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Bipartisan state Attorneys General coalition urge CFPB to examine for MLA compliance
On October 23, a bipartisan coalition of 33 state Attorneys General sent a letter to acting Director of the CFPB, Mick Mulvaney, expressing concern over reports that the Bureau is no longer supervising financial institutions for compliance with the Military Lending Act (MLA). The Attorneys General wrote that the Bureau would be “failing to abide by its statutorily mandated duty to enforce the MLA” by interpreting its authority to preclude the examination of lenders for compliance with the act. Specifically, the Attorneys General point to recent amendments to the MLA providing that the statute “shall be enforced” by the Bureau (among other agencies) “under any . . . applicable authorities available to the [Bureau].” This includes the authority to examine lenders “to ‘detect[] and assess[] risks to consumers.” According to the Attorneys General, the origination of non-MLA compliant loans to servicemembers constitutes such a risk.
Georgia Supreme Court holds legal settlement advances are not loans under state laws
On October 22, the Georgia Supreme Court held that legal settlement cash advances are not “loans” under the state’s Payday Lending Act (PLA) and the Industrial Loan Act (ILA) when the obligation to repay is contingent upon the success of the underlying lawsuit. The decision results from a class action lawsuit bought by clients of a legal funding company. After being involved in automobile accidents, appellants signed financing agreements with a legal funding company, which advanced them funds while their personal injury lawsuit was pending. Per the terms of their financing agreements, appellants were required to repay the funds only if their personal injury lawsuits were successful. They were successful and the settlement company soon sought to recover funds pursuant to the terms of the agreement. The appellants objected and brought suit, alleging, among other things, that the financing agreements they executed violated the state’s PLA and ILA because they were usurious loans and a product of unlicensed activity. The state trial court concluded that the PLA applied to the agreements but that the ILA did not. The state appeals court concluded that neither statute applied, determining that because the repayment obligation was contingent on the success of the lawsuit, it was not a “loan” under either the PLA or the ILA. The state supreme court agreed, holding that “an agreement that involves . . . a contingent and limited obligation of repayment is not a ‘contract requiring repayment,’” as required by the ILA’s definition of “loan.” Similarly, the financing arrangement did not constitute an agreement pursuant to which “funds are advanced to be repaid,” which would make it a loan under the PLA. Appellants also argued that the contingent repayment obligation in the financing agreement was illusory, contending that the legal funding company agrees to such an arrangement only when the risk the lawsuit will fail is “close to null.” The court rejected this claim, however, noting that nothing in the pleadings suggested that the agreements were shams.
New York City Department of Consumer Affairs sues for-profit college for deceptive and predatory lending practices
On October 19, New York City Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA) announced that it filed suit in New York County Supreme Court against a for-profit college alleging deceptive and predatory lending practices that violate NYC Consumer Protection Law and local debt collection rules. The DCA alleges that college recruiters engaged in deceptive practices such as (i) masquerading federal loan applications as scholarships; (ii) steering students towards college loans and referring to them as “payment plans”; and (iii) deceiving students about institutional grants by failing to disclose that they require students to obtain the maximum amount of federal loans available before a grant can be awarded. DCA also alleges that the for-profit college violated debt collection laws by concealing its identity on invoices when collecting debt, and seeking payments from graduates for debts not owed.
CFPB urges 9th Circuit to reverse district court’s order and impose higher penalty in tribal lending action
On October 19, the CFPB filed its opening brief before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. CashCall, Inc., an action brought by the CFPB to limit the reach of the so-called “tribal model” of online lending. In the original action, the court found that an online loan servicer that operated on tribal lands engaged in deceptive practices by collecting on loans that exceeded the usury limits in various states, and ordered it and its affiliates to pay a $10 million penalty, far short of the Bureau’s request. (Previously covered by InfoBtyes here and here.) The CFPB appealed, arguing that the district court erred by imposing a civil penalty that was “inappropriately low” and by refusing to order appropriate restitution. In its brief, the Bureau argued that the district court misapplied the law when finding that restitution was not “an appropriate remedy.” According to the Bureau, the district court believed it had discretionary power to deny restitution, based on the court’s view of the equities. But the district court had no such discretion, the Bureau asserted, claiming that if a plaintiff proves a violation and resulting harm, it is entitled to restitution under the CFPA. In addition, the Bureau argued that the district court should not have denied restitution on the grounds that the servicer had not acted in bad faith. The Bureau argued that allowing the servicer to earn $200 million in ill-gotten gains while paying a $10 million penalty leaves companies with “little incentive to follow the law.” The Bureau also argued that the loan servicer’s actions were reckless and warranted a higher civil penalty. The district court had concluded that the servicer did not act recklessly because its primary counsel opined that it could contract around state law. In response, the Bureau asserted that the servicer had “ample reason to know” its attempts to circumvent state usury laws posed an unjustifiably high risk that it was “collecting amounts consumers did not owe” after multiple lawyers warned the servicer that its attempts to avoid state law “likely” would not work.”
