuit against the OCC arguing that the agency’s decision to allow fintech companies to apply for a Special Purpose National Bank Charter (SPNB) is a “lawless” and “ill-conceived” move that will destabilize financial markets more effectively regulated by the state. As previously covered in InfoBytes, last December the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed NYDFS’ previous challenge because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over NYDFS’ claims since the OCC had yet to finalize its plans to actually issue SPNBs. However, in light of the OCC’s July announcement welcoming nondepository fintech companies engaged in one or more core banking functions to apply for a SPNB (previously covered by Buckley Special Alert here), Superintendent Vullo once again issued a challenge to the OCC’s decision, arguing that it is unlawful and grants federal preemptive powers over state law. Among other things, NYDFS requests the court to (i) declare that the OCC’s decision to grant SPNBs exceeds its statutory authority under the National Bank Act, and specifically that the decision improperly defines the “‘business of banking’ to include non-depository institutions,” and (ii) enjoin the OCC “from taking further actions to implement its provisions.”
Court dismisses NYAG’s claims under CFPA after determining Title X is invalid
On September 12, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an order dismissing the New York Attorney General’s (NYAG) claims against a New Jersey-based finance company and its affiliates (defendants) under the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA). In doing so, the court reversed its June ruling that the NYAG could proceed with its CFPA claims despite the court’s conclusion that the CFPB’s organizational structure, as defined by Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act, is unconstitutional and therefore, the CFPB lacks authority to bring claims against the defendants, as previously covered by InfoBytes.
According to the new order, the remedy for Title X’s constitutional defect is to invalidate Title X in its entirety, which therefore invalidates the NYAG’s statutory basis for bringing claims under the CFPA. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over NYAG’s remaining state law claims and dismissed the NYAG’s action against the defendants in its entirety.
The amended order is the culmination of a process that began with an August request by the CFPB for the court to enter a final judgment with respect to its dismissal of the CFPB’s claims, which would allow the Bureau to appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit. (Previously covered by InfoBytes here.) After numerous letters were submitted by all the parties, the court granted the CFPB’s request for entry of final judgment and granted the defendant’s request to stay the NYAG claims during the pendency of the CFPB’s appeal. The NYAG subsequently responded with a letter requesting clarity on the court’s jurisdiction over the claims, which resulted in the new order dismissing the NYAG claims in their entirety.
District court rules U.S. securities law may cover initial coin offering in criminal case
On September 11, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York issued a ruling that the U.S. government can proceed with a case for purposes of federal criminal law against a New York-based businessman who allegedly made “materially false and fraudulent representations and omissions” connected to virtual currencies/digital tokens backed by investments in real estate and diamonds sold through associated initial coin offerings (ICOs). The defendant—who was charged with conspiracy and two counts of securities fraud for his role in allegedly defrauding investors in two ICOs—claimed that the ICOs at issue were not securities but rather currencies, and that U.S. securities law was unconstitutionally vague as applied to ICOs. However, the U.S. government asserted that the investments made in the tokens were “investment contracts” and thereby “securities” as defined by the Securities Exchange Act. The U.S. government further argued that the jury should apply the central test used by the U.S. Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. to determine if a financial instrument “constitutes an ‘investment contract’ under the federal securities laws.” The judge commented that “simply labeling an investment opportunity as ‘virtual currency’ or ‘cryptocurrency’ does not transform an investment contract—a security—into a currency.” Moreover, while the judge cautioned that it was too early to determine whether the virtual currencies sold in the ICOs were covered by U.S. securities law, he concluded that a “reasonable jury” may find that the allegations in the indictment support such a finding.
