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Eleventh Circuit Rules Credit Reporting Agency Did Not Willfully Violate FCRA
In an August 24 opinion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a credit reporting agency had not interpreted the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) in an “objectively unreasonable” manner when it included in a plaintiff’s credit report that the plaintiff was an authorized user of her parents’ delinquent credit card account. In doing so, the appellate court upheld the Georgia district court’s decision to dismiss the class action lawsuit over allegations that two credit reporting agencies failed to take reasonable precautions to ensure the accuracy of the plaintiff’s credit score. The appellate court concluded that including the information was a reasonable interpretation of the FCRA obligation to “follow reasonable procedures to assure the maximum possible accuracy” of the reported information—meaning the report must be technically accurate. Because this interpretation was not objectively unreasonable, the plaintiff could not plead that the violations were willful.
The case concerned a plaintiff who was designated as an authorized user of her parents’ credit card when they became ill. After the plaintiff’s parents died, the account went into default, and the credit card company reported the default to consumer reporting agencies listing the consumer as an authorized user, which caused her credit score to drop by 100 points. The credit card company—responding to the plaintiff’s complaint over the inaccurate information—interceded in the matter with the credit reporting agencies. The information was expunged from the plaintiff’s report and her credit score returned to its prior level. The plaintiff then filed a consumer class action complaint in 2015, contending that the consumer reporting agencies had violated their duty under the FCRA when they failed to take reasonable precautions to ensure the accuracy of her credit score.
At issue, the appellate court opined, was which interpretation should be applied when determining “maximum possible accuracy,” which, depending on differing court opinions, might mean (i) making certain that any included information is “technically accurate,” or (ii) ensuring the information is not only technically accurate but also not misleading or incomplete. The appellate court asserted that while the first interpretation was a less exacting reading of the FCRA, the plaintiff failed to cite any judicial precedents or agency interpretive guidance advising that reporting authorized user information was a violation. Further, the plaintiff failed to show that the credit reporting agency reported false information.
Of note, the appellate court determined the plaintiff had shown an “injury in fact” and had standing to sue based on the following reasons: (i) reporting inaccurate credit information “has a close relationship to the harm caused by the publication of defamatory information,” which has a long provided basis as a cause of action; (ii) a concrete injury was allegedly sustained due to time spent resolving the problems resulting from the credit inaccuracies; and (iii) the plaintiff was affected personally because her credit score fell due to the reported information.
National Bank, Debt Collection Agency Reach $4.3 Million Class Action Settlement for Alleged FDCPA Violations
On August 21, a national bank and a debt collection agency (Defendants) together entered a $4.3 million settlement in a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) class action lawsuit brought by borrowers who alleged the Defendants unlawfully attempted to collect certain mortgage payments. The July 2015 complaint, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, accused Defendants of violating the FDCPA, California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and California’s Unfair Competition Law, Business and Professions Code when they sent more than 20,000 allegedly misleading, unenforceable payment notices to borrowers after the bank had released the liens on the properties securing the mortgage loans.
According to a memorandum in support of the motion seeking preliminary approval of the settlement, approximately three percent of the 23,376 members of the settlement class members made payments on unenforceable loans. The rest of the class did not make any payments. After three mediation sessions and a series of negotiations, Defendants agreed to award class members amounts based on their placement into one of three tranches: (i) tranche 1: borrowers who made at least one “challenged payment” on a purchase money mortgage; (ii) tranche 2: borrowers who made at least one challenged payment on a non-purchase money mortgage; and (iii) tranche 3: borrowers who received an “allegedly deceptive payment communication” but did not make any challenged payments. The settlement terms stipulate that class members in tranche 1 will receive an initial payment worth 76 percent of the total challenged payments they made, and members in tranche 2 will receive an initial distribution of 38 percent of what they paid. Class members from Tranche 1 and Tranche 2 will be eligible for a second distribution if sufficient funds remain available. An approximately $22 payment will be sent to the majority of the class members (who fall into tranche 3), which will be paid from the $500,000 maximum statutory civil penalty available under the Rosenthal Act. Class members are not required to do anything to receive their award.
