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FTC asks Supreme Court to delay review of $1.3 billion judgment
On December 13, the FTC filed a brief in a U.S. Supreme Court action that is currently awaiting the Court’s decision to grant certiorari. The question presented to the Court asks whether the FTC is empowered by Section 13(b) of the FTC Act to demand equitable monetary relief in civil enforcement actions. The petitioners, who include a Kansas-based operation and its owner, filed the petition for a writ of certiorari in October, appealing a December 2018 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (covered by InfoBytes here), which upheld a $1.3 billion judgment against the petitioners for allegedly operating a deceptive payday lending scheme. Among other things, the 9th Circuit rejected the petitioners’ argument that the FTC Act only allows the court to issue injunctions, concluding that a district court may grant any ancillary relief under the FTC Act, including restitution. The 9th Circuit also rejected the petitioners’ request to revisit those precedents in light of the Court’s 2017 holding in Kokesh v. SEC—which limited the SEC’s disgorgement power to a five-year statute of limitations period applicable to penalties and fines under 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (previously covered by InfoBytes here)—concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in calculating the award. Additionally, the 9th Circuit referenced the Court’s statement in Kokesh that noted “[n]othing in [its] opinion should be interpreted as an opinion on whether courts possess authority to order disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceedings.”
In response to the petition, the FTC asked the Court to delay reviewing the appeal, stating that the Court should hold the petition pending the disposition in a matter that was recently granted cert “to decide whether district courts may award disgorgement to the [SEC] under analogous provisions of the securities laws.” The FTC acknowledged that while the “relevant statutory schemes are not identical, and the FTC’s and the SEC’s authority to seek monetary relief will not necessarily rise and fall together,” the questions presented in both cases overlap.
Supreme Court holds FDCPA filing limit starts on date of violation
On December 10, the U.S. Supreme Court, in an eight-to-one decision, held that the one-year time limit for filing an FDCPA action starts on the date of the violation, and that no “discovery rule” applies. According to the opinion, the respondent law firm sued the petitioner seeking payment of credit card debt. The respondent attempted service on the petitioner at his old address, where the occupant accepted service. After the petitioner did not respond, a default judgment was entered against him in 2009. The petitioner claimed that he had no knowledge of the default judgement until 2014. He then sued the respondent in district court in 2015 alleging that the respondent “purposely served process in a manner that ensured he would not receive service,” and that the respondent violated the FDCPA by filing the debt collection suit against the petitioner “after the state-law limitations period expired,” and thus had no “lawful ability to collect.” The district court dismissed the action, rejecting the petitioner’s assertion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit holding that a “discovery rule” exists, which delays the one-year limit to the date when the violation is discovered. The district court held that the FDCPA does not include a discovery rule, relying on the FDCPA’s “plain language.”
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that “there is no default presumption” of a discovery rule in the FDCPA.
Upon review by the Court, Justice Thomas, who penned the majority opinion, averred that the FDCPA explicitly provides a one-year limitation starting on “the date on which the violation occurs.” Moreover, the opinion points out that Congress would have added a provision to delay that limitation until after a violation was discovered if it meant for the FDCPA to have such a provision.
According to Justice Ginsberg’s dissenting opinion, though she agreed with the one-year limitation for filing suit under the FDCPA, she added that the discovery rule should be observed when fraud prevents the petitioner from filing within the one-year period, distinguishing the “fraud-based discovery rule” from general “equitable tolling” principles.
