InfoBytes Blog
Filter
Subscribe to our InfoBytes Blog weekly newsletter and other publications for news affecting the financial services industry.
11th Circuit: Arbitration provision survives termination of subscriber agreement
On April 5, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that an arbitration provision survived the termination of a subscriber agreement between a defendant cable company and a customer. According to the opinion, the plaintiff obtained services from the defendant in December 2016, and signed a subscriber agreement containing an arbitration provision covering claims that arose before the agreement was entered into and after it expired or was terminated. The plaintiff terminated the defendant’s services in August 2017, but later called the defendant in 2019 to inquire about pricing and services. The plaintiff filed a putative class action, alleging the defendant violated the FCRA when it accessed his credit report during the call without his permission, thus lowering his credit score. The defendant moved to compel arbitration, which the district court denied, ruling that while the parties may have intended for the arbitration provision to survive termination of the subscriber agreement, the plaintiff’s claim fell outside the scope of the subscriber agreement because “no reasonable person would believe that the Arbitration Provision was so all-encompassing as to apply to all claims regardless of when they occurred or whether they related to the agreement.” Moreover, the district court ruled that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) “could only compel [the plaintiff] to arbitrate his FCRA claim if it ‘arose out of’ or ‘relate[d] to’ the 2016 subscriber agreement, which the district court held it did not.
On appeal, the appellate court disagreed, concluding that the plaintiff’s FCRA claim relates to the 2016 subscriber agreement since the defendant was only able to conduct the credit check during the phone call because of its previous relationship with the plaintiff. The plaintiff argued that he was calling to obtain new services and not to reconnect services, but the appellate court countered that the “reconnection provision” contained within the subscriber agreement provides broad language that defines terminate, suspend, and disconnect as not necessarily being mutually exclusive. However, the 11th Circuit clarified that its holding is narrow, and that because it concluded that the plaintiff’s claim did arise out of the subscriber agreement the court did not need to and was not making a determination about whether the “broad scope” of the arbitration provision in the subscriber agreement is enforceable under the FAA.
11th Circuit affirms dismissal of RESPA suit
On March 31, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of an action for failure to state a claim against a mortgage servicer, agreeing with the district court that the consumer failed to plausibly allege a “causal link” between the alleged RESPA violation and actual damages. According to the opinion, the plaintiff alleged he never received notice of a foreclosure sale on his deceased mother’s property, although he was the administrator of her estate. He filed suit, claiming the servicer failed to respond to his qualified written requests within 30 days as required under RESPA, and that as a result of the foreclosure, he allegedly “suffered actual damages from the loss of his mother’s home, loss of her belongings, and his mental anguish.” The servicer countered that the alleged “actual damages” did not result from the servicer’s failure to respond properly to the plaintiff’s letters, but rather were a result of the estate’s failure to pay the mortgage and the resulting foreclosure. In affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims, the 11th Circuit agreed with the district court that the plaintiff never asked the servicer to rescind the foreclosure sale (noting that under RESPA, a borrower is not authorized to request rescission of a foreclosure sale), and that, moreover, the servicer’s failure to do what the plaintiff actually asked it to do—provide information about the mortgage—did not cause his damages.
5th Circuit: Oral agreement to accept past-due mortgage payments is unenforceable under statute of frauds
On March 26, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for a national bank, upholding its foreclosure sale in a 2-1 opinion. According to the opinion, after the borrowers missed several payments the bank foreclosed on their property. The borrowers filed suit alleging, among other things, that the bank “violated the deed of trust and the Texas Property Code” by failing to send proper notices prior to the foreclosure of their home, and also violated the Texas Debt Collection Act (TDCA). The bank argued that it had properly served notice, and the district court agreed, granting summary judgment on the foreclosure-sale claims, concluding “that there was no genuine dispute over whether [the bank] properly sent notice in compliance with both the deed of trust and the Texas Property Code.” The district court also agreed with the bank that an oral agreement between the borrowers and a bank representative to accept a $14,000 payment “to bring the loan current” was “unenforceable under the statute of frauds because it modified the terms of the loan agreement.”