CFPB Files Amicus Brief Supporting Reversal of Preliminary Injunction Freezing Department of Education’s Student Debt Collection
On August 21, the CFPB filed an amicus brief in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, urging the court to reverse a trial court’s order and arguing that precluding the Department of Education (Department) from sending billions of dollars in defaulted student loans to debt collection companies is contrary to public interest. The Bureau, siding with the Department, claims the trial court’s preliminary injunction deprives “borrowers in default of access to basic information about key consumer protections and the opportunity to arrange repayment—functions performed by debt collection contractors under [the Department’s] current collections regime—[and] does not facilitate, but impedes, borrowers’ ability to enter into income-driven repayment plans, whether through rehabilitation or consolidation.” As previously reported in InfoBytes, on May 31, U.S. Court of Federal Claims Chief Judge Susan G. Braden ordered a continuation of her preliminary injunction, which prevents the Department from collecting on defaulted student loans—a process that was halted on March 29 when Judge Braden issued a temporary restraining order in this matter. The May order, Judge Braden stated, would stay in place “until the viability of the debt collection contracts at issue is resolved.”
In its amicus brief, the Bureau contended that data presented in its 2016 Ombudsman Report (Report) providing recommendations for reforms to the current process for collection and restructuring federal student loan debt does not support the trial court’s position, a claim the court made when issuing its order. Rather, the Bureau’s position is that the Report provides several recommendations for improvements to the current system, which focus on which companies will be granted debt collection contracts and, additionally, suggests solutions such as moving rehabilitated borrowers into income-driven repayment plans. The Bureau also proposes ways policymakers can simplify and streamline the rehabilitation process. Thus, the Bureau countered, the preliminary injunction is “wholly divorced from these concerns and recommendations and is, in fact, inconsistent with them.”
Two of the defendant-appellants also filed separate briefs August 14 and 15. The Department claimed in its August 15 brief that, as of May 31, the injunction has “deprived approximately 234,000 defaulted borrowers, holding accounts valued at $4.6 billion, of loans servicing services” and, furthermore, has resulted in approximately $2.4 million in uncollected funds.
Notably, the appeals court issued an order on July 18 holding the defendant-appellants motions to stay in abeyance pending the trial court’s decision and denying the plaintiff-appellee’s motion to dismiss.
Second Circuit Reverses Decision Concerning Online Contract Formation
On August 17, 2017, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded a district court order denying a defendant's motion to compel arbitration where the plaintiff had accepted an arbitration agreement through a smart phone application. See Meyer v. Uber Technologies Inc., et al., 2017 WL 3526682, (2d Cir. 2017). There, the plaintiff had created an account with the defendant by entering personal and payment information into a mobile application. On the final account creation screen, the application presented a button marked “REGISTER,” below which was black text advising users that “[b]y creating an Uber account, you agree to the TERMS OF SERVICE & PRIVACY POLICY.” The capitalized language was a hyperlink, which led to a copy of an agreement containing an arbitration clause. The trial court held that this notice was not “reasonably conspicuous” and, therefore, the plaintiff did not—unambiguously—manifest assent to the arbitration provision by registering an account. On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, finding that a “reasonably prudent smartphone user” would have been on “reasonably conspicuous notice” of the terms and conditions of service and that the text beneath the registration button put the plaintiff on notice that clicking “REGISTER” meant acceptance of those terms—regardless of whether he actually reviewed them. Relevant to the court’s analysis were proximity of the hyperlink to the “REGISTER” button and the absence of clutter, which might have otherwise impaired the plaintiff’s ability to locate the hyperlink.
District Court Cites Spokeo, Refuses to Certify TCPA Class Action Suit
On August 15, a federal judge in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division granted a pet health insurance company’s (defendants) motion to strike class allegations in a Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) lawsuit over alleged robocalls. Citing a recent Supreme Court ruling in Spokeo v. Robins, the judge opined that because evidence proved some of the class members agreed to receive calls, plaintiffs failed to establish a lack of consent and could therefore not claim to have suffered a concrete injury. In 2014, plaintiffs filed a suit against the defendants proposing certification of two classes—“advertisement” and “robocall”—alleging that calls were made to individuals’ cell phones without specific consent and arguing that these calls were a form of “advertising,” which, pursuant to FTC rules, requires express written consent. However, the defendants’ position—for which the judge ruled in favor—was that because affidavits signed by individuals during the pet adoption process show that some of the class members consented to receive calls about special offers (electing not to opt-out), these individuals would not be able to prove injury under the Spokeo standard. Thus, issues of individualized consent would predominate, making it impossible for plaintiffs to “establish a lack of consent with generalized evidence.” Furthermore, the court stated that if plaintiffs agreed to receive calls—as defendants claim a significant number did, just not in writing—a lack of written evidence does not make the calls unsolicited.
