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CFPB’s new innovation office to focus on competition instead of fintech sandboxes
On May 24, the CFPB launched the Office of Competition and Innovation, which will focus on competition and explore ways to “create market conditions where consumers have choices, the best products win, and large incumbents cannot stifle competition by exploiting their network effects or market power.” The new office will be housed under the Bureau’s Research, Markets and Regulation division, providing “greater access to resources to look at market-structure problems that create obstacles to innovation.” It replaces the Bureau’s existing Office of Innovation, which was established in 2018 and focused on allowing companies to apply for no-action letters and regulatory sandboxes in order to test specific product offerings. According to the Bureau, the agency will no longer offer these programs after a review established that the initiatives “proved to be ineffective and that some firms participating in these programs made public statements indicating that the Bureau had conferred benefits upon them that the Bureau expressly did not.”
The new office will focus on competition and explore ways to stop large banks and fintech lenders from “squeezing out smaller players” in the consumer finance market. It will also explore ways to ensure that consumers have their “walking rights” and can easily switch service providers. Additionally, the new office will research “structural problems” that create obstacles to innovation, examine dynamics between large and small players related to competition, identify ways to address commonplace obstacles such as access to capital and talent, examine financial data-sharing to ensure large financial institutions are not hoarding large volumes of digital data, and host events that explore barriers to entry and other obstacles, the Bureau said.
District Court issues judgment against student debt relief operation
On May 24, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California entered a stipulated final judgment and order against an individual defendant who participated in a deceptive debt-relief enterprise operation. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in 2019, the CFPB, along with the Minnesota and North Carolina attorneys general, and the Los Angeles City Attorney (together, the “states”), announced an action against the student loan debt relief operation for allegedly deceiving thousands of student-loan borrowers and charging more than $71 million in unlawful advance fees. In the third amended complaint, the Bureau and the states alleged that since at least 2015 the debt relief operation violated the CFPA, TSR, FDCPA, and various state laws by charging and collecting improper advance fees from student loan borrowers prior to providing assistance and receiving payments on the adjusted loans. In addition, the Bureau and the states claimed that the debt relief operation engaged in deceptive practices by misrepresenting, among other things: (i) the purpose and application of fees they charged; (ii) their ability to obtain loan forgiveness for borrowers; and (iii) their ability to actually lower borrowers’ monthly payments. Moreover, the debt relief operation allegedly failed to inform borrowers that it was their practice to request that the loans be placed in forbearance and also submitted false information to student loan servicers to qualify borrowers for lower payments. Under the terms of the final judgment, the individual defendant must pay a $483,662 civil money penalty to the Bureau.
9th Circuit says CFPB can seek restitution in action against payday lender
On May 23, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a district court’s judgment finding an online loan servicer and its affiliates liable for a deceptive loan scheme. However, the appellate court vacated the district court’s order, which had imposed a $10 million civil penalty (rather than the requested penalty of over $50 million) and had declined the CFPB's request for $235 million in restitution. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in 2018, the district court ordered the defendants to pay the civil penalty for offering high-interest loans in states with usury laws barring the transactions after determining in September 2016 that the online loan servicer was the “true lender” of the loans that were issued through entities located on tribal land (covered by a Buckley Special Alert). At the time, the district court found that a lower statutory penalty was more appropriate than the CFPB’s requested amount because the Bureau failed to show the company “knowingly violated the CFPA” or acted “recklessly.” In rejecting the Bureau’s requested restitution amount, the district court found that the agency had not put forth any evidence that the defendants “intended to defraud consumers or that consumers did not receive the benefit of their bargain from the [program]” for restitution to be an appropriate remedy.
