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California Court of Appeal: Including extraneous language in FCRA disclosure may constitute willful violation
On April 19, the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District reversed a trial court’s summary judgment order and held that the inclusion of extraneous language in an employer’s FCRA disclosures to job applicants may constitute willful violation of the FCRA. The plaintiff filed a putative class action against the defendant employer, contending that it willfully violated the FCRA by providing job applicants with a disclosure that included extraneous language unrelated to the topic of consumer reports. The plaintiff alleged that the disclosure violated the FCRA’s requirement for providing a standalone disclosure informing the applicant that the employer may obtain the applicant’s consumer report when making a hiring decision upon applicant’s consent. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that no reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff’s FCRA violation was willful, because the erroneous disclosure form was the result of a drafting mistake that took place when the defendant modified a sample disclosure provided by a consumer reporting agency to ensure compliance with the FCRA. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion, finding that any non-compliance resulted from a drafting was an inadvertent error.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed and remanded with instructions that the trial court deny the motion for summary judgment. The appellate court found that “a reasonable jury could find that [the employer] acted willfully because it violated an unambiguous provision of the FCRA.” The Court of Appeal noted that that there’s evidence that at least one of the defendant’s employees was aware that the extraneous language would be included in the disclosure form. In addition, the continuous use of the allegedly problematic disclosure form for nearly two years could signify recklessness. The Court of Appeal reasoned further that the defendant’s “continued and prolonged use” of the “problematic” disclosure form “suggest[ed] that it had no proactive monitoring system in place to ensure its disclosure was FCRA-complaint.”
District Court lowers punitive damages award in FCRA dispute
On April 8, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied in part and granted in part a defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and alternative motion for a new trial, after concluding that the debt collector violated the FCRA by incorrectly reporting medical debts on the plaintiff’s credit reports despite allegedly receiving 31 separate disputes challenging the validity of the debt. The plaintiff contended that the medical debts in question belonged to his father, and that due to the inaccurate reporting, he was denied credit by two lenders. At trial, after finding that the defendant failed to conduct a reasonable investigation into the plaintiff’s FCRA disputes as required by the statute, a jury awarded the plaintiff $80,000 in actual damages and $700,000 in punitive damages for willful violations. The defendant challenged the award and requested a new trial, arguing that the court improperly admitted hearsay testimony, that the plaintiff failed to prove he suffered emotional damage, and that the jury’s punitive damages award was too high.
The court denied defendant’s request for a new trial, finding that the plaintiff suffered emotional damages and that the “verdict could be supported ‘without considering the challenged testimony.’” With respect to the amount of punitive damages awarded, the court concluded that the defendant’s actions were “highly reprehensible” and “callous” in the way it processed consumers’ disputes. However, in comparing the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages in other cases, the court determined that $700,000 was too high based on the actual damages award and lowered the punitive damages to $475,000 to be consistent with Eleventh Circuit law. The court concluded, “to be sure, the high punitive damages award likely reflects the jury’s assessment of Defendant’s callous behavior throughout the eighteen months of processing Plaintiff’s approximately thirty disputes, and Defendant’s employees’ testimony which confirmed that such treatment would likely repeatedly occur with countless other consumers,” adding that “given the size of [the defendant], and the number of disputes handled annually, it is not surprising that the jury deemed a high punitive damages award necessary to send the Defendant a deterrence message.”
CFPB sues credit reporter and one of its executives
On April 12, the CFPB sued a credit reporting agency (CRA), two of its subsidiaries (collectively, “corporate defendants"), and a former senior executive for allegedly violating a 2017 enforcement order in connection with alleged deceptive practices related to their marketing and sale of credit scores, credit reports, and credit-monitoring products to consumers. The 2017 consent order required the corporate defendants to pay a $3 million civil penalty and more than $13.9 million in restitution to affected consumers as well as abide by certain conduct provisions (covered by InfoBytes here). The Bureau’s announcement called the corporate defendants “repeat offender[s]” who continued to engage in “digital dark patterns” that caused consumers seeking free credit scores to unknowingly sign up for a credit monitoring service with recurring monthly charges. According to the Bureau’s complaint, the corporate defendants, under the individual defendant’s direction, allegedly violated the 2017 consent order from the day it went into effect instead of implementing agreed-upon policy changes intended to stop consumers from unknowingly signing up for credit monitoring services that charge monthly payments. The Bureau claimed that the corporate defendants’ practices continued even after examiners raised concerns several times. With respect to the individual defendant, the Bureau contended that he had both the “authority and obligation” to ensure compliance with the 2017 consent order but did not do so. Instead, he allowed the corporate defendants to “defy the law and continue engaging in misleading marketing, even in the face of thousands of consumer complaints and refund requests.” The complaint alleges violations of the CFPA, EFTA/ Regulation E, and the FCRA/Regulation V, and seeks a permanent injunction, damages, civil penalties, consumer refunds, restitution, disgorgement and the CFPB’s costs.
