InfoBytes Blog
Filter
Subscribe to our InfoBytes Blog weekly newsletter and other publications for news affecting the financial services industry.
Court enters judgments against multiple defendants in CFPB debt-relief action
On December 15, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California entered final judgment against two defendants (defendants) and a default judgment against another defendant (defaulting defendant) in an action brought by the CFPB alleging the defendants (and others not subject to these judgments) charged thousands of customers approximately $11.8 million in upfront fees in violation of the Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR). As previously covered by InfoBytes, in July, the CFPB filed a complaint against the defendants, one other company, its two owners, and four attorneys, alleging the companies would market its debt-relief services to customers over the phone, encouraging those with private loans to sign up with an attorney to reduce or eliminate their student debt. The businesses allegedly charged the fees before the customer had made at least one payment on the altered debts, in violation of the TSR’s prohibition on requesting or receiving advance fees for debt-relief service or, for certain defendants, the TSR’s prohibition on providing substantial assistance to someone charging the illegal fees. In August, the court approved stipulated final judgments with one of the owners of the other company and three of the attorneys. In December, the court entered a default judgment against the other company and another owner (previous InfoBytes coverage available here).
The final judgment permanently bans the defendants from engaging in any debt-relief service or telemarketing of any consumer financial product or service. Additionally, the court entered a suspended judgment of over $11 million in redress, which will be satisfied by a payment of $5,000 (due to an inability to pay) and each defendant is required to pay a civil money penalty of $1 to the Bureau. Liability for nearly $5 million was entered by default judgment against the defaulting defendant and a civil monetary penalty in the amount of $5 million.
8th Circuit vacates FDCPA judgment against debt buyer
On December 14, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit vacated a $4,000 judgment in favor of a consumer in an FDCPA action against a debt buyer (defendant), concluding that while the defendant qualifies as a debt collector, the actions of the subsequent debt collector cannot be imputed to the defendant. According to the opinion, the defendant brought a collection action against a consumer, which was dismissed by the district court after the consumer retained an attorney and the defendant failed to respond to the consumer’s dismissal motion. The defendant subsequently hired a collection agency to collect on the debt but failed to inform the collection agency that the consumer had previous retained an attorney. After the collection agency sent a settlement offer to the consumer, the consumer filed an action against the defendant alleging violations of the FDCPA and the Arkansas Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (AFDCPA) for contacting her directly when she was represented by an attorney. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the consumer, concluding, among other things, that the defendant (i) qualified as a debt collector under federal and state law; (ii) the defendant was acting as an agent of the collection agency; and (ii) the defendant is liable for the violations arising out of the collection agency’s contact with the consumer. The consumer accepted a $4,000 offer of judgment, and the district court entered final judgment.
On appeal, the 8th Circuit agreed that the defendant qualified as a debt collector under the FDCPA and the AFDCPA, but determined that the consumer “did not present sufficient evidence to establish that [the collection agency]’s actions may be imputed to [the defendant] as a matter of law.” Specifically, the appellate court concluded that in order to establish the defendant’s liability under the FDCPA, the consumer needed to show that the defendant was responsible for the collection agency’s action. Because it was established that the collection agency did not know that the consumer was represented by an attorney, the appellate court noted that the consumer “cannot prevail against [the defendant] on a theory of vicarious liability,” and instead, must prove that an agency relationship existed for direct liability. Because the consumer failed to put into evidence an agreement between the defendant and the collection agency and the district court failed to address the agency relationship, the appellate court concluded the district court erred in granting partial summary judgment and vacated the $4,000 judgment and remanded the case.
