InfoBytes Blog
Filter
Subscribe to our InfoBytes Blog weekly newsletter and other publications for news affecting the financial services industry.
11th Circuit: No FCRA violation for reporting as delinquent during forbearance plan
On June 27, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed summary judgment for a mortgage servicer, concluding that reporting the consumer as delinquent to credit bureaus during a forbearance plan is neither inaccurate nor materially misleading under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). According to the opinion, a borrower enrolled in a forbearance plan with her mortgage servicer, which allowed for a “monthly forbearance plan payment” of $25 while the remaining payment balance accrued and became due at the end of the plan. Before the borrower agreed to the plan, a representative for the servicer explained to the borrower that because she was not paying the actual contractual payment under the note, the monthly payments would still be considered late. The mortgage servicer reported the borrower past due for the duration of the plan, and the borrower subsequently filed suit alleging violations of the FCRA. In affirming the lower court’s decision, the appeals court found that while the borrower made timely payments under the forbearance plan, the payments were not the ones she was contractually bound to make under the mortgage note. Additionally, the appeals court found that the borrower did not establish that the forbearance plan legally modified the original note and, therefore, the information the servicer reported to the credit bureaus was not inaccurate and was also not materially misleading “particularly in light of [the servicer’s] additional affirmative statement that [the borrower] was paying under a partial payment agreement.”
District Court rules city failed to prove bank engaged in discriminatory lending practices
On June 29, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted a national bank’s Motion for Summary Judgment against the City of Miami Gardens (City) on the City’s claims that the bank allegedly made loans to minority borrowers that were more expensive than those given to non-minority borrowers, resulting in greater rates of default and foreclosure, which led to reduced property values in the City and decreased the City’s property tax revenue. (See previous Buckley Sandler Special Alert on a 2017 Supreme Court ruling addressing whether cities have standing to bring discriminatory lending claims under the FHA to recover lost tax revenue and upkeep costs). The court, siding with the bank, found the City had failed to present sufficient evidence to support a claim of discriminatory lending. According to the order, the parties agreed that the bank had not made any predatory loans during the limitations period. Because the City only identified two types of loans from a total of 153 loans issued by the bank during the limitations period as having been made at a higher cost to minorities, the record was insufficient to show the bank’s policies produced “statistically imbalanced lending patterns” and failed to support a claim for disparate impact. The judge further determined that the bank established that there were “legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons that motivated the different pricing,” and that “the City ultimately cannot carry its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that [the bank’s] reasons for the price differentials were a mere pretext for discrimination.” On these bases, the court granted the motion.
Court dismisses “convenience fee” action against bank for lack of damages
On June 25, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed a proposed class action alleging a national bank violated the Maryland Credit Grantor Closed End Credit (CLEC) law by charging “convenience fees” in connection with secured vehicle financing. According to the opinion, after the consumer defaulted on vehicle payments, the bank repossessed the consumer’s vehicle and demanded the consumer pay the deficiency balance. In August 2017, the consumer, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, filed a class action against the bank for allegedly charging convenience fees in connection with over 500 retail installment sales contracts for vehicles governed under the CLEC. Upon removal to federal court, the consumer sought to amend her complaint to replace the CLEC claim with a breach of contract claim based on the same violation in her original complaint and the bank sought dismissal of the claim. The court granted the bank’s motion to dismiss, concluding that even if the bank did charge a convenience fee in violation of the CLEC, the bank (i) did not collect payments in excess of the original principle amount of the loan; and (ii) did not seek a deficiency judgment against the consumer. Additionally, the consumer did not seek injunctive or declaratory relief. Therefore, the court held that the consumer is not entitled to damages under CLEC and her corollary breach of contract claim is “futile and must be dismissed.”
District Court agrees with FTC, enters $5 million judgment against credit monitoring scheme
On June 26, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted the FTC’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that no reasonable jury would find that the defendants’ scheme of using false rental property ads to solicit consumer enrollment in credit monitoring services without their knowledge did not involve unfair or deceptive practices. The FTC argued that the defendants’ scheme, which used the promise of a free credit report to enroll the consumers into a monthly credit monitoring program, violated the FTC Act’s ban on deceptive practices. The court agreed, holding that the ad campaign was “rife with material misrepresentations that were likely to deceive a reasonable consumer.” Additionally the court agreed with the FTC that the defendants’ website was materially misrepresentative because it did not give “the net impression that consumers were enrolling in a monthly credit monitoring service” for $29.94 a month, as opposed to defendants’ claim that consumers were obtaining a free credit report.