According to the 9th Circuit, the district court applied the wrong legal analysis in 2018 when it assessed only a $10 million civil money penalty against the defendants and no restitution payments to consumers harmed by the improper loans. By applying federal common law choice-of-law principles, the appellate court declined to apply tribal law, holding that state laws applied to the loans, thus rendering them invalid. The appellate court determined that the defendants acted recklessly when they attempted to collect on invalid debts after counsel advised in 2013 that such actions were likely illegal. While the defendants shut down the tribal lending program for new loans, the 9th Circuit said they continued to collect on existing loans. “We conclude that from September 2013 on, the danger that [defendants’] conduct violated the statute was ‘so obvious that [defendants] must have been aware of it,’” the appellate court wrote. Noting that penalties for “reckless” violations under tier two were appropriate beginning September 2013, the appellate court ordered the district court to recalculate the civil penalty on remand. The 9th Circuit also directed the district court on remand to reconsider the appropriate restitution without relying on irrelevant considerations that motivated its earlier decision, including (i) whether defendants acted in bad faith; and (ii) “whether consumers received the benefit of their bargain.” Moreover, the appellate court held that the district court erred by stating “that the ‘proposed restitution amount [should be] netted to account for expenses.’”
The 9th Circuit also concluded that the district court was correct in holding one of the individual defendants personally liable for the company’s conduct. Furthermore, the appellate court held that the defendants’ argument that the structure of the Bureau is unconstitutional did not affect the validity of the lawsuit (which was filed when the Bureau was headed by lawfully appointed former Director Richard Cordray), writing that, as in Collins v. Yellen (covered by InfoBytes here), “the unlawfulness of the removal provision does not strip the Director of the power to undertake the other responsibilities of his office.”
Remittance provider hints it may challenge CFPB’s funding structure
On May 20, a global payments provider, which was recently sued by the New York attorney general and the CFPB, filed a pre-motion letter hinting that it will challenge the constitutionality of the Bureau’s funding structure. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the complaint claimed the “repeat offender” defendant allegedly violated numerous federal and state consumer financial protection laws in its handling of remittance transfers. Earlier in the month, the defendant called the allegations “false, inflammatory and misleading,” and took issue with the Bureau’s suggestion that it had “uncovered widespread and systemic issues involving ‘substantial’ consumer harm.” According to the defendant, “data from the CFPB’s own consumer complaint portal strongly suggest otherwise.” (Covered by InfoBytes here.)
The defendant raised several arguments, including that the “CFPB’s funding structure also violates the Appropriations Clause, requiring dismissal”—a nod to a recent en banc decision issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (covered by InfoBytes here), in which several dissenting judges argued that the case should be dismissed because the agency’s funding structure violates the Constitution’s separation of powers and “is doubly removed from congressional review.” The defendant’s pre-motion letter also argued that the Bureau’s complaint should be moved to the Northern District of Texas where the company is headquartered and where the Bureau’s examinations were conducted.
In response, the Bureau and New York AG filed their own letter responding to the defendant’s proposed grounds for dismissal, countering, among other things, that the case is “adequately pled,” the claims are timely, and that the Bureau’s funding structure is constitutional. Challenging the defendant’s contention that the Bureau’s statutory method of funding violates the Constitution’s appropriations clause, the letter stressed that the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit have held that this clause “simply requires that federal spending be authorized by statute,” adding that “[b]oth the Bureau’s receipt of funds and its use of those funds are so authorized.”
CFPB, New York reach $4 million settlement with debt collection operation
On May 25, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York entered a stipulated final judgment and order in an action taken by the CFPB, in partnership with the New York attorney general, resolving allegations that a debt collection operation based near Buffalo, New York, which includes six companies, three owners, and two managers (collectively, “defendants”), engaged in deceptive tactics to induce consumer payments. (See also CFPB press release here.) As previously covered by InfoBytes, the CFPB filed a complaint in 2020 against the defendants for allegedly violating the CFPA, FDCPA, and various New York laws by using illegal tactics to induce consumer payments, such as (i) threatening arrest and imprisonment; (ii) claiming consumers owed more debt than they actually did; (iii) threatening to contact employers about the existence of the debt; (iv) harassing consumers and third parties by using “intimidating, menacing, or belittling language”; and (v) failing to provide debt verification notices. Under the terms of the settlement, the defendants must pay a $2 million penalty to the CFPB and a $2 million penalty to the New York AG. The judgment provides that if the defendants fail to make timely payments, each penalty amount would increase to $2.5 million. The judgment also permanently bans the defendants from engaging in debt collection operations and prohibits them from engaging in deceptive practices in connection with consumer financial products or services.