OCC Files Motion Seeking Dismissal of NYDFS Fintech Challenge
On August 18, the OCC filed a motion in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York to dismiss a lawsuit brought by the New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) challenging the OCC’s fintech charter, which would allow the OCC to consider applications from fintech firms for Special Purpose National Bank Charters (SPNB). See Vullo v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Case 17-cv-03574 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 18, 2017). In a memorandum supporting its motion to dismiss, the OCC argued that the case is not ready for judicial review because NYDFS’ claims that the charter is unlawful and would grant preemptive powers over state law are “contingent on future actions that [the] OCC might or might not take.” Therefore, because NYDFS “cannot point to any injury-in-fact that it has suffered as a result of [the] OCC’s purported actions . . . all of the potential injuries . . . are future-oriented and speculative, and therefore insufficient to confer standing.” Citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the OCC asserted that injury must be “likely”—not just “speculative” in nature.
The OCC additionally contended that NYDFS’ challenge lacks standing because:
- The matter fails to meet the fitness and hardship prongs for ripeness and lacks evidence of concrete hardship: (i) the fitness prong is not met because the OCC’s inquiry regarding whether to offer SPNB Charters is ongoing and it has not decided whether it will accept applications for the charters; and (ii) the hardship prong is not met because the OCC averred NYDFS “will not suffer any immediate or significant hardship” if the court were to delay review of this matter.
- Any challenge to the OCC’s 2003 amendment to Section 5.20(e)(1) is “time-barred by the statute of limitations applicable to civil actions against federal agencies.” Furthermore, “[i]nsofar as the adoption of the amendment . . . constitutes a final agency action that [NYDFS] seeks to challenge here, any cause of action would have accrued on January 16, 2004, when the Final Rule became effective. 68 Fed. Reg. 70122 (Dec. 17, 2003). Accordingly, the time for filing a facial challenge to the regulation expired on January 16, 2010.”
- NYDFS’ complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted because the OCC would have had to have issued Section 5.20(e)(1) charters—non-finalized policy statements and requests for public input alone are insufficient to satisfy the “final agency action” requirement needed to give rise to a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act. The OCC asserted it has not completed its decision-making process and that its actions have not affected rights or obligations or resulted in legal consequences.
- Under the National Bank Act, the OCC’s interpretation of “the business of banking”—in which a special purpose bank “must conduct at least one of the following three core banking functions: receiving deposits; paying checks; or lending money”—deserves Chevron deference.
- The OCC has statutory and constitutional authority to issue a Section 5.20(e)(1) charter because: (i) the limited judicial authority cited by the DFS is not entitled to weight; (ii) the historical understanding of “bank” is consistent with the OCC’s interpretation; and (iii) any SPNB charters issued to fintechs pursuant to Section 5.20(e)(1) would not violate the Tenth Amendment.
See additional InfoBytes coverage on NYDFS’s challenge to the OCC’s special purpose fintech charter here and here.
Eleventh Circuit Holds TCPA Consent Can Be Partially Revoked
On August 10, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) “permits a consumer to partially revoke her consent to be called by means of an automatic telephone dialing system.” As alleged in this case, when the consumer plaintiff applied for a credit card, she broadly consented to receive automated calls from the bank defendant on her cell phone. After falling behind on her payments, she started receiving automated delinquency calls from the bank. On an October 2014 call with a bank employee, the plaintiff expressed that she did not want to receive these automated calls “in the morning” and “during the work day.” The plaintiff claimed that the bank violated the TCPA by making “over 200 automated calls” thereafter during these restricted times of day, until she fully revoked consent in March 2015.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida had granted summary judgment in favor of the bank, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the bank’s legal argument that “the only effective revocations are unequivocal requests for no further communications whatsoever.” Instead, the court concluded that “the TCPA allows a consumer to provide limited, i.e., restricted, consent for the receipt of automated calls,” and that “unlimited consent, once given, can also be partially revoked as to future automated calls under the TCPA.” The court also concluded that there was an “issue of material fact” as to whether the plaintiff’s October 2014 statements constituted a partial revocation. Noting that “[t]his issue is close,” the court explained that a reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff revoked her consent to be called “in the morning” and “during the work day,” even if she did not specify exactly what times she meant. Accordingly, the court remanded for trial.
Ninth Circuit Rules FCRA Plaintiff Has Article III Standing
On August 15, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion, on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, ruling that a consumer plaintiff could proceed with his Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) claims because he had sufficiently alleged a “concrete” injury and therefore had standing to sue under Article III of the Constitution. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., No. 11-56843, 2017 WL 3480695 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2017). By way of background, the plaintiff had alleged that the defendant consumer reporting agency “willfully violated various procedural requirements under FCRA,” and consequently published an inaccurate consumer report on its website that “falsely stated his age, marital status, wealth, education level, and profession” and “included a photo of a different person.” In May 2016, the Supreme Court vacated an earlier Ninth Circuit decision, finding that the court failed to consider an essential element of Article III standing: whether the plaintiff alleged a “concrete” injury. (See previous Special Alert here.) After providing some guidance—including that the plaintiff’s injury must be “real” and not “abstract” or merely “procedural”—the high court remanded to the Ninth Circuit for further consideration.