On appeal, the majority opinion considered, among other things, whether the statute of frauds barred consideration of the alleged oral agreement under the TDCA. The majority concluded that alleged oral agreement “cannot alone” sustain the borrowers’ claims under the TDCA. In order for the $14,000 to be considered “an actual, enforceable acceptance” as either part of the repayment plan or to bring the loan current, the agreement would have to be in writing under Texas law, the majority held. The dissenting judge argued, however, that the bank violated the TDCA by “misrepresenting, in a March 2017 phone call, that $14,000 would be automatically deducted from the [borrowers’] account to pay off the bulk of their past-due mortgage payments.” According to the dissent, “the phone call plausibly muddled the [borrowers’] understanding of whether they had a past-due mortgage debt, how much they owed, and whether they were in default,” thus creating a false sense of security about their mortgage—the kind of conduct the TDCA is intended to guard against.
5th Circuit: Law firm may send debt dispute letters on behalf of clients
On April 1, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a district court’s ruling in favor of defendant credit repair organizations (including a law firm), holding that plaintiff data furnishers failed to provide sufficient evidence supporting their claims of fraud and fraud by nondisclosure. The plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the defendants were sending dispute letters that appeared to have come directly from the defendants’ debtor clients. Under the FCRA and the FDCPA, the plaintiffs are obligated to investigate disputed debts that come directly from debtors. Letters from law firms, the plaintiffs argued, do not trigger such requirements. According to the plaintiffs, the disputes they were receiving were costing them money to investigate, which they would not have spent if had they known the letters were coming from a law firm. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs on their claims of fraud and fraud by non-disclosure and awarded them roughly $2.5 million. The district court ultimately vacated the jury’s verdict, however, explaining that the evidence failed to show that the defendants made any false misrepresentations, material or otherwise, when they signed their clients’ names on letters mailed to the plaintiffs. The law firm defendant “had the legal right to sign its clients’ names on the correspondence it sent on their behalf to data furnishers who reported inaccurate information about the clients’ credit,” the district court wrote.
On appeal, the 5th Circuit determined, among other things, that the plaintiffs did “not provide any precedential support or explanation for their assertion that these facts demonstrate Defendants committed fraud and fraud by non-disclosure beyond the observation that the jury found for them on those claims.” Moreover, the appellate court disagreed with the plaintiffs’ argument that the engagement agreements that clients signed with the defendant law firm, which allowed it to send dispute letters on a client’s behalf, were fraudulent because the defendant law firm did not discuss the letters with the consumers first. According to the appellate court, the existence of any such discussion was immaterial because the engagement agreements allowed the defendant law firm to send letters on a client’s behalf. However, the appellate court noted that “[w]hile we do not hold today that there are no situations in which a third party may act fraudulently when it mails dispute letters (and leave for another day what those situations may be), we can safely say that this is not one of them.”
Special Alert: Supreme Court narrows TCPA autodialer definition
On April 1, the United States Supreme Court issued its long-awaited opinion in Facebook Inc. v. Duguid. The 9-0 decision narrows the definition of what type of equipment qualifies as an autodialer under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), a federal statute that generally prohibits calls or texts placed by autodialers without the prior express consent of the called party.
The TCPA defines an autodialer as equipment with the capacity both “to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator,” and to dial those numbers. The question before the Supreme Court in Facebook was whether that definition encompasses equipment that can “store” and dial telephone numbers, even if the device does not use “a random or sequential number generator.” The Court held it does not. Rather, to qualify as an “automatic telephone dialing system,” the Court held that a device must have the capacity either to store or produce a telephone number using a random or sequential generator. In other words, the modifier “using a random or sequential number generator” applied to both terms “store” and “produce.”
Background
In 2014, Noah Duguid received text messages from Facebook alerting him that someone attempted to access his Facebook account. However, Duguid alleged that he never provided Facebook his phone number and did not have a Facebook account.
Duguid was unable to stop the notifications and eventually brought a putative class action against Facebook, alleging that Facebook violated the TCPA by maintaining technology that stored phone numbers, and sent automated texts to those numbers each time the associated account was accessed by an unrecognized device or web browser.
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Duguid’s amended complaint with prejudice, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding Duguid stated a claim under the TCPA by alleging Facebook’s notification system automatically dialed stored numbers. The Ninth Circuit held that an autodialer as defined under the TCPA, need not have the capacity to use a random or sequential number generator, but that it need only have the capacity to store number to be called and to dial those numbers automatically.
