District Court grants summary judgment for debt collector over dunning emails

Courts FDCPA Debt Collection Consumer Finance

On June 23, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that dunning emails sent to collect unpaid credit card debt did not violate the FDCPA. The plaintiff received an email from the defendant stating that it was attempting to collect the debt on behalf of the creditor, and that due to the age of her debt, the creditor could not sue her for it. While the email stated that “making a payment on a time-barred debt has the potential to restart the statute of limitations for suit on the debt,” it went on to say that it was the creditor’s policy “never to file suit on a debt after the original statute of limitations has expired” and that it never sells such debt. A few days later, the defendant sent the plaintiff an email attempting to collect a separate debt owed to a different creditor. The plaintiff’s attorney sent a letter informing the defendant that she represented plaintiff and requested that plaintiff not be contacted again. After the plaintiff received a third email from the defendant, she sued alleging the defendant violated Section 1692e by urging her to pay a debt without disclosing that the defendant could not sue or report the debt. She further alleged that the defendant violated the FDCPA by continuing to send communications even after the defendant knew she was represented by an attorney. The plaintiff argued that she suffered an injury—and had standing—because she refrained from making purchases and because the defendant had wasted her time.

The court disagreed, writing that the plaintiff failed to put forth evidence demonstrating some form of financial harm in order to have Article III standing. The court observed that “[o]ne does not suffer a monetary injury by refraining from making a purchase; one still has her money if she refrains from making a purchase. Paying too much for an item constitutes an economic injury but refraining from paying for an item does not. At best, plaintiff’s action might have left her with a feeling of want or desire, but such feelings are not concrete injuries.” Moreover, “[e]ven if plaintiff could be thought to have suffered an injury, her decision to refrain from any particular purchase is not fairly traceable to defendant,” the court wrote. And though the court found standing on her claim related to defendant’s continued contact, the court held that “Section 1692c(a)(2) applies only where the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney with respect to the specific debt being collected.” The defendant needed to be informed that the attorney was representing the plaintiff on both creditors’ debts for the third email to be a violation of the FDCPA, the court concluded.