The court entered a judgment ordering the defendants to pay over $5 million in equitable monetary relief to the FTC and prohibiting defendants from, among other things, charging consumers for any credit monitoring services and disclosing or using any collected consumer information. The defendants must also submit to compliance reporting and monitoring by the FTC.
District Court grants preliminary approval of TCPA class action settlement
On June 25, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California issued an order preliminarily approving a class action settlement between class members and a student loan management enterprise (defendants) accused of violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by using an automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS) to place calls to cellular telephones without receiving prior express written consent. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants used a phone number previously used by the Department of Education (Department) to contact borrowers and which was listed on the Department’s forms, website, and billing statements, so that when class members returned calls under the impression that they were contacting the Department, the defendants collected and stored the phone numbers. The plaintiff further alleged that the stored numbers were used by the defendants to place calls using an ATDS for the purpose of “mislead[ing] class members into paying for student loan forgiveness and payment programs that were otherwise offered for free by the federal government.” According to the order, preliminarily approval of the settlement prevents possible further litigation and, given the current “‘wind-down’ mode” of one of the defendants, prevents a risk that class members seeking relief would be unable to collect on a large judgment. Under the terms of the settlement, the defendants have agreed to establish a $1.1 million settlement fund, as well as to injunctive relief that prohibits the defendants from using an ATDS to contact individuals without first receiving prior written consent.
9th Circuit holds that judicial foreclosure proceedings to collect unpaid HOA fees is debt collection under FDCPA
On June 25, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit held that judicial foreclosure proceedings to collect delinquent assessments and other charges that were owed to a homeowners association (HOA) represented by a law firm that was also a defendant in the case constitute “debt collection” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The decision results from unpaid assessments owed to the HOA that had previously been settled in two prior suits. However, the homeowner (plaintiff-appellant) defaulted on both settlement agreements, and foreclosure proceedings commenced due to an acknowledgment contained within the second agreement, which recognized the HOA’s right to collect the debt by foreclosing on and selling her property. According to the order, the 9th Circuit first drew a distinction between judicial foreclosures and nonjudicial foreclosures. Nonjudicial foreclosures, the 9th Circuit opined, are not debt collections under the FDCPA because, under California law, they present no possibility of a deficiency judgment against the homeowner and recover nothing from the homeowner. However, the Court held that in this case, the judicial foreclosure created the possibility for a deficiency judgment against the homeowner and subsequent collection of money. Furthermore, since the law firm regularly collected debts owed to others, it was a debt collector, and the lower court’s contrary decision “cannot be reconciled with the language of the FDCPA.” The 9th Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling that the defendants were not engaged in “debt collection” as defined by the FDCPA.
However, because the lower court granted summary judgment to the defendants, it did not assess whether the plaintiff-appellant had suffered any damages from her claim that the defendants “misrepresented the amount of her debt and sought attorneys’ fees to which they were not entitled” during judicial proceedings. The 9th Circuit held that the law firm’s application for a writ of special execution included “accruing attorney fees,” implying that the fees had been approved by a court, as required by state law, when they had not. The 9th Circuit noted that the state trial court’s subsequent approval of the fee request did not mean the representation was accurate when it was made. The 9th Circuit remanded to allow the lower court to determine what damages, if any, were due the homeowner due to this violation.
In a separate memorandum disposition, the 9th Circuit, however, affirmed in part the lower court’s order granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment concerning the plaintiff-appellant’s time-barred claims, holding that “even the ‘least sophisticated debtor’ would not likely be misled by the communication—and lack of communication—at issue here, as Plaintiff cannot have reasonably believed that she had paid off the debt in question.”