CFPB Director Rohit Chopra issued a statement the same day warning the Bureau will continue to bring cases against repeat offenders. Dedicated units within the Bureau’s enforcement and supervision teams will focus on repeat offenders, Chopra stated, adding that the Bureau will also work with other federal and state law enforcement agencies when repeat violations occur. “Agency and court orders are not suggestions, and we are taking steps to ensure that firms under our jurisdiction do not engage in repeat offenses,” Chopra stressed. He also explained that the charges against the individual defendant are appropriate, as he allegedly, among other things, impeded measures to prevent unintended subscription enrollments and failed to comply with the 2017 consent order, which bound company executives and board members to its terms.
The CRA issued a press release following the announcement, stating that it considers the Bureau’s claims to be “meritless” and that as required by the consent order, the CRA “submitted to the CFPB for approval a plan detailing how it would comply with the order. The CFPB ignored the compliance plan, despite being obligated to respond and trigger deadlines for implementation. In the absence of any sort of guidance from the CFPB, [the CRA] took affirmative actions to implement the consent order.” Moreover, the CRA noted that “[r]ather than providing any supervisory guidance on this matter and advising [the CRA] of its concerns – like a responsible regulator would – the CFPB stayed silent and saved their claims for inclusion in a lawsuit, including naming a former executive in the complaint,” and that “CFPB’s current leadership refused to meet with us and were determined to litigate and seek headlines through press releases and tweets.”
8th Circuit: No standing in FCRA action following Spokeo
On May 3, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit vacated a district court’s approval of a class action settlement agreement in an FCRA action after determining that the plaintiff lacked Article III standing in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins. According to the opinion, after the plaintiff applied for employment with the defendant, the defendant made a conditional offer of employment to the plaintiff and also asked her to sign an authorization for release of information so that it could conduct a background investigation of the plaintiff, including a criminal background search. The plaintiff contended that, after the defendant reviewed the background screening report, it withdrew the conditional offer of employment and did not provide her an opportunity before the offer was withdrawn to correct or explain the results in the report. A follow-up letter, which included a copy of the report and a description of her rights under the FCRA, was sent to the plaintiff stating that if she planned to dispute the information she had to do so within seven days from receipt of the letter. The plaintiff commenced the action in February 2016, alleging the defendant violated the FCRA by: (i) “taking adverse employment action based on a consumer report without first providing the report to the applicant”; (ii) “obtaining a consumer report without providing a disclosure form that complied with the FCRA”; and (iii) “exceeding the scope of the authorization by obtaining more information than the disclosed in the authorization.” In May 2016, the parties reached a tentative settlement agreement, but four days later the Supreme Court issued its decision in Spokeo, which requires plaintiffs to show that they have suffered a concrete injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and not just allege a statutory violation. Following Spokeo, the defendant moved to dismiss for lack of standing, but the district court approved the settlement.
On appeal, the 8th Circuit concluded that the plaintiff lacked Article III standing to bring her FCRA claims, determining, among other things, that “the right to pre-action explanation to the employer is not unambiguously stated in the text of the statute,” and that “[n]either the text of the FCRA nor the legislative history provide support for [plaintiff’s] claim that she has a right under the FCRA to not only receive a copy of her consumer report, but also discuss directly with the employer accurate but negative information within the report prior to the employer taking adverse action.” The plaintiff “may have demonstrated an injury in law, but not an injury in fact,” the appellate court wrote. With respect to the plaintiff’s other two claims, the appellate court noted that she failed to show any claim of harm—tangible or intangible. Because Schumacher lacked standing to assert any of her claims, the appellate court vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case with instructions to return the case to the state court.