District Court holds Department of Education stay of student loan regulations is procedurally invalid
On September 12, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of a consolidated action brought by a coalition of 19 state Attorneys General and the District of Columbia as well as two student borrowers (collectively, the plaintiffs), holding that the Department of Education’s (Department) decision to delay the enactment of Final Regulations (81 FR 75926) (also known as the “Borrower Defense Regulations” or “regulations”) was “procedurally invalid.” The Borrower Defense Regulations, published November 2016, afford students protections against misleading and predatory practices by postsecondary institutions (see previous InfoBytes coverage here), and were set to take effect July 1, 2017. However, the Department delayed the effective date pending the resolution of a lawsuit challenging certain portions of the regulations filed by the California Association of Private Postsecondary Schools; delayed the effective date further through an interim rule issued in October 2017; and last February, issued a final rule further delaying the effective date until July 1, 2019.
The Department argued it was entitled to a stay under Section 705 of the Administrative Procedure Act because the lawsuit “raised serious questions concerning the validity of certain provisions of the final regulations and ha[d] identified substantial injuries that could result if the final regulations [went] into effect before those questions [were] resolved.” The court disagreed with the Department’s argument, finding that in order to justify a Section 705 stay, “an agency must, in short, do more than simply assert—without elaboration—that the litigation raises unspecified ‘serious questions’ for resolution and that a stay will save regulated parties the cost of compliance.” Moreover, the court concluded that (i) plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Department’s delay actions; (ii) the Department’s 2017 interim final rule “is based on an unlawful construction of the Higher Education Act”; (iii) the February final rule is “procedurally invalid”; and (iv) the Section 705 stay is “judicially reviewable” and “arbitrary and capricious.”
CFPB argues structure is constitutional under current precedent
On September 10, the CFPB rejected the arguments made by two Mississippi-based payday loan and check cashing companies (appellants) challenging the constitutionality of the CFPB’s single director structure. The challenge results from a May 2016 complaint filed by the CFPB against the appellants alleging violations of the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA) for practices related to the companies’ check cashing and payday lending services, previously covered by InfoBytes here. The district court denied the companies’ motion for judgment on the pleadings in March 2018, declining the argument that the structure of the CFPB is unconstitutional and that the CFPB’s claims violate due process. The following April, the 5th Circuit agreed to hear an interlocutory appeal on the constitutionality question and subsequently, the appellants filed an unopposed petition requesting for initial hearing en banc, citing to a July decision by the 5th Circuit ruling the FHFA’s single director structure violates Article II of the Constitution (previously covered by InfoBytes here).
In its September response to the appellants’ arguments, which are similar to previous challenges to the Bureau’s structure—specifically that the Bureau is unconstitutional because the president can only remove the director for cause—the Bureau argues that the agency’s structure is consistent with precedent set by the U.S. Supreme Court, which has held that for-cause removal is not an unconstitutional restriction on the president’s authority. The brief also cited to the recent 5th Circuit decision holding the FHFA structure unconstitutional and noted that the court acknowledged the Bureau’s structure as different from FHFA in that it “allows the President more ‘direct[] control.’” The Bureau also argues that the appellants are not entitled to judgment on the pleadings because the Bureau’s complaint— which was filed under the previous Director, Richard Cordray— has been ratified by acting Director, Mick Mulvaney, who is currently removable at will under his Federal Vacancies Reform Act appointment and therefore, any potential constitutional defect in the filing is cured. Additionally, the Bureau argues that even if the single-director structure were deemed unconstitutional, the provision is severable from the rest of the CFPA based on an express severability clause in the Dodd-Frank Act.
8th Circuit holds employee failed to plead injuries in FCRA suit against employer, law firm, and credit reporting agency
On September 6, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit held that an employee lacked standing to bring claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) because she failed to sufficiently plead she suffered injuries. An employee brought a lawsuit against her former employer, a law firm, and a credit reporting agency (defendants) alleging various violations of the FCRA after the employee’s credit report that was obtained as part of the hiring process background check was provided to the employee in response to her records request in a wrongful termination lawsuit she had filed. The district court dismissed the claims against the employer and the law firm and granted judgment on the pleadings for the credit reporting agency. Upon appeal, the 8th Circuit, citing the Supreme Court’s 2016 ruling in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (covered by a Buckley Sandler Special Alert), concluded the former employee lacked Article III standing to bring the claims. The court found that the former employee authorized her employer to obtain the credit report and failed to allege the report was used for unauthorized purposes, therefore there was no intangible injury to her privacy. Additionally, the court determined that the injuries to her “reputational harm, compromised security, and lost time” were “‘naked assertion[s]’ of reputational harm, ‘devoid of further factual enhancement.’” As for claims against the law firm and credit reporting agency, the court found that the injury was too speculative as to the alleged failures to take reasonable measures to dispose of her information. Further, whether the credit reporting agency met all of its statutory obligations to ensure the report was for a permissible purpose was irrelevant, as she suffered no injury because she provided the employer with consent to obtain her credit report.
