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SEC charges settlement company with cybersecurity disclosure violations
On June 15, the SEC announced charges against a real estate settlement services company for its role in allegedly failing to disclose controls and procedures related to a cybersecurity vulnerability that exposed sensitive customer information. According to the SEC’s order, an independent cybersecurity journalist warned the company in May 2019 of a vulnerability concerning its system for sharing document images that exposed over 800 million images dating back to 2003, including images containing sensitive personal data such as social security numbers and financial information. In response, the company allegedly issued a press release for inclusion in the cybersecurity journalist’s report published in May 2019 and furnished a Form 8-K to the Commission on May 28, 2019. However, according to the order, the company’s senior executives responsible for these kinds of releases “were not apprised of certain information that was relevant to their assessment of the company’s disclosure response to the vulnerability and the magnitude of the resulting risk.” Specifically, the order states that senior executives were not informed that the company’s information security personnel had identified a vulnerability several months earlier, in January 2019, but failed to remediate the vulnerability in accordance with the company’s policies. The order finds that the company “failed to maintain disclosure controls and procedures designed to ensure that all available, relevant information concerning the vulnerability was analyzed for disclosure in the company’s public reports filed with the Commission.” The SEC charged the company with violating Rule 13a-15(a) of the Exchange Act and ordered the company, who agreed to a cease-and-desist order, to pay a $487,616 penalty.
District Court approves new settlement in student debt-relief action
On June 15, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California entered a stipulated final judgment and order against one of the defendants in an action brought by the CFPB, the Minnesota and North Carolina attorneys general, and the Los Angeles City Attorney in 2019, which alleged a student loan debt relief operation deceived thousands of student-loan borrowers and charged more than $71 million in unlawful advance fees. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the complaint alleged that the defendants violated the Consumer Financial Protection Act, the Telemarketing Sales Rule, and various state laws by charging and collecting improper advance fees from student loan borrowers prior to providing assistance and receiving payments on the adjusted loans. In addition, the complaint asserts the defendants engaged in deceptive practices by misrepresenting (i) the purpose and application of fees they charged; (ii) their ability to obtain loan forgiveness; and (iii) their ability to actually lower borrowers’ monthly payments.
The finalized settlement issued against the relief defendant—who acted in an individual capacity and also as trustee of a trust, and who neither admits nor denies the allegations—requires the liquidation of certain assets up to but not exceeding $3 million as monetary relief to go to the CFPB and the People of the State of California. If the liquidation value of the asset is less than $3 million, the relief defendant “will be additionally liable for the difference between the liquidation value of the [asset] and $3,000,000, up to but not exceeding $500,000.” The relief defendant is also liable to all plaintiffs for $88,381.80. In addition, the relief defendant must comply with certain reporting and recordkeeping requirements and fully cooperate with the plaintiffs.
The court previously entered final judgments against four of the defendants, as well as a default judgment and order against two other defendants (covered by InfoBytes here and here). Orders have yet to be entered against the remaining defendants.
11th Circuit affirms dismissal of FDCPA claims for lack of standing
On June 11, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a lower court’s ruling dismissing a plaintiff’s FDCPA lawsuit for lack of standing. According to the opinion, the plaintiff claimed a debt collector violated the FDCPA by engaging in deceptive debt collection practices. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the plaintiff lacked standing because the debts they sought to collect were owed by a company listed under a fictitious name that the plaintiff created with another person as co-owner and used to buy a condominium, and was registered under the Florida’s Fictitious Name Act, not the plaintiff himself. The plaintiff argued he established standing and that his complaint stated a claim on which relief may be granted. The district court ruled the plaintiff failed to state a claim because the company created by the plaintiff was not the same as the plaintiff himself, and in the alternative ruled that the debt owed by the fictitiously named company did not meet the definition of “consumer debt,” nor was the company a “consumer” under the FDCPA. The plaintiff appealed the decision, arguing that the fictitiously named company was not a legal entity; therefore, he should be permitted to continue with his lawsuit. The appellate court sided with the defendants, ruling that the plaintiff did not justify why he and the fictitiously named company should be treated “as the same party in light of the shared ownership of the fictitious name” with a second person who was not party to the suit. The appellate court wrote: “since [the plaintiff and the fictitiously named company] cannot be treated as an interchangeable entity, [the plaintiff’s] proceeding alone lacks standing to bring the FDCPA and related claims based on Defendants’ efforts to collect debts from [the fictitiously named company].”
FTC adds charges against small-business financer
On June 14, the FTC announced additional charges against two New York-based small-business financing companies and a related entity and individuals (collectively, “defendants”). Last June, the FTC filed a complaint against the defendants for allegedly violating the FTC Act and engaging in deceptive and unfair practices by, among other things, misrepresenting the terms of their merchant cash advances, using unfair collection practices, and making unauthorized withdrawals from consumers’ accounts (covered by InfoBytes here). The amended complaint alleges that the defendants also violated the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act’s prohibition on using false statements to obtain consumers’ financial information, including bank account numbers, log-in credentials, and the identity of authorized signers, in order “to withdraw more than the specified amount from consumers’ bank accounts.” Additionally, the FTC’s press release states that the defendants “engaged in wanton and egregious behavior, including laughing at consumer requests for refunds from [the defendants’] unauthorized withdrawals from customer bank accounts; abusing the legal system to seize the business and personal assets of their customers; and threatening to break their customers’ jaws or falsely accusing them of child molestation during collection calls.” The amended complaint seeks a permanent injunction against the defendants, along with civil money penalties and monetary relief including “rescission or reformation of contracts, the refund of monies paid, and other equitable relief.”