10th Circuit affirms $5 million disgorgement in Kokesh
On December 6, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed a district court’s revised disgorgement order in SEC v. Kokesh. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a unanimous ruling in Kokesh and rejected the SEC’s position that disgorgement is an equitable remedy and not a penalty. The Court’s decision limited the SEC’s disgorgement power to a five-year statute of limitations period applicable to penalties and fines under 28 U.S.C. § 2462. Following the Court’s ruling, in 2018, the 10th Circuit, on remand, directed the district court to enter an order for a lower disgorgement amount of $5 million (from nearly $35 million), holding that only a portion of the SEC’s claims were not time-barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2462. At the district court, the SEC also argued that prejudgment interest of more than $2.6 million should apply to the disgorgement penalty, as well as nearly $2.3 million in civil penalties, and the district court awarded such amounts, rejecting Kokesh’s argument that “the district court should reject any relief other than an order of disgorgement.” Kokesh again appealed, arguing, among other things, that “§ 2462 is jurisdictional and precludes this action in its entirety,” and that the permanent injunction and civil penalties were invalid.
On appeal, the 10th Circuit refused to address Kokesh’s jurisdictional argument, stating that, among other things, the appellate court had previously found that “each act of misappropriation should be considered separately” and that not all of the SEC’s claims were time-barred. The appellate court further concluded that because it had previously found that some alleged misappropriations happened within the five-year limit, the $5 million disgorgement calculation that the SEC requested was warranted. Moreover, the appellate court noted that Kokesh failed to show any reason that its 2018 decision was “clearly erroneous,” and during remand, “rather than. . .contesting timeliness or the SEC’s calculations, Kokesh conceded the district court should enter the disgorgement order and instead focused on the SEC’s new request for prejudgment interest.” Additionally, the appellate court refused to consider Kokesh’s challenges to the permanent injunction and the civil penalty ordered because they were first raised in Kokesh’s reply brief.
House passes bill to let SEC go back 14 years on disgorgement
On November 18, the U.S. House passed the Investor Protection and Capital Markets Fairness Act (H.R. 4344) by a vote of 314-95. The bill, which was received in the Senate, would overturn the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Kokesh v. SEC, which limits the SEC’s disgorgement power and subjects the agency to the five-year statute of limitations applicable to penalties and fines. (Previously covered by InfoBytes here.) As discussed in a recent Buckley article, in Kokesh’s wake, H.R. 4344 would amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by specifically authorizing the SEC to seek disgorgement and restitution, putting to rest the threshold question of whether the SEC has the authority to seek disgorgement. Notably, on November 1, the Court granted certiorari in Liu v. SEC to answer this very question. If signed into the law, H.R. 4344 would allow the SEC 14 years to pursue disgorgement in federal court under the statute of limitations.
Government says CFPB should have authority to continue enforcement actions even if declared unconstitutional
On November 6, the CFPB and the DOJ filed a brief with the U.S. Supreme Court arguing that the Bureau should still “have the authority to commence or continue enforcement proceedings” in the event that the Court declares the Bureau’s structure unconstitutional. The brief was filed in response to a petition for writ of certiorari by two Mississippi-based payday loan and check cashing companies (collectively, “petitioners”) urging the Court to grant certiorari before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit renders a decision on a challenge to the Bureau’s single-director structure. The petitioners are not only challenging the Bureau’s structure but also arguing that the asserted constitutional violation requires the dismissal of the underlying lawsuit brought by the Bureau.
The government argues that dismissal of the underlying enforcement action is not the way to remedy a constitutional structure violation, at least in a situation where “an official fully accountable to the President determines that it should go forward.” The brief notes that, in this case, then-Acting Director Mulvaney, to whom the Bureau has argued the limitation to for-cause removal did not apply, had ratified the enforcement action against petitioners at issue. While the Bureau and the DOJ acknowledge that lower courts “have not yet addressed the particular issue here,” they make the case that “the few reasoned decisions that address related issues are in accord: A separation-of-powers problem with an agency does not compel invalidation of the agency’s actions if those actions are subsequently approved in compliance with separation-of-powers requirements.”