House Republicans concerned about CFPB UDAAP manual and administrative adjudications
On May 19, nineteen Financial Services Committee Republicans sent a letter to CFPB Director Rohit Chopra expressing concerns about the agency’s new UDAAP supervisory policy and the recent changes to CFPB administrative adjudication procedures. As previously covered by a Buckley Special Alert, the Bureau revised its UDAAP exam manual to highlight the CFPB’s view that its broad authority under UDAAP allows it to address discriminatory conduct in the offering of any financial product or service. With the March announcement, the Bureau made clear its view that any type of discrimination in connection with a consumer financial product or service could be an “unfair” practice — and, therefore, the CFPB can bring discrimination claims related to non-credit financial products. According to the letter, “the CFPB’s new [UDAAP] supervisory policy and the recent changes to CFPB administrative adjudication procedures deviate significantly from past practices.” The letter further argued that “Congress enacted the fair lending laws and delegated their enforcement to the CFPB, clearly defining the limits of CFPB’s jurisdiction.” Additionally, the letter noted that “[e]xtending ECOA’s disparate treatment and disparate impact analysis to non-credit financial products and services ignores these clear limits.” The legislators also contended that “[i]n addition to radically reinterpreting UDAAP, changes to the way the CFPB will supervise for UDAAP will impose significant new responsibilities on supervised entities.”
The letter also expressed concerns regarding changes recently made to the rules governing CFPB administrative adjudications. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in February the Bureau published a procedural rule and request for public comment in the Federal Register to update its Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings. The Bureau indicated that the amendments would provide greater procedural flexibility, providing parties earlier access to relevant information, expanding deposition opportunities, and making various changes related to “timing and deadlines, the content of answers, the scheduling conference, bifurcation of proceedings, the process for deciding dispositive motions, and requirements for issue exhaustion, as well as other technical changes.” According to the letter, this represents a “disturbing” action that is “contrary to [Chopra’s] comments about intending to establish durable jurisprudence made during testimony before the House Financial Services Committee in October 2021,” and “does not abide by typical notice and comment procedures.” The nineteen House Republicans on the Committee stated their view that “it is appropriate for the CFPB to immediately revert back to the previous Rules of Practice and conduct notice and comment rulemaking before [] any new procedures become effective.”
7th Circuit reverses dismissal of FDCPA case involving misleading letters
On May 20, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed a district court’s order dismissing a suit against a debt collection firm that allegedly sent misleading letters to a debtor. According to the order, the plaintiff defaulted on a credit card debt owed to a bank, which hired the defendant for collection services. The defendant filed a collection action on behalf of the bank and obtained a judgment against the plaintiff. The defendant then sent the plaintiff a letter, referencing the plaintiff’s credit card “account,” describing the amount of the judgment as the “balance due,” and offering to settle that debt for 40 cents on the dollar if the plaintiff made the payment within a specified time frame. The plaintiff did not pay the offered settlement amount by that deadline and ultimately learned that interest on the judgment was increasing daily. The plaintiff then filed suit against the debt collector, alleging that it violated the FDCPA by sending a misleading letter that: (i) described the debt as an “account” even though it was a judgment; (ii) listed two different amounts as the “balance due” (the amount of the judgment and the offered settlement amount); and (iii) did not disclose that the debt was increasing daily. The district court dismissed the case, finding that the plaintiff had failed to allege a concrete injury because he did not allege “that he had the ability to pay the debt owed, that he actually paid other debts instead, or that he took any detrimental step as a result of the alleged confusion.”
On the appeal, the 7th Circuit held that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged an injury, finding that his allegation that he would have prioritized paying the judgment over other debts “supports the reasonable inference that he had the ability to pay the settlement and that he used his available funds on other debts.” The appellate court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff lacked standing because he was insolvent at all relevant times and could not have paid his credit card debt, finding that this argument raised a factual dispute that should have been resolved with an evidentiary hearing.