3rd Circuit affirms summary judgment for internet company in TCPA action
On June 26, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit affirmed summary judgment for a global internet media company holding that the plaintiff failed to show the equipment the company used fell within the definition of “automatic telephone dialing system” (autodialer) based the recent holding by the D.C. Circuit in ACA International v. FCC. (Covered by a Buckley Sandler Special Alert.) The decision results from a lawsuit filed by a consumer alleging the company’s email SMS service, which sent a text message every time a user received an email, was an “autodialer” and violated the TCPA. The consumer had not signed up for the service, but had purchased a cellphone with a reassigned number and the previous owner had elected to use the SMS service. Ultimately, the consumer received almost 28,000 text messages over 17 months. In 2014, the district court granted summary judgment for the company concluding that the email service did not qualify as an autodialer. In light of the FCC’s 2015 Declaratory Ruling—which concluded that an autodialer is not limited to its current functions but also its potential functions—the 3rd Circuit vacated the lower court’s judgment. On remand, the lower court again granted summary judgment in favor of the company.
In reaching the latest decision, the 3rd Circuit interpreted the definition of an autodialer as it would prior to the 2015 Declaratory Ruling in light of the D.C. Circuit’s recent holding, which struck down the part of the FCC’s 2015 Ruling expanding the definition to potential capacity. The appellate court held that the consumer failed to show that the email SMS service had the present capacity to function as an autodialer.
Supreme Court upholds credit card company’s anti-steering provisions
On June 25, the U.S. Supreme Court in a 5-4 vote held that a credit card company did not unreasonably restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Act by preventing merchants from steering customers to other credit cards. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in September 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit considered the non-steering protections included in the credit card company’s agreements with merchants and concluded that such provisions protect the card company’s rewards program and prestige and preserve the company’s market share based on cardholder satisfaction. Accordingly, the 2nd Circuit concluded that “there is no reason to intervene and disturb the present functioning of the payment‐card industry.” In June 2017, a coalition of states, led by Ohio, petitioned the Supreme Court to review the 2nd Circuit decision, arguing the credit card industry’s services to merchants and cardholders are not interchangeable and therefore, the credit card market should be viewed as a two-sided market, not a single market. The Supreme Court disagreed with the petitioners’ arguments, finding that the credit card industry is best viewed as one market. The court reasoned that while there are two sides to the credit card transaction, credit card platforms “cannot make a sale unless both sides of the platform simultaneously agree to use their services,” resulting in “more pronounced indirect network effects and interconnected pricing and demand.” Accordingly, the two-sided transaction should be viewed as a whole for purposes of assessing competition. The court further concluded that the higher merchant fees the credit card company charges result in a “robust rewards program” for cardholders, causing the company’s anti-steering provisions to not be inherently anticompetitive, but in fact to have “spurred robust interbrand competition and has increased the quality and quantity of credit-card transactions.”
Plaintiffs must arbitrate with telecom provider over TCPA claims
On June 20, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted a telecommunication company’s motion to compel arbitration and dismissed a putative class action alleging the company violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). Specifically, the plaintiff brought an action against the telecommunications company for allegedly making unauthorized phone calls using prerecorded messages in an effort to reach account holders to collect unpaid bills. The company moved to compel arbitration because the plaintiff had entered into a “subscriber agreement,” which was provided to him via mail after he agreed to self-install his services, and the agreement requires arbitration of disputes. The court agreed with the company, holding that the arbitration provision of the subscriber agreement covered the dispute because the “Federal Arbitration Act does not require agreements to be signed, only written” and the plaintiff installed and used the telecommunication services, which constituted acceptance of the subscriber agreement.
Supreme Court rejects review of $806 million RMBS judgment
On June 25, the Supreme Court denied without comment an international bank’s petition for writ of certiorari to challenge the $806 million in damages awarded by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) for selling allegedly faulty mortgage-backed securities to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in September 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit affirmed the New York District Court’s ruling requiring the $806 million payment. Both lower courts concluded that the marketing prospectus used to sell the mortgage securities to Fannie and Freddie between 2005 and 2007 contained “untrue statements of material fact,” including false statements regarding the underlying loans’ compliance with underwriting standards related to the creditworthiness of borrowers and appraisal value of the properties.