Holding
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that to “qualify as an ‘automatic telephone dialing system,’ a device must have the capacity either to store a telephone number using a random or sequential generator or to produce a telephone number using a random or sequential number generator.”
In reaching this decision, the Court explained that “expanding the definition of an autodialer to encompass any equipment that merely stores and dials telephone numbers would take a chainsaw” to the nuanced problems Congress sought to address with the TCPA. It further explained that Duguid’s interpretation of an autodialer—the one adopted by the Ninth Circuit—“would capture virtually all modern cell phones, which have the capacity to store telephone numbers to be called” and “dial such numbers.” “TCPA’s liability provisions, then, could affect ordinary cell phone owners in the course of commonplace usage, such as speed dialing or sending automated text message responses.”
And while the Court acknowledged that interpreting the statute in the manner it did may limit its application, the Court reasoned that it “cannot rewrite the TCPA to update it for modern technology,” and that its holding reflected the best reading of the statute.
If you have any questions regarding the Supreme Court’s decision regarding the TCPA, please visit our Class Actions practice page, or contact a Buckley attorney with whom you have worked in the past.
NY AG obtains $53 million judgment against company selling debt relief on student loans
On March 30, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York entered a default judgment and order against a student debt relief company, which requires the payment of $53 million in statutory penalties, after the defendant failed to respond to a suit filed by the New York attorney general. The AG alleged that the defendant sold debt-relief services to student loan borrowers that violated several laws, including the state’s usury, banking, credit repair, and telemarketing laws, and the federal Credit Repair Organizations Act and the Telemarketing Sales Rule. In addition to the $53 million penalty, the order permanently bans the defendant from engaging in debt-relief activities, collecting on loans related to its debt relief products or services, or using any personal information it has for student borrowers. The court also ordered the defendant to turn over financial records and authorized the AG’s office to seek additional restitution and disgorgement on the basis of those records. The order follows a 2020 stipulated judgment entered against other defendants in the action, which included a $5.5 million judgment (covered by InfoBytes here).
Court rules incomplete loss mitigation application does not carry foreclosure protections
On March 19, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted a mortgage lender’s motion for summary judgment, rejecting allegations that it had violated RESPA and Regulation X in handling plaintiffs’ loss mitigation application. The plaintiffs executed a promissory note and mortgage with the lender in 2017 and then initiated a loss mitigation application the following year. To complete the loss mitigation application process, the lender requested documents and information from the plaintiffs. The lender filed a foreclosure action after informing the plaintiffs that “required documents ‘remain outstanding.’” The plaintiffs filed suit, alleging the lender mishandled their loss mitigation application by, among other things, (i) failing to exercise reasonable diligence in obtaining documents and information to complete the loss mitigation application; (ii) failing to provide “the correct notices regarding the receipt of documents or with notice of a reasonable date by which Plaintiffs were required to submit additional documents to complete the loss mitigation application”; (iii) failing to evaluate the complete loss mitigation application for all available loss mitigation options within 30 days; (iv) requesting documents already received or impossible to obtain; and (v) filing a foreclosure action against the plaintiffs even though the loss mitigation application was either complete or facially complete.
The court disagreed, ruling that the lender “did not violate RESPA or Regulation X in either the handling of Plaintiffs’ loss mitigation application or in filing foreclosure litigation against Plaintiffs” because, among other things, “[t]here is no genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiffs did not comply with [the lender’s] request for additional information” and that “a complete, or even facially complete, loss mitigation application was not pending in this matter at the time of the filing of the foreclosure action.” As such, because an incomplete loss mitigation application does not carry foreclosure protections, the filed foreclosure action was not improper, the court wrote.