Colorado Supreme Court affirms that tort claims are not “debts” under Colorado’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
On October 15, the Colorado Supreme Court issued an opinion affirming the judgment of the appeals court dismissing a Colorado Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (CFDCPA) action involving a tort claim. According to the opinion, the consumer alleged that a law firm representing a subrogee auto-insurance company violated the CFDCPA when the firm obtained a judgment against her for damages in tort. In affirming the appeals court, the supreme court held that that damages arising from the tort does not qualify as a debt under the CFDCPA. The court reasoned that because a tort does not obligate the tortfeasor to pay for damages, it cannot be a transaction giving rise to an obligation to pay money and is therefore not a “debt” within the meaning of the CFDCPA.
In its decision, the Court reasoned that both the federal and state FDCPA “clearly exclude from the definition of debt any obligation to pay money for many, if not all, non-consumer related purpose.” The Court concluded that “because an insurance contract providing for the subrogation of the rights of a damaged insured is not a transaction giving rise to an obligation of the tortfeasor to pay money, but merely changes the person to whom the tortfeasor’s obligation to pay is owed,” it is not a transaction that creates debt under the CFDCPA.
New York Court of Appeals holds that accrual clause does not delay commencement of six-year statute of limitations for RMBS repurchase claims
On October 16, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s dismissal of trustee RMBS repurchase claims against a mortgage originator on statute of limitations grounds, concluding that New York’s six-year statute of limitations for breaches of representations and warranties governed despite the inclusion of an accrual clause within the governing agreements.
In the underlying lawsuit, the plaintiff trustee claimed that the mortgage originator breached representations and warranties in loan purchase agreements relating to the characteristics and quality of the loans ultimately securitized into RMBS. However, because the originator sold the final set of loans conveyed into the RMBS in May 2007, and the trustee did not file suit until August 2013, the trial court held that the claims were time-barred under New York’s six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract suits. The trial court cited precedent set by the appeals court in ACE Securities Corp. v. DB Structured Products, which found that “a cause of action for breach of representations and warranties contained within a [RMBS] contract accrued when the contract was executed” because the representations and warranties were breached on that date.
On appeal, the trustee argued that the contractual language at issue was different from the language in ACE. Specifically, the trustee argued that the inclusion of an accrual clause stating that claims “shall accrue” upon an originator’s failure to repurchase a defective loan created a condition precedent to suit and operated to delay the commencement of the statute of limitations. The appeals court disagreed, concluding that “no substantive condition precedent was created, and that to the extent the parties otherwise intended to delay the commencement of the limitations period, their attempt to do so was inconsistent with New York law and public policy.” In reaching this conclusion, the appeals court explained that New York’s public policy “represented by the statute of limitations” and specific New York laws governing extensions thereof would effectively be abolished if contracting parties could circumvent it by mutually agreeing to postpone the date on which the period of limitation commences.
Arizona’s fintech sandbox program accepts first participant
On October 11, the Arizona Attorney General announced the state’s first fintech sandbox participant. The mobile payment platform company will test its product—a centralized wallet infrastructure designed to create “cheaper and faster payment transfers”—for two years by processing guest payments at a Tucson resort. Arizona resident-guests will receive a disclosure agreement outlining the company’s participation in the sandbox, an explanation of the test product, a privacy notice, and the ability to opt out of any information sharing with the resort. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the Arizona governor signed legislation in March creating the first state sandbox program for companies to test innovative financial products or services without certain regulatory requirements.
The Attorney General also announced the finalization of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Taiwan’s financial regulator, the Financial Supervisory Commission, to increase the reach of the state’s sandbox program. The MOU will establish an information sharing agreement “that may result in the opportunity for businesses to develop/test eligible [fintech] products in both markets,” the release stated.