Court: Lender does not owe PPP fees to law firm
On December 15, the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona issued an order dismissing an action against a California bank over whether a law firm is entitled to a portion of the fees paid by the Small Business Administration (SBA) to lenders making loans under the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP). According to the order, the law firm argued that it assisted a borrower in applying for a PPP loan from the bank and was therefore entitled to collect an agent fee. The court was unpersuaded and dismissed the action, concluding that the CARES Act—which created the PPP—“undermines, rather than supports” the law firm’s position. While “the statute affirmatively obligates the SBA Administrator to pay processing fees to lenders that make PPP loans,” it “does not create an affirmative obligation on the part of the SBA Administrator, or anybody else, to pay a fee to agents who assist borrowers in applying for PPP loans,” the court ruled. Instead, the statute “‘merely establishes that there can be a ceiling on the amount of such fees if they are collected.’” The court’s decision follows rulings issued by other federal courts, which have also dismissed similar agent fee actions (covered by InfoBytes here, here, and here). The order states that to date, every court that has addressed this question has concluded that PPP lenders do not have a mandatory obligation to pay fees to agents assisting borrowers with their PPP loan applications.
Court denies arbitration bid in tribal loan usury action
On December 10, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied a motion to compel arbitration filed by a collection company and its chief operations officer (collectively, “defendants”), ruling that the arbitration agreements are “unconscionable” and therefore “unenforceable” because of the conditions under which borrowers agreed to arbitrate their claims. According to the order, the plaintiffs received lines of credit from an online lending company purportedly owned by a federally recognized Louisiana tribe. After defaulting on their payments, the defendants purchased the past-due accounts and commenced collection efforts. The plaintiffs sued, alleging the defendants’ collection efforts violated the FDCPA and Florida’s Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA) because the defendants knew the loans they were trying to collect were usurious and unenforceable under Florida law. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement in the tribal lender’s line-of-credit agreement, and filed—in the alternative—motions for judgment on the pleadings.
The court ruled, among other things, that while the plaintiffs agreed to arbitrate all disputes when they took out their online payday loans, the “proposed arbitration proceeding strips Plaintiffs of the ability to vindicate any of their substantive state-law claims or rights,” and that, moreover, “the setup is a scheme to hide behind tribal immunity and commit illegal usury in violation of Florida and Louisiana law.” The court also granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motions for judgment on the pleadings. First, in denying in part, the court ruled that because the “tribal choice-of-law provision in the [tribal lender’s] account terms is invalid,” the plaintiffs’ accounts are subject to Florida law. Therefore, because Florida law is applicable to the plaintiffs’ accounts, they present valid causes of action under the FDCPA and FCCPA. The court, however, ruled that the plaintiffs seemed to “conflate Defendants’ communications to facilitate the collection of the outstanding debts with a communication demanding payment,” pointing out that FDCPA Section 1692c(b) only punishes that latter, which “does not include communications to a third-party collection agency.”
Eleventh Circuit affirms ruling in TCPA re-consent case
On December 4, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in a TCPA action in favor of a student loan servicer and an affiliate responsible for performing default aversion services (collectively, “defendants”), concluding that the plaintiff re-consented to being contacted on his cell phone after filling out a form on the servicer’s website. According to the opinion, following a class action settlement in 2010—in which members of the class (including the plaintiff) who did not “submit revocation request forms were ‘deemed to have provided prior express consent’” to be contacted by the defendants—the plaintiff later claimed to have revoked consent to being contacted through the use of an automated telephone dialing system (autodialer) during a call with the servicer. While on the call, the plaintiff filled out an online automatic debit agreement to make payments on his delinquent loan. The agreement included a demographic form with an option for the plaintiff to update his contact information, which included an optional cell phone number field and a disclosure that granted consent to being contacted on his cell phone using an autodialer. The defendants began contacting the plaintiff on his cell phone after he fell behind on his loan payments, and the plaintiff sued, alleging the defendants violated the TCPA by placing calls using an autodialer without obtaining his prior express consent. The district court granted the servicer’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the plaintiff “expressly consented” to receiving the calls and could not “unilaterally revoke” consent “given as consideration in a valid bargained-for-contract,” and that the plaintiff nonetheless “reconsented when he submitted the demographic form.” The plaintiff appealed, arguing, among other things, that he did not re-consent to being contacted because the form was submitted directly after his oral revocation to the servicer.