MSB out from under deferred prosecution agreement
On June 10, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted the DOJ’s unopposed motion to dismiss anti-money laundering charges brought against a money services business, ending an extended deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) related to deficiencies in the company’s anti-fraud and anti-money laundering (AML) programs. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the DOJ filed charges against the company in 2012 for allegedly “willfully failing to maintain an effective AML program and aiding and abetting wire fraud,” including scams targeting the elderly and other vulnerable groups that involved victims sending funds through the company’s money transfer system. In 2018, the DOJ and the company extended and amended the DPA through May 2021 after the DOJ alleged that the company continued to experience significant weaknesses in its AML and anti-fraud programs. At the time, the company agreed to, among other things, comply with additional enhanced anti-fraud and AML compliance obligations. The DOJ noted in its motion to dismiss with prejudice that the company has forfeited $225 million as required and has “satisfied the conditions and obligations imposed under the DPA and the Amendment.” Additionally, the DOJ confirmed that an independent compliance monitor has certified that the company’s “anti-fraud and anti-money laundering compliance program, including its policies and procedures, are reasonably designed and implemented to detect and prevent fraud and money laundering and to comply with the Bank Secrecy Act.”
District Court, citing Supreme Court in Facebook, says bank’s dialing equipment is not an autodialer
On June 9, the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina granted summary judgment in favor of a national bank, ruling that the dialing equipment used by the bank did not fit within the U.S. Supreme Court’s narrowed definition of the type of equipment that qualifies as an autodialer under the TCPA. As previously covered by a Buckley Special Alert, the Supreme Court held that in order to qualify as an “automatic telephone dialing system,” a device must have the capacity either to store or produce a telephone number using a random or sequential generator. The TCPA defines an autodialer as equipment with the capacity both “to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator,” and to dial those numbers. The question before the Supreme Court in Facebook Inc. v. Duguid was whether that definition encompasses equipment that can “store” and dial telephone numbers, even if the device does not use “a random or sequential number generator.” The Court held it does not, stating that the modifier “using a random or sequential number generator” applied to both terms “store” and “produce.”
In the South Carolina case, the plaintiff argued that the bank used an autodialer when it placed at least 155 debt collection calls without her consent. She sued the bank, alleging, among other things, violations of the TCPA, FCRA, and invasion of privacy. The court ruled in favor of the bank on the FCRA and invasion of privacy claims and directed the parties to refile their motions after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Facebook. Following the Facebook opinion, the plaintiff argued that “the dialer at issue must only have the capacity to store or produce numbers using a random or sequential number generator, and Defendant’s internal documents establish that the [bank’s dialing equipment] has that capacity,” and that, moreover, a footnote in Facebook “leaves open the possibility that the [equipment’s] ability to use a random number generator to determine the order in which numbers are dialed from a preproduced list may qualify it as an ATDS.”
The court disagreed, concluding that even though internal bank documents referred to the dialing equipment as an autodialer and showed that the equipment dialed numbers automatically without the assistance of an agent, the information was insufficient to meet the Supreme Court’s statutory definition. “As we learned from Duguid, the automatic dialing capability alone is not enough to qualify a system as an ATDS,” the court ruled. “The system at issue must store numbers using a random or sequential number generator or produce numbers using a random or sequential number generator to qualify as an ATDS.” According to the court, the bank’s equipment dialed members’ numbers from a pre-created list of targeted accounts. With respect to the plaintiff’s footnote argument, the court found that the plaintiff was taking the footnote in Facebook “out of context.”
2nd Circuit overturns ruling in favor of defendant in FDCPA case
On June 4, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned a district court’s decision, holding that a debt collector’s offer to settle an outstanding debt did not require informing the consumer that the balance could increase as a result of interest and fees. The plaintiff allegedly incurred credit card debt, which was then placed with the defendant for collection. The defendant sent the plaintiff a collection letter offering to settle the account for less than what was owed. The plaintiff sued, alleging that the letter violated Section 1692e of the FDCPA because it did not specify that interest was accruing on the balance. The district court, relying on the 2nd Circuit’s 2016 decision in Avila v. Riexinger & Associates, held that the defendant violated the FDCPA because the letter did not indicate that the balance would increase as a result of interest and fees.