Utah Supreme Court reverses foreclosure ruling, states OCC interpretation of “located” is reasonable
On October 5, the Utah Supreme Court revisited a 2013 decision in which it held that federal law does not preempt Utah state law that limits the ability of national banks to foreclose on real property in the state. In a unanimous opinion, the court wrote that it was overruling its “clearly erroneous” decision in a case stemming from a borrower’s challenge to the validity of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale of her Utah home by a Texas-based national bank. According to the opinion, the borrower argued that the sale of her home at auction was invalid because Utah state law “does not permit a bank to act as a trustee on a trust need.” Fannie Mae, which won the auction, secured an eviction order and argued that under the National Bank Act (NBA), the bank had the authority to conduct the sale. The court, however, reversed the eviction order after deciding that the bank did not have the authority under Utah law to act as a trustee under a deed of trust.
In overruling its 2013 decision, the court held that whether a national bank has the authority to act as a trustee to foreclose on property in Utah depends on the OCC’s regulation implementing the NBA, not on Utah state law. According to the OCC’s interpretation of Section 92a of the NBA, a bank is located in the state where it “accepts the fiduciary appointment, executes the documents that create the fiduciary relationship, and makes discretionary decisions regarding the investment or distribution of fiduciary assets.” Previously, the court had found this interpretation to be unreasonable and not entitled to Chevron deference. However, when reconsidering the issue, the court determined that the OCC had the authority to implement the NBA and that the agency’s interpretation of the word “located” was reasonable. “Whatever located means, Congress has instructed that a state has to permit a national bank to act as a fiduciary if institutions that compete with the national bank in the state where it is located can act as a fiduciary,” the court wrote. “This expresses a federal intent to clomp into an area of traditional state concern.” The question, however, remained whether the bank performed its actions in a fiduciary capacity in Texas—a point on which the two parties to the litigation disagreed. “Because the district court has not had the opportunity to address this issue and because of the potential need for factual findings, we remand for the district court to consider this argument,” the opinion stated.
Coalition of state Attorneys General encourages FCC to create rules to block illegal robocalls
On October 8, a collation of 35 state Attorneys General submitted reply comments in response to a public notice seeking ways the FCC could create rules that will enable telephone service providers to block illegal robocalls. In their comments to the FCC, the coalition encourages the FCC to implement rules and additional reforms that go beyond the agency’s 2017 call-blocking order, which allows phone companies to proactively block illegal robocalls originating from certain types of phone numbers. (See previous InfoBytes coverage here.) “Many illegal robocallers, however, simply do not care about the law and have a more insidious agenda — casting a net of illegal robocalls to ensnare vulnerable victims in scams to steal money or sensitive, personal information,” the coalition stated. “[C]riminals are estimated to have stolen 9.5 billion dollars from consumers through phone scams in 2017.” The coalition encourages collaboration between states, federal counterparts, and the domestic and international telecommunications industry, and applauds recent progress on the implementation of frameworks such as the “Secure Telephone Identity Revisited” and “Secure Handling of Asserted information using toKENs” protocols that assist service providers in identifying illegally spoofed calls.
New Jersey appeals court says choice-of-law exception may apply in interest rate class action suit
On October 9, the Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division reversed a trial court’s decision to revive a proposed class action that challenged, among other things, interest rates of over 30 percent on car title loans. According to the appellate court, the trial court dismissed the case because Delaware, not New Jersey, had a more substantial relationship with the parties’ dispute. While the plaintiff’s contract with the Delaware-based title loan company stipulated that Delaware law applied even though she resided in New Jersey, the appellate court said that under the second exception of the test established by Instructional Systems Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp., New Jersey courts will uphold the contractual choice unless the “application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to the fundamental policy of the state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and which . . . would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.”
“In her certification, plaintiff asserted that she applied for the title loan from her home in New Jersey and that defendant advised her that the loan had been approved by calling and advising her that all she had to do to pick up the money was to come to Delaware and sign the contract.” The appellate court stated that these additional facts may be sufficient to satisfy the second exception’s prerequisites, and that from a procedural standpoint, the trial court should have either converted the title loan company’s motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment in order to consider the new information or granted the plaintiff’s motion to file a second amended complaint.