Texas bank petitions Supreme Court over CFPB constitutionality
On September 6, a Texas bank and two associations (petitioners) filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the CFPB’s structure. Specifically, the petition asks the Court (i) whether the CFPB as an independent agency headed by a single director that can only be removed from office for cause violates the Constitution’s separation of powers; (ii) whether a 1935 Supreme Court case upholding removal restrictions on members of the FTC should be overturned; and (iii) weather the CFPB’s “perpetual, on-demand funding streams” are permitted under the Appropriations Clause. The petition results from a 2012 lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of several provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, which resulted in the June decision by the D.C. Circuit to uphold summary judgment against the petitioners. That decision was based on the January 2018 D.C. Circuit en banc decision concluding the CFPB’s single-director structure is constitutional (covered by a Buckley Sandler Special Alert.
District court denies bank’s motion to dismiss; rules homeowner’s claims under California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices can proceed
On September 5, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California denied a national bank’s motion to dismiss certain alleged violations of both the California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Rosenthal Act) and the state’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) as cited in the homeowner’s first amended complaint. According to the order, the plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the bank engaged in debt collection activities that went “beyond the scope of an ordinary foreclosure process” under the Rosenthal Act “when it attempted to collect on the original amount due under the promissory note rather than the [loan modification] agreement.” The bank countered and argued that when it acted as the mortgage loan servicer for the homeowner in the context of foreclosure proceedings it was not subject to liability under the Rosenthal Act because “courts have held ‘that the Rosenthal Act [is] not applicable to residential mortgage loans.” However, the court rejected the bank’s argument and found, among other things, that (i) the homeowner adequately pleaded the bank engaged in debt collection activities; (ii) as determined by the 9th Circuit, “mortgage servicers may be subject to the Rosenthal Act for collection activities surrounding a loan modification agreement”; and (iii) the plaintiff’s allegations concerning the bank’s debt collection practices may be subject to the Rosenthal Act and are sufficient to withstand the bank’s motion to dismiss. Concerning the alleged UCL violation, the court determined that the plaintiff’s factual allegations supported her claims.
5th Circuit rejects enforcement of CFPB CID for failing to allege a violation
On September 6, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit declined to enforce a Civil Investigative Demand (CID) issued by the CFPB against a Texas public records company, after holding the Bureau did not comply with Dodd-Frank when it issued the CID. After initially receiving the CID, the Texas company objected to its Notification of Purpose as inadequate, as it read, “whether consumer reporting agencies, persons using consumer reports, or other persons have engaged or are engaging in unlawful acts and practices in connection with the provision or use of public records information in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act . . . or any other federal consumer law.” In response, the Bureau filed a petition in federal court seeking to enforce the CID and the lower court granted the petition, holding that the Notification of Purpose provided fair notice of the violations under investigation as required by the Dodd-Frank Act. The 5th Circuit disagreed, however, finding that the CID did not identify an alleged violation. The court noted that the CID only made references to the FCRA, a “broad provision of law that the CFPB has authority to enforce,” and “any other federal consumer financial law,” which subsequently “defeats any specificity provided by the reference to the FCRA.” The court emphasized that it could not review the CID under the “reasonable relevance” standard, because the CID failed to identify the conduct under investigation and concluded that the Bureau does not have “unfettered authority to cast about for potential wrongdoing.”