On appeal, the 2nd Circuit clarified that its Avila decision discussed two exceptions, or “safe harbors,” to the requirement for debt collectors to disclose the possibility of interest and fees accruing, which are if the collection notice: (i) “ accurately informs the consumer that the amount of the debt stated in the letter will increase over time”; or (ii) “clearly states that the holder of the debt will accept payment in the amount set forth in full satisfaction of the debt if payment is made by a specified date.” The 2nd Circuit pointed out that the “payment of an amount that the collector indicates will fully satisfy a debt excludes the possibility of further debt to pay.” The appellate court further held that “a settlement offer need not enumerate the consequences of failing to meet its deadline or rejecting it outright so long as it clearly and accurately informs a debtor that payment of a specified sum by a specified date will satisfy the debt.” Therefore, the appellate court concluded that the collection notice to the consumer did not violate FDCPA section 1692e “because it extended a settlement offer that, if accepted through payment of the specified amount(s) by the specified date(s), would have cleared [the plaintiff’s] account.”
1st Circuit holds Fannie, Freddie not “government actors” despite FHFA control
On June 8, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit stated that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (GSEs) can continue non-judicial foreclosures in states that permit them, holding that the GSEs are not “government actors” despite being controlled by FHFA. According to the opinion, the plaintiffs obtained mortgages that were later sold to Fannie Mae. After the borrowers defaulted on their loans, Fannie Mae, consistent with Rhode Island law, conducted non-judicial foreclosure sales of the properties. The plaintiffs filed suit, arguing that Fannie Mae and FHFA (which acts as Fannie Mae’s conservator) are government actors and that the nonjudicial foreclosure sales violated their Fifth Amendment procedural due process rights. The district court disagreed, however, and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds that “because FHFA stepped into Fannie Mae’s shoes as its conservator and its ability to foreclose was a ‘contractual right inherited from Fannie Mae by virtue of its conservatorship,’ FHFA was not acting as the government when it foreclosed on the plaintiffs’ mortgages and was not subject to the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claims.” The court further determined that FHFA’s conservatorship over Fannie Mae did not make Fannie Mae a government actor subject to the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims because FHFA “does not exercise sufficient control” over the GSE. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing, among other things, that the FHFA’s nearly 13-year conservatorship of the GSEs makes its control permanent and renders them governmental actors.
On appeal, the appellate court concluded that in its role as conservator, “FHFA is not a government actor because it has ‘stepped into the shoes’ of the private GSEs” and assumed all of their private contractual rights, including the right to perform non-judicial foreclosures. The appellate court also refuted the plaintiffs’ argument that FHFA’s 13-year conservatorship made its control permanent, pointing out that the “housing and mortgage financial markets are highly complex, as are the various indicators of their financial health, so the fact that FHFA has maintained the conservatorship for almost thirteen years does not mean that the government’s control is permanent.” As such, because the GSEs are not government actors they are also not subject to the plaintiffs’ due process claims, the appellate court concluded.
9th Circuit reverses ruling in FDCPA case
On June 8, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned a district court’s finding that an obligation for a rental property cannot be “primarily consumer in nature” under the FDCPA. The plaintiff and his wife purchased two properties in the same community in Arizona. The plaintiff and his wife claimed that they initially purchased the first property as a retirement home and only decided to use it as a rental property later. The plaintiff also claimed that he and his wife purchased the two properties with the intent of having tenants occupy them until they moved into one of them upon retirement. The defendant homeowner’s association sued the plaintiff in state court for allegedly failing to pay assessments and late fees associated with one of the properties. The plaintiff sued the defendant in federal court, alleging the attempts to collect the money violated the FDCPA. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant concluding that, “because there is no genuine dispute that the [first property] was a rental property, the obligation associated with the property is commercial, not consumer, in nature.” Consequently, because the obligation was not consumer in nature, the district court determined that it does not qualify as a “debt” subject to the FDCPA.
On appeal, the 9th Circuit reversed the entry of judgment for the defendant and remanded to the district court with instructions that the court, “make a factual determination of the true purpose of the [plaintiff’s] acquisition of [both properties].” The 9th Circuit also noted that, “to determine whether the transaction was primarily consumer or commercial in nature, the court must ‘examine the transaction as a whole, paying particular attention to the purpose for which the credit was extended.’”
District Court says disputed tradeline is not misleading
On June 8, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama granted a defendant auto finance company’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in an action concerning alleged violations of the FCRA. The plaintiff filed an action against the defendants (an auto finance company and a financial service company) alleging that her credit report included an inaccurate or misleading “Errant Tradeline” in violation of the FCRA because it identified a paid off loan as being “closed” with a “$0 balance,” but also indicated that the loan had a monthly payment amount of $669. The plaintiff argued that this created “the impression that she still ha[d] an outstanding loan” as well as upcoming payments and alleged that the inaccurate reporting caused her financial and emotional damages. The plaintiff also claimed that the auto finance company negligently or willfully violated the FCRA because it failed to conduct a proper investigation. Upon review, the court granted the motion by the auto finance company, finding that because the balance listed says “$0,” and the account is listed as “closed,” there is “little opportunity for confusion when the alleged Errant Tradeline is reviewed in context.” The court further noted that “the context of the report reveals that the monthly payment line is neither inaccurate nor misleading.”