On appeal, the 11th Circuit agreed with the district court, holding that while it was true that the plaintiff “filled out the demographic form just moments after he orally revoked his prior consent, [the plaintiff] cites no authority that this temporal proximity should require this Court to consider the separate interactions (of revoking consent and later reconsenting) as one lumped-together interaction.” As such, the appellate court disagreed with the plaintiff’s argument “that the revocation of consent standard should stretch to apply to [his] later reconsent to [the servicer].”
Court enters $41 million default judgment against student debt-relief operators
On December 3, the U.S. District Court of the Central District of California entered a default judgment against a student debt-relief company and one of its owners (collectively, “defaulting defendants”) in an action brought by the CFPB alleging the defaulting defendants (and others not subject to the judgment) charged thousands of customers approximately $11.8 million in upfront fees in violation of the Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR). As previously covered by InfoBytes, in July, the CFPB filed a complaint against the defaulting defendants, one other company, its owner, and four attorneys, alleging the companies would market its debt-relief services to customers over the phone, encouraging those with private loans to sign up with an attorney to reduce or eliminate their student debt. The businesses allegedly charged the fees before the customer had made at least one payment on the altered debts, in violation of the TSR’s prohibition on requesting or receiving advance fees for debt-relief service or, for certain defendants, the TSR’s prohibition on providing substantial assistance to someone charging the illegal fees. In August, the court approved stipulated final judgments with the other company owner (available here) and three of the attorneys (available here, here, and here).
The court entered into a default judgment against the defendants after they failed to file an answer or otherwise respond to the Bureau’s complaint. The judgment requires the defaulting defendants to pay over $11 million in consumer redress with separate $15 million civil money penalties entered against the company and the owner. Additionally, the defaulting defendants are permanently banned from providing debt-relief services or engaging in telemarketing of any consumer financial product or service.
Satellite company to pay over $200 million for telemarketing violations
On December 7, the DOJ announced a settlement with a satellite service provider totaling over $210 million in penalties to be paid to the United States and four states for alleged violations of the TCPA, the FTC Act, and similar state laws. The settlement stems from an action brought by the United States against the satellite company in 2009 asserting that the company initiated millions of unlawful telemarketing calls to consumers and was responsible for millions of calls made by marketers of the company’s products and services. In 2017, a district court awarded the U.S. and the states of California, Illinois, North Carolina, and Ohio $280 million in civil penalties, with a record $168 million going to the federal government (covered by InfoBytes here). On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed liability but vacated and remanded the monetary award for recalculation.
The stipulated judgment requires the satellite company to pay over $200 million in civil penalties, with $126 million going to the U.S. government, nearly $40 million to California, over $6.5 million to Illinois, nearly $14 million to North Carolina, and $17 million to Ohio.
2nd Circuit: SEC within authority to bring actions for SAR failings
On December 4, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the SEC in an action brought by the agency against a penny stock broker-dealer, concluding the agency has the authority to bring an action under Section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) and Rule 17a-8 promulgated thereunder for failure to comply with the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). According to the opinion, the SEC filed an action against the broker-dealer for violating the Exchange Act and Rule 17a-8’s reporting, recordkeeping, and record-retention obligations by failing to file SARs as required by the BSA. Both parties moved for summary judgment, with the broker-dealer arguing that the SEC was improperly enforcing the BSA. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the SEC in part (deferring “its resolution of categories of allegedly deficient SARs pending discovery and additional briefing”) and denied summary judgment for the broker-dealer, concluding that the SEC had authority to bring the action under the Exchange Act. After discovery and additional briefing, the SEC moved for summary judgment on the Rule 17a-8 violations and the district court granted summary judgment as to nearly 3,000 violations on the basis of the broker-dealer’s SARs-reporting and recordkeeping practices and imposed a $12 million civil penalty.
