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Supreme Court of Appeals for West Virginia upholds summary judgment for consumer against check cashing company
On May 11, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed summary judgment for a consumer who alleged a check cashing company and its debt collector violated the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (WVCCPA) by contacting her multiple times after being notified of her Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing. According to the opinion, the consumer filed a Chapter 7 petition for bankruptcy in February 2012 and the cash checking company was notified on or about March 6, 2012 of the filing. On March 9, the company, in response to the bankruptcy notice, sent a letter to the consumer notifying her collection efforts would be stayed but the company would be pursuing a criminal complaint against her. Additionally, a debt collection agency under contract with the company contacted the consumer five additional times in attempt to collect the debt. The trial court first granted the consumer’s motion for summary judgment in part, finding that the company violated the WVCCPA by not contacting the consumer’s attorney and by threatening criminal prosecution even though the company was aware of the bankruptcy filing. The court awarded the consumer over $19,000 in statutory damages. Subsequently, the trial court granted the consumer’s second motion for summary judgment, holding, among other things, that the company instructed the debt collector to contact the consumer despite having “actual knowledge” that an attorney represented the consumer. The court granted additional statutory damages in the amount of $18,000 and awarded attorney’s fees and costs.
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals concluded that the check cashing company’s violations of the WVCCPA were deliberate and intentional, and therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding the consumer over $37,000 in damages and attorney’s fees.
Georgia amends state code provisions related to financial institutions
On May 3, the Georgia governor signed into law an act amending provisions of the Official Code of Georgia applicable to the state’s Department of Banking and Finance (Department) and financial institutions generally, including banks, credit unions, licensed sellers of payment instruments, and mortgage lenders and brokers. Among other things, HB 780 grants the Department and/or its commissioner (i) powers to authorize state chartered financial institutions to exercise powers authorized by federal law but not authorized under state law; (ii) the authority to remove individuals employed by state chartered financial institutions, including officers and directors; and (iii) the ability to establish a process for state chartered financial institutions to “exercise rights and powers authorized solely under federal law.” HB 870 also amends the Official Code of Georgia to provide for the Department’s licensing of mortgage lenders and brokers. The law took effect on May 3, and does not apply to litigation pending as of March 9.
Maryland announces settlement with mortgage servicer over property inspection fees
On May 14, the Maryland Attorney General announced a settlement with a mortgage loan servicer to resolve allegations that it charged homeowners illegal inspection fees. According to the announcement, the servicer allegedly charged borrowers for property inspections that were done when the borrower was in default on their payments, in violation of a Maryland law, which prohibits passing on such inspection costs. The mortgage servicer ceased the practice in 2014 for forward mortgages and in 2016 for reverse mortgages, according to the Attorney General’s office. The settlement requires the mortgage servicer to (i) refrain from engaging in the same practice in the future; (ii) complete the return of almost $1 million in collected inspection fees; and (iii) pay nearly $500,000 in penalties and costs.
Maryland expands scope of unfair and deceptive practices under the Maryland Consumer Protection Act, increases maximum civil penalties
On May 15, the Maryland governor signed HB1634, the Financial Consumer Protection Act of 2018, which expands the definition of “unfair and deceptive trade practices” under the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (MPCA) to include “abusive” practices, and violations of the federal Military Lending Act (MLA) and Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA). The law also, among other things:
- Civil Penalties. Increases the maximum civil penalties for certain consumer financial violations to $10,000 for the initial violation and $25,000 for subsequent violations
- Debt Collection. Prohibits a person from engaging in unlicensed debt collection activity in violation of the Maryland Collection Agency Licensing Act or engaging in certain conduct in violation of the federal FDCPA.
- Enforcement Funds. Requires the governor to appropriate at least $700,000 for the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) and at least $300,000 to the Office of the Commissioner of Financial Regulation (OCFR) for certain enforcement activities.
- Student Loan Ombudsman. Creates a Student Loan Ombudsman position within the OCFR and establishes specific duties for the role, including receiving, reviewing, and attempting to resolve complaints from student loan borrowers.
- Required Studies. Requires the OCFR to conduct a study on Fintech regulation, including whether the commissioner has the statutory authority to regulate such firms. The law also requires the Maryland Financial Consumer Protection Commission (MFCPC) to conduct multiple studies, including studies on (i) cryptocurrencies and initial coin offerings and (ii) the CFPB’s arbitration rule (repealed by a Congressional Review Act measure in November 2017).
9th Circuit will not rehear interest on escrow preemption decision
On May 16, a panel of three judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit denied the petition for an en banc rehearing of its March decision, which held that a California law that requires a bank to pay interest on escrow funds is not preempted by federal law. In addition to the national bank’s appeal for a rehearing, the OCC notably filed an amicus brief supporting the rehearing, arguing that the court “comprehensively misinterpreted” the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson. (Previously covered by InfoBytes here.) The panel noted that the full court had been advised of the bank’s petition for rehearing, and no judge had requested a vote on rehearing.