CFPB releases semi-annual report
On April 6, the CFPB issued its semi-annual report to Congress covering the Bureau’s work for the period beginning April 1, 2021 and ending September 30, 2021. The report, which is required by Dodd-Frank, addresses several issues, including difficulties faced by consumers in obtaining consumer financial products or services throughout the reporting period. The report highlighted that the Bureau, among other things, has: (i) taken steps to increase workforce and contracting diversity; (ii) carefully observed consumer reporting agencies’ and furnishers’ compliance with Fair Credit Reporting Act accuracy obligations relating to rental information, and outlined specific areas of focus and concern; (iii) hosted a roundtable examining racial bias in home appraisals; (vi) expanded housing efforts into a comprehensive, cross-federal campaign aimed at connecting homeowners and renters facing housing insecurity as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic with the resources available to help them stay in their homes; and (v) launched an initiative to reduce fees that consumers are charged by banks and financial companies. In regard to supervision, enforcement and fair lending, the report highlighted its public supervisory and enforcement actions and other significant initiatives during the reporting period. Additionally, the report noted rule-related work, including advisory opinions, advance notice of proposed rulemakings, requests for information and proposed and final rules.
3rd Circuit confirms adversary proceeding required to discharge student debt in bankruptcy
On March 25, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of an FDCPA and FCRA case against a student loan servicer and three credit reporting companies for attempting to collect a loan debt after it had been discharged in bankruptcy. After the discharge and completion of his bankruptcy case, the plaintiff filed suit, alleging the defendants violated the FDCPA and the FCRA by attempting to collect student loan debt that had been discharged. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, ruling that the plaintiff failed to state a claim because under Section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code, student loan debt is presumptively non-dischargeable and the plaintiff had not filed an adversary proceeding to determine otherwise.
On appeal, the plaintiff “argued that he was not required to file an adversary proceeding in Bankruptcy Court to determine the dischargeability of his student loan debt,” and that the Bankruptcy Court’s determination that the plaintiff was indigent rebuts “the presumption that his debt was nondischargeable by satisfying the exception in §523(a)(8) for undue hardship.” However, the appellate court held that “a finding of indigence is not the same as an undue hardship determination under §538(a)(8)” and that while the Bankruptcy Code does not require an adversary proceeding to discharge student loan debt, the procedures established in the Bankruptcy Rules do include such a requirement by providing that adversary proceedings include “a proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a debt” and are commenced by serving a summons and complaint on affected creditors. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed dismissal.
CFPB proposal would limit negative credit reporting on human trafficking victims
On April 7, the CFPB released a proposed rule and solicited comments on regulations implementing amendments to the FCRA intended to assist victims of trafficking. The proposed rule would establish a method for a trafficking victim to submit documentation to consumer reporting agencies (CRAs) establishing that they are a survivor of trafficking, and would require CRAs to block adverse information in consumer reports after receiving such documentation. The proposed rules would amend Regulation V to implement changes to FCRA enacted in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, also referred to as the “Debt Bondage Repair Act,” which was signed into law in December 2021. (Covered by InfoBytes here). Under the law, CRAs are prohibited “from providing consumer reports that contain any negative item of information about a survivor of trafficking from any period the survivor was being trafficked.” In announcing the proposal, the CFPB noted that “Congress required the CFPB to utilize its rulemaking authorities to implement the Debt Bondage Repair Act through rule changes to Regulation V, which ensures consumers’ credit information is fairly reported by CRAs.” According to the CFPB, the proposal “would protect survivors of human trafficking by preventing CRAs from including negative information resulting from abuse.” Comments are due 30 days after publication in the Federal Register.
CFPB’s UDAAP claims to proceed against mortgage lender
On March 31, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia mostly denied motions to dismiss filed by a mortgage lender and four executives (collectively, “defendants”) sued by the CFPB for allegedly engaging in unlawful mortgage lending practices. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the Bureau filed a complaint last year against the defendants alleging violations of several federal laws, including TILA and the CFPA. According to the Bureau, (i) unlicensed employees allegedly offered and negotiated mortgage terms; (ii) company policy regularly required consumers to submit documents for verification before receiving a loan estimate; (iii) employees denied consumers credit without issuing an adverse action notice; and (iv) defendants regularly made misrepresentations about, among other things, the availability and cost savings of FHA streamlined refinance loans.
The mortgage lender had argued in its motion to dismiss that neither TILA nor the Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act (SAFE Act) required the lender to ensure that its individual employees were licensed under state law. In denying the motions to dismiss, the court disagreed with the lender’s position stating that in order for a mortgage originator to comply with TILA, it must also comply with Bureau requirements set out in Regulation Z, including a requirement that “obligates loan originator organizations to ensure that individual loan originators working for them are licensed or registered as required by state and federal laws.”