On remand, the court first asked “whether the statutory provisions at issue were established to protect [the plaintiff’s] concrete interests (as opposed to purely procedural rights).” The court answered affirmatively, finding that “the FCRA procedures at issue in this case were crafted to protect consumers’ . . . concrete interest in accurate credit reporting about themselves.” Next, the court asked “whether the specific procedural violations alleged in this case actually harm, or present a material risk of harm to, such interests.” The court again answered affirmatively, finding that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged that he suffered a “real harm” to his “concrete interests in truthful credit reporting.” That is, the plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the defendant “prepared . . . an [inaccurate] report,” “that it then published the report on the Internet,” and that “the nature of the specific alleged reporting inaccuracies” was not “trivial or meaningless,” but instead covered “a broad range of material facts” about the plaintiff’s life “that may be important to employers or others making use of a consumer report.” Finally, the court found that the plaintiff’s allegations were not too speculative, because “both the challenged conduct and the attendant injury have already occurred.” After reaffirming that the plaintiff had adequately alleged the other essential elements of standing, the court remanded to the Central District of California for further proceedings.
District Judge Denies Student Loan Servicer’s Motion to Dismiss, Rules CFPB is Constitutional
On August 4, a federal judge in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied a motion to dismiss brought by a student loan servicer, ruling that the CFPB is constitutional, and that it has the authority to act against companies without first adopting the rules used to define a specific practice as unfair, deceptive, or abusive. Further, the court found that the Bureau’s complaint is “adequately pleaded.” As previously reported in InfoBytes, the CFPB filed a complaint in January of this year, contending that the student loan servicer systematically created obstacles to repayment and cheated many borrowers out of their rights to lower repayments, causing them to pay much more than they had to for their loans.
Citing numerous precedents, including several which have already examined the issue of the CFPB’s constitutionality, the court disposed of several arguments raised by the student loan servicer, finding that:
- There is no merit in the argument that the “CFPB lack[ed] statutory authority to bring an enforcement action without first engaging in rulemaking to declare a specific act or practice unfair, deceptive, or abusive,” because under the provisions of Title X of Dodd-Frank, the CFPB has the authority to declare something as “unlawful” both through rulemaking and litigation.
- The CFPB isn’t outside the bounds of the Constitution, in part because its provision making it difficult for the President to remove the CFPB’s director isn’t any more burdensome than those of other agencies, such as the FTC. By recognizing this, and that the CFPB director “is not insulated by a second layer of tenure and is removable directly by the President,” the court ruled that the “Bureau’s structure is not constitutionally deficient.”
- The funding method utilized by the Bureau has parallels in other federal agencies and does not affect presidential authority, stating that “although the CFPB is funded outside of the appropriations process, Congress has not relinquished all control over the agency’s funding because it remains free to change how the Bureau is funded at any time.” The court therefore found that the President’s constitutional powers have not been curtailed.
The court dismissed the student loan servicer’s assertion that it is unable to “reasonably prepare a response” due to the vague and ambiguous nature of the complaint. Rather, the court argues that the Bureau’s complaint provides enough “multiple specific examples” to warrant a response by way of an answer.
District Judge Denies Motion to Compel Arbitration, Rules Arbitration Agreement Contained in Nested Hyperlink Invalid
On July 21, a federal judge in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California denied a Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that the Plaintiff had not agreed to arbitrate where the Defendant had presented the arbitration agreement electronically to the Plaintiff through a multi-layered set of hyperlinks. See McGhee v. North American Bancard, LLC, 17-CV-0586-AJB-KSC, 2017 WL 3118799 (S.D. Cal. Jul. 21, 2017). The dispute revolved around an agreement for the use of a credit card reader provided by the Defendant. The terms and conditions for this service were presented to the Plaintiff electronically via a hyperlink. The hyperlink was placed next to a checkbox and button labeled with the phrase “I have read and agree to the Terms and Conditions.” But the Terms and Conditions document accessible through that hyperlink did not contain the arbitration agreement. Instead, the arbitration agreement was only accessible by clicking on a second hyperlink contained in the first document. Additionally, the Terms and Conditions document accessible through the first-level hyperlink conflicted with the nested arbitration agreement because the Terms and Conditions document included a forum selection clause designating state and federal courts of Georgia. On these facts, the court found that Plaintiff’s consent applied only to the Terms and Conditions document immediately behind the first hyperlink, and did not apply to the arbitration agreement accessible through the nested hyperlink.