Court rules CFPB lacked authority to bring suit while its structure was unconstitutional
On March 26, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware dismissed a 2017 lawsuit filed by the CFPB against a collection of Delaware statutory trusts and their debt collector, ruling that the Bureau lacked enforcement authority to bring the action when its structure was unconstitutional. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the Bureau alleged the defendants filed lawsuits against consumers for private student loan debt that they could not prove was owed or that was outside the applicable statute of limitations, which allowed them to obtain over $21.7 million in judgments against consumers and collect an estimated $3.5 million in payments in cases where they lacked the intent or ability to prove the claims, if contested. In 2020, the court denied a motion to approve the Bureau’s proposed consent judgment, allowing the case to proceed. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Bureau lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the defendants should not have been under the regulatory purview of the agency, and that former Director Kathy Kraninger’s ratification of the enforcement action, which followed the Supreme Court holding in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB that that the director’s for-cause removal provision was unconstitutional but was severable from the statute establishing the Bureau (covered by a Buckley Special Alert), came after the three-year statute of limitations had expired. While the Bureau acknowledged that the ratification came more than three years after the discovery of the alleged violations, it argued that the statute of limitations should be ignored because the initial complaint had been timely filed and that the limitations period had been equitably tolled.
The court rejected the subject-matter jurisdiction argument because it held that the term “covered persons” as used in the Consumer Financial Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6), is not a jurisdictional requirement. However, the court then determined that the Bureau’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The Bureau filed the complaint while operating under a structure later found unconstitutional in Seila Law, and Director Kraninger’s subsequent ratification of the action came after the limitations period had expired. The court concluded that this made the complaint untimely. It also rejected the Bureau’s equitable tolling argument based on the Bureau’s failure to take actions to preserve its rights during the period when its constitutionality was in question. The court also noted that the Bureau “failed to pursue this very argument seriously in its brief,” which presented the equitable tolling argument in a “brief and conclusory” fashion.
3rd Circuit: Plaintiff must arbitrate debt adjustment allegations
On March 24, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that a plaintiff must arbitrate proposed class claims brought against a debt resolution law firm. The plaintiff alleged the law firm engaged in racketeering, consumer fraud, and unlawful debt adjustment practices in violation of various New Jersey laws. The district court denied the firm’s motion to compel arbitration, applied the law of the forum state, New Jersey, and ruled that the arbitration provision was invalid and unenforceable. The law firm appealed, arguing, among other things, that the arbitration provision would have been found valid if the district court had applied Delaware law in accordance with the parties’ 2013 professional legal services agreement. On appeal, the 3rd Circuit disagreed with the district court, holding that the arbitration provision demonstrated that the plaintiff gave up her right to litigate her claims in court, despite there appearing to be a true conflict between Delaware and New Jersey law. The appellate court concluded that the arbitration clause met the standard set forth in Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P., which held that an arbitration provision “will pass muster if it, ‘at least in some general and sufficiently broad way,. . .explain[s] that the plaintiff is giving up her right to bring claims in court or have a jury resolve the dispute.’” Moreover, the 3rd Circuit noted that the arbitration provision was also sufficiently broad enough to reasonably encompass the plaintiff’s statutory causes of action.
New York law prohibiting paper billing statement fees is an unconstitutional restriction of commercial speech
On March 16, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed a putative class action with prejudice over whether a national bank violated state law by charging a fee for paper billing statements in certain circumstances. The consumer’s suit alleged violations of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 399-zzz as well as N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349, which prohibits deceptive acts and practices. The bank argued, among other things, that (i) the consumer’s § 399-zzz claim was preempted by the National Bank Act (NBA); (ii) the consumer’s interpretation of § 399-zzz “would prevent [the bank] from exercising its federally authorized power to charge non-interest fees”; (iii) § 399-zzz is unconstitutional under the First Amendment because it limits the bank’s communication of fees and pricing to consumers; (iv) the statute does not apply to national banking institutions like the defendant; and (v) the statute does not prohibit the conduct at issue. The court disagreed, ruling that § 399-zzz is not preempted by the NBA because paper statement fees are not limited to only banking institutions. Moreover the court determined that the state statute is a rule of general application and “does not prevent or significantly interfere with [the bank’s] exercise of its powers.” However, the court ultimately dismissed the consumer’s action, agreeing that § 399-zzz constitutes an unconstitutional restriction on the bank’s First Amendment right of commercial speech under intermediate scrutiny. According to the court, § 399-zzz regulates “how businesses can communicate their fees” by “prohibit[ing] businesses from charging consumers for receiving a paper statement” but permits businesses “to offer consumers a credit for receiving an electronic statement instead of a paper statement.” The court also ruled that the consumer failed to state a claim for a deceptive act or practice because §399-zzz unconstitutionally infringes on the bank’s First Amendment rights.