On appeal, the 2nd Circuit agreed with the district court, rejecting the broker-dealer’s argument that the SEC is attempting to enforce the BSA, which only the U.S. Treasury Department has the authority to do. The appellate court noted that the SEC is enforcing the requirements of Rule 17a-8, which requires broker-dealers to adhere to the BSA in order to comply with requirements of the Exchange Act, which does not constitute the agency’s enforcement of the BSA. Moreover, the appellate court concluded that the SEC did not overstep its authority when promulgating Rule 17a-8, as SARs “serve to further the aims of the Exchange Act by protecting investors and helping to guard against market manipulation,” and that the broker-dealer did not meet its “‘heavy burden’ to show that Congress ‘clearly expressed [its] intention’ to preclude the SEC from examining for SAR compliance in conjunction with FinCEN and pursuant to authority delegated under the Exchange Act.” In affirming the $12 million civil penalty, the appellate court stated that the district court acted “within its discretion to impose the [] penalty” considering the broker-dealer’s “systematic and widespread evasion of the law.”
District court denies dismissal and stay of CFPB action
On November 30, the U.S. District Court of the District of Maryland denied a motion to dismiss an action brought by the CFPB against a debt collection entity, its subsidiaries, and their owner (collectively, “defendants”), rejecting the defendants’ argument that the Bureau lacked standing to bring the action. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in September 2019, the Bureau alleged the defendants violated the FCRA, FDCPA, and the CFPA by, among other things, failing to (i) establish or implement reasonable written policies and procedures to ensure accurate reporting to consumer-reporting agencies; (ii) incorporate appropriate guidelines for the handling of indirect disputes in its policies and procedures; (iii) conduct reasonable investigations and review relevant information when handling indirect disputes; and (iv) furnish information about accounts after receiving identity theft reports about such accounts without conducting an investigation into the accuracy of the information. The defendants moved to dismiss the action arguing, among other things, that (i) the Bureau lacks standing to bring the action; and (ii) Director Kraninger’s ratification of the litigation was invalid. In the alternative, the defendants moved to stay the lawsuit until the U.S. Supreme Court issued a ruling in Collins v. Mnuchin (covered by InfoBytes here).
The court denied the motion to stay, concluding that the issues pending before the Supreme Court in Mnuchin may not necessarily apply to the Bureau, as they are different agencies and further, there is no issue of ratification in Mnuchin. Thus, given the “uncertainty surrounding the effect a decision in Collins v. Mnuchin will have on the present case,” the court denied the motion to stay. The court also denied the motion to dismiss, concluding, among other things, that the Supreme Court’s finding in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB (covered by a Buckley Special Alert) that the Bureau had a constitutional defect in its leadership structure under Article II does not diminish the agency’s Article III standing. Moreover, the court concluded that the decision in Seila Law does not mean that the Bureau “lacked authority during the time in which it was led by an improperly removable Director,” and therefore the Bureau had the authority to initiate the September 2019 lawsuit against the defendants. Further, the court held that the July 2020 ratification of the enforcement action was proper.
CFPB charges online lender with MLA violations
On December 4, the CFPB announced it filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against a California-based online lender alleging violations of the Military Lending Act (MLA). According to the CFPB, the “action is part of a broader Bureau sweep of investigations of multiple lenders that may be violating the MLA,” which provides protections connected to extensions of consumer credit for active-duty servicemembers and their dependents. The complaint alleges that since October 2016 the lender, among other things, made more than 4,000 single-payment or installment loans to over 1,200 covered borrowers in violation of the MLA. Specifically, the Bureau claims that these violations include (i) extending loans with Military Annual Percentage Rates (MAPR) exceeding the MLA’s 36 percent cap; (ii) requiring borrowers to submit to arbitration in loan agreements; and (iii) failing to make certain required loan disclosures, including a statement of the applicable MAPR, before or at the time of the transaction. The complaint seeks an injunction against the lender that would require the lender to “correct inaccurate information furnished to consumer reporting agencies concerning loans that were void ab initio,” and would prohibit it from collecting on those loans and require it to rescind the credit agreements on those loans. The complaint also seeks damages, redress, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, and civil money penalties.