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Court rejects mortgage company’s motions to dismiss in two separate TCPA actions
On August 2, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey denied a mortgage company’s motions to dismiss in two putative class actions (opinions available here and here) alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) for unsolicited phone calls. In both cases, the mortgage company requested the court dismiss the action or, in the alternative, stay the proceedings pending guidance from the FCC regarding what constitutes an automatic telephone dialing system (autodialer) in light of the D.C. Circuit decision in ACA International v. FCC. (Covered by a Buckley Sandler Special Alert; InfoBytes coverage on the FCC’s notice seeking comment on what constitutes an autodialer, available here.) In each of the actions, consumers allege the company violated the TCPA by placing unsolicited calls to their phones using an autodialer. In denying both motions, the judge rejected the company’s argument, in one case, that it was not using “a random or sequential number generator” because the preloaded numbers belonged to the company’s customers rather than members of the public, reasoning that just because the population of numbers which may be dialed are pre-selected does not make the calling system, the next number being dialed, less random. Moreover, in the second case, the judge rejected the company’s assertion that written consent was not needed because the calls were placed to a number of customers with existing debt. The court noted the calls were regarding refinancing services and “calls to customers soliciting refinance are ‘telemarketing’ calls for a new product requiring prior express written consent under the TCPA.” As for the requests to stay the proceedings, the court held in both cases that it is unnecessary to stay the case because “whatever guidance the FCC may issue in the future will not alter the statutory definition of an [autodialer]” or previous unchanged FCC guidance pursuant to which the court decided the motions to dismiss.
2nd Circuit holds NCUA lacks standing to bring derivative suit against two national banks regarding RMBS claims
On August 2, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit held that the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) lacked standing to bring a suit against two national banks on behalf of trusts created by the agency that held residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). According to the opinion, in 2009 and 2010, NCUA took control of five failing credit unions, including ownership of certificates the credit unions held in RMBS trusts. NCUA then transferred the certificates into new trusts and a financial institution was appointed, pursuant to an Indenture Agreement, as Indenture Trustee. NCUA subsequently brought derivative claims on behalf of the trusts against two national banks, trustees of the original RMBS trusts. In affirming the lower court’s dismissal of the claims, the appellate panel found that the NCUA did not have derivative standing to sue on behalf of the trusts because the trusts had granted the right, title, and interest to their assets, including the RMBS trusts, to the Indenture Trustee. The 2nd Circuit reasoned that therefore only the Indenture Trustee possesses the claims, and the NCUA did not have the right to sue on behalf of the Indenture Trustee under the Indenture Agreement.
3rd Circuit holds unpaid highway tolls are not “debts” under the FDCPA
On August 7, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit held that unpaid highway tolls are not “debts” under the FDCPA because they are not transactions primarily for a “personal, family, or household” purpose. According to the amended class action complaint at issue in the case, after a consumer’s electronic toll payment system account became delinquent, a debt collection agency sent notices containing the consumer’s account information in the viewable display of the notice envelope. The consumer filed suit alleging the collection agency violated the FDCPA. While the lower court held that the consumer had standing to bring the claim, it dismissed the action on the ground that the unpaid highway tolls fell outside the FDCPA’s definition of a debt. The 3rd Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision. On the issue of standing, citing the Supreme Court’s 2016 ruling in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (covered by a Buckley Sandler Special Alert), the panel reasoned that the exposed account number “implicates a core concern animating the FDCPA—the invasion of privacy” and is a legally cognizable injury that confers standing. The panel agreed with the consumer that the obligation to pay the highway tolls arose out of a “transaction” for purposes of the FDCPA because he voluntarily chose to drive on the toll roads, but found the purpose of the transaction was “public benefit of highway maintenance and repair”—not the private benefit of a “personal, family, or household” service or good as required by the FDCPA. Moreover, the court concluded that while the consumer chose to drive on the roads for personal purposes, the money being rendered was primarily for public services, as required by the statute to collect tolls “to acquire, construct, maintain, improve, manage, repair and operate transportation projects.”