Maryland expands authority over credit reporting agencies
On May 8, Maryland governor Larry Hogan signed HB848, which expands Maryland’s authority over Credit Reporting Agencies (CRAs) by requiring CRAs to develop a secure system to process electronic requests for placing, lifting, or removing a security freeze. Additionally, the law expands the definition of “protected consumer” for purposes of free security freezes to include persons age 85 or older, certain members of the military, and incarcerated individuals. The law also (i) codifies an existing requirement that CRAs register with the Office of the Commissioner of Financial Regulation (OCFR); (ii) allows the OCFR to investigate written consumer complaints against CRAs; and (iii) increases the maximum civil monetary penalty to $1,000 for the first violation and $2,500 for each subsequent violation. The law is effective October 1.
Supreme Court says states can legalize sports gambling
On May 14, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 1992 Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), which, among other things, bans most states from authorizing sports gambling, violates the 10th Amendment “anticommandeering” principle. The decision results from a lawsuit filed by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and four major professional sports leagues alleging that a 2012 New Jersey state law legalizing sports betting violated PASPA. The district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit agreed with the NCAA and New Jersey revised the law in 2014. The new law removed existing bans on sports gambling at horseracing tracks, casinos, and gambling houses in Atlantic City as long as the wagers did not involve New Jersey college teams or a collegiate event in the state. The NCAA filed suit again and the district court, with the 3rd Circuit affirming, held that the revised law violated PASPA. New Jersey appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that PASPA violates the “anticommandeering” principle of the Constitution.
In a 7-2 vote, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the PASPA provision, which prohibits state authorization of sports gambling, “unequivocally dictates what a state legislature may and may not do.” The Court rejected the NCAA’s argument that PASPA preempts, not commandeers, state laws that conflict with its provisions, concluding that preemption applies to private actors and the prohibition cannot be understood “as anything other than a direct command to the States.” The Court went on to hold that no provision of PASPA is severable from the anti-authorization provision and, therefore, the entire law should be struck down. The majority acknowledged that the legalization of sports gambling is an important, yet controversial, policy choice but not a choice for the Court to make. “Congress can regulate sports gambling directly, but if it elects not to do so, each State is free to act on its own.”
Pennsylvania adopts CFPB mortgage servicing regulations
On April 28, the Pennsylvania Department of Banking and Securities adopted regulations to effectively incorporate Subpart C of the CFPB’s RESPA mortgage servicing regulations (Regulation X), which were amended effective as of April 19. The adopted regulations address, among other things, (i) disclosure requirements; (ii) mortgage servicing transfers; (iii) escrow payments and account balances; (iv) forced-place insurance; and (v) loss mitigation procedures. The adopted regulations were effective on April 28.
New York Senate introduces bill to enact state charters for on-line lenders
On May 2, the New York Senate introduced a bill that, if passed, would establish a new article under the state’s banking law to provide for the chartering and regulating of internet lending services corporations (on-line lenders). Among other things, the “New York limited state charter for internet lending services,” S8340, would (i) authorize the New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) to issue limited state charters to on-line lenders who “engage in the business of making loans over an internet or electronic platform”; (ii) allow chartered on-line lenders to approve or deny consumer loan applications submitted through NYDFS-approved electronic means; (iii) limit the principal amount of personal loans to $25,000 and $50,000 for business and commercial loans, as well as require the adherence to legally authorized interest rates; (iv) require that chartered on-line lenders be able to demonstrate fiscal solvency with “a minimum capital requirement of not less than $250,000”—an amount five times higher than what is required of brick and mortar-based licensed lenders; and (v) grant NYDFS the authority to regulate chartered on-line lenders.
S8340 further notes that, at present, the state’s banking law does not provide a regulatory environment to oversee the operations of on-line lenders. The bill currently sits with the Senate’s Banks Committee.
Florida District Court of Appeal holds contract for used car not covered by state usury law
On April 25, a Florida District Court of Appeal held that a Florida usury law did not apply to the purchase of a used car because the contract for purchase was a retail installment sales contract covered under the Florida Motor Vehicle Retail Sales Finance Act (the Finance Act). According to the opinion, a consumer filed a lawsuit against a used car seller and a lender claiming violations of Florida’s general usury law, which prohibits interest of more than 18 percent per year, because the contract for purchase of a used car had a 27.81 percent interest rate. In affirming the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment for the car seller and lender, the appeals court found that the contract for purchase met the state’s definition of a retail installment sales contract and, therefore, was governed by the Finance Act (which both the seller and lender were licensed under) rather than the general usury statute. Additionally, because the car was financed over a four-year period, the appeals court found that the finance charge per year was permissible under the Finance Act at $16.48 for every $100. The court also held that the general usury law did not apply to a contract to secure the price of personal property sold, as opposed to a contract for the “loan of money.”