District Court grants in part/denies in part defendant’s motion in RESPA, FDCPA case
Recently, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee granted in part and denied in part a defendant mortgage servicer’s motion for summary judgment concerning allegations that the defendant improperly foreclosed on plaintiff’s property. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant wrongfully accused her of failing to remedy her default and therefore violated RESPA and the FDCPA, among other things. Ultimately, the court denied defendant’s summary judgment request as to plaintiff’s RESPA claim because the defendant failed to exercise due diligence. But the court granted defendant’s request for summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s FDCPA claim because plaintiff presented no evidence that the defendant acted deceptively.
The plaintiff’s original loan—serviced by a previous servicer—was modified in 2016. But payments again were not made, so the previous servicer notified the plaintiff in December 2018 that it had accelerated the loan’s maturity date and referred the loan to foreclosure. The plaintiff, however, again applied for another modification in early 2019. After telling plaintiff her application was complete, the previous servicer then told the plaintiff, who claimed she inherited the property, that it needed additional documents to prove plaintiff’s successor-in-interest status. Ultimately, the previous servicer did not confirm the modification because the plaintiff did not confirm her successor-in-interest status.
The plaintiff again applied for a loan modification in March 2019, after the previous servicer transferred servicing rights to the defendant, and this modification was denied. She allegedly spoke with one of defendant’s representatives about the denial and indicated that she wished to reapply for a modification. However, the representative advised that she would have to reinstate the mortgage first before any loan modification. The defendant then sent a default letter to plaintiff’s property, which advised that the loan was still in default and needed payment.
The plaintiff submitted at least one additional request for mortgage assistance after the March 2019 modification application. The defendant acknowledged receipt of the request and detailed the documents it needed to process the request. The defendant then followed up in June 2019, stating again that it could not confirm that she was the successor-in-interest on the loan without documentation. A month later the defendant advised the plaintiff again that documents were still missing that were necessary to process her loan assistance request. The loan remained in default thereafter and the defendant foreclosed in August 2019.
In adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment be denied as to the RESPA claim, the district court noted that the defendant possibly should have sought documents, specifically the successor-in-interest documentation from the previous servicer, after the plaintiff submitted an incomplete loan modification application. The court stated that “there is a question of material fact whether [defendant] exercised reasonable diligence in failing to request the successor-in-interest documentation from [the previous servicer].” The court added that “there is a requirement of reasonable diligence, and there is no evidence showing that [defendant] met this standard. Failing to address the regulatory standard creates a question that cannot be resolved on the available information. Thus, there is at least one question of material fact here.”
Regarding plaintiff’s FDCPA claim, the court noted that “there is no evidence of deception in the foreclosure of loan payment process” and that “[p]laintiff has failed to provide any evidence that [defendant] acted dishonestly in requesting additional documentation to complete the loan modification.” The court therefore granted defendant’s summary judgment motion as to the FDCPA claim.
9th Circuit: Revived FCRA suit questions reasonableness of furnisher’s investigation
On May 16, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of a defendant furnisher, stating that it is up to a jury to decide whether the defendant’s “reasonable investigation” into the plaintiff’s dispute complied with the FCRA. After the plaintiff defaulted on both his first and second mortgages, the property was foreclosed and sold. Several years later, the plaintiff tried to purchase another home but was denied a mortgage due to a tradeline on his credit report that showed one of his mortgages as past due with accruing interest and late fees due to missed payments. The plaintiff disputed the debt through the consumer reporting agency (CRA) and provided a citation to the Arizona Anti-Deficiency Statute, which abolished his liability for the reported debt. The CRA then told the defendant about the dispute and provided information about the statutory citation. The defendant originally “updated” the plaintiff’s account to show that the debt was being disputed, but continued to report current and past due balances. Yet after the plaintiff again disputed the validity of his debt, the defendant marked the account as “paid, closed” and changed the balance to $0.