Court again denies request to stay CFPB payday rule compliance date
On August 7, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas denied a request by two payday loan trade groups to reconsider its June decision denying a stay of the compliance date (August 19, 2019) of the Bureau’s final rule on payday loans, vehicle title loans, and certain other installment loans (Rule) until 445 days after final judgment in the pending litigation. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the court granted the trade groups’ and the CFPB’s joint request to stay the lawsuit—which asks the court to set aside the Rule— because of the Bureau’s plans to reconsider the Rule, but the court denied, without explanation, the request to stay the compliance date. In denying the reconsideration request, the court acknowledged considering, among other things, the trade groups’ motion and the CFPB’s response, which supported the motion but again, did not provide a substantive justification for the denial.
3rd Circuit says business meets “principal purpose” definition of collector under the FDCPA
On August 7, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit held that a company using the mail and wires to collect “any debts” meets the “principal purpose” definition under the FDCPA. According to the opinion, after homeowners defaulted on a home equity line of credit, the debt was sold and the mortgage assigned to a company whose sole business is the purchase of debts entered into by third parties and collecting on those debts. After several attempts to collect the debt, the company filed a foreclosure action in Pennsylvania. The homeowners contacted the company requesting loan statements to resolve the debt but the company refused to provide statements. The homeowners later received a collection email with an even higher amount than previously communicated and filed an action alleging the company violated the FDCPA. The lower court rejected the company’s arguments that it was not a debt collector under the FDCPA’s “principal purpose” definition—any person “who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business, the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts”—and held that the company violated the act.
The company appealed, challenging the lower court’s determination that it met the definition of debt collector, instead arguing it was a “creditor.” The 3rd Circuit, following the plain text of the FDCPA, held that “an entity whose principal purpose of business is the collection of any debts is a debt collector regardless whether the entity owns the debts it collects.” Affirming the lower court’s determination, the appellate panel disagreed with the company, reasoning that the company admitted its sole business is collecting purchased debts and it uses “mails and wires for its business,” such that it could be “no plainer” that the company fits the “principal purpose” definition under the FDCPA.
District Court denies service provider’s motion to dismiss on several grounds, rules Bureau’s structure is constitutional
On August 3, the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana denied a Texas-based service provider’s motion to dismiss a suit brought by the CFPB over allegations that the service provider engaged in unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts or practices in violation of the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA) by assisting three tribal lenders in the improper collection of short-term, small-dollar loans that were, in whole or in part, void under state law. (See previous InfoBytes coverage here.) The defendants moved to dismiss the claims on multiple grounds: (i) the Bureau’s structure is unconstitutional; (ii) the claims are not permitted under the CFPA; (iii) the complaint “fails to, and cannot, join indispensable parties;” and (iv) certain claims are time-barred.
In answering the service provider’s challenges to the Bureau’s constitutionality, the court ruled that the CFPB’s structure is legal and cited to orders from nine district courts and an en banc panel of the D.C. Circuit Court, which also rejected similar arguments. (See Buckley Sandler Special Alert.) Addressing whether the Bureau’s claims were permitted under the CFPA, the court ruled that other courts have held that enforcing a prohibition on amounts that consumers do not owe is different from establishing a usury limit, and that moreover, “[t]he fact that state law may underlie the violation . . . does not relieve [d]efendants . . . of their obligation to comply with the CFPA.” Regarding the defendants’ argument that the complaint should be dismissed on the grounds of failure to join an indispensable party because the tribal lenders possess sovereign immunity to the suit, the court wrote that “[u]nder these circumstances, the Court will not create a means for businesses to avoid regulation by hiding behind the sovereign immunity of tribes when the tribes themselves have failed to claim an interest in the litigation.” Furthermore, the court found that the remedies sought by the Bureau would not “impede the [t]ribal [l]enders’ ability to collect on their contracts or enforce their choice of law provisions directly.” Finally, the court stated that, among other things, the service provider failed to show that the Bureau’s suit fell outside the CFPA’s three-year statute of limitations for filing claims after violations have been identified.