The court also concluded that the individual defendants must face claims for allegedly engaging in unfair or deceptive practices. The Bureau contended that the company’s chief compliance officer had warned the individual defendants that certain unlicensed employees were engaging in activities requiring licensure, and that the company’s owners approved the business model that permitted the underlying practices. According to the court, an individual “engages” in a UDAAP violation if the individual “participated directly in the practices or acts or had authority to control them” and “‘had or should have had knowledge or awareness’ of the misconduct.” The court rejected defendants’ arguments that it was improper to adopt this standard, and stated that “the fact that a separate theory of liability exists for substantially assisting a corporate defendant’s UDAAP violations has no bearing on how courts evaluate whether an individual defendant himself engaged in a UDAAP violation.”
While the court allowed the count to continue to the extent that it was based on allegations of unlicensed employees performing duties that would require licensure, it found that the complaint did not support an inference that the individual defendants knew that the employees were engaging in activities to make it appear that they were licensed. The court provided the Bureau an opportunity to replead the count to provide a stronger basis for such an inference.
District Court: Consumer must notify furnisher directly to remove dispute notification from credit report
On March 21, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee granted a Pennsylvania-based student loan servicer’s (defendant) motion for judgment on the pleadings, ruling that the servicer did not violate the FCRA when furnishing information to a credit reporting agency (CRA) that contained a notation of an “account in dispute” because the plaintiff submitted the removal request only to the CRA and not to the defendant itself. The plaintiff contended that his account was still being reported as in dispute even though he sent a letter to the CRAs indicating that he no longer disputed the tradelines and requesting that the dispute notification be removed. The CRAs forwarded the plaintiff’s dispute to the defendant. Several months later the plaintiff noticed the account was still being reported as in dispute on his credit report. The plaintiff sued, alleging the defendant violated Sections 1681s-2(b) and 1692s-2(b)(1) of the FCRA by, among other things, willfully failing to conduct a reasonable investigation after it received notice from the CRAs of the dispute. The court disagreed, pointing to caselaw which states that if a consumer wants to remove a dispute notification from his or her credit report, the consumer must alert the furnisher—not just the CRA. The court also referenced FTC guidance, which informs consumers that in order to correct mistakes on their credit reports they need to contact both the credit bureau and the furnisher that reported the inaccurate information. Additionally, the court wrote that “a defendant cannot, as a matter of law, fail to conduct a reasonable investigation under § 1681s-2(b) where the plaintiff never terminates the dispute directly with the furnisher, regardless of to whom the plaintiff initially disputed the account.”
District Court partially grants motion for class certification
On March 4, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California granted in part a consumer plaintiff’s motion for class certification after denying the defendant credit reporting agency’s motion for summary judgment in an FCRA and California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCRAA) suit. The plaintiff, on behalf of the class, alleged that the defendant “failed to follow reasonable procedures to assure the maximum possible accuracy of the consumer information included in its OFAC Check documents” and “failed to disclose upon request all information in consumer files,” in violation of CCRAA and the FCRA. Additionally, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant “failed to reinvestigate the disputed OFAC-related information that it had prepared and sold” to its clients. In granting in part the plaintiff’s motion for class certification, the district court quoted the U.S. Supreme Court case TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, which ruled that only a plaintiff concretely harmed by a defendant’s violation of the FCRA has Article III standing to seek damages against a private defendant in federal court (covered by InfoBytes here). In referencing TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, the district court noted that “[the plaintiff] and the putative class members incurred the ‘same or similar injury’ in that they suffered ‘concrete reputational harm’ from the ‘same conduct’ of [the defendant].” The district court further noted that as a basis for class typicality, “[e]ven if [the plaintiff’s] injuries were slightly more severe than some class members’ injuries, [the plaintiff’s] injuries still arose ‘from the same event or practice or course of conduct that [gave] rise to the claims of other class members and [his claims were] based on the same legal theory.’” Consequently, the district court certified the class with respect to plaintiff’s FCRA allegations for statutory damages and CCRAA claims for injunctive relief. However, the district court denied class certification with respect to plaintiff’s CCRAA allegations for statutory damages, noting that “[t]he CCRAA, unlike the FCRA, requires a showing of actual harm where, as here, the plaintiff is seeking statutory punitive damages” because “individual issues will predominate.”