The plaintiff sued, claiming the defendant violated the FCRA by failing to reasonably investigate his dispute and for reporting inaccurate information. The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the reports it made were accurate as a matter of law and that the defendant had reasonably investigated the dispute. Moreover, “whether the Arizona anti-deficiency statute rendered [plaintiff’s] debt uncollectible is a legal question, not a factual one,” the district court stated, adding that “the FCRA does not impose on furnishers a duty to investigate legal disputes, only factual inaccuracies.”
The 9th Circuit disagreed, writing that Arizona law required that the plaintiff’s balance be “abolished,” so it was “patently incorrect” for the defendant to report otherwise. In applying Arizona law, the plaintiff had “more than satisfied his burden” of showing inaccurate reporting, the appellate court wrote, explaining that the “situation was no different than a discharge under bankruptcy law, which extinguishes ‘the personal liability of the debtor.’” The 9th Circuit also held that the FCRA does not “categorically exempt legal issues from the investigations that furnishers must conduct.” Pointing out that the “distinction between ‘legal’ and ‘factual’ issues is ambiguous, potentially unworkable, and could invite furnishers to ‘evade their investigation obligation by construing the relevant dispute as a ‘legal’ one,’” the panel referred to an April 2021 amicus brief filed in support of the plaintiff by the CFPB, which argued that the FCRA does not distinguish between legal and factual disputes when it comes to furnishers’ obligations to investigate disputes referred from CRAs. The CFPB recently made a similar argument in an amicus brief filed last month in the 11th Circuit (covered by InfoBytes here). There, the CFPB argued that importing this exemption would run counter to the purposes of FCRA, would create an unworkable standard that would be difficult to implement, and could encourage furnishers to evade their statutory obligations any time they construe the disputes as “legal.”
Holding that there was a “genuine factual dispute about the reasonableness” of the defendant’s investigation, the appellate court ultimately determined that it would “leave it to the jury” to decide whether the defendant’s investigation had been reasonable. “Unless ‘only one conclusion about the conduct’s reasonableness is possible,’ the question is normally inappropriate for resolution at the summary judgment stage,” the appellate court stated. “Here, as is ordinarily the case, this question is best left to the factfinder.”
CFPB affirms states may enforce CFPA and other federal laws
On May 19, the CFPB issued an interpretive rule addressing states’ authority to bring enforcement actions for violations of federal consumer financial protection laws, including the CFPA. Though the Bureau is charged with, among other things, administering, interpreting, and enforcing federal consumer financial laws, a category that includes the CFPA itself, the agency said it is not the only enforcer of these laws. According to the interpretive rule, “states can enforce [federal consumer financial laws] to the full extent authorized under those laws—including against entities that are not covered persons or service providers (and thus not subject to liability under section 1036(a)(1)(A)) and including against national banks and Federal savings associations.”
The interpretive rule establishes:
- States can enforce any provision of the CFPA, which includes making it unlawful for covered persons or service providers to violate any provision of federal consumer financial protection law. This provision covers the CFPA itself, in addition to its 18 enumerated consumer laws and certain other laws, along with any rule or order prescribed by the Bureau under the CFPA, an enumerated consumer law, or pursuant to certain other authorities.
- States can pursue claims and actions against a broad range of entities. The interpretive rule states that “the limitations on the Bureau’s authority in sections 1027 and 1029 generally do not constrain States’ enforcement authority.” States can bring actions against a broader cross-section of companies and individuals.
- States may pursue actions under section 1042 even if the Bureau is pursuing a concurrent enforcement action against the same entity. States are not restricted from bringing enforcement actions in coordination with the Bureau, and may also bring an enforcement action to stop or remediate harm that is not addressed by an action taken by the Bureau against the same entity. “Nothing in the [CFPA] precludes these complementary enforcement activities that serve to protect consumers at both the national and state levels,” the Bureau said in its announcement.
The Bureau stated the interpretive rule is a “part of the CFPB’s expansion of its efforts to support state enforcement activity,” and noted that it “plans to consider other steps to promote state enforcement of federal consumer financial protection law, including ways to facilitate victim redress.”