Arizona Supreme Court holds statute of limitations for credit cards begins to accrue upon first missed payment
On July 27, the Arizona Supreme Court held that a cause of action to collect a credit card debt subject to an acceleration clause begins to accrue as of the date of the consumer’s first uncured missed payment. According to the opinion, the consumer was sued in 2014 by a debt collector for an unpaid balance of over $17,000 on a credit card issued in 2007. Throughout 2007 and 2008 the consumer routinely made late payments and completely missed the February 2008 payment. The consumer moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claim was barred by Arizona’s six-year statute of limitations, which began to accrue at the time of the first missed payment in February 2008. The motion was granted by the trial court. The appellate court reversed, agreeing with the debt collector that the cause of action for the entire debt does not accrue until the creditor accelerates the debt. Disagreeing with the appeals court, and affirming the trial court’s decision, the Arizona Supreme Court distinguished revolving credit card accounts from closed-end installment contracts, which have a set date that the debt must be paid in full. The court explained that with installment contracts, the accrual date can be no later than the date in which the entire balance must be paid, as compared to credit card accounts, which have no end date. On that basis, the court held that allowing a creditor to delay accrual by not accelerating the debt, would “functionally eliminate the protection provided to defendants by the statute of limitations.”
FTC halts fraudulent telemarketing scheme in Arizona
On July 31, the FTC announced that it had successfully halted a $3 million telemarketing scheme, which falsely promised to obtain grants for consumers in exchange for the upfront payment of fees. The FTC alleges the Arizona-based defendants charged consumers upfront fees ranging from $295 to $4,995 and promised to obtain $10,000 or more in government, corporate, or private grants that could help the consumers pay off personal expenses such as medical bills. However, “most, if not all,” consumers ultimately received nothing in return and the defendants often changed the company name once they received consumer complaints or state attorney general notices, or once they lost merchant accounts.
On July 16, the FTC filed a now-unsealed complaint with the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The FTC simultaneously sought a temporary restraining order (TRO), which the court granted the following day. Among other things, the TRO prohibits the defendants from: (i) conducting similar business activities; (ii) violating the Telemarketing Sales Rule; and (iii) using or disseminating consumer information obtained through the fraudulent activities. Additionally, the TRO freezes the defendants’ assets and places the companies in receivership until relief is determined.
6th Circuit cites Spokeo, but holds plaintiffs alleged sufficient harm from deficient debt collection letters
On July 30, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit held that consumers had standing to sue a debt collector whose letters allegedly failed to instruct them that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) makes certain debt verification information available only if the debt is disputed “in writing.” The court found that these alleged violations of the FDCPA presented sufficiently concrete harm to satisfy the “injury-in-fact” required for standing under Article III of the Constitution.
The debt collector had filed a motion to dismiss in the lower court, arguing that the putative class action plaintiffs lacked Article III standing under the Supreme Court’s 2016 ruling in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (covered by a Buckley Sandler Special Alert). The district court denied the motion, determining that the letters “created a ‘substantial’ risk that consumers would waive important protections afforded to them by the FDCPA” due to the insufficient instructions. The 6th Circuit affirmed. After analyzing Spokeo, the court agreed that the “purported FDCPA violations created a material risk of harm to the interests recognized by Congress in enacting the FDCPA,” namely the risk of unintentionally waiving the verification and suspension rights afforded by the FDCPA when a debt is disputed.
New Jersey state appeals court reverses $1.8 million ruling against bank over flood damage
On July 30, a New Jersey state appeals court reversed a lower court’s judgment awarding consumers over $1.8 million in connection with allegations that a national bank’s predecessor violated the state’s Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) by misrepresenting information to the town’s planning board in order to secure approvals for a housing development. Specifically, the plaintiffs had argued that, because of misrepresentations to the town’s planning board, the construction of a housing development was approved and resulted in the flooding of their home. According to the plaintiffs, the national bank’s predecessor was aware that their housing section could be susceptible to groundwater runoff but concealed the information from the planning board, and that had the planning board been aware of the information, the board would have denied the plans and the plaintiffs’ home would not have flooded. A jury agreed, and the trial court ultimately awarded the plaintiffs almost $50,000 in treble damages under the CFA claim, and $1.8 million in fees and expenses, along with smaller amounts of damages for nuisance and trespass claims.
On appeal, the panel reversed the damages for the CFA claims, including the fee award, holding that “there is a complete lack of proof of a causal connection” between the predecessor’s misrepresentations and the plaintiffs’ decision to purchase their residence. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that had the misrepresentations not been made, the construction of the development would have been denied and their house would not have flooded. The court concluded the argument was “speculative and attenuated” and there was no proof the development “would not have been built by another developer.”