In its brief, the Bureau and the DOJ also argue that questions presented to the Court do not warrant review of the case before the 5th Circuit has an opportunity to rule. The government emphasizes that the Court has already agreed to hear a different case, Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, to answer the question of whether an independent agency led by a single director violates the Constitution’s separation of powers under Article II (covered by InfoBytes here). In doing so the Court also directed the parties to that action to brief and argue whether 12 U.S.C. §5491(c)(3), which established removal of the Bureau’s single director only for cause, is severable from the rest of the Dodd-Frank Act, should it be found to be unconstitutional.
House tells Supreme Court CFPB structure is constitutional
On October 4, the U.S. House of Representatives filed an amicus brief with the U.S. Supreme Court arguing that the CFPB’s structure is constitutional. The brief was filed in response to a petition for writ of certiorari by a law firm, contesting a May decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held that, among other things, the Bureau’s single-director structure is constitutional (previously covered by InfoBytes here). The House filed its brief after the amicus deadline, but requested its motion to file be granted because it only received notice that the Bureau changed its position on the constitutionality of the CFPB’s structure the day before the filing deadline. As previously covered by InfoBytes, on September 17, the DOJ and the CFPB filed a brief with the Court arguing that the for-cause restriction on the president’s authority to remove the Bureau’s single Director violates the Constitution’s separation of powers; and on the same day, Director Kraninger sent letters (see here and here) to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) supporting the same argument.
The brief, which was submitted by the Office of General Counsel for the House, argues that the case “presents an issue of significant important to the House” and, because the Solicitor General “has decided not to defend” Congress’ enactment of the for-cause removal protection through the Dodd-Frank Act, the “House should be allowed to do so.” The brief asserts that the 9th Circuit correctly held that the Bureau’s structure is constitutional based on the D.C. Circuit’s majority in the 2018 en banc decision in PHH v. CFPB (covered by a Buckley Special Alert). Moreover, the brief argues that when an agency is “headed by a single individual, the lines of Executive accountability—and Presidential control—are even more direct than in a multi-member agency,” as the President has the authority to remove the individual should they be failing in their duty. Such a removal will “‘transform the entire CFPB and the execution of the consumer protection laws it enforces.’”
District Court: New York’s interest on escrow law not preempted by National Bank Act
On September 30, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that the National Bank Act (NBA) does not preempt a New York law requiring interest on mortgage escrow accounts. According to the opinion, plaintiffs brought a pair of putative class actions against a national bank seeking interest on funds deposited into their mortgage escrow accounts, as required by New York General Obligation Law § 5-601. The bank moved to dismiss both complaints, arguing that the NBA preempts the state law. The district court disagreed, concluding that the plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract can proceed, while dismissing the others. The court concluded there is “clear evidence that Congress intended mortgage escrow accounts, even those administered by national banks, to be subject to some measure of consumer protection regulation.” As for the OCC’s 2004 preemption regulation, the court determined that there is no evidence that “at this time, the agency gave any thought whatsoever to the specific question raised in this case, which is whether the NBA preempts escrow interest laws,” citing to and agreeing with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lusnak v. Bank of America (which held that a national bank must comply with a California law that requires mortgage lenders to pay interest on mortgage escrow accounts, previously covered by InfoBytes here). Lastly, the court applied the preemption standard from the 1996 Supreme Court decision in Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, and found that the law does not “significantly interfere” with the banks’ power to administer mortgage escrow accounts, noting that it only “requires the Bank to pay interest on the comparatively small sums” deposited into the accounts and does not “bar the creation of mortgage escrow accounts, or subject them to state visitorial control, or otherwise limit the terms of their use.”
CFPB informs two courts its director structure is unconstitutional
On September 18, the CFPB issued letters in pending litigation to inform the courts that it was changing its position regarding the constitutionality of the for-cause removal provision of the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA). As previously covered by InfoBytes, the DOJ and the CFPB filed a brief with the U.S. Supreme Court arguing that the for-cause restriction on the president’s authority to remove the Bureau’s single Director violates the Constitution’s separation of powers. The brief was filed in response to a petition for a writ of certiorari by a law firm contesting the May decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held that, among other things, the Bureau’s single-director structure is constitutional. The brief noted that, since the appellate opinion was issued, “the Director has reconsidered that position and now agrees that the removal restriction is unconstitutional.” The Bureau has now issued letters (available here and here) to the 9th Circuit in two cases noting that the Bureau will no longer defend the constitutionality of the for-cause removal restriction. The Bureau also submitted a similar letter with the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah. In each letter, the Bureau argues that, while it now believes the for-cause removal provision is unconstitutional, this does not change its position with regard to the judgments made in any of the cases, noting that the provision should be severed from the rest of the CFPA.
Kraninger tells Supreme Court CFPB structure is unconstitutional
On September 17, the DOJ and the CFPB filed a brief with the U.S. Supreme Court arguing that the for-cause restriction on the president’s authority to remove the Bureau’s single Director violates the Constitution’s separation of powers. The brief was filed in response to a petition for a writ of certiorari by a law firm, contesting the May decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held that (i) the Bureau’s single-director structure is constitutional, and that (ii) the district court did not err when it granted the Bureau’s petition to enforce a law firm’s compliance with a 2017 civil investigative demand (CID) (previously covered by InfoBytes here). The brief cites to a DOJ filing in opposition to a 2018 cert petition, which also concluded that the Bureau’s structure is unconstitutional by infringing on the president’s responsibility to ensure that federal laws are faithfully executed, but urged the Court to deny that writ as the case was a “poor vehicle” for the constitutionality consideration (previously covered by InfoBytes here).
In contrast to the December brief, the DOJ now asserts that the present case is a “suitable vehicle for resolving the important question,” noting that only the constitutional question was presented to the Court and the 9th Circuit has stayed its CID mandate until final disposition of the case with the Court. Moreover, the government argues that until the Court resolves the constitutionality question of the Bureau’s structure, “those subject to the agency’s regulation or enforcement can (and often will) raise the issue as a defense to the Bureau’s efforts to implement and enforce federal consumer financial law.” While the Bureau previously defended the single-director structure to the 9th Circuit, the brief notes that since the May decision was issued, “the Director has reconsidered that position and now agrees that the removal restriction is unconstitutional.”
On the same day, Director Kraninger sent letters (here and here) to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) supporting the argument that the for-cause restriction on the president’s authority to remove the Bureau’s single Director, violates the Constitution’s separation of powers. Kraninger notes that while she is urging the Court to grant the pending petition for certiorari to resolve the constitutionality question, her position on the matter “does not affect [her] commitment to fulfilling the Bureau’s statutory responsibilities” and that should the Court find the structure unconstitutional, “the [Consumer Financial Protection Act] should remain ‘fully operative,’ and the Bureau would ‘continue to function as before,’ just with a Director who “may be removed at will by the [President.]’”
District Court says TCPA dismissal bid cannot rely upon Supreme Court ruling
On September 3, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey denied a medical laboratory’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the company cannot use a Supreme Court ruling to avoid a proposed TCPA class action suit concerning allegations that it made unsolicited calls using an “autodialer.” As previously covered by InfoBytes, the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss last December after it concluded that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged the equipment used to make unsolicited calls qualified as an “autodialer.” The defendant argued, however, that the court should reconsider its decision in light of a 2019 Supreme Court ruling in which separate concurring opinions written by Justices Kavanaugh and Thomas concluded that district courts are not bound by the FCC’s interpretation of the term “autodialer” under the TCPA. According to the defendant, because of these concurring opinions, the court “was not bound by the FCC’s 2003 and 2008 guidance on the definition of an ‘autodialer,’” and should therefore revisit its prior opinion. However, the court stated that the Supreme Court’s case does not change any of the “controlling law” dealing with the TCPA issue in the current lawsuit. “Because defendant’s arguments are not based on any actual change in controlling law,” its motion for reconsideration is denied, the court stated, noting that concurring opinions “do not